

November 16, 2010

# FINAL REPORT

## Evaluation Study of Prince William County's Illegal Immigration Enforcement Policy



# Project team

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# Many thanks to:

- The Board of County Supervisors
- Chief Charlie T. Deane
- PWCPD senior staff
  - Tom Pulaski, Police Department Project Manager
- CXO and senior County staff
- PWCPD officers who responded to our questions and interviews
- Our respondents and informants in the community

*Views expressed here are those of the authors.*

# Overview

- Background & history
- Goals & limitations of the evaluation
- Data sources
- The policy's goals
  - and possible consequences
- Have these goals been met?
  - Our findings, with summaries of key supportive data
- Overall summary of findings

# Background and history

- July 2007: BOCS passes initial resolution regarding immigration
- October 2007: BOCS passes original Immigration Policy
  - BOCS determines outside evaluation of policy is needed
  - BOCS includes funding for outside evaluation
- BOCS modifies policy: April 2008
- Modified policy is implemented: July 2008
- Interim Report: August 2009
- Report on 2009 Citizen Survey: September 2009
- Report on 2010 Citizen Survey: September 2010
- Final report release date: November 16, 2010

# The current policy:

“Officers *shall* investigate the citizenship or immigration status of all persons who are arrested for a violation of a state law or county ordinance when such arrest results in a physical custodial arrest.”

PWCPD General Order 45.01

Implementing BOCS resolution, April 2008

# Our task

- “Assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the new general order with respect to community outcomes, enforcement data, workload and the prevention of racial profiling.”

*--BOCS resolution, 10/16/2007*

- “Provide a multi-faceted evaluation of the [County’s] Immigration Enforcement Policy and its effects during a two year monitoring period.”

*--Final project specifications*

# Some limitations

- No solid baseline we can compare PWC with
  - But some police data can be examined from earlier years
  - Sharp breaks in trend lines are suggestive
- No “control group” or comparison County
  - Immigration policies vary across nearby localities
  - But we can compare patterns in PWC to other localities in the region, or to the rest of the metro area
- Immigration status not recorded in most police records
  - Not in other available data sources, either
  - Only known for those checked by PWC police after March 2008
- Direct surveys of illegal immigrants not feasible



# More limitations

- Important and rapid changes in the environment
  - Changing demographics in PWC
  - Decline in new construction in PWC
  - The mortgage crisis
  - General economic slowdown
  - National immigration policy in flux
  - Shifts in public opinion
  - Strong media interest and attention
    - Including recent media surge in summer 2010
- Therefore: Due care must be observed in attributing changes in the community to the County policy itself
  - But some clear conclusions are possible when multiple data sources are used

# Methods and data sources

*Quantitative*  
&  
*Qualitative*

# Quantitative data sources

- Collection of data from departmental records and systems
  - Crime reports [PWCPD, UCR data, COG data, *Crime in Virginia*]
  - Calls for service data from PWCPD
  - Field interview/observation cards
  - RMS data on arrests by PWCPD
  - Neighborhood services, school data
- The annual PWC Citizen Survey, 1993-2010
  - Including questions about the policy added in 2008 and 2009
- Surveys of police officers in Fall of 2008, 2009
- A survey of police departments in 46 localities throughout the metropolitan region

*more . . .*

# More quantitative sources

- U. S. Census Bureau data
  - Decennial census for all localities
  - American Community Survey
    - Yearly data for Prince William 2006 – 2009
    - No data for Manassas or Manassas Park
  - Public Use Micro Sample data from ACS
    - Allows custom analysis on our choice of variables
  - Home mortgage data from HMDA public files
    - Counts mortgage applications from Hispanics, by census tract

# Varying geography

- The evaluation draws on data from many sources
- Some data sources combine PWC with Manassas and Manassas Park (“PWC + cities”)
  - Others treat them separately
- Some crime data are available only for Virginia localities
  - Others include DC, and Maryland localities in the metro DC data

*We show whatever data are relevant, allowing geography to vary by data source.*

# Qualitative data sources

- Focus groups
  - Police officers at various levels
  - Criminal Alien Unit
  - Adult detention center
  - Focus groups with Hispanic residents (September 2010)
- “Key informant” and stakeholder interviews
  - County Board, County staff
  - Community groups on all sides
  - Immigrants (through churches)
  - Business leaders
  - Semi-structured interviews with random respondents to citizen survey
    - Hispanic respondents selected for follow-up, some in Spanish
- Observation
  - At the jail
  - “Ride-alongs” with patrol officers

# Studying a “hidden” population


- We don't know which individuals are in the U.S. illegally
  - But we know quite a bit about illegals as a group
- PWC is a diverse county; many nationalities are represented
  - About 13% of all residents are non-citizens
  - About 20% of all residents are Hispanic
- 50% of PWC Hispanics are citizens; 50% are not
  - Non-citizens include those who are here illegally and legally
- 73% of PWC non-citizens are Hispanic
  - 26% of these from Mexico, 74% other countries
- Hispanic percent of PWC illegal immigrants is: ???
  - But: most Hispanics in PWC are in the U.S. legally

Source: US Census 2006 ACS


# Background trends





# Growth in Hispanic population 1990-2005



# Births to Hispanic Mothers in PWC by Mother's Country of Origin




# Home Purchase Loans to Hispanics: Change Between 2000-2006




Source: CSR analysis of HMDA data files


# Building Permits in PWC 2001-2009




# Residential Construction Across Counties



# PWC Employment in Selected Industries



# The mortgage boom and bust



# Defining the goals of the policy



# What are the goals of the County's immigration policy?

- 1) Improve public safety;
- 2) Reduce the number of illegal immigrants in the county;
- 3) Save money by delivering fewer services to illegal immigrants;
- 4) Reduce overcrowded housing and public disorder,
  - such as loitering at day labor sites and public intoxication;
- 5) Maintain PWCPD reputation for professionalism
  - And community confidence and trust in police;
- 6) Maintain County's reputation as an inclusive community
  - Internally (PWC residents) and externally (elsewhere)

# Possible other consequences?

- Overzealous police enforcement?
- Costly litigation?
- Overburden PWCPD, unanticipated costs?
- Create fear and a sense of being unwelcome among immigrants in general?
- Cause immigrants (including legal immigrants), or Hispanics generally, to leave or avoid the county?
- Lower crime reporting?
  - Resulting in greater victimization among immigrants?
- Capacity of jail, courts, ICE overwhelmed?

# Our Evaluation

How do the outcomes stack up against the policy's several goals?

# UVA, PERF, JMU conclude . . .

- The Prince William County illegal immigration enforcement policy:
  - Was smoothly implemented by PWCPD and County staff
  - Had wide-ranging effects
    - Some of these effects were those intended
    - Some of the policy's goals were not achieved
  - Had few of the unintended consequences that some had feared

*It IS possible for a local government to have an impact on its illegal immigration experience.*

# Smooth Implementation by the Police Department

- PWCPD prepared carefully, consulted with legal counsel, developed training materials
- Every officer trained before policy went into effect (Jan – Feb 2008)
  - 4,884 officer-hours devoted to this training
- Criminal Alien Unit created, trained in 287g program
- Change in the policy in July 2008 eased the risk of racial profiling complaints
  - No lawsuits directly alleging racial profiling have been filed
  - One lawsuit peripherally mentions racial profiling; court dismissed those allegations
  - Potential for other negative effects was lessened by this change
- All were re-trained for policy revision, May 2008
  - 500 officer-hours

# 2008 Officer Survey showed: Effective training

Statement	Strongly Agree or Agree
Currently, I believe it is clear how to implement the PWC immigration policy.	83.9%
I believe I have enough knowledge about the current policy to enforce this policy correctly.	85.0%
The training I have been provided by the PWPCD has adequately prepared me to enforce the PWC immigration policy.	82.3%
When appropriate, I have the necessary skills to ask immigration status questions.	88.9%
I have the necessary skills to review identification (e.g., driver's license) for fakes.	78.5%

2009 re-survey of officers showed virtually identical results.

Source: Officer survey Fall 2008, N=379

# PWCPD Community Outreach

- Board directed extensive community education
  - Particularly with minority groups
- Nearly 200 meetings with community groups & media
  - Many attended by Chief Deane and Senior Police Officials
- Meetings with over 300 County employees
- Pamphlets and media coverage, website info
  - English and Spanish versions
- Emphasizing:
  - Focus on those who commit crimes
  - Protection for crime victims and those who report crime
  - No racial profiling

# Contacts with Suspected Illegal Immigrants

- About 3,000 contacts March 2008 – June 2010
  - Average of 107 contacts per month
- Under current policy, 83% of recorded contacts with illegal immigrants are through arrest
  - July 2008 – June 2010
- 99% of suspected illegal immigrants were confirmed to be illegal



# 2009 Police Focus Groups

- Reports from all levels of department:
  - The policy has become a routine part of police business
  - Any extra burden on officers from executing policy seems to be well accommodated
  - Burden on senior staff has diminished from initial year of frantic activity
    - But immigration issues still require their frequent attention
  - Community relations seem to be improving over initial reaction
    - Hispanics responding more positively to police
  - No increased difficulty in recruiting minorities to PD and County
  - Not sure if level of crime reporting has been affected
  - CAU plays a useful, specialized role

# Continuing effort required: Senior police staff views


- Training effort
  - Initial training, ongoing training, academy training
- Major effort was needed for increased community outreach
- Establishing new business processes
  - Manual processes for internal reporting are labor intensive
    - Example: Field Interview Cards
- Media incidents create surges in demand on senior staff
- Auditing of data, quality control, analysis, reporting
- Line officers spending extra time on arrests

*IN SUM: Significant cumulative effect on PD resources*

PWC citizens view police  
implementation of the policy  
positively . . .

*“How satisfied are you with the job the  
Police Department is doing in carrying out  
this policy?”*

# Satisfaction: carrying out policy, 2010



Asked of 1,392 respondents in 2010

Overall satisfaction:  
76.0%

# Satisfaction 2010: carrying out policy

<i>How satisfied are you . . .</i>	% of all asked	% of those with opinion
Very satisfied	29.6	43.3
Somewhat satisfied	22.3	32.7
Somewhat dissatisfied	7.3	10.7
Very dissatisfied	9.1	13.3
Decline to rate/oppose the policy	4.4	
No opinion/don't know	26.9	
Refused	0.4	

# Reasons for being very satisfied, 2010

Comments from 43% who were very satisfied:	# of responses	% of cases
Illegal immigration causes problems in the community	56	14.3
The policy is good/needed	138	35.0
The policy's enforcement is having positive results	124	31.6
The police have been doing a good job of carrying out the policy.	129	32.8
Other, no opinion, not codable	44	11.3

*Base: 492 respondents who explained why they were very satisfied*

# Reasons for being very dissatisfied, 2010

Comments from 13.3% who were very dissatisfied:	# of responses	% of cases
The policy inadequately addresses the problems of illegal immigration	2	1.5
The policy is bad	31	27.7
Results of enforcing the policy are negative	10	8.5
Problems with enforcement	35	31.0
Police are unfair/racial profiling	23	20.7
Other, no opinion, uncodable	24	21.3

*Base: 125 respondents who explained why they were very dissatisfied*

Did the number of  
illegal immigrants  
in the County decline?


Yes, although we cannot count illegal  
immigrants directly – must use proxy data



# Hispanic growth leveled off


- From 2000 to 2006, PWC's Hispanic population grew much more rapidly than the metro area's
  - PWC Hispanic population more than doubled in 6 years
  - PWC accounted for all Hispanic growth in DC metro region
- From 2006 to 2009, metro region Hispanic population increased by 18.8%.
- From 2006 to 2009, PWC's Hispanic population increased by only 3.6%.

# Hispanic growth in PWC & DC metro area



Source: Decennial Census & ACS

# Young Hispanic Males in DC Metropolitan Area 2006-2008




Ages 20-29 decreased 4% in 2 years.

Source: ACS

# Young Hispanic Males in PWC


## 2006-2008




Ages 20-29 decreased 22% in 2 years.

Source: ACS


# Births to Hispanic Mothers 2000-2008



# Births to Hispanic Mothers for Selected Nearby Small Cities




# Hispanic Enrollment in Public Schools as Percent of Total Enrollment SY02/03 – SY09/10



# ESOL Student Enrollments


**Growth in ESOL Population in PWC and Surrounding Communities, 1999–2009**






# Non-citizens among Hispanics

## PWC + cities vs. rest of metro




# Non-English speaking among Hispanics

## PWC + cities vs. rest of metro




# Linguistically isolated among Hispanics

## PWC + cities vs. rest of metro



# Police use of 'language line' translation service (billed calls)

Calls for both Accounts



Source: monthly vendor billings to PD

# Are there fewer illegal immigrants?

- YES, although we cannot count illegal immigrants directly
- Number of Hispanics in PWC stabilized
  - But increased in the rest of metro area
- Age structure of Hispanic population changed
  - Young Hispanic males left in substantial numbers
  - Far more so than in other localities
- Percent of non-citizens, non-English speakers, and linguistically isolated among Hispanics went down
- Police encountered fewer non-English speakers

# Are there fewer illegal immigrants?

- Births to Hispanic women went down
- ESL enrollments, Hispanic school enrollments leveled
- Key informants describe changes in recreation facilities, night clubs, overcrowded dwellings
  - Reports that some Hispanics moved to Fairfax
  - Fairfax demographics 2007-2008 reflect some influx
  - But park usage has rebounded since 2007

# More on loss of immigrants . . .

- We estimate that several thousand illegal immigrants left when the policy was enacted
  - And over the following year
  - PWC, Manassas and Manassas Park were affected
  - We estimate: a decrease of 2,000 – 6,000 illegal immigrants between 2006 and 2008
- Economic crisis contributed
  - Mortgage crisis
  - Loss of construction jobs, housing market decline
- The pattern of rising growth in immigrant population has halted
  - Growth in immigrant population was rapid and increasing 2000 – 2006
  - The growth in illegals was reversed
  - The police policy was partly responsible for the shift

# Has the policy helped to reduce crime?


Christopher Koper PhD  
Police Executive Research Forum  
(PERF)



# Examining the Policy's Impact on Crime


- Examination of PWCPD statistics on crime and arrests
  - Arrests of illegal immigrants, 2008-2009
- Time series analysis of 7-10 years of PWCPD RMS data
- Comparisons of PWC to other DC area jurisdictions
- Perceptions of officers, 2008-2009
- Crime victimization and reporting in PWC citizen surveys, 2008-2010

# Crime Rate in PWC, 2000-2009



*Based on Uniform Crime Reports Part I crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, auto theft)*

# Aggravated assaults



UVa CSR & PERF

# Changes in UCR Part I Crimes in PWC

- Changes in two-year averages, 2005-2006 to 2008-2009:
  - Part I violence (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault)
    - Total: -32%
    - Aggravated assault: -47%
  - Part I property (burglary, larceny, auto theft): -8%


**How much crime do illegal immigrants  
commit in PWC and  
what have been the trends in crime  
by illegal immigrants?**

## Arrests of Illegal Immigrants for Serious Crimes, 2009

UCR Part 1 Crimes	Total Persons	Illegal Immigrants	Illegal immigrants as % of Arrestees
Murder	12	0	0%
Rape	37	3	8%
Robbery	117	4	3%
Aggravated Assault	175	16	9%
Burglary	191	8	4%
Larceny	1,467	88	6%
Motor Vehicle Theft	54	2	4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,053</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>6%</b>

# Arrests of Illegal Immigrants for Other Selected Offenses, 2009

Crime Category	Arrests	Arrests of Illegal Immigrants	Illegal Immigrants as % of Arrests
All UCR Part II	12,254	774	6%
Public Drunkenness	1,365	269	20%
DUI	2,138	286	13%
Traffic—no license	2,085	205	10%




Arrest locations  
and  
residence locations  
of arrested  
illegal immigrants,  
2009



# Country of birth, illegal alien detainers


## Jan-Sept 2010



# Trends in Arrests of Illegal Immigrants, 2008-2009

Crime Category	2008 Arrests per Month	2009 Arrests per Month
UCR Part I crimes	6.3	10.1
Public drunkenness	15.4	22.4
DUI	11.1	23.8
Total	63.7 (Mar.-Dec.) 72.6 (Jul.-Dec.)	95.8

# Arrests for Public Drunkenness



Arena arrests not included

- Public drunkenness arrests have decreased
- But not likely due to policy because an increased percentage of the arrestees are illegals
- 2007 showed an increase over 2006

# Conclusions from Arrest Data

- Illegal immigrants account for small to modest share of offenders for most crime types
  - Caveat: no data on involvement of illegal immigrants in crime before the policy
- Arrests of illegal immigrants increased from 2008 to 2009
  - Deterrent effects of policy must have been greatest before it was implemented in March 2008

# Did the policy affect trends in crime in PWC?


# Analysis of Crime Trends in PWC

- Time series analysis of weekly trends over several years
  - Take into account long term trends, seasonal patterns, and other predictable variation over time
  - Tested for effects from July 2007 policy announcement and March 2008 implementation
- Crime reports for UCR Part I violent and property crimes, 2003-2009
- Calls for service [CFS] for several categories of crime and disorder, 2000-2009

# Pre-Post Policy Changes in Crime

Offense / CFS Category	Before v. After July 2007	Before v. After March 2008
Part I violent crimes	<b>-10.16%</b>	<b>-10.76%</b>
Aggravated assault	<b>-27.23%</b>	<b>-27.50%</b>
Part I property crimes	1.25%	-0.18%
CFS for personal crimes	<b>-8.37%</b>	<b>-8.74%</b>
CFS for property crimes	-1.02%	-4.12%
CFS for disorder crimes	-4.94%	-5.98%
CFS for drug-related crimes	2.89%	2.36%
CFS for DUI	-1.02%	7.87%

# Aggravated Assaults in PWC, 2003-2009 (Weekly)



UVa CSR & PERF



# Geographical Patterns in the Policy's Impact

- Examined trends in violence in PWCPD patrol beats in Manassas area, Woodbridge, and Dumfries
  - Decline in total Part I violence in these areas accounted for half of countywide reduction
  - Decline in aggravated assaults in these areas accounted for 70% of countywide reduction


# Ethnicity of Aggravated Assault Victims and Offenders (from VA State Police)

- 2005 – 2009:
  - Hispanics accounted for 21% - 28% of arrestees (no trend)
  - Hispanics and victims with unknown ethnicity fell from about half of victims during 2005–2007 to about one-third during 2008-2009
  - Ratio of non-Hispanic to Hispanic victims rose from 1.87 in 2005 to 2.88 in 2009
    - Victimization of Hispanics falling relative to others

# Conclusions from Time Series Analysis

- Policy did not affect most types of crime and disorder
- Serious assaults declined following the policy's announcement
  - Effect concentrated in heavily Hispanic areas of PWC
  - Change coincided closely with announcement of policy
  - Questions about source of the decline:
    - Change in offending, crime reporting, or both?
    - Fewer immigrant offenders, victims, or both?
    - Collateral effects?


# Impact on Hit and Run Accidents




Only shows incidents reportable to State Police.

**How did crime trends in PWC  
compare to those in other DC  
area localities?**

# Aggravated Assault Offenses 2003 - 2009 for Selected Areas including DC/MD



# Aggravated Assault Offenses 2003 - 2009 for PWC versus All Other Metro



# Changes in Crime Rates in PWC and Northern VA Localities (Percentage Changes in 2-Yr Averages, 2005/06 - 2008/09)

Jurisdiction	% Change Violent Crime	% Change Agg Assault	% Change Property Crime
Prince William	-31.9%	-46.7%	-8.1%
Manassas City	-9.7%	-7.2%	-3.0%
Alexandria City	-37.6%	-43.5%	-4.8%
Arlington	-26.1%	-27.8%	6.7%
Fairfax	-14.7%	-2.1%	12.1%
Loudoun	32.8%	75.7%	-8.3%
Spotsylvania	37.5%	15.2%	27.0%



# Conclusions from Comparative Analysis

- Violence declined in a number of DC area localities
  - Regional factors may have helped sustain reduction in PWC (e.g., decline in housing market)
- But PWC's decline in violence was large compared to most of DC area, esp. for aggravated assault
- Crime did not consistently decline in localities doing immigration checks
  - PWC policy announcement and publicity were unique

# Perceptions of Officers Regarding Crime and Disorder Problems

*From surveys in fall 2008 and fall 2009*

# Problems Observed by Officers


*(1=never, 2=occasionally, 3=often, 4=regularly)*

Issue	Time 1(2008)	Time 2 (2009)
Getting legal immigrants to report crime.	1.84	1.80
Getting illegal immigrants to report crime.	2.38	2.20
Getting witnesses to cooperate with the police.	2.20	2.07
Violent crimes in PWC	1.92	2.04
Property crimes in PWC	2.17	2.27
Public disorder (e.g., loitering, public drinking, etc.)	2.51	2.60
Traffic violations	2.42	2.59
Fear of crime in certain parts of PWC	2.14	2.22


# Post-policy trends in crime victimization and reporting

*PWC survey results, 2008-2010*

# Have you been a victim of crime?



# Did you report the crime to police?



# Conclusions from PWC Survey Data

- Crime victimization has not changed from 2008 to 2010
- Victimization is somewhat higher for Hispanics but their reporting levels are comparable to others
  - No significant increase in victimization of Hispanics
- Crime reporting has not changed from 2008 to 2010
- But we do not have data on crime reporting among illegal immigrants specifically
  - PWCPD has evidence that Hispanic victims do not report some crimes

# Summary

- Illegal immigrants account for small to modest share of most crimes
  - 69% arrested for drunkenness, DUI, traffic offenses
- Policy did not impact most types of crime
- But aggravated assaults declined significantly after policy's announcement
  - Unique decline compared to most of DC area
  - Less immigrant offending, victimization, reporting, or some combination?
- Reportable (more serious) hit and run accidents declined
  - Less serious hit and run accidents also declined
- Crime data and surveys of officers and citizens show stable crime trends since policy's implementation



Did the County save money on  
its services?

# No BIG savings

- Most of the more costly services provided by PWC are federally regulated or funded
  - Some must be supplied to everyone, regardless of immigration status
    - Notably, educational services like ESOL
  - Some are already denied to illegal immigrants by Federal law such as TANF, Food Stamps, Medicaid
- A small list of specific County services are denied to illegal immigrants
  - Cost savings transferred into services for legal residents
  - Example – Homeless Prevention

Were overcrowded housing  
and problems of public order  
reduced?

# Overcrowded housing declined; Loitering reduced (temporarily?)


- Neighborhood services records show dramatic decline in complaints about parking in overcrowded properties
  - Down 38% from 2006 to 2008
- Residents reported less loitering at day labor sites
  - But this problem came back after its initial decline
- Mortgage foreclosures reached crisis proportions
- Complaints about neglected vacant properties went up substantially
  - Weed/tall grass violations doubled from 2006 to 2008
- Changes in staffing, enforcement tools make time trends unclear in Neighborhood Services data
  - Enforcement capacity of Neighborhood Services increased

# What is overcrowding?

- PWC ordinances give specific definitions
  - These allow many relatives to reside in a dwelling
  - Most overcrowding complaints are judged to be “unfounded”
- Nationally, the household structure of Hispanics differs from non-Hispanics
  - More multi-family households, more “sub-families”
- Public Use Micro Sample data from ACS allow us to examine households that include more than one family
  - “Complex HH” here includes any HH with a “subfamily” or a second family in HH
- 34% of Hispanic households, 16% of non-Hispanic are complex
  - Across DC Metro (2005-2008)


# Complex HH among Hispanics

## PWC + cities vs. rest of metro



# Complex HH among Hispanics

## West PWC (+ cities) vs. East PWC



# How did the policy affect confidence in the PWC Police?

*Data from PWC  
Citizen Surveys*



# Satisfaction with Police


% satisfied

Items	2008	2009	2010
Overall satisfaction with Police	89.0	92.5*	92.2
Police Department carrying out immigration policy	80.5	85.0*	76.0**
Police attitudes and behaviors	79.3	84.4	84.7
Police Department treats everybody fairly	74.3	78.8*	79.9

\* 2009 percentage significantly higher than 2008


\*\* 2010 percentage significantly lower than 2009

# Overall rating of police by ethnic/racial group, by year



Before 2000, the number of Hispanic respondents was low.

# Police attitudes and behaviors by ethnic/racial group, by year




% satisfied

# Hispanic Views by Language of Interview


<b>2010 Items (Hispanics only)</b>	<b>English</b>	<b>Spanish</b>
Overall satisfaction with Police	89.3	93.6
Police Department carrying out immigration policy	58.4	16.8
Police attitudes and behaviors	82.3	70.4
Police Department treats everybody fairly	64.2	48.6

% satisfied


# Satisfaction with police, by language




# Satisfaction with attitudes, by language



# Satisfaction with fairness, by language




# Satisfaction with policy implementation, by language






# Satisfaction with drug efforts, by language



# Satisfaction with gang efforts, by language



Asked in even-numbered years only

# Hispanic views of police are issue-specific and media-sensitive

- Introduction of the policy created serious ethnic gaps in perceptions
- Ethnic gap (of 2008) in overall satisfaction with the police has disappeared
- Ethnic gaps in views of police attitudes and fairness have improved markedly since 2008
  - But residents still think that immigrants with poor English would not report a crime nor act as a witness
- Wide gaps between Spanish interviewees and English interviewees
  - Spanish interviewees are less acculturated and more tuned to Spanish-language media
- Hispanics, including Spanish interviews, approve of specific police efforts and the police in general
  - But Spanish interviewees don't like the immigration policy
- Media attention to local and national immigration events in 2010 heightened fears about PWC's policy

# Many lack understanding of the policy

- In semi-structured interviews, respondents were asked their understanding of the policy
  - Few can give specifics about the policy
  - Spanish-speaking Hispanics are especially likely to be unclear on the policy
    - Many unable to understand the question itself
    - Perhaps not seeing police posture as policy-governed
- Current information on the police website is in need of updating
  - And simplification

# How did the policy affect views of PWC as an inclusive community?


*Views of PWC residents  
(from annual community surveys)*

# PWC Quality of Life

- Rated on a ten-point scale (10 = highest)
- Current rating: 7.28
- 2009 rating: 7.30
- 2008 rating: 6.98
- 2007 rating: 7.18
- 2006 rating: 7.15
- 1993 rating: 6.90


\*The 2010 mean rating is significantly different from the 2008 mean rating

# Quality of Life Ratings: 1993-2010




# Quality of Life by ethnic/racial group, by year

Rating PWC as a place to live, 1 to 10 scale.






# Want to live in PWC 5 years from now? by ethnic/racial group by year




# Trust in County Government, 2003-2010

- How often do residents trust the County government to do what's right?



# Differences by Ethnicity

## Trust in County Government




% saying always or most of the time

# How did the policy affect views of PWC as an inclusive community?

*Effect on Hispanic demand for  
PWC homes and  
Hispanic population change*

# Growth in Hispanic population 1990-2010



# Conclusions of the study

# Conclusions about the Policy's Goals

## 1. Reduce the number of illegal immigrants in the County:

- The number of illegal immigrants has been reduced
- Result: leveled growth and changed demographics of Hispanic population
- Hispanic demand for home mortgages in PWC was reduced

## 2. Improve Public Safety and Reduce Crime:

- Most types of crimes were not affected by the policy, however:
- Aggravated assaults were reduced by the policy
  - Police initiatives predating 2008 also had impact on violent crime
- Hit and run accidents were reduced
- Public drunkenness went down; cause unclear
- No significant change in disorder crimes

# Conclusions about the Policy's Goals

## 3. Reduce neighborhood problems

- Overcrowding complaints are down, but founded violations are up
- Day laborer sites went down temporarily
  - But sites are still active in the County
  - BOCS passed July 2010 ordinance which regulates solicitation on public ways

## 4. Save money by delivering fewer services to illegal immigrants:

- ESOL students still high in schools but leveled
  - Cannot restrict by Federal Law
- Funding saved by restricting services to illegal immigrants in programs such as homeless intervention shifted to citizens and legal immigrants



# Conclusions about the Policy's Goals

## 5. Maintain community confidence and trust in Police

- The community became ethnically divided in its views of the police in 2008
- After two years, the ethnic gaps in perception are mostly repaired
- Police have conducted over 200 outreach opportunities with the community since current resolution approved by BOCS
  - Information about the BOCS policy is provided at events, on the website in English and Spanish
- Spanish-speaking Hispanics still view the policy negatively but have returned to positive views of the police overall.

# Conclusions about the Policy's Goals

6. Maintain County's reputation as an inclusive community both internally and externally
  - Hispanic ratings of quality of life, desire to live in PWC in the future dropped sharply in 2008, opening an ethnic gap in perception
  - Quality of life ratings show no difference in 2010 between Hispanic, Black and other
  - Percent of Hispanics in the County wanting to live in PWC five years from now is no different than non-Hispanics in 2010
  - Trust in government has been maintained at historic rates, however, trust by minorities is lower than it is "others"
  - Lowered Hispanic growth in PWC suggests issues with perception of PWC among Hispanics outside the County

# Conclusions about Unintended Consequences:

## A. Facilitate overzealous or inappropriate enforcement actions by Police?

- No lawsuits directly claiming racial profiling have been filed against the County
- From 2008-2010, satisfaction regarding Police behaviors improved from 70% to 83% (08-10) for English-speaking Hispanics and from 26% to 72% for Spanish-speaking Hispanics

## B. Generate a costly flood of litigation against the Police Department and the County?

- The litigation flood did not materialize

*The risks of these unintended consequences were greatly reduced by the BOCS change to the current policy being implemented today.*

# Conclusions about Unintended Consequences:

- C. Overburden the PD to the point of reducing its effectiveness and create admin costs far greater than anticipated?
  - Initial implementation did require resources for training, outreach and for executive staff
    - but burden has somewhat diminished
  - Ongoing cost of the Criminal Alien Unit is in the Five-Year Budget
  - Officers report policy has become a routine part of PD business
  - Overwhelmingly, Police Officers believe they have the necessary training and skills to implement the BOCS policy
  - This does represent a significant, continuing impact on the PD and its resources

# Conclusions about Unintended Consequences:

D. Create fear and a sense of being unwelcome amongst immigrants in general and cause legal immigrants to leave?

- Clear that illegal immigrants have left County, unclear if legal immigrants have also left County
- Hispanic population has leveled off
- Hispanics who live here now say they want to live in PWC five years from now

E. Capacity problems at jail, or with ICE?

- Some problems in first few months, promptly resolved
- We don't know how ICE disposes of cases turned over to them

# Conclusions about Unintended Consequences:

## F. Result in lower crime reporting from the Hispanic community or increase their victimization?

- No significant change in reported victimization by Hispanics (citizen survey)
- Hispanics reporting crimes has not changed significantly, and is same as rate for non-Hispanics (citizen survey)
- Under-reporting could play a role in decreases seen in some crimes, but cannot explain all of the decreases.
  - PWCPD has evidence of some crimes against Hispanics that were not reported
  - Residents & some officers are still concerned that crimes are not being reported by illegal immigrants
- The immigration policy is still not well understood, especially by Hispanics who do not speak English well.
- PWCPD outreach efforts must continue to encourage crime reporting without fear of an immigration check

# Conclusions about implementation

- Police implemented the policy smoothly, with a high level of effort & professionalism
  - Strong leadership, with continuity and focus
  - Training fully met officer needs
  - Clear message: Racial profiling would not be tolerated
  - Good coordination and support from ICE
  - Additional time burden on officers accommodated without reducing departmental effectiveness
    - Major time commitment from senior staff was needed
  - High satisfaction with implementation among residents
- Police invested major effort in promoting public understanding of the policy
  - These efforts took time to show success
  - Further work is needed to educate Spanish speakers and users of Spanish media about the policy

# In sum, we conclude . . .

- The Prince William County illegal immigration enforcement policy:
  - Was smoothly implemented by PWCPD and County staff
  - Had wide-ranging effects
    - Some of these effects were those intended
    - Some of the policy's goals were not achieved
  - Had few of the unintended consequences that some had feared

*It IS possible for a local government to have an impact on its illegal immigration experience.*



November 16, 2010



WELDON COOPER  
CENTER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE  
*at the University of Virginia*

# FINAL REPORT

## Evaluation Study of Prince William County's Illegal Immigration Enforcement Policy



**CSR**

*Center for Survey Research*

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POLICE EXECUTIVE  
RESEARCH FORUM

# Evaluation Study of Prince William County's Illegal Immigration Enforcement Policy FINAL REPORT 2010



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Prince William County, Virginia  
November 2010



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## Acknowledgments

We would like to acknowledge the contributions of the many people who helped us collect and analyze the information on which this report is based. First, we would like to acknowledge the Prince William County Police Department, which funded the study. We are grateful for the support that Chief Charlie T. Deane has given from beginning to the end of the project. Mr. Tom Pulaski was our primary point of contact for the project at PWCPD, and we thank him for his patience and for coordinating many of the research activities with police personnel. Deputy Chief Barry Bernard was instrumental in helping us obtain detailed reports and learning to interpret the data correctly. We thank Master Police Officer Bill Anzenberger for coordinating activities associated with the officer surveys and discussions with ICE personnel, Major Amanda Lambert for arranging our visit to the detention center, Carole Moye who provided us with ADC data, and Mr. Tim McCormack for providing access to police department databases. Deputy Chief Barry Barnard and Assistant Chiefs Steve Hudson and Ray Colgan reviewed the draft report and provided useful information and corrections. Our draft reports also received very helpful feedback from County Executive Officer Melissa Peacor, Deputy County Executives Susan Roltsch and Chris Martino, County Attorney Angela Horan, Budget Director Michelle Casciato, Director of the Neighborhood Services Division Patricia Reilly, and Public Information Officer Jason Grant.

Many people in Prince William County willingly shared their insights and thoughts with us, participating in interviews and focus groups and filling out surveys. Those people include about 375 Police Department personnel, five County Supervisors, other local government staff, employees of health institutions serving institutions in the county, faith-based leaders in the community, and other stakeholders. In addition, over 1,000 County residents participated each year in the Prince William County Citizen's Survey. We thank them all.

At the University of Virginia, Dr. Abdoulaye Diop and graduate assistants Jennifer Jones and Natalie Brown assisted greatly in the preparation of our Interim Report of September 2009. Ms. Kathleen Coker coded responses from the Citizen Survey, and helped with final editing of both the interim and final reports. Ms. Nicole Fedoravicius assisted with Spanish language interviewing and analysis of Spanish language materials throughout the project. Graduate assistants Katherine Asbury, Claire Terni, Elizabeth Kaknes, and J. Clayton Ford assisted in the data collection, preparation of graphs and tables, and assembly and editing of the final report. Our understanding of U.S. Census data sources was greatly aided by Achsah Carrier and Susan Klapp of the Demographics and Workforce Division at the Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, where Mike Spar provided us with background on population estimates. Ila Crawford, CSR Fiscal Technician, was responsible for administering the UVa portion of the contract and the UVa subcontracts with PERF and James Madison University.

At the Police Executive Research Forum, Daniel Woods, Bruce Kubu, Nathan Ballard, Anthony Bellero, Brandon Gustafson, and Mary Martinez assisted with data collection, analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, survey development and administration, and various other research and administrative tasks.

*The views and interpretations in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Prince William County's elected leaders, the County's Executive Management, the Police Department, or any other unit of County government.*

*The Center for Survey Research is responsible for any errors or omissions in this report. Questions may be directed to the Center for Survey Research, P.O. Box 400767, Charlottesville Virginia 22904-*

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## **Executive Summary**

# **Evaluation Study of Prince William County's Illegal Immigration Enforcement Policy**

## **Final Report**

This is the final report of a three-year, interdisciplinary evaluation study of the illegal immigration policy in Prince William County that was adopted by resolution by the Board of County Supervisors in October 2007, amended in April 2008, and implemented in its current form in July 2008. This evaluation study was approved by the Board at the time the policy was passed into law, and it was funded by the County Police Department. In this report we recount some of the events leading up to and surrounding the implementation of the policy, identify the policy's goals, and then proceed to assess whether or not the policy met each of its goals over the years since its inception. We also investigate whether the policy has had any of the negative consequences that some had predicted would result from it. We have used a variety of resources and research methods in conducting our research, including both qualitative and quantitative data sources, and information supplied by the County police and government offices as well as information from independent sources. We conclude that the Prince William Immigration policy was smoothly implemented by the Prince William County Police Department and County staff; that the policy had wide-ranging effects, some of which were those intended; and that it also fell short of achieving some of its goals.

### **Methods**

The research team, a collaboration between researchers at the University of Virginia, the Police Executive Research Forum, and James Madison University, analyzed both quantitative and qualitative data on the police and the community. This triangulation of methods strengthened our ability to learn about and understand the effects of the policy.

Our quantitative data sources included data from the Prince William County Police Department, including crime statistics, data on arrests of illegal immigrants, data on calls for service, and crime data from the department's records management system. We also analyzed published crime data from other jurisdictions in the metropolitan area. We conducted two anonymous surveys of the County's police officers, and analyzed data from the annual community surveys conducted by telephone each year by the University of Virginia Center for Survey Research. We also surveyed other police departments in the metropolitan area about their immigration enforcement practices. From the U.S. Census Bureau we accessed not only information from the decennial census, but also results of the 2006 through 2009 American Community Surveys, and the more detailed Public Use Micro Sample derived from those surveys.

Our qualitative data sources included focus groups with police officers at various levels, and key informant interviews with members of the County Board, key County staff, and community leaders on all sides of the immigration issue. We also conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with community residents, some recruited through our informants and others selected at random from among those who had been interviewed in the 2009 and 2010 community surveys. Many of these interviews were with Hispanic residents and some were conducted in Spanish. In addition, we observed staff at the local jail while they did their work, sat in on officer training for the new policy,

talked with members of the Criminal Alien Unit, and conducted day and evening “ride-alongs” with patrol officers.

## **The Policy’s History**

The Hispanic population of Prince William County grew very rapidly, increasing by over 150 percent from 2000 to 2006. It is not known what proportion of these new residents were in the U.S. without legal authorization, but the number of illegal immigrants in the County definitely increased during these years. Starting in 2006, there was increasingly vocal concern among some residents about neighborhood problems and certain kinds of crime that they associated with the presence of illegal immigrants. These concerns resulted in action by members of the County Board. The first resolution concerning illegal immigrants was introduced in July 2007. After a period of study and vigorous public debate, the Board passed into law the initial version of the illegal immigration policy in October 2007. In addition to denying some specific county services to illegal immigrants, the initial policy required police officers to inquire about the citizenship or immigration status of any person they detained (including traffic stops) and for whom there was probable cause that they were not legally in the country. After police officers had been trained in the policy, it was put into effect in March of 2008. However, in a pivotal move the Board amended the policy in April 2008, changing it to read: “Officers shall investigate the citizenship or immigration status of all persons who are arrested for a violation of a state law or county ordinance when such arrest results in a physical custodial arrest.” Proponents of this change, including the Chief of Police, argued that the amended policy would reduce the risk that police officers would be accused of racial profiling. Officers were retrained, and the amended policy was implemented in July 2008. It remains in effect today.

## **The Policy’s Goals**

Our analysis of the policy process and our interviews with those who advocated, created, implemented, and modified the immigration policy yields the following list of six goals that the Prince William County immigration enforcement policy was designed to achieve:

- 1) Reduce the number of illegal immigrants in the county;
- 2) Improve public safety and reduce crime;
- 3) Reduce overcrowded housing problems, neighborhood nuisances and public disorder, such as loitering at day labor sites and public intoxication;
- 4) Save money by delivering fewer services to illegal immigrants;
- 5) Maintain the Prince William County Police Department’s reputation for professionalism, and maintain community confidence and trust in police;
- 6) Maintain County’s reputation as an inclusive community, both internally (among its current residents) and externally (among people outside the County).

Our evaluation was also attentive to the following possible, adverse consequences that could have occurred. The policy might:

- A) Facilitate overzealous or inappropriate enforcement actions by police;
- B) Generate a flood of costly litigation against the Police Department and the County government;
- C) Overburden the Police Department to the point of reducing its effectiveness;

- D) Generate administrative costs far greater than anticipated at the time of adoption;
- E) Create fear and a sense of being unwelcome among immigrants in general;
- F) Cause legal immigrants, or Hispanics generally, to leave the county; and
- G) Result in lower crime reporting from the Hispanic community, or even increase their victimization.

We also looked at possible obstacles to the policy's success, such as limits on the capacity of the criminal justice system to handle an increased flow of detainees. However, we found that most of these negative consequences did not occur and that the obstacles to implementation were fairly minor or temporary.

### **Contacts with illegal immigrants**

From March 2008 through June 2010, PWCPD officers had 2,984 contacts with suspected illegal immigrants; 79 percent of these contacts were associated with an arrest. These arrests represent about six percent of all arrests in the County. Nearly all suspects thought to be illegal immigrants were later confirmed as such. The great majority of the illegal immigrants arrested were from Latin American countries. During the same period, the Adult Detention Center (a joint jail facility that serves Prince William County, Manassas, and Manassas Park and began its own 287[g] program in July 2007) checked the immigration status of 9,284 foreign-born arrestees, many of whom were, of course, legally present in the U.S. The ADC issued immigration detainers for about 30 percent of these. From July 2007 to June 2010, the ADC turned over a total of 2,499 illegal immigrants to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]. We have no specific figures on how many of these were deported or released back to the County by ICE.

Our survey of other jurisdictions in the metropolitan area reveals that Prince William's immigration enforcement policy is not entirely unique, since several other jurisdictions do check the immigration status of persons they send to jail. However, the County's policy of checking the immigration status of *all* arrestees is more comprehensive than those of other jurisdictions that do immigration checks.

### **PWCPD's experience implementing the current policy**

The Police Department prepared extensively for implementation of the original immigration policy, trained all its officers thoroughly on the original and amended policies, and invested great effort into educating the public about how the policy was being implemented. Our surveys of officers show that they feel well trained and equipped to deal with immigration checks, and are comfortable implementing the policy. The Criminal Alien Unit has played an important, specialized role, focusing on proactive investigation of more serious offenders in coordination with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]. Although implementation of the policy placed additional burdens and costs on PWCPD, especially on the command staff, the agency seems to have adapted well to these demands.

Police personnel believe that the policy initially caused fear in the immigrant community, undermining the immigrant community's trust of the Department. However, they also feel that their outreach efforts have helped to ease these fears; they regard problems with police-community relations as only occasional. Fears that the policy would hurt minority recruitment efforts or increase racial bias complaints have not been realized.



We found that coordination of the Police Department's efforts with the magistrates, the ADC staff, and ICE have all gone fairly smoothly. In the early stages of the program, slow follow-up by ICE did exacerbate crowding conditions at the ADC, increased the number of ADC inmates sent to other regional and local jails (known as "farm-outs") and caused an increase in the average length of an inmate's stay at the ADC. However, this issue was resolved in 2008 through a Memorandum of Agreement between ICE and ADC, and ICE agents now pick up (or allow the release) of immigration cases from the ADC within 48 hours. Although the 287(g) process for checking immigration status of arrestees is sometimes time-consuming, the process seems to work fairly smoothly. In October of 2009, ICE renegotiated its 287(g) agreements with Prince William and other localities that participate in this partnership program, placing closer limits on the types of cases for which ICE would take custody. However, this change has not had much effect on the policy's operations at the ADC, because staff there had already been informally prioritizing detainees so as to turn over only the more serious cases to ICE.

### **Changes in the County's Hispanic population and the number of illegals**

It is challenging to determine whether the County's illegal immigrant population decreased after the policy was introduced, since no official statistical source actually counts illegal immigrants (other than the Police Department's records of persons arrested post-policy). It is also difficult to disentangle effects of the policy from the effects of the economic downturn that occurred at nearly the same time. Despite these challenges, the data suggest that the policy resulted in some important changes in the community.

Growth in the County's Hispanic population suddenly leveled off. While Prince William County accounted for most of the growth in the metropolitan area's Hispanic population from 2000 to 2006, since the policy's introduction nearly all Hispanic growth in the metro area has occurred outside of Prince William.

The number of non-citizens in the County decreased substantially (by about 7,400 persons in two years).

Using a series of proxy measures (such as limited English proficiency, number of young Hispanic males) that all point in the same direction, we are also able to conclude that the number of illegal immigrants was significantly reduced. We estimate that this number decreased by an amount between 2,000 and 6,000 persons from 2006 to 2008. We believe that both the policy and the changing economy contributed to this decrease, but the immigration policy surely played a role because the rate of changes in these same proxy measures is so much smaller elsewhere in the metropolitan area.

The Hispanic population of the County was restructured, as unattached young adults (mostly male) left and were replaced by Hispanic couples, somewhat older adults, and families with small children, all more likely to be English speakers.

### **Impacts on crime and disorder**

We find that the policy has not affected most types of crime in Prince William County, in large part because illegal immigrants account for only a small percent of arrests overall and a small to modest share of offenders for most types of crime. About seventy percent of arrests of illegal immigrants were for just three specific offenses: public drunkenness, driving while intoxicated, and driving

without a license. However, there was a substantial drop in aggravated assaults following the announcement of the policy and the initiation of immigration checks at ADC in July 2007. (Using a time-series analysis of weekly crime data from the PWCPD records management system, we can identify with some precision when the decrease in aggravated assaults occurred.) Because of this drop, the index of violent crimes also went down. We attribute the reduction in violence primarily to the publicity surrounding the adoption of the policy in its original form, but we caution that some of this drop may also have been due to a reduction in reporting of assaults by illegal immigrants (and perhaps legal immigrants as well). Our annual community surveys do not show any change in crime reporting by Hispanic residents, but police officers and community members tell us that crime reporting is still an issue for immigrants because of fears associated with the County's policy.

Property crimes and most crimes of public disorder do not appear to have been affected by the policy. However, there was an affect on one type of traffic offense: hit-and-run accidents in Prince William went down by nearly half between 2006 and 2008, and this change can reasonably be attributed to the introduction of the policy.

Despite these mixed findings, the policy in its current form (mandating immigration checks only for arrestees) appears to be a reasonable way of targeting illegal immigrants who are serious offenders—a policy goal on which there is broad agreement.

### **Effects on neighborhood problems**

The implementation of the County's immigration enforcement policy did have significant effects on some of the neighborhood problems that had been of concern to activist groups and to members of the Board when they framed the policy. However, some of the effects proved to be temporary and others were apparent in some parts of the County but not in others. Survey respondents are divided on the severity of neighborhood problems and the degree to which they have improved or worsened. We attribute this partly to differences in where respondents live, as each of the problems was highly localized.

Prior to the policy's implementation, there was a significant problem of overcrowded housing in the County, associated with the increasing presence of illegal immigrants but localized in a few areas. We have strong, clear reports from some informants that particular overcrowded houses became vacant or changed to normal occupancy very soon after the policy was passed.

There were more complaints and founded violations of overcrowding and related property violations in the areas near Manassas than in the Eastern portion of the County. Perhaps as a result, there is evidence that overcrowded housing (or housing that may appear overcrowded to some residents even if it is not in violation of code) was reduced in the area around Manassas but did not decrease in the Eastern part of the County.

Prior to the introduction of the policy there were several active day labor sites that caused concern or apprehension for some residents. There are consistent reports in our qualitative data that loitering at day labor sites went down sharply when the policy was first implemented, but then returned to significant levels of activity at the sites within a year or so. Our direct observation and interviews with police officers in the fall of 2010 verified that the day labor sites in the County continue to be quite active.

Vacant housing became a major neighborhood issue at around the time the resolution was implemented, in part because of the mortgage crisis. Responses to the annual citizen survey, as well as

reports of informants, show that the problems with upkeep of vacant properties have lessened significantly in the last year.

There was a marked increase in the capabilities of the Neighborhood Services Division to guide and respond to complaints from residents about Property Code Enforcement issues. As a result, the Division's caseload of complaints did not recede as the policy was put into effect, but continues at a high level. Prince William County is now far better equipped than it was earlier in the decade to work with neighborhood groups to identify and correct problems in property code enforcement and to handle the increased, continuing caseload.

### **Saving money by delivering fewer services to illegal immigrants**

Most of the more costly social services that are delivered to residents by the Prince William County government are federally funded or regulated. Some must, by Federal law, be delivered without regard to immigration status; others (such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Food Stamps and Medicaid) have already been restricted at the Federal level from being delivered to illegal immigrants. Therefore, the County's October 2007 resolution covered only a small list of services, such as homeless intervention, that would be newly denied to illegal immigrants. We did not undertake to measure the cost savings from these changes, but it is clear that they are not very large. The County shifted any savings so realized to services from the same agencies for citizens and legal immigrants.

### **Community relations with the police**

The data from our annual community surveys reveal that the introduction of the policy in 2007-2008 seriously disrupted police-community relations in the County, at least temporarily. When the policy was introduced and implemented, new and substantial gaps in satisfaction emerged between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in overall satisfaction with the police, satisfaction with the attitudes and behavior of officers, satisfaction with police fairness, and satisfaction with police efforts to enforce the immigration policy itself. The Police Department invested substantial effort in explaining the new policy and attempting to reassure members of the Hispanic community. It is likely that the damage to community relations would have been considerably greater, and more permanent, without these efforts. However, they were not sufficient to prevent a palpable chill to fall over police-community relations in 2008, as seen not only in our survey results but in the everyday experiences of police officers, reported to us in the 2008 focus groups and in some of the responses to our surveys of officers.

The good news is that the chilly relations with Hispanics warmed fairly rapidly. There was measurable improvement in 2009, and by 2010 Hispanic satisfaction with the overall performance of police equaled the satisfaction of non-Hispanics. On more specific questions about police attitudes and behaviors and about police fairness, a significant ethnic gap in satisfaction remained, but the gap regarding police attitudes had narrowed considerably from what was seen in 2008.

Through further analysis of the survey data and our in-depth interviews with some community residents, we found that the group that is most dissatisfied with the immigration policy is those Hispanics who do not speak English well. These County residents are far less satisfied than English-speaking Hispanics with particular aspects of police performance that are related to the immigration issue. Our qualitative interviews also reveal that many residents, especially Hispanics and even more so the less acculturated Hispanics, do not understand the current immigration policy. Further and

continuing effort will be required to get correct information out to the Hispanic community and to fully restore their confidence in the Prince William County police to the levels maintained before 2007.

### **The County's internal and external reputation for inclusiveness**

The County's adoption of its immigration policy had a strong, immediate impact on the way Hispanic residents perceived their life in the County, their desire to continue to live in the County, and their trust in the County government. On several of these indicators, Hispanics had been more positive than non-Hispanics prior to 2006. In each of these, dramatic and unprecedented ethnic gaps emerged in 2008 that separate the views of Hispanics from those of non-Hispanics, whose views of the County were generally unaffected by the immigration controversy. In the two years that followed, these ethnic gaps were largely repaired, disappearing entirely for quality of life ratings and the desire to continue living in the County. The ethnic gap in government trust lingers on in 2010, but is not as wide as in 2008.

We have no direct opinion data on how Hispanics outside Prince William view the County, but data on Hispanic population trends in the metropolitan region as well as mortgage data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act show that Hispanics are avoiding Prince William County in favor of moving to other parts of the region. Thus, the County did not initially succeed in its goal of implementing the immigration enforcement policy without damaging its reputation as an inclusive community. For Hispanic residents within the County, ratings of quality of life and desire to continue living in the County rose sufficiently by 2010 to match the sentiments of non-Hispanic residents. So, the County had by 2010 achieved a measure of success in restoring its internal reputation as a welcoming place for Hispanics—that is, its reputation among Hispanics who live in Prince William. However, the data on Hispanic growth outside Prince William—and the relative lack of Hispanic growth within Prince William—suggest that there is much work to do if more Hispanics outside the County are to be convinced that they will be welcome in Prince William.

### **Unintended negative consequences and obstacles**

We found no evidence of overzealous or inappropriate immigration enforcement actions by police. The flood of costly racial-profiling litigation that some had feared—under both the original and the current policy—never materialized. Another concern was that the Police Department might be overburdened to the point of reducing its effectiveness. While the burden of implementing and continuing the policy has been considerable, the Department has accommodated well to these demands and there is no evidence that its effectiveness has been hampered. We also did not find that the costs of the policy were widely different than those that the Police Department anticipated—and the County budgeted for—at the time of the policy's adoption.

It does seem that the policy, at least at first, created fear and a sense of being unwelcome among immigrants in general, and it seems to have caused some *legal* immigrants, or Hispanics generally, to leave or avoid the County. We have dealt with this issue above, in connection with our evaluation of the inclusiveness goals of the County's policy implementation.

On the issue of whether or not the policy has seriously reduced crime reporting by immigrants or by Hispanics generally, our evidence is mixed. Our community survey shows no changes from 2008 to 2010 in reported victimization of Hispanics or in the percentage who report crimes they have been victims of, nor does it show lower reporting rates for Hispanics than for non-Hispanics. On the other hand, we do not have data to assess before and after changes in crime reporting by Hispanics,

nor do we have specific data on reporting of crime by illegal immigrants. Some police officers express concern that crimes against illegal immigrants are less likely to be reported, and the department knows of specific crimes in the Hispanic community that were not reported to the police. The Police Department should certainly continue to encourage reporting by all residents and to emphasize their policy of not inquiring about the immigration status of those who are victims or witnesses to crimes.

Most of the possible obstacles that could have hindered successful implementation of the policy relate to issues of capacity. As has been noted, there was some initial strain on jail capacity in the early months, before a more streamlined coordination arrangement was worked out with ICE for prompt transfer of detainees. Other than that, the police department (with the additional resources provided by the Board of County Supervisors), the judicial system, the jail, and ICE have all been able to handle the steady flow of illegal immigrants who are arrested and the somewhat smaller number who are placed on detainer.

## **Overall conclusions and implications**

Our overall conclusion, again, is that the Prince William immigration policy was smoothly implemented; that the policy had wide-ranging effects, some of which were those intended; and that it also fell short of achieving some of its goals. Some of the intended effects which were achieved were a reduction in the number of illegal immigrants in the County, a reduction in some specific categories of crime, but not in crime overall; and some amelioration of neighborhood problems, at least in parts of the County. The County was not able to implement the policy without creating a serious ethnic gap in perception of the police, ratings of the County as a place to live, and trust in the local government; Hispanic opinions on these matters plunged to unprecedented lows in 2008. This pattern emerged despite extensive efforts by the senior staff of the Police Department to educate the public about the policy through community meetings and media appearances. Fortunately, these ethnic gaps were largely—but not completely—repaired by 2010, with Hispanic residents currently showing satisfaction with the police and with the County as a place to live that equals that of non-Hispanics. It appears, however, that Hispanics elsewhere in the metropolitan area are not eager to move to Prince William, as its Hispanic growth rate continues to lag far behind that of the rest of the metropolitan area. It is also clear that many residents still do not understand the amended immigration enforcement policy.

One implication of Prince William's experience is inescapable: it is indeed possible for a local government to have an impact on its experience with illegal immigration, despite the national scope of the problem and the primacy of the Federal government in dealing with the issue.

The pattern and timing of change we have observed on several key indicators suggests that the impact of the policy on the Prince William community stemmed in large part from the very public controversy that accompanied its introduction, passage, and later modification. The irony is that the outcry about the policy and the fears of harassment and profiling that were aroused in the immigrant community were based on the original, 'probable cause' version of the policy, which was in effect in Prince William for only two months. The current policy, mandating immigration inquiry only upon arrest, was put into effect in July 2008 and remains in effect today. It is not clear that this latter policy would have raised the same level of concern if it had been proposed at the outset. If, accordingly, there had been less outcry and less arousal of fear, then it is doubtful that the police activities in identifying and detaining illegal immigrants arrested for crimes would, in themselves, have made nearly as much difference.

There are thus three circumstances that make the Prince William experience fairly unique and warrant caution from anyone who seeks to generalize the outcomes seen here to other jurisdictions. As we just noted, Prince William started with a highly controversial policy and then quickly switched to one that was somewhat less far-reaching, less controversial, and presented less possibility that allegations of racial profiling would arise. Second, the County has a highly professional and well-resourced Police Department that enjoyed continuity of its strong and effective leadership throughout our study period. Third, the immigration policy was implemented concurrently with drastic changes in the economy, the housing market, the construction industry, and mortgage finance. We are convinced that the effects of the policy in Prince William cannot all be attributed wholly to these economic factors, but it is not at all certain that the effects would have been as far-reaching if the economic circumstances had been less dire. For these reasons, the lessons of Prince William's experience should be applied with great caution to other places in other times.

*The views and interpretations in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Prince William County's elected leaders, the County's Executive Management, the Police Department, or any other unit of County government.*

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# Evaluation Study of Prince William County's Illegal Immigration Enforcement Policy

## Final Report

### 1 Introduction

This is the final report of a three-year, interdisciplinary evaluation study of the illegal immigration policy in Prince William County that was adopted by resolution by the Board of County Supervisors in October 2007, amended in April 2008, and implemented in its current form in July 2008. This evaluation study was approved by the Board at the time the policy resolution was passed, and it was funded by the County Police Department. The policy is controversial for a number of reasons, one of these being that it directly involves local police officers in some aspects of the enforcement of national immigration laws, a responsibility that has traditionally been carried out only by federal agencies. In this report we recount some of the events leading up to and surrounding the implementation of the policy, identify the policy's goals, and then proceed to assess whether or not the policy met each of its goals over the years since its inception. We also investigate whether the policy has had any of the negative consequences that some had predicted would result from it. We have used a variety of resources and research methods in conducting our research, including both qualitative and quantitative data sources, and information supplied by the County police and government offices as well as information from independent sources. We have enjoyed the full cooperation of our sponsors and they have given us complete freedom to reach our own conclusions as social scientists. We released an Interim Report<sup>1</sup> about the policy in August 2009; most of the tentative conclusions we reached at that stage of our research have proven to be valid as we now evaluate them against the full range of data now available, covering a longer period of time. But we also have reached some new conclusions and have been able to answer many of the issues that were necessarily left unresolved in our Interim Report. We conclude that the Prince William Immigration policy was smoothly implemented by the Prince William County Police Department and County staff; that the policy had wide-ranging effects, some of which were those intended; and that it also fell short of achieving some of its goals.

#### 1.1 Background

In July 2007, the Board of County Supervisors in Prince William County, VA unanimously passed the first of several resolutions designed to provide a local solution to growing illegal immigration among the county's residents. That resolution required the County staff to withhold as many County services as possible from illegal immigrants. It also required the police to inquire into a person's immigration status during all detentions, including traffic stops, if an officer had probable cause to believe that the person might be in the United States illegally. The immigration enforcement policy was passed into law in October 2007, but was then significantly amended in April of 2008 to require only that persons placed under arrest be checked on their immigration status. That policy has been in operation in the County since July of 2008.

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<sup>1</sup>Thomas M. Guterbock, Bruce Taylor, Karen Walker, Christopher S. Koper, Milton Vickerman, Timothy Carter and Abdoulaye Diop. *Evaluation Study of Prince William County Police Illegal Immigration Enforcement Policy: Interim Report 2009*. University of Virginia Center for Survey Research and the Police Executive Research Forum, August 2009.



The county, which by 2000 had already transitioned from a rural, exurban area into a highly developed suburban county and the third most populous jurisdiction in Virginia, was one of the fastest growing counties in the country during the early 2000s. The Hispanic population grew especially quickly, more than doubling in just 7 years, from about 27,000 to over 64,000 people.

Population growth and shifts in the county led to significant changes in the county's quality of life. Traffic congestion became a major problem as the county became Washington's most populous outer suburb. The make-up of schools and neighborhoods changed markedly: Between 2000 and 2008, 26 elementary schools experienced tremendous growth in their English Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL). In those schools, the ESOL population jumped from less than 30 students to more than 30% of the total school population. In 17 schools, the ESOL population increased to over 40% of the school population; in several cases the schools experienced a doubling or tripling of the ESOL population in just 8 years. In some cases, the ESOL population was more than 60% of the schools' total population. As immigrants moved in, they engaged in behaviors that immigrants have long used in order to establish a foothold in the United States: They shared housing with relatives, friends and strangers in order to make ends meet. As a result, parking spaces on neighborhood streets became difficult for long-term residents to find. In addition, some of the immigrants were single men who shared houses; frequented day labor sites, staying for much of the day if they did not get work; and consumed alcohol, sometimes becoming drunk in public. Unlike cities with long histories of absorbing large numbers of immigrants, Prince William County was unprepared in some ways to manage these changes.<sup>2</sup>

By 2007, an unknown number of immigrants were in the County illegally. Our estimate is that they numbered in the tens of thousands, out of a total resident population of 360,000. As housing overcrowding, school overcrowding loitering and other quality of life issues grew, illegal immigrants became the focus of some of the county's native-born Americans' anger, who believed that if illegal immigrants did not live in Prince William County, the problems would decrease. These residents had watched other local jurisdictions experience failure in their attempts to control the quality of life problems that they attributed to illegal immigration. In nearby Manassas City, council members attempted to restrict the number of related people who could live in the same house, an effort that was rescinded a month after it was passed. They had also seen efforts to control illegal immigration by fining employers and landlords who rented to illegal immigrants run into trouble in the courts. To avoid these problems, those who wished to curtail the number of illegal immigrants in the county hoped to deny County services to all illegal immigrants and to use the police to check immigration status and detain illegal immigrants.

The resolution that passed in July of 2007 was just the opening for an extended series of discussions among the Board of County Supervisors, County staff, residents and the Prince William County Police Department [PWCPD]. The various parties attempted to identify a strategy that would respond to resident concerns, comply with the law and not increase the County's risk of lawsuits, ensure continued community support for the Police Department's efforts to promote public safety and reduce crime, and not redirect too many police resources from the Department's core policing mission. In March 2008, PWCPD implemented General Order 45, which mandated that police inquire about the immigration status of all detainees if there was probable cause to believe that the person was not in the United States legally.

In late April 2008, the Board passed an amended resolution, which mandated that police inquire into the immigration status of all people who were physically arrested instead of all detained persons for

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<sup>2</sup>Singer et al (2009).

whom there was probable cause to inquire, although officers could still use their discretion to question people who they had detained. This change was a pivotal moment in the history of the policy, because it greatly lessened the risk that racial profiling might occur, or appear to occur (thus generating unfounded lawsuits), in the implementation of the policy. In July 2008, PWCPD implemented the revised policy in the form of General Order 45.01, to comply with the April resolution. In addition, the Police Department entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government, which allowed specially trained officers to act as immigration enforcement officers. These officers focused primarily on people who had committed serious crimes. The agreement also mandated that the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) would remove arrestees who had federal immigration warrants for their detention from the county's jail. The police practices that ensued from the policies were in marked contrast to the Police Department's previous practice regarding suspected illegal immigrants, which was "to call ICE based on the priority of seriousness of local charges" against detainees.<sup>3</sup>

## 1.2 Our Charge from the County

As part of the policy's implementation, the Police Chief requested and the Board of County Supervisors unanimously approved funds to conduct an evaluation of the policy that had three major goals:

Goal 1: Provide information about the policy's implementation

The new policy has few counterparts in other locales, and little information exists about how to best implement such policies. Although one can expect challenges when implementing new policies, the exact nature of those challenges—and the potential solutions to them—depend on the capabilities of the local community's political dynamics, economic conditions, and other social and cultural factors. Prince William County has a large Police Department, with over 550 officers, and putting the policy in place was a major task. In order to do so, the Police Department designed a training curriculum for all patrol officers and created a Criminal Alien Unit to identify illegal immigrants who committed serious offenses. It also needed to educate a wary public about the scope of the policy. This evaluation attempted to identify specific challenges encountered by the PWCPD and their potential solutions.

Goal 2: Provide information about the policy's potential effects on the community and police services in Prince William County

The Police Department wanted to better understand the policy's effects on the Department and the community. The police, County staff and community members had many hypotheses about what the original policy's effects might be, but no one was exactly sure what and how extensive the effects would be. As we shall see throughout this report, the policy appeared to have some of the effects desired by its proponents or intended by the Board, although it also appeared to have some of the unintended effects that others had predicted or no effects on some conditions. This evaluation therefore examines a range of questions related to the policy's hypothesized effects through the analysis of crime data, criminal arrests, resident use of and satisfaction with social services, citizen complaints, traffic infractions, crime victimization, property code enforcement records and other data sources.

Goal 3: Provide a blueprint for future research and data collection by the Prince William County Police Department

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<sup>3</sup> Deane (2007a, June 15).

Prior to the policy's implementation, the Police Department, like most police departments across the country, did not collect systematic information on immigration status. The policy's supporters believe that the lack of information prevented the County from effectively addressing illegal immigration. Also, the Police Department and evaluation team recognized that lack of information presented inherent challenges in determining if observable changes were due to the policy or other community conditions. Throughout our work we have consulted closely with the senior staff of the Police Department to discuss what records are available, to request new or modified reports, and to show them the utility of some external sources of data that have turned out to be relevant to understanding the broader effects of the immigration policy. We believe the range and quality of data we have pulled together in the course of our investigations is unprecedented for an evaluation of this kind.

### **1.3 The Research Team**

To carry out the research, the Police Department contracted with the Center for Survey Research (CSR) at the University of Virginia, which has conducted a resident satisfaction survey of Prince William County residents since 1993 and has extensive trend data from these surveys going back more than 17 years. In addition, the evaluation required researchers with expertise in a variety of methods and substantive areas, and CSR coordinated the overall team. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF, a non-profit organization that provides technical assistance and research support to major police departments across the country) participated in the project via a sizable subcontract with the University. A separate subcontract engaged the services of James Madison University.

At the University of Virginia, Dr. Thomas M. Guterbock, a survey methodologist with background in community sociology, oversaw the project. Having directed the County's annual community surveys since their inception in 1993, Guterbock had extensive knowledge of resident opinions in Prince William. Dr. Karen Walker, an evaluation researcher, and Dr. Milton Vickerman, an immigration researcher, were responsible for the design, implementation and analysis of the portion of the study that relies on intensive interviews with key informants and with randomly selected community members. Staff members at the UVa Center for Survey Research coordinated the annual resident survey and provided analyses of the survey's trend data. Ms. Nicole Fedoravicius conducted interviews with Spanish-speaking residents in Prince William County. Dr. Christopher Koper and Dr. Bruce Taylor<sup>4</sup> from The Police Executive Research Forum were responsible for the survey and interviews of Police Department personnel, interviews of other criminal justice officials (including representatives of ICE), the analysis of the Police Department's calls for service and crime data, and the survey of police departments in other jurisdictions. At PERF, Daniel Woods worked on the processing and analysis of PWCPD's automated records on crime reports and calls for service, while Bruce Kubu assisted with the development, implementation, and analysis of the PWCPD officer surveys and the survey of police agencies in the metropolitan area. Dr. Tim Carter, a criminologist from James Madison University, consulted in the design of the crime analysis efforts, drawing on a variety of available data sources.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Since summer of 2010 Dr. Taylor has been employed at the Washington office of NORC, but he continued to assist with the project through the end, while Dr. Koper took the primary role on the project at PERF.

<sup>5</sup> Others who assisted with the project are credited in the acknowledgements at the beginning of this document.

## 1.4 Research Questions and Methods

In asking how effectively the Prince William County Police Department was able to implement the County's new policy of working with ICE to enforce federal immigration law, our interim report examined three major research questions that addressed the first two goals of the evaluation overall.

- What are the Police Department's experiences in implementing the policy?
- What affect, if any, does the new policy appear to have on other areas of the Department's policing?
- What affect, if any, does the new policy appear to have on members of the Prince William County community?

The interim report, based on information collected through 2008, covered the policy's history from the policy's initial introduction in a Board of County Supervisors meeting through its first 9 months of enforcement. It also provided information about Prince William County that is pertinent to the policy's history and that provides a context for interpreting post-policy police and community data.

This final study report is conceived as a stand-alone document; we do not assume that the reader has reviewed the Interim Report. A key step in formulating this presentation of our findings is our development of a clear listing of the policy's goals as well as some key, possible unintended consequences that also needed to be evaluated. We have organized this report around an assessment of each of these policy goals and possible consequences, which we lay out in section 3 below.

There are, however, some important limits to the scope of our inquiry. We have focused primarily on the aspects of the policy that involve the Police Department. We did not undertake to evaluate directly the provisions of the policy that deny specific County services to illegal immigrants. Our focus is on the experience of the Police Department in carrying out the policy, the effects of the policy on crime and policing in the community, and on effects on the community (such as changes in attitudes toward the police) that could directly affect crime and policing. Since alleviation of certain neighborhood problems was one of the policy's goal areas, we also consider whether these problems got better or worse. However, we do not attempt to gauge the broader economic impacts of the policy on residents or on businesses (if any); nor have we been able to gain any comprehensive or close-up picture of how the everyday lives of illegal immigrants might have been changed by the policy.<sup>6</sup> In fact, because of strict human subjects research protections in place at the University of Virginia, we were not permitted in this research to ask any County resident about his or her immigration status.

The research team analyzed both quantitative and qualitative data on the police and the community. This triangulation of methods strengthened our ability to learn about and understand the effects of the policy.

### 1.4.1 Quantitative Data Collection

*PWC Police Department data* – Our team worked with the Prince William County Police Department to access the Department's existing crime statistics for the years prior to the implementation of the

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<sup>6</sup>To learn more than we have here about the illegal immigrants' views and experiences would have required a quite different, more ethnographic research strategy. It would be important to the success of such an effort to have funding for the work from a source independent of the County Police Department.

immigration policy as well as for the years post-implementation. For this report we include summary data on PWCPD Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data, PWCPD data on arrests of illegal immigrants, and our own analysis of trends in calls for service to PWCPD over ten years [CFS data]. We also conducted time-series analyses of UCR data and arrests for the last seven years, as recorded in the Police Department's Record Management System [RMS data].

*Published data from other police departments.* We used data published by the FBI in the Uniform Crime Reports of the United States to compare Prince William's crime statistics with those of other localities in the Washington metropolitan area. We also examined similar crime reports published by the Metropolitan Council of Governments (COG) and a compendium of crime statistics entitled *Crime in Virginia*, published by the Virginia State Police, to compare the County to other jurisdictions in the Virginia portion of the metro area.<sup>7</sup>

*PWC Officer survey* – We fielded a self-administered, anonymous survey with all sworn officers of the PWCPD during October and November 2008, and then repeated the procedure in late 2009. The timing of the first survey allowed our team to assess the officers' experiences with both the initial policy, General Order 45 (implemented in March 2008), and the revised policy, General Order 45.01 (implemented in July 2008). The second survey focused exclusively on the revised policy. Police Department staff distributed the surveys at roll calls, and officers were requested to return a completed survey in a sealed envelope within two weeks. Although the surveys were fully anonymous, we used a system of numbered stickers and sealed envelopes that allowed us to preserve anonymity while linking each officer's first and second survey responses.

The officer survey contained a series of mostly closed-ended questions (with a small number of open-ended items). Questions were grouped by topic in four sections:

- Knowledge of immigration policy and implementation
- Officer behavior related to the current immigration policy
- Problems observed by officers since the current immigration policy went into effect in July 2008
- Officer perspective on General Order 45 (probable cause standard)

*Community survey.* Our team added to the 2008 PWC Citizen Survey<sup>8</sup> a set of questions related to the implementation of the PWC immigration policy, including items on community attitudes towards the new policy, police fairness, victimization and reporting of crime to the police. The community survey is administered in the summer months by telephone each year (in both English and Spanish) to a large, county-wide sample of residents. Recent surveys have included calls to cell phone users. The team used pre-existing questions in the survey to examine residents' experiences with the police, feelings of safety in their neighborhoods and their ratings of the county's overall quality of life. In 2009 a new set of questions was added, asking about specific neighborhood problems such as loitering and overcrowded housing; these were repeated in the 2010 survey.

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<sup>7</sup> Because of various issues in data comparability and consistency, we have not included data from COG or Crime in Virginia in this report.

<sup>8</sup> This study series has always been titled as the Prince William County Citizen Survey. It includes in its study population all adult County residents, regardless of citizenship or immigration status, and does not ask respondents about either status. To avoid misunderstanding about the survey's scope, we refer to these annually recurring telephone surveys as the community surveys in this report.

*Survey of other metropolitan police departments.* In late 2009 and early 2010, PERF conducted a survey of all other police jurisdictions in the metropolitan area, asking for details about their immigration enforcement practices and policies, their perceptions of whether crime rates are linked to the presence of illegal immigrants, and for reports of certain recent crime statistics. Forty-six departments responded, representing about two-thirds of the targeted jurisdictions.

*U.S. Census data.* In addition to gathering reports from the published data tables of the decennial census, we have made considerable use of a newer Census product, the detailed social and demographic data reported annually from the American Community Census for large jurisdictions since 2006. Fortunately, Prince William County is large enough that its ACS results are reported by the Census Bureau annually. Unfortunately, this is not the case for Manassas, Manassas Park and some of the other smaller jurisdictions in the metropolitan area. We have also been able to make good use of the Public Use Micro Samples that are derived from the ACS. These are anonymized databases of individual records from the ACS survey, allowing the researcher to build custom reports on combinations of variables. In this data source, Prince William's data are combined with those from Manassas and Manassas Park; data for the balance of the metro region can also be accessed for comparison.

#### **1.4.2 Qualitative Data Collection**

While our quantitative data is useful for identifying trends over time in police data, area demographics, and community attitudes, we also collected a variety of qualitative data to better understand implementation of the policy and its effects on residents and their neighborhoods. The qualitative data provide context to aid in our interpretation of our quantitative data. Qualitative data are particularly useful for understanding processes (such as implementation of new policies and protocols) because they permit researchers to probe in greater detail than is possible in surveys. We collected the following qualitative data:

*Focus groups* – Focus groups are an effective way of listening to people and learning from them. They can provide insight into how a group thinks about an issue, the range of opinions and ideas, and the inconsistencies and variations of ideas among a group. Our team worked with PWCPD to set up focus groups with PWC police officers, held in County buildings in the summer of 2008. We also conducted focus groups with command staff and with other specialized units in PWCPD, notably the Criminal Alien Unit and the Human Resources staff. These focus groups elicited police attitudes toward the PWCPD immigration policy and assessments of its impact with questions that were retrospective as well as covering the situation at the time. Each group lasted about two hours in duration. Our team took extensive notes and analyzed the results for each individual group as well as conducting a macro summary analysis across all the groups. The series of police focus groups was repeated in summer of 2009.

*Key informant interviews* – The evaluation team conducted key informant interviews with a number of the community stakeholders, including local magistrates, ICE agents, ADC commanders and 287(g) officers, County supervisors, senior County staff members, and community leaders from faith-based institutions and advocacy organizations. These interviews provided us with individual perspectives and permitted us to collect politically sensitive information that provided important insights and background information. For example, our interviews with ICE agents that work in the Prince William County area helped us assess the impact of the police immigration policy on ICE's resultant response capabilities and efficiency. In all interviews, we offered to withhold the names of those whom we interviewed, and some asked that we do so. Others said that we were welcome to use their names and quote their views, and we have done so in parts of this report.

*Semi-structured community interviews* – In summer of 2008, we enlisted the aid of community and church leaders to arrange one-on-one interviews with local community residents. We used a protocol of prepared questions and topics, and the interviews were tape recorded, transcribed, and analyzed with the aid of qualitative data analysis software that facilitates retrieval of text material by topic or theme. Some interviews were conducted in Spanish. In 2009 and 2010, we changed our recruitment strategy and recruited two small samples from among community survey respondents who had agreed in their initial telephone interview to be re-contacted. We sampled 16 respondents, including some Hispanics, from the 2009 survey. A second sample of 18 respondents, all Hispanics, were interviewed individually in 2010 using a protocol that focused more narrowly on residents' views of the police and understanding of the immigration policy. In addition, we conducted focus groups in September 2010 with two groups of Hispanics recruited out of the 2010 community survey sample; one group was conducted in English and one in Spanish. These group sessions were focused on understanding of the policy and assessment of communications about the policy with the Hispanic community.

*Observations* – The evaluation team worked with PWCPD to gain access to the arrestee screening and processing system in the County jail. Our team conducted observations of the screening process, with a special focus on the handling of detainees with non-resident alien status. We also observed the 287(g) interviewing process, as well as conducted interviews with the jail officers. The research team also conducted a series of “ride-alongs” with PWCPD officers to observe the implementation of the new policy in a field setting across the range of police shifts and service areas in the County.

### **1.4.3 Data Analysis**

Our analyses of the quantitative data involved mostly univariate statistics describing the key analytic variables over time. However, we also conducted some more technically sophisticated trend analyses of the PWCPD calls for service data and the incident report data from the RMS.

Analyses of the qualitative data first focused on identifying the range of responses and the key issues that people raised in focus groups and interviews with officers, departmental representatives and citizens. These early analyses consisted of mostly thematic and content analyses and were very descriptive in nature. Later analyses of the qualitative data focused on examining the policy's implementation in greater detail and on using the qualitative data to assist in the interpretation of quantitative data. In conducting our analyses of focus groups, interviews and observations, we used qualitative data analysis software (i.e., NVivo) to organize our field notes. With one or two exceptions, we did not transcribe interviews or focus groups, but instead used researcher-generated field notes and summaries of all interviews and focus groups. (The 2010 semi-structured interviews were transcribed.) The NVivo qualitative analysis software permitted our team to search across multiple documents for key themes, generate cross-tabs to examine the frequency with which certain themes emerged, and link documents that, together, describe events, activities or topics of interest.

### **1.4.4 Research Design Issues**

While our study design has generated a wide range of rich and informative data, our ability to draw strong inferences from these data, especially regarding questions about cause and effect, is somewhat restricted because of limitations in the study's design and the kinds of data that are available. It is an inescapable fact that the illegal immigrant population is hidden from official view and is present in most data sets only in an ‘invisible’ form. That is, illegal immigrants, when they are counted, are counted in a way that does not allow them to be identified in the data. Systematic baseline information about illegal and legal immigrants' attitudes and practices is unavailable; public service institu-

tions have avoided asking about immigration status because they worry that asking such questions will deter people from seeking services that they need. For this particular evaluation, the lack of baseline information on a key variable means that assessing change over time in demographic patterns, behaviors and practices is challenging.

One way that evaluators often address this type of challenge is to use comparison or control groups. A control group, however, requires an experimental design—infeasible in this case. And comparison group designs can be difficult when the comparisons are between communities (in this case counties) where the number of factors that may affect the outcomes of interest (in this case citizen and police attitudes and practices) is very large and dynamic, and includes such things as county or state policies, shifts in public attitudes, economic changes, and crime or drug epidemics that may be unrelated to the policy of interest. Despite these concerns, we did undertake data collection of limited amount of data from other police departments in the DC Metropolitan area. We also make frequent comparisons of Prince William to some of its neighboring jurisdictions, to the balance of the metropolitan area, or to the balance of the Virginia portion of the metro area. Although county comparisons are able to provide some insight into the effects of Prince William County’s immigration enforcement policies, caution must be used in interpreting these results to avoid making mistaken attributions.

To address these methodological concerns we have adopted a multi-method approach, involving many sources of different types of data. By drawing on a blend of both quantitative and qualitative traditions in our study, each approach informs the other and allow for triangulation of data sources and methods. When multiple sources of varying types of data reveal similar findings, confidence in the validity of the findings grows exponentially.

## 1.5 Structure of the Report

In Section 2, we describe the political and social dynamics that led to the Board of County Supervisors’ decision to restrict services to illegal immigrants and mandate that the Police Department conduct immigration status checks. That section also describes how the County police and staff developed workable procedures to carry out the Board’s mandates.

Section 3 discusses and lists the various goals of the County’s immigration policy, lists some key unintended consequences that might have resulted from the policy, and identifies a few of the possible obstacles to the policy’s successful execution. The remainder of the report is devoted to evaluation of the Police Department’s experience in carrying out the policy, assessment of whether the policy’s several distinct goals were realized, and consideration of whether the unintended negative consequences actually emerged.

Section 4 provides a description of criminal justice processing in Prince William County over time—prior to the initial policy, after the first policy (General Order 45) and after the revised policy (General Order 45.01). Sections 5 and 6 examine the policies’ implementation in detail. The focus in these sections is assessment of the implementation process itself, and consideration of some of the obstacles that implementation might have faced. Section 5 investigates the experiences that the Police Department had in training its officers, implementing the policies, and communicating the policies’ intent to the public. This section also considers the costs of the implementation. Section 6, in turn, examines how Prince William County magistrates and other officials, including personnel from US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of the Department of Homeland Security, worked with the Police Department and jail staff to enforce immigration law. These sections rely on documents about the policies, including the Board of County Supervisors’ resolutions, the Police



Department's policies and training materials, and presentations and letters to the Board. They also rely on interviews and focus groups with County staff, including police department personnel, and other community stakeholders, as well as the results of our two anonymous surveys of the police officers.

In sections 7 through 11 we turn to our assessments of whether each of the policy's main goals was met.<sup>9</sup> Section 7 examines a variety of data sources and proxy measures to determine whether the number of illegal immigrants in the County was reduced by the policy. This section also examines ways in which the demographic structure of the County's Hispanic community changed after the policy's introduction.

In section 8 we turn our attention to analyzing the policy's effects as these relate to public safety and the Police Department. This section uses quantitative information from the Police Department (including calls for service data and Uniform Crime Reports data) to focus on an analysis of trends in crime and calls for service to examine whether or not the policy may have contributed to change in either.

Section 9 looks at neighborhood problems such as overcrowded housing, loitering, and property upkeep to see if these were ameliorated by the introduction of the policy. A variety of indicators and data sources are used, especially data from our interviews, the community surveys, and statistics reported by the Division of Neighborhood Services.

Because the Police Department assumes that good policing requires strong police-community relations, section 10 draws on data from the annual community surveys to investigate the effects that the policy may have had on those relations. This section benefits greatly from the fact that we have on hand survey data collected in years prior to the policy's introduction, allowing real assessments of attitude changes for various subgroups of County residents. These results relate to the County's goal of implementing the policy in a way that would maintain the reputation of its Police Department for professionalism and fairness.

Section 11 considers possible effects of the policy on the County's reputation as an inclusive community. This section uses results of the annual community surveys to examine how Prince William County and its government are perceived by Hispanics (and others) who live in the County. Again, data from years before the policy's introduction are compared to data from the most recent years. This section also uses data on demand for home mortgages from Hispanics, and Hispanic population trends in the region, to gain some insight into how Hispanics in other parts of the metropolitan region view Prince William as a possible place to live.

We summarize our overall conclusions in section 12, and briefly consider some of the implications of our findings. As already noted, we conclude that the Prince William Immigration policy was smoothly implemented by the Prince William County Police Department and County staff; that the policy had wide-ranging effects, some of which were those intended; and that it also fell short of achieving some of its goals.

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<sup>9</sup> One goal, that of saving money by denying services to illegal immigrants, was not directly investigated in this research and is therefore not treated in a separate section of the report.

## 2 The Policy's History

To comprehend how the County's immigration enforcement policy was formulated, it is necessary to understand the policy's genesis in Prince William County's population growth, the effects of that growth, and the increased visibility of immigrants within the county. It is also important to understand the national political climate, and the way in which the immigration debate was framed.

Disentangling the initial motivations of the policy is challenging because several groups of people took part in shaping the policy over time, and those people had different ideas for what the policy should accomplish. In their interviews, people attributed diverse motivations to those who proposed, modified, passed, and then amended the policy. Some of those descriptions agreed with the descriptions provided by the key actors themselves; others did not. Also, a few key actors expressed multiple—occasionally contradictory—motivations.

### 2.1 Population Growth in Prince William County

The one part of the policy's history that seems clear is that it grew out of change in Prince William County. For many years, much of the county had been a rural area beyond the boundaries of Washington, D.C.'s suburbs. It surrounded the city of Manassas in its northwest section and included a stretch of the Interstate 95 corridor in its southwest section, where some modest D.C. suburbs existed. As Washington and its inner suburbs became increasingly expensive and pressure for housing grew, housing developments and shopping areas sprouted in Prince William County.

**Table 2-1: Prince William County Population 1960–2006**


Year	Total population Count	% Hispanic	% Black
1960	50,164	N/A	7.9
1970	111,102	2.1	5.2
1980	144,703	2.3	8.2
1990	215,686	4.5	11.4
2000	280,813	9.7	18.8
2006 (est.)	357,503	19.1	18.3

Table 2-1 shows the county's growth since 1960, before the Interstates were built. With population growth came increased population diversity. The county's African-American population grew notably between 1970 and 2000. Growth in the Hispanic population came later, starting in the 1990's, then accelerating, and almost doubling in percentage terms between 2000 and 2006.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> U. S. Census Bureau (1960–2000). U. S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey (2007). Prior to the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census, respondents were only able to select a single race. In both the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2005–2009 American Community Survey, however, respondents could be categorized as being of “two or more races.” When reporting information for these recent surveys, our table includes only the total population of blacks in PWC who selected being “black or African American alone.” In the 2000 Decennial Census, an additional 10,178 respondents from PWC (3.6% of the population) selected being of “two or more races;” they are not represented in this table. Similarly, 9,217 respondents (2.6% of the population) in PWC selected being of “two or more races” in the 2005–2007 American Community Survey; they are also not represented in this table.

The growth in the Hispanic Population in Prince William County significantly exceeded the growth in the Hispanic population in surrounding counties between 2000 and 2006, as indicated in Figure 2-1 below.

**Figure 2-1: Growth in Proportion of Hispanic Population, by County, 2000-2007<sup>11</sup>**



Historically, the County has been largely successful in integrating and accepting the diverse newcomers. This is evidenced in the results of the Center for Survey Research's annual Citizen Survey conducted for the County since 1993. These surveys ask residents for their overall rating of the quality of life in the county and their desire to live there in the future. Historically, African-Americans consistently gave the county high marks on these measures that almost equaled the scores given by white residents. Until recently, Hispanics also gave good ratings to the county as a place to live. Prof. Vickerman carried out a detailed study of the racial experiences of African-American residents of Prince William just a few years ago.<sup>12</sup> His interviews with African-American residents revealed that, overall, black residents, who were comfortable to affluent, enjoyed living in the county because of its quality of life (e.g., services and physical beauty). Most had moved there because of a combination of this quality of life and (at the time) lower real estate prices compared to surrounding counties. (The presence of the Quantico Marine base was another factor drawing blacks to the area.)

We do not wish to paint an overly rosy picture of race relations in the county, however. In their interviews, African American residents also reported continued racial discrimination (though not only in Prince William but throughout the region), such as recurring negative racial experiences on the job, while shopping and, more rarely, with neighbors. It is fair to say, however, that Prince William County has not had a history of unusual racial or ethnic animosity in recent decades.

<sup>11</sup> Data come from 2000 Census and 2009 ACS data comparison tables.

<sup>12</sup> Vickerman (2007).

The county was one of the fastest growing counties in the nation in the 2000–2007 period, with a 28.3% population increase.<sup>13</sup> Further, almost two-thirds of that growth was in the immigrant population, both naturalized citizens and non-citizens (which includes people who are legally in the country as residents or on work visas and those who are in the country illegally).

Fast growth inevitably produces strains as counties find that their infrastructure and social services must be expanded. In Prince William, previously rural roads became congested, schools were full and time on sports fields in the county was at a premium. Additional tensions arose as the Hispanic population grew, increasing from under 10% of the population in 2000 to over 19% of the population in the 2005–2007 period.<sup>14</sup> In addition, 54% of immigrants living in PWC in 2006 were from Latin America, a dramatic rise from the 28% in 2000.<sup>15</sup>

Population growth also affected the schools. In addition to almost 50% growth in the absolute number of students in the school district, which rose from 50,000 to 73,000 between 1998 and 2007, the number of students with limited English proficiency rose from 1362 to 13,404, an almost tenfold increase. The proportion of all PWC students who had limited English proficiency rose from 3% to 18%,<sup>16</sup> making foreign language speaking students a much more visible part of the school population. Much of the growth in foreign language students was among the Hispanic population.

It is important to note that the growth in the Hispanic population occurred unevenly across the county and was particularly strong in the areas around Manassas and Woodbridge.<sup>17</sup> As a result, certain neighborhoods experienced a great deal of change, whereas others experienced far less. For example, in 2000, one elementary school had a population that was over 40 percent Hispanic (43%), and four others had populations between 30 and 38 percent Hispanic. In 2007, seventeen schools had populations that were over 40 percent Hispanic—half of those had student enrollments of 50 percent or more Hispanic.<sup>18</sup> Almost all those schools were located near or in Manassas and Woodbridge.

Therefore, although population growth in general was perceived as a challenge for the county, for some PWC residents the larger problem was the influx of immigrants that had produced new social problems and cultural clashes in their neighborhoods.

The policy was initiated by the elected leadership in response to a growing chorus of community concerns expressed in citizens' time and probably in direct email with Board Supervisors about some community conditions that were viewed as detrimental by most folks here in the county, and those included things like residential overcrowding, a very large number of vehicles associated with one address and parked all over the place, including front lawns, a deterioration of property standards—some of which were violations of our property code; some of which were representatives of cultural differences—such as chickens in the back yard, which clearly is [also] a violation—a different approach to outdoor activity, things being stored outside, vehicles being parked on the lawn, parties...involving music and drinking late at night...and there were some vehicular accidents linked back to illegal immigrants.

Craig Gerhart, Former County Executive

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division (2008, March 20).

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Census Bureau (2000–2007).

<sup>15</sup> Singer et al (2009).

<sup>16</sup> Virginia Department of Education (2007).

<sup>17</sup> Singer et al (2009).

<sup>18</sup> Virginia Department of Education (2008).

Our neighborhoods were being overrun by Hispanics who were buying houses and moving 10 gentlemen in, parking on the lawns, there were gangs, and the politicians were responding to the community.

In PWC, there was a lot of growth, a lot of building going on, and so there were a lot of laborers here in order to build those houses....And it wasn't one family per house, one mom, dad, children—it was 10 men, 10 cars and drinking all night and being disruptive in a quiet neighborhood.

Former PWC Resident who Works in the  
County

There had been some efforts to deal with problems associated with illegal immigration—major overcrowding. And there were attempts in Manassas city to do something to address this and the result was that...advocacy groups—all pretty much from outside—descended on City Hall to prevent them from taking any action to prevent overcrowding...—there was a great amount of frustration—[the Manassas residents] felt under-armed and ill-prepared to deal with the issues—not only did the residential overcrowding continue but it got worse and worse and worse. As the influx continued, there was massive immigration—people having their parked cars hit by someone who doesn't have a driver's license and doesn't speak English, illegal immigrants who had committed crimes, it raised people's consciousness.

Greg Letiecq, President, Help Save Manassas

Advocates against the policy, in contrast to those who supported it, did not think that housing overcrowding was responsible for the policy.<sup>19</sup>

People welcome diversity in moderation, and we think this particular group was uncomfortable with the changing demographics here and were looking to drive people away.

Nancy Lyall, Mexicans Without Borders

Similarly, during a focus group a few patrol officers indicated that after the policy went into effect they saw evidence that some supporters of the policy viewed it as a way of ridding their neighborhoods of Hispanics in general and not just illegal immigrants. It is not uncommon to see conflicts develop in urban neighborhoods between ethnic or racial groups with differing lifestyles as they compete for jobs, living space and arenas for cultural expression. For some of the residents involved, ethnic and language differences can become a symbol of competing interests and definitions of community boundaries. These processes can develop in changing suburban neighborhoods as easily as they do in the city neighborhoods that urban sociologists have so richly described in the past (for example, Hunter 1974, Suttles 1972).<sup>20</sup> In fact, research in both Europe and the United States has shown that anti-immigrant sentiment tends to be greater (among the dominant groups) in

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<sup>19</sup> It is difficult to know to what extent overcrowded housing existed in the county. According to federal housing estimates, the number of housing units in Prince William County grew from 98,000 to 134,000 between 2000 and 2007, a 37% increase. The average number of people per unit actually declined from 2.8 people to 2.6 people. These figures, of course, do not account for illegal immigrants, for which there is no good estimate, but if we assume that illegal immigrants added an extra 40,000 to the county's population, the average number of people per housing unit would only have risen to 3 people. It is likely that overcrowding was less of a problem than indicated, but that there were some visible cases that affected people's perceptions.


<sup>20</sup> Hunter (1974); Suttles (1972).

areas where there are large numbers of immigrants and/or when these groups perceive an increase in the size of minority groups in their areas.<sup>21</sup>

## 2.2 The Economic Downturn

Although not yet obvious, an economic slowdown began to be felt in Prince William County by 2006, which may have contributed to the policy's genesis. The number of construction permits issued each year, which had grown dramatically in the county between 2000 and 2005, began to fall precipitously in 2006, as Figure 2-2 indicates.

**Figure 2-2: Number of Building Permits Issued by Year**



Along with the decline in construction permits came a decline in the number of construction jobs. These economic pressures may have contributed to the dissatisfaction over illegal immigration in Prince William County. As the number of construction jobs fell, work for day laborers probably diminished, and the day labor sites, where primarily Hispanic men congregated, may have had more

<sup>21</sup> McLaren (2003); Alba et al (2005); Berg (2009). Recent research by Berg (2009) has shown that core networks mediate conflicts between whites and immigrants, either strengthening or weakening them. Specifically, participation by white Americans in tighter or older core networks is associated with less tolerance for immigrants, while involvement in educated networks, or those involving non-whites, correlates with greater tolerance toward immigrants.

people standing around for longer portions of the day. In addition, as employment became tighter in the county, native-born residents may have become increasingly resentful of people who were being hired when they were in the country illegally. Although these pressures may have been present in surrounding counties, several factors probably ignited the debate around illegal immigration in Prince William County.

### **2.3 National and Local Efforts to Restrict Illegal Immigration**

Tensions in Prince William County over undocumented immigrants reflect broader tensions nationwide, as these immigrants have increasingly moved to non-traditional destinations. One aspect of this demographic shift, resulting from efforts in the early 1990s to close the nation's southern border, has seen undocumented immigrants move to such upper Midwestern and western states as Iowa, Nebraska, Arizona and Colorado. An even more pronounced movement has been occurring along the eastern seaboard, with states in that part of the country—especially in the South—reporting significant spikes in their Hispanic populations. For instance, between 1990 and 2005 the number of Hispanics in Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee increased by over 200 percent. Maryland, South Carolina, and Virginia registered an increase of between 100 and 200 percent.<sup>22</sup> The other relevant aspect of the recent wave of Hispanic migrants is that many are increasingly bypassing cities and going directly to suburbs.<sup>23</sup> Northern Virginia, in general, and Prince William County in particular, are examples of this trend.

A national political debate has grown over how to address problems perceived as arising from the growth in immigration. In the national debate, groups critical of immigration—notably the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)—argue that competition from illegal immigrants hurts American workers and businesses and that immigrants are straining local school and human services budgets. For FAIR and these other groups, immigration needs to be reduced and illegal immigration, especially, needs to be halted. In contrast, groups sympathetic to immigrants argue that American employers are partially responsible for the growth in immigration because they hire immigrants for jobs that native born Americans will not take. This debate has resulted in a number of local strategies, ranging from attempts to provide sanctuary to illegal immigrants to attempts to remove them from communities.

Prior to the actions taken by the Prince William Board of County Supervisors, efforts had been made in other northern Virginia communities to restrict illegal immigration. The Town of Herndon had attempted to prevent day laborers from congregating, and it established a 287(g) agreement with the Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) in 2007. The Manassas City Council (Manassas is an independently governed city surrounded by Prince William County) passed a resolution in December 2005 that restricted extended families from living in one home in order to address what its advocates saw as overcrowding in homes that was above legal limits. After widespread questions about its legality and strong advocacy from Mexicans Without Borders and a fair housing organization, the Council rescinded its policy in January 2006.

### **2.4 Participants in Crafting the Policy**

As with all public policies, a range of people were involved in crafting and presenting the policy to the Prince William Board of County Supervisors. Among the key players were citizens who belonged

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<sup>22</sup> Van Hook et al (2005, September).

<sup>23</sup> Singer et al (2008, April).

to Help Save Manassas, a local activist group formed to limit illegal immigration in the county. This group, although perceived by some of our informants as far to the right of the political center, generated extensive, vocal public support for the policy. A County supervisor worked with the Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI), an affiliate of FAIR, to craft the initial language of the proposal. The Chairman of the Board of County Supervisors was vocal in his support of the proposal during his re-election campaign in fall 2007. By early October of 2007, as seen in a *Washington Post* survey of the region, 61% of likely voters in Northern Virginia called illegal immigration a problem where they lived. In Prince William, “half of all residents called immigration the most or second-most important issue facing the state, and a majority classified illegal immigration as a very serious local problem.”<sup>24</sup> Other supervisors, also up for re-election in the fall, voted for various versions of the policy but suggested that additional work be done to ascertain the feasibility of implementing the resolution as initially proposed. Finally, the County Executive, County Attorney, Chief of the County Police Department, and their staffs were all involved in making modifications to the resolution.

## 2.5 The Initial June 2007 Immigration Enforcement Proposal

At the June 25, 2007 regular Board of County Supervisors meeting, Supervisor John Stirrup proposed a policy resolution restricting social services to illegal immigrants and directing the police department to inquire into the immigration status of everyone detained<sup>25</sup> in routine work. At that point, therefore, the policy was expressly directed toward all illegal immigrants.

Overall, interviews with the police, County staff and some of the supervisors indicated that the proposal, its breadth and the speed with which its proponents pushed for a decision took them by surprise:

Supervisor Stirrup brought this up and said, “I have an issue with illegal immigration and here’s this policy I’d like you to take a look at, and I’d like to vote on it in two weeks,” which is generally our policy. You can introduce an issue and vote on it in two weeks. [But] this is not your typical issue, obviously there were a lot of broad issues that we had to consider and that’s why it took us some time to go through the analysis and also arrive at the policy position that we have today, which is significantly different than the one that was first introduced.

...My first reaction was that this was not something you could decide on in two weeks; my initial reaction was that it was kind of, um, sudden. But at the same time I thought...it was at least something that merited consideration, we had already established a 287(g) program in our jail about six months prior to that, where we were basically having our jail identify inmates who were not legally present and give their names to immigration and customs enforcement, and the idea of extending that training to the police in appropriate circumstances, again, mainly related to what I would call criminal illegal aliens.

Supervisor Michael May

Despite the surprise, there were earlier indications that immigration enforcement was becoming an issue in the county. In 2005, as the City of Herndon was cracking down on day laborer sites, a Prince William County supervisor requested the Board’s permission to convene a task force to look into how to better manage such sites in PWC. The task force recommended that the County apply for federal money to create an indoor site in a commercial area, but the supervisors did not discuss the report in any detail:

<sup>24</sup> Washington Post (2007, October 24).

<sup>25</sup> The definition of “detained” refers to people stopped by the police for diverse reasons ranging from traffic violations, being intoxicated in public to questioning them about criminal activity.



It got no reception at all, the board received the report, they didn't want a presentation, and the political instincts of the board were already attuned to the fact that this was not an issue that they would be successful with—if they were willing to accommodate day laborers. Then [things] got quiet until [the immigration enforcement issue] resurfaced in the fall and winter of 2007.

Craig Gerhart, Former County Executive

In May 2007, a Freedom of Information Act [FOIA] request was filed with the County Attorney's Office for the release of a Police Department policy, General Order 26.05, pertaining to the Department's approach to immigration status checks, which were limited. Following the Department's custom of refusing to release the Department's general orders, which specified police procedures and thus could potentially place the Department's staff in hazardous situations, Chief Charlie T. Deane refused the request.<sup>26</sup>

On June 5, 2007, Supervisor Stirrup requested a copy of the general order, and on June 12<sup>th</sup>, the County Attorney received another FOIA request for General Order 26.05, which the Chief then decided to release in order to quell suspicion that the Police Department was hiding something or that the policy was intended to protect illegal immigrants, which some residents believed.<sup>27</sup> In fact, the leader of Help Save Manassas referred to it in an interview as "akin to a sanctuary policy." In addition to his decision to release the document, the Chief also wrote a letter to the Board of County Supervisors that detailed the reason for his decision.

In the two weeks following the policy's introduction on June 25, 2007, advocates for the policy organized an email and telephone campaign aimed at convincing the Board of County Supervisors to vote to support it. Their tactics proved to be well chosen. As a subsequent political analysis in the *Washington Post* put it, "In the end, the quiet, coordinated, Internet-savvy lobbying efforts of the pro crack-down camp won over...the mass mobilization techniques of their opponents." Supervisors indicated that their constituents were very concerned about the issue; they received numerous e-mails and faxes.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, County staff and the Police Department requested that the Board give them time to study the proposal and ensure its legality and feasibility.

From the Police Chief's point of view, mandating the Department to inquire into the immigration status of all detainees (as was required in the original policy and general order number 45.0) would severely drain Department and other County resources, expand the role of the Department's mission beyond traditional policing and into what has traditionally been a federal responsibility, impact public trust in a negative manner among immigrant communities leading to fear of cooperation in reporting crime and assisting police, set unrealistic expectations and would not address things such as day laborer issues. He was also concerned that it would lead to further jail overcrowding.

From the County Attorney's point of view, a clause in the initial draft noting that citizens could request a writ of mandamus from the courts if County departments and agencies did not follow the mandate potentially placed County staff in additional legal jeopardy, primarily by indicating that the Board supported such citizen actions. And from the County Executive's point of view, there needed to be careful assessment of County services that could legally be withheld from illegal immigrants, were already being withheld as a result of state or federal law, or could legally be withheld but not without financial or other costs to the County and its residents.

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<sup>26</sup> For a profile of Chief Deane, see Mack (2008, July 24).

<sup>27</sup> Deane (2007b, June 15).

<sup>28</sup> *Washington Post* (2007, November 4).

By July 10, 2007, when the resolution was passed into law by the Board, several changes had been made. Instead of directing the police to ask after the immigration status of all people detained, it mandated them to ask about immigration status if there was “probable cause” to believe that the detainee might not have legal documentation to be in the United States. The Board directed the Police Department to define “probable cause.” The redrafted resolution also directed the County staff and the Police Department to undertake reviews of the policy’s impact on their operations: The County staff had 90 days to review the potential effects of withholding County services from illegal immigrants, and the Police Department had 60 days to figure out a way to implement the policy.

## 2.6 Refining the Policy and General Order 45

In the following 90 days, County agencies, working closely with the County Attorney and County Executive, discovered that relatively few services that were not already denied to illegal immigrants could be withheld. Many services, such as TANF, child care subsidies and health insurance, are already restricted to legal immigrants and citizens. Others, including public health services such as immunizations, are focused on ensuring the safety of a population, and excluding certain groups from those services is potentially dangerous to other residents. Denying the use of roads and County parks would be impractical. The County staff, however, found eight relatively small programs that could legally and practicably be restricted to legal residents. They included home repair assistance and a tax break for elderly residents.

The Police Department began its own careful study of immigration law and the potential for local intervention in an issue under federal jurisdiction. The Board had never asked the Police Department to implement a policy change of this magnitude in such a short period of time. In an August 31, 2007 report to the Board of County Supervisors, the Chief outlined a new policy, General Order 45: “The Police Department will investigate the citizenship or immigration status of any person who is lawfully detained for a violation of a state law or County ordinance, if there is probable cause to believe such person is in violation of federal immigration law and when such inquiry will not expand the duration of the detention. Racial profiling is expressly prohibited, as emphasized in existing General Order 2.01, Section C, 56.”<sup>29</sup> In addition to the new general order, the Chief suggested the creation of a new “criminal alien unit,” whose officers would receive 287(g) training and be authorized by Immigration and Customs Enforcement to act on its behalf and issue federal detainers on illegal immigrants.

Chief Deane had four major concerns about the original resolution (general order No. 45) that he wanted to address in the policy’s implementation:<sup>30</sup>

Immigrants would feel intimidated, trust the police less and be less willing to report crimes, resulting in a more dangerous community.

Residents who supported the policy might have expectations surpassing the local police department’s authority to address the immigration issue. For example, although police officers can check the federal databases for criminal immigration warrants and act on criminal warrants that exist, they have no authority to detain illegal immigrants who have no criminal warrants and who have not committed a local criminal offense. To address those concerns, the Chief requested that the Board of County Supervisors authorize an extensive public education campaign about the policy.

The policy could result in lawsuits of racial profiling against the Police Department. To address this concern as much as possible, he suggested that the Board provide sufficient funds to provide ade-

<sup>29</sup> Deane (2007a).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

quate training to all officers. As we shall see, the training only partially addressed his concerns about vulnerability to allegations of racial profiling, and his concerns grew over the coming months.

Jail overcrowding, already a problem, would intensify. ICE, the Chief pointed out, did not have its own jail facilities, and if the County jailed larger numbers of people, the already overcrowded Adult Detention Center might become more so.

In developing General Order 45 for carrying out the PWC Board's mandate, PWCPD examined federal and state laws pertaining to immigration; consulted with prosecutorial authorities including the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Virginia Attorney General, the Virginia Commonwealth's Attorney's Office, and the County Attorney's Office for Prince William County; investigated research and other documents on immigration enforcement efforts around the country; and participated in national forums on immigration. In total, PWCPD estimates that it devoted 1,200 personnel hours to this effort.

PWCPD planned a three-pronged approach:

1. Make the following required changes:
  - a. Replace the existing Immigration Enforcement Policy (General Order 26) by developing a new policy that would comply with the BOCS resolution. (The new policy would be known as General Order 45, later amended to General Order 45.01.)
  - b. Create the Criminal Alien Unit – acquire Fed authority (287g).
2. Implement an extensive public education program to inform the public of the facts regarding the new initiative.
3. Retain a research group to evaluate the impacts of the new policy.

In crafting its policy for conducting immigration checks, PWCPD was limited by the fact that local jurisdictions do not have the authority to enforce federal immigration laws. Consequently, PWCPD officers cannot detain or arrest persons solely for suspicion of being an illegal immigrant. However, local officers do have the authority to check the immigration status of persons who are lawfully detained for suspicion of violating state or local statutes. (This was true even before the policy.) If a suspected illegal immigrant has not committed an offense requiring arrest under state or local law, an officer may arrest the subject under certain circumstances: i.e., there is a criminal ICE detainer for the subject; the subject is a convicted felon who was previously deported;<sup>31</sup> or the officer has reason to believe that the subject will not appear in court to answer for a summons offense (e.g., due to being in the country illegally).<sup>32</sup> Absent these circumstances, however, officers cannot arrest a person for being an unauthorized immigrant.

In keeping with the PWC Board's mandate that PWCPD undertake a cooperative 287(g) enforcement program with ICE, PWCPD also established a 7-member Criminal Alien Unit (CAU) to undergo federal 287(g) training. PWCPD allocated six officers and a crime analyst to CAU and tasked them with a mission to focus specifically on the apprehension and deportation of serious

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<sup>31</sup> This provision is specified under Virginia law.

<sup>32</sup> Circumstances under which this might occur include summonses for driving without an operator's license or committing a summons offense and the subject's identity cannot be verified

immigrant offenders and to conduct special investigations into operations like document mills that provide false identification. PWCPD has kept the CAU focused on serious offenders and has not used the unit to conduct sweeps or round-ups of suspected illegal immigrants.

Finally, PWCPD designed a public education effort with two broad goals. One was to assuage fear and distrust that the policy might cause in the immigrant community. The other goal was to inform the broader public, and particularly those in favor of the policy, as to what the police could and could not do under the policy.

## 2.7 The October 2007 Resolutions

Given the legal and practical challenges to the initial (July 2007) proposal, the Board of County Supervisors passed two resolutions pertaining to the policy in October 2007. The first, passed on October 2, 2007, accepted the reports of the Chief and the County Executive and directed the Police Chief to make General Order 45 public.<sup>33</sup> The second resolution was formally brought up for consideration at the October 16<sup>th</sup> Board meeting. After a tumultuous public hearing at a Board meeting that lasted until 2:30 am on October 17,<sup>34</sup> the Board of County Supervisors voted unanimously in favor of the new illegal immigration enforcement policy. The resolution that accomplished several tasks: It directed County staff to restrict eight local service programs to those with legal documentation to be in the US. It also directed the Chief to implement General Order 45 by March 1, 2008, establish a seven-person criminal alien unit, conduct a public information campaign, and hire a qualified evaluator. It also directed funds toward those efforts. The resolution passed at the end of the October 16<sup>th</sup> meeting thus allowed several months for the Police Department to implement the policy. General Order 45.01 is shown in full in Appendix A. In this report we refer to the policy passed on October 16<sup>th</sup> as the “initial policy.” General Order 45.01, effective March 3, 2008, stated:

“... if there is probable cause to believe a person is in violation of federal immigration law and when such inquiry will not unlawfully expand the duration of the detention, it is the policy of this Department that officers *shall* investigate the citizenship or immigration status of a person who is lawfully detained for a violation of state law or county ordinance.”

An important aspect of this sequence of events was the public, extended, and sometimes acrimonious nature of the debate over the proposed policy. Press coverage was continuous and sometimes shrill. The national media picked up the story; it was in the local papers, the Spanish press,<sup>35</sup> the *Washington Post*, and played on cable news shows. The press brought heightened attention to the sentiments of the policy’s proponents, the consternation of the policy’s opponents, and the fears

<sup>33</sup> This addressed the Chief’s concern that if the actual language of some of the Police Department’s general orders were made public, the Department might lose its legal ability to restrict the release of other general orders that could put police officers at risk. The resolution explicitly stated that the release of General Order 45 did not waive the Department’s or the Board of Supervisor’s rights to exempt other general orders from Freedom of Information Act requests.

<sup>34</sup> *Washington Post* (2007, October 17).

<sup>35</sup> See, for example, Prince William: Una Tierra Prohibida [Prince William: A Prohibited Land]. (2007, February 29), *Washington Hispanic*, p. 1. The banner headline accompanied a Spanish-language news story that begins: “For many years the United States was considered by many immigrants as the land of promises, not only for the work opportunities but also for the quality of life improvements it could offer families. But, on March 3rd a new anti-immigrant resolution goes into effect that gives the police the authority to act like immigration agents in Prince William, in the state of Virginia, and change this region into a land prohibited for undocumented people...the measure has provoked a mass exodus of immigrants to other neighboring states that are more friendly to immigrant communities.” [Translation: Nicole Fedoravicius.]

and concerns of local Hispanic residents. There can be no doubt that this visible and rancorous community conflict played a role in the subsequent responses of some residents. Thus, while our primary concern is to evaluate the policy's effects, these cannot be completely separated from the effects of the public conflict that surrounded the policy from the start.

## 2.8 Further Modifications to the Policy and General Order 45.01

In late fall 2007 and early winter 2008, as the Police Department prepared to implement General Order 45.01, the Chief and the County Attorney's Office became increasingly concerned about the probability of unfounded racial lawsuits against the department.<sup>36</sup> At issue was the "probable cause" standard in General Order 45, which mandated officers to inquire into immigration status if they had probable cause to think a person might be in the country illegally. In the view of the Chief, the issue was not *if* the department would become subject to those complaints and lawsuits, but *when*. Emotions in the county were running high, local and national newspapers were covering the issue, and online blogs on both sides were very active. Training his officers was one safeguard against such lawsuits, but the Chief also thought that the Department would benefit from cameras in patrol cars. Cameras would provide the evidence to protect officers from unfounded lawsuits as part of the Department's overall risk management approach. For this reason, PWCPD advocated the purchase of cameras for all patrol cars so that encounters between police and citizens would be recorded and could be available for use in court if needed.

The cost of the cameras—an estimated \$3.2 million—was prohibitive in a county that was facing numerous housing foreclosures, dropping home values and reduced tax revenues. In lieu of cameras, a modification to the policy was proposed and passed by the Board on April 29, 2008, which mandated officers to conduct immigration checks only of arrestees. In this report, we refer to this policy as the "revised" or "amended" policy. The revised General Order 45.01, which is shown in Appendix A, reads:

"Officers ***shall*** investigate the citizenship or immigration status of all persons who are arrested for a violation of a state law or county ordinance when such arrest results in a physical custodial arrest."

Pre-arrest immigration status checks could still be conducted at the officer's discretion.<sup>37</sup>

After rescinding the original General Order 45.01 at the end of April 2008, PWCPD formulated and later implemented the new policy (revised General Order 45.01) on July 1, 2008. This policy remains in effect today. An important benefit to the current (revised) policy in the view of PWCPD is that it more clearly focuses immigration efforts on those who have committed criminal acts, a policy for which there seems to be more public consensus. Although post-arrest immigration status checks were already being done in the Adult Detention Center, where everyone's status was being checked under the 287(g) agreement that had been put into place the previous July, the new resolution also covered individuals who were arrested but not detained in the Adult Detention Center. Those people constituted a significant portion of all arrested persons.

## 2.9 The Role of the Policy's Opponents

We have said little about those people who opposed the policy, primarily because they had little impact on how it was shaped, although there were residents and community leaders who opposed

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<sup>36</sup> Racial profiling is specifically prohibited by PWCPD policy.

<sup>37</sup> PWCPD may still find itself open to charges of racial profiling in the conduct of these discretionary inquiries. Nonetheless, as discussed elsewhere in the report, this has not been an issue thus far.

the policy. Mexicans Without Borders, a left-of-center immigration support and advocacy group that had organized to oppose the Manassas housing zoning policy, appeared to have been caught off guard when the resolution was proposed in June and passed in July 2007. However, it quickly organized during summer and fall 2007, marshalling a rally in front of a County office building and a week-long boycott of local businesses. The group also encouraged people to attend Board of Supervisor meetings to speak out against the resolution.

The opponents' limited impact in the debate over the resolution was probably due to several factors. The debate took place in an election year, and some believe that the fact that many members of Mexicans Without Borders are not citizens and cannot vote meant that supervisors would not include them in their political calculations for the elections.<sup>38</sup> Second, several people have said that differences in strategies between the policy's proponents and opponents contributed to the opponents' lack of success in altering the policy.<sup>39</sup> The organization Help Save Manassas organized an email campaign to the supervisors in support of the policy, and County supervisors indicated that they had received many emails from citizens. Mexicans Without Borders organized demonstrations. For supervisors facing elections, the individual, written opinions of registered voters in their districts probably resonated more than the speeches of leaders of an advocacy group. Finally, the initial (July 2007) resolution was passed so quickly that it took the opposition by surprise, and they were late to organize.

Even though Mexicans Without Borders and other residents who opposed the resolution were unsuccessful in altering it, they became visible in the local and national press and helped shape the community debate about what the policy's effects would be. From their perspective, the policy was anti-immigrant, tainted with racism, and would lead to legal immigrants leaving the county because they would be afraid and feel unwelcome in the community.

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<sup>38</sup> McKelvey (2007, November 6).

<sup>39</sup> *Washington Post* (4 November 2007), op. cit.

### **3 The Goals of the Immigration Policy, Possible Unintended Consequences, and Implementation Obstacles**

A fundamental step in evaluating the effectiveness of any new policy is to determine its goals. This is not always a straightforward task, because policies are created and implemented through complex governmental and political processes that involve many actors and interests. Those who seek to influence a proposed policy decision may differ in their goals and are not always open in expressing their goals. Those on one side of a policy debate may give distorted accounts of the “goals” or motivations of those on the other side. It is also not unusual for policy goals to shift or become altered as the policy proceeds from initial proposals to legislative passage to implementation by the executive departments of government. On the other hand, it is part of the policy process that consensus is usually reached on a policy’s goals by the time it is put into law and implemented by the government. Through our intensive interviews with members of the Board of County Supervisors, County officials, and key local activists and community representatives who were part of the policy debate, we have been able to identify a set of goals that reflects the general consensus among those who passed and implemented the County’s illegal immigration enforcement policy.

#### **3.1 The policy’s goals**

In its narrowest formulation, the County’s current Immigration Enforcement Policy is aimed at identifying and removing from the community illegal aliens who commit serious crimes. The public debate and our interviews make clear, however, that the resolutions passed by the Board (which included provisions to deny County services to illegal residents) were also intended to reduce the number of illegal immigrants in the County. Some actors in the drama of the resolution’s passage had quite different goals. Some in the community who advocated the policy made clear (in their blog entries and in confidential comments in our citizen surveys) that they were hoping to “take back the County” by reversing the tide of rapid in-migration of Hispanics to Prince William County. However, it is clear both from the public record and from our private interviews that this was not a shared goal of the County Supervisors who unanimously passed and then unanimously modified the resolutions.<sup>40</sup> The focus of the board was clearly on illegal immigration. There was much discussion in the public debate about the costs to the County that resulted from the influx of illegal immigrants, and reducing those costs must be recognized as one of the policy’s goals. There is no doubt that advocacy of the policy helped to advance the political goals of some Board members who were running for office in the 2007 elections, but this must be viewed as a secondary gain for the politicians and not as a goal of the County government. Some of the concerns raised by opponents of the policy were shared by members of the Board and the County government: for example, the concern that instituting a harsh immigration policy might adversely affect police-community relations and thus make it harder to prevent crime from occurring, or the concern that accusations of racial profiling might result. These concerns were eventually addressed in both the revised resolution and the formal implementation plans of the Police Department, County Attorney, and County staff, so that avoiding racial profiling and maintaining good relations with the Hispanic community became explicit goals of the policy implementation. The resolution passed by the Board on April 29, 2008, which modified the policy into its current form, makes explicit mention of “the risk of false allegations of ‘racial profiling’ against police officers,” and the Board’s responsibility for “managing legal and other risk in County operations, including law enforcement.” It also states that the modification of the serves “to emphasize and clarify that Police Department actions are to be directed at illegal aliens who commit crimes in the County.”

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<sup>40</sup>No local government in the United States could legitimately or legally propose or implement a policy aimed at discriminating against or “keeping out” a racial, ethnic, or nationality group.

Our analysis of the policy process and our interviews with those who advocated, created, implemented, and modified the immigration policy yields the following list of six goals that the Prince William County Immigration Enforcement Policy was designed to achieve:

- 1) Reduce the number of illegal immigrants in the county;
- 2) Improve public safety and reduce crime;
- 3) Reduce overcrowded housing problems, neighborhood nuisances and public disorder, such as loitering at day labor sites and public intoxication;
- 4) Save money by delivering fewer services to illegal immigrants;
- 5) Maintain the Prince William County Police Department's reputation for professionalism, and maintain community confidence and trust in police;
- 6) Maintain County's reputation as an inclusive community, both internally (among its current residents) and externally (among people outside the County).

Unfortunately, we have not been able to gather any data regarding the fourth goal (saving money by delivering fewer services), as our work has focused on the work of the police department, the effect of their work on the community, and the effect of the policy on policing. It should be noted that, after careful study by the County staff, it turned out that only a few services could legally be denied to illegal immigrants by the County, due to a variety of regulations surrounding health and welfare services that are funded with Federal dollars. (These services are listed in an attachment to the resolution of October 16, 2007, shown in Appendix A.) It is doubtful, therefore, that any large cost savings were realized through the 'denial of service' sections of the immigration enforcement resolution. On the other hand, there was a potential for cost saving in the County schools if the number of ESOL students was reduced by the policy. Our data gathering does include trends in ESOL enrollments (reported in section 7.3.1), but we have not attempted to translate enrollments into dollar costs or cost savings.

### **3.2 Possible unintended consequences of the policy**

A comprehensive policy evaluation must attend not only to a policy's goals but also to its unintended consequences, especially to undesirable consequences. Numerous concerns were raised during the policy debate about adverse results that might occur if the policy were implemented. Our evaluation has been especially attentive to the following possible, adverse consequences that could have occurred. The policy might:

- H) Facilitate overzealous or inappropriate enforcement actions by police;
- I) Generate a flood of costly litigation against the Police Department and the County government;
- J) Overburden the Police Department to the point of reducing its effectiveness;
- K) Generate administrative costs far greater than anticipated at the time of adoption;
- L) Create fear and a sense of being unwelcome among immigrants in general;
- M) Cause *legal* immigrants, or Hispanics generally, to leave the county; and
- N) Result in lower crime reporting from the Hispanic community, or even increase their victimization.

As will be seen in our evaluation, most of these consequences did not in fact occur.



### 3.3 Implementation obstacles

Finally, our evaluation was attentive to possible implementation obstacles that might prevent the policy from achieving its goals. We wondered if ICE, the Federal agency responsible for processing illegal aliens who are turned over to their custody, would be able to handle the increased workload. Would the local jail be able to hold the new detainees? Would there be money to pay for placement of detainees in outside facilities? There were concerns that police supervisors would be overburdened with supervisory duties in connection with the actions of line officers in processing inquiries into the immigration status of persons encountered in the field. We wondered if patrol officers would understand the policy's legal complexities and whether they would cooperate fully in carrying out their new duties and the new documentation requirements accompanying the policy's implementation.

In summary, the chapters that follow will evaluate the County's immigration policy primarily by assessing the degree to which its identified goals were achieved. We will also consider whether the policy had adverse, unintended consequences, and will evaluate the degree to which implementation obstacles were significant in affecting the policy's outcomes. We will thus be evaluating both the implementation process as the Police Department put the policy into effect, and the outcomes of the policy for the Department and the community it serves. The watershed decision of the Board in April 2008 to modify the police enforcement policy, just two months after its implementation, was surely consequential for the policy's outcomes, but as will be seen below there is evidence that the original policy—and the very public controversy that was generated by its consideration and adoption—also played an important role in determining what happened.

## 4 Criminal Justice Processing of Illegal Immigrants in Prince William County

Before describing the experiences of PWCPD and other criminal justice agencies with the immigration policy and 287(g) process in PWC, we first describe the process by which these agencies handle known and suspected illegal immigrants. We first discuss processing of suspected illegal immigrants by PWCPD under the current version of its immigration enforcement policy, General Order 45.01, which has been in effect since July 2008. We then discuss the handling of illegal immigrants by local (state-appointed) magistrates and by the Prince William – Manassas Regional Adult Detention Center (ADC), which serves as the local jail in PWC.

### 4.1 PWCPD's Immigration Enforcement Policy

Under the original version of PWCPD's immigration policy that was in effect from March 1, 2008 through April 29, 2008 (General Order 45), officers were instructed to inquire into the citizenship or immigration status of persons who were lawfully detained for a violation of state or local law, provided that the inquiry did not unreasonably extend the detention (see Figure 3-1). After the suspension of this policy during May and June of 2008, PWCPD implemented its current (amended) immigration policy (General Order 45.01) in July 2008.<sup>41</sup>

Under the current policy, officers are no longer required to run immigration checks on suspected immigrants that they detain without arrest, but they still have discretion to conduct such checks if they have reason to believe that someone they have detained is an illegal immigrant. However, the new policy mandates that officers run immigration checks on all arrestees.

Figure 4-1 depicts police procedures under the current policy. When an immigration check indicates or suggests that an arrestee is an illegal immigrant, the arresting officer records this information on a field interview card that is forwarded to PWCPD's 287(g) unit, named the Criminal Alien Unit (CAU), for discretionary follow-up. (We say more below about the CAU.) In addition, the arresting officer notifies the magistrate that the arrestee is a suspected illegal immigrant so that the magistrate can take this information into consideration for the determination of release and bail (we say more about the role of magistrates below). Finally, officers notify CAU and through it, ICE, when they find that an arrestee has an ICE detainer.

In cases where probable cause does not exist for an arrest, officers still have authority to extend the detention if their initial contact with a detainee yields a reasonable suspicion that the person is an undocumented or illegal immigrant. If the check indicates that the detainee is an illegal immigrant for whom the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) has issued a criminal detainer, officers are to arrest the subject for subsequent processing by ICE or PWCPD's Criminal Alien Unit (CAU).<sup>42</sup> If the immigration check indicates or suggests that the detainee is in the country illegally but shows no ICE detainer, officers record the contact on a field interview card that is then forwarded to ICE and CAU for discretionary follow-up. It is important to note that officers


<sup>41</sup> See our 2009 interim report for a more extended discussion of this original version of PWCPD's immigration enforcement policy.

<sup>42</sup> Even before the implementation of the first immigration policy, PWCPD officers were expected to check the names of traffic violators, criminal suspects, and arrestees against federal National Crime Information Center (NCIC) databases and to hold any such persons wanted for criminal immigration violations (memo from PWCPD Chief Charlie Deane to the PWC Board of County Supervisors, June 15, 2007).

without 287(g) training—i.e., those not part of the CAU—cannot arrest detainees for federal immigration violations absent an ICE detainer or evidence that a detainee is a deported felon.

However, suspicion that a subject is an illegal immigrant might lead an officer to arrest the subject if the officer has grounds for issuing a summons to the subject and feels there is reason to believe that the subject will not appear in court for the summons. Further, subjects may be arrested for summons offenses if they lack identification. They may also be arrested anytime they present false identification.

**Figure 4-1: Processing of Suspected Illegal Immigrants by PWCPD under the Current Policy (General Order 45.01)**



Developed in consultation with the Prince William County Police Department.

## 4.2 PWCPD Contacts with Suspected Illegal Immigrants, March 2008-December 2008

PWCPD data show that officers had 2,984 contacts with suspected illegal immigrants from March 2008 through June 2010.<sup>43</sup> Most of these suspects were charged with a state or local offense. In all, officers arrested 79% of the suspects and released 8% with a summons. Thirteen percent of suspected illegal immigrants encountered by officers were released following a field interview (meaning that they were not charged with a State or local offense or wanted for an immigration violation). These figures demonstrate that not all illegal immigrants identified by PWCPD are arrested, though illegal immigrants are most commonly identified during an arrest incident. Virtually all suspects thought to be illegal immigrants (98%-99%) were confirmed as such by PWCPD.

Police contacts with suspected illegal immigrants occurred for a variety of reasons. Table 4-1 shows the circumstances surrounding these contacts for the first two years under the current version of the policy (July 2008 through June 2010). Nearly three-quarters of contacts with illegal immigrants involved traffic stops or other calls for service. Other contacts involved checks of suspicious people and vehicles, warrant service, and other miscellaneous matters.

**Table 4-1. Circumstances of PWCPD Contacts with Suspected Illegal Immigrants, July 2008-June 2010.**

Circumstance	Number of Contacts	% of Contacts
Traffic stop	1079	41%
Call for service	840	32%
Suspicious person	349	13%
Suspicious vehicle	55	2%
Warrant service	125	5%
Other	160	6%

Figures provided by PWCPD. Total contacts = 2,608.

As shown in Figure 4-2, arrests of illegal immigrants during 2009 were concentrated in areas around Manassas and Woodbridge, which is where the County's Hispanic population is concentrated more generally (Singer et al. 2009). The arrest locations are indicated by blue dots on the map. The red

<sup>43</sup> Note that the 2008 data include two months (March and April of 2008) during which the original policy was in effect that required officers to check the immigration status of all lawfully detained persons suspected of being illegal immigrants. The 2008 data also include two months (May and June of 2008) during which PWCPD suspended its immigration policy.

dots show the residence addresses of the illegal immigrants who were arrested; they also typically lived in these areas.<sup>44</sup> About 87% of illegal immigrants arrested during 2008 and 2009 were charged with misdemeanor or traffic violations and about 9% were charged with felony offenses (PWCPD 2009: 14; 2010: 15). (We review the offenses committed by illegal immigrants in more detail in Section 8.)

Figure 4-2 shows the country of birth of the illegal immigrants, arrested and jailed in the first nine months of 2010, who were placed on detainer by the ADC. The overwhelming majority (95.3%) of these individuals were born in Latin American countries. Most of these were from just four countries: El Salvador (37.4 percent of all those detained), Mexico (25.3%), Guatemala (14.8%) and Honduras (14.7%).

### 4.3 The Role of Magistrates and ADC in the Processing of Illegal Immigrants

After processing by PWCPD, arrestees are brought before state-appointed magistrates who make decisions about pre-trial release and bail (see Figure 4-3). Magistrates are not required to detain suspected illegal immigrants that do not have ICE detainers. Under this circumstance, a magistrate may release a suspected illegal immigrant on personal recognizance or bail if the subject has not committed a serious offense, is not a danger to anyone, and appears to have strong community ties. Statistics on these releases are not readily available, but the magistrates with whom we spoke estimate that around one-third of suspected illegal immigrants are released without detention.<sup>45</sup> However, illegal immigrant status does create more of a tendency in favor of detention; the estimated release rate for suspected illegal immigrants is substantially lower than the 75% release rate estimated for all arrestees. The police are supposed to notify the magistrate and the jail if they think an arrestee is an illegal immigrant.

Arrestees not released by a magistrate are taken to ADC where they are screened by intake officers. In accordance with requirements established by state law in 2007, ADC intake officers screen arrestees for illegal immigration status based on three criteria: 1) a birthplace outside the United States; 2) lack of a social security number or use of a false social security number; and 3) non-U.S. citizenship. Arrestees meeting one or more of these criteria are referred to ADC's 287(g) unit whose members interview the arrestees and run various database queries on them. ADC's 287(g) unit serves the appropriate documents on arrestees identified as illegal immigrants, places detainers on them, and notifies ICE. ICE then takes custody of the arrestees after they have served any applicable sentence(s) for their state and/or local offense(s). Anyone not taken by ICE is released after serving his or her sentence.

<sup>44</sup> There are far fewer points on the map of residence addresses than arrest locations because some of the arrestees reside outside PWC+cities and because some did not have address information that was sufficiently accurate for geocoding.

<sup>45</sup> Note again that PWCPD officers forward information about all arrested illegal immigrants to CAU for potential follow-up.

**Figure 4-1. Locations where Illegal Immigrants were Arrested in PWC, and where they resided, 2009.**






Figure provided by PWCPD


**Figure 4-2. Country of Birth for illegal immigrants arrested and placed on detainer by ADC, Jan-Sept 2010.**





**Figure 4-3. Post-Arrest Processing of Suspected Illegal Immigrants by Magistrates and ADC.**

Data provided by ADC show that the facility received 11,386 arrestees of foreign birth from July 2007 through June 2010 (the first three years of ADC's 287(g) program). This figure includes persons arrested by PWCPD and by other law enforcement agencies in the County (most notably, the police departments of Manassas and Manassas Park). Foreign-born commitments declined 16% during this period, falling from 4,161 in fiscal year 2008 (July 2007-June 2008) to 3,487 in fiscal year 2010 (July 2009-June 2010). Monthly trends are shown in Figure 4-4.

**Figure 4-4: Illegal Immigration Cases Handled by ADC**

ADC's 287(g) unit initiated immigration checks on 9,284 of the foreign-born arrestees (they have run immigration checks on virtually all such arrestees since April 2008) and issued detainers for 2,783 (or 30% of those for whom they initiated immigration checks). The number of detainers issued remained steady at around 960 per year during FY 2009 and FY 2010. ADC has discretion over whether to issue detainers for illegal immigrants, particularly those who have committed minor offenses and have no criminal history. The 6,501 foreign-born arrestees for whom ADC did not issue detainers thus includes persons that were not illegal immigrants as well as illegal immigrants for whom ADC chose not to issue a detainer (ADC may still send records to ICE, however, about persons in the latter group).

In total, ADC released 2,499 illegal immigrants to ICE from July 2007 through June 2010. This figure amounts to 90% of the persons for whom ADC issued detainers during this period (some of the remaining 10% were likely transferred to ICE after June 2010, and others may be transferred after serving sentences for State or local offenses). Because ICE tends to focus its resources on serious offenders and others who have been previously deported, many illegal immigrants arrested for minor offenses (such as public drunkenness) are released back into the community after their stay in ADC. We have no specific figures on the numbers of illegal immigrants processed in ADC who are deported by ICE or released back into the community. (PWC officials have been unable to obtain this information from ICE.) If Prince William County's experiences reflect the estimates provided in a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on ICE's operations, about two-thirds may either have agreed to voluntary deportation or been detained pending deportation proceedings (GAO, 2009). More recently, however, this may have changed in response to policy changes within ICE (see Section 6). ADC officials estimate informally that about half of the people they turned over to ICE during FY 2010 were released on recognizance (per ICE's instructions)

without being taken to an ICE facility.<sup>46</sup> There are likely more that are released after a temporary stay in an ICE facility. In 2008, for example, ICE released over 51,000 detainees into communities around the country via bond, orders of supervision or recognizance, or parole (Schriro, 2009).

ADC statistics also show that 225, or 9%, of the persons processed by the jail's 287(g) unit during the program's first 3 years were returned to ADC after release to ICE. This number includes people who were returned because they were convicted of State or local charges that were pending when they were released to ICE. It also implies, however, that the percentage of persons released to ICE by ADC who were rearrested for new crimes in PWC was less than 9%.

#### **4.4 PWC's Handling of Illegal Immigrants in Comparison to Other Jurisdictions**

To put PWC's immigration enforcement efforts in perspective, PWCPD and ADC are among 71 state and local law enforcement and correctional agencies around the country that were participating in the 287(g) program as of January 2010 (Rodriguez, Chishti, Capps, and St. John, 2010). Thirty-two of these agreements were jail agreements (such as ADC's), 27 were task force agreements deputizing local law enforcement officers to conduct immigration enforcement (such as PWCPD's agreement to operate the CAU), and 12 were hybrid jail/task force agreements. Most of these agreements were signed from 2007 through 2009. Participants in 287(g) include eight agencies in Maryland and Virginia other than PWCPD and ADC, five of which serve jurisdictions outside PWC.

In addition, many more law enforcement and correctional agencies work with ICE through other programs including the Secure Communities Program, the Criminal Alien Program (also known as CAP), and related efforts (see <http://www.ice.gov/pi/topics/index.htm>). The Secure Communities Program, launched in 2008, enables law enforcement and correctional agencies to check the fingerprints of detainees against Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) databases that include information about immigration violations. As of early 2010, 116 jurisdictions in 16 states were participating in the program (Rodriguez et al., 2010). Locally participating jurisdictions as of August 2010 included 4 jurisdictions in Maryland and all 129 jurisdictions in Virginia (see [http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure\\_communities/pdf/sc\\_activated.pdf](http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure_communities/pdf/sc_activated.pdf)). Under the CAP program, ICE also works with local detention facilities around the country to identify and remove criminal aliens. (ICE has not posted a public listing of agencies participating in CAP.) Both programs are operated in 287(g) jurisdictions as well as others that are not part of the 287(g) program.

Local immigration enforcement has also been examined in at least three surveys of local law enforcement agencies. One of these was conducted in 2007 with 168 police agencies affiliated with the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a membership organization for police executives in medium to large (i.e., primarily urban and suburban) jurisdictions (PERF, 2008).<sup>47</sup> Of these agencies, 60% reported that they check the immigration status of persons who are stopped, arrested, or detained for cause. Over half (57%) of the agencies doing immigration checks indicated these checks are done pursuant to arrest and 36% indicated that they are done when booking a suspect into a holding facility. However, 33% indicated that they conduct immigration checks anytime they

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<sup>46</sup> Prior to that time, all persons released to ICE were taken to ICE facilities at least temporarily. This change appears to have been linked to a nationwide change to the 287(g) in late 2009 that placed sought to refocus the program more precisely on serious offenders. We return to this issue below.

<sup>47</sup> Generally, PERF agencies are those with 100 or more officers and/or a jurisdiction of 50,000 or more people that also have a chief executive who is a PERF member.

have probable cause to believe a person is in the country illegally. Further, although these checks may not be mandated by agency policy (this issue was not explicitly addressed), 18% reported doing immigration checks during investigative detentions and 7% during traffic stops.

A second survey conducted in 2007 included 237 police agencies in medium to large size cities, primarily cities and towns of 60,000 or more people (Decker et al., 2009). Three-quarters of the agencies reported that they contact ICE when holding a suspected illegal immigrant for a criminal violation, but few had formal agreements with ICE. Four percent were party to a 287(g) agreement, three percent had a formal memorandum of agreement for managing illegal immigrants who are incarcerated, and eight percent had ICE agents embedded in one or more their units.

Over 80% of the agencies reported that they typically check immigration status, contact ICE, or both when they arrest a suspected illegal immigrant for a violent crime, and about 50% reported doing so when they arrest a suspected illegal immigrant for a non-violent crime, even if the suspect does not have a prior criminal record. In contrast, only about 20% indicated that they check immigration status when they encounter suspected illegal immigrants during traffic stops, and fewer than 20% reported doing so when they encounter them as crime victims, complainants, or witnesses. However, only 39% of the agencies actually had a written policy for dealing with illegal immigrants.

A third survey concerning local law enforcement and immigration was conducted by PERF during late 2009 and early 2010 with police agencies in the Washington, DC metropolitan area. This survey was conducted specifically for this project and is discussed in detail in Appendix B. Here, we note some key findings from the survey.

Forty-six agencies completed the survey, representing 67% of the agencies in the greater DC area. Twenty-six, or 57%, of the agencies reported that immigration checks are conducted in their jurisdiction; in most of these places, immigration checks had been initiated sometime since 2006.<sup>48</sup> In over half of the jurisdictions doing immigration checks (54%), the checks are conducted by the jails only. However, 12 agencies, accounting for roughly a quarter of all respondents (26%), indicated that their officers conduct immigration checks either alone (2) or in addition to the jails (10). Among this group, six agencies, or half, indicated that the checks are mandated by agency policy.

Half of the police agencies doing immigration checks conduct them when arresting a suspect, and 42% do so when booking suspects into a holding facility. Agencies also reported conducting immigration checks in other situations including traffic stops (n=3, or 25%), investigative detention (n=3, or 25%), and other circumstances such as the furtherance of a criminal investigation (n=4, or 33%). Further, in half of these agencies (6), officers can conduct checks whenever probable cause exists to believe a person is an illegal immigrant. This may extend to crime victims and witnesses as well; only 4 (or 33%) of the agencies doing immigration checks had policies protecting victims and witnesses from arrest if they were determined to be illegal immigrants. However, only 4 agencies, representing a third of those doing checks and about 9% of all respondents, had policies requiring immigration checks for all arrestees believed to be in the country illegally. Only 2 agencies, accounting for 17% of the police agencies doing immigration checks and 4% of all responding agencies, reported having policies that required officers to conduct immigration checks on any lawfully stopped persons who are reasonably believed to be in the country illegally.

<sup>48</sup> This participation rate could be higher now due to the participation of all Virginia agencies in the Secure Communities Program. However, the Secure Communities Program is for the identification of persons with immigration detainers and criminal violations rather than all illegally present immigrants.

In sum, immigration enforcement efforts in PWC, including those of both PWCPD and ADC, are not entirely unique, even among other agencies in the Washington, DC area. Many law enforcement and correctional agencies around the country cooperate formally or informally with ICE on immigration enforcement efforts. Surveys of police agencies, though not based on nationally representative samples, suggest that jails and/or police agencies conduct immigration checks on detainees under some circumstances in more than half of all jurisdictions in metropolitan areas (including the DC area). Most commonly, these checks are done on persons arrested, as in PWC. However, substantial minorities of police agencies doing immigration checks conduct them under a variety of circumstances including traffic stops and investigative field detentions. Hence, PWCPD's policy of allowing officers to conduct discretionary checks on detainees prior to arrest is also consistent with the practices of many other police agencies involved in immigration enforcement. Further, PWCPD provides explicit protection to crime victims and witnesses who are illegal immigrants, whereas the majority of police agencies involved in immigration enforcement in the DC area do not.

PWCPD's policy of checking the immigration status of all arrestees appears to be more comprehensive than those of many other police agencies doing immigration checks. Few police agencies in the DC area, for example, have a requirement to run immigration checks on all arrestees. However, such policies may have less impact in jurisdictions where the jails are already conducting immigration checks. On the other hand, the original policy mandated by PWC's Board of County Supervisors, which required PWCPD to do immigration checks on all lawfully detained persons, appears to have been more far-reaching than that of all but a small number of police agencies.

## 5 The PWCPD's Experience Implementing General Order 45.01

In this section, we review PWCPD's experience with preparing for and implementing its immigration policy. PWCPD's immigration enforcement efforts have been twofold: immigration checks for detained or arrested persons and establishment of a Criminal Alien Unit (CAU) that focuses on a select group of serious offenders who are illegal immigrants.<sup>49</sup> Our discussion covers both aspects and is based on the following data sources:

1. Department-wide surveys completed with PWCPD sworn personnel at all ranks during the fall of 2008 and fall of 2009 that examined their experiences with implementing the current immigration policy (General Order 45.01);
2. Interviews conducted with separate focus groups of patrol officers, first-line supervisors, mid-level commanders, CAU detectives, and senior command staff at various points from 2008 through 2010;
3. Ride-alongs conducted by research staff with patrol officers; and
4. Review of training materials and other public information provided by PWCPD.

We begin by reviewing how PWCPD prepared for the policy's implementation. We then examine the overall experience of the Department with implementing the policy, followed by a focus on the experiences of the CAU. Finally, we consider the impact of the policy on other Departmental concerns, including recruitment, translation services, and costs.

### 5.1 Preparing for the Policy's Implementation

Preparing for the implementation of the immigration policy mandated by the PWC Board of County Supervisors required PWCPD to accomplish a number of key tasks. These included: 1) developing a policy for checking the immigration status of persons who were suspected illegal immigrants; 2) developing and conducting training on the policy for PWCPD officers; 3) forming a special unit of officers to receive federal 287(g) training; and 4) educating the public about the new policy. These efforts contributed to a reported start-up cost of \$1.3 million for PWCPD.

#### 5.1.1 Policy Development

Section 2 discussed the concerns that shaped PWCPD's formulation of both the original and current versions of the immigration policy. In developing a policy for carrying out the PWC Board's mandate, PWCPD examined federal and state laws pertaining to immigration; consulted with prosecutorial authorities including the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Virginia Attorney General, the Prince William County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office, and the County Attorney's Office for Prince William County; investigated research and other documents on immigration enforcement efforts around the country; and participated in national forums on immigration. PWCPD estimates that the Department devoted 1,200 personnel hours to this effort.

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<sup>49</sup> It does not appear that PWCPD has conducted roundups or sweeps of any sort for illegal immigrants. Indeed, the Department has made regular efforts to assure PWC's immigrant community that it is not conducting such activities.

### **5.1.2 Training**

To prepare for the policy's implementation, all PWCPD officers underwent training on General Order 45 during January and February of 2008. The training curriculum developed by PWCPD covered several issues. First, it provided background on immigration issues, the mandate of the PWC Board of County Supervisors, and the development of the Department's policy. Training on the specifics of the policy included instruction on how to verify a person's legal or illegal presence in the country and information about the legal statutes that govern the circumstances under which officers may arrest a person for suspicion of being an illegal immigrant. Materials provided to officers included decision tree diagrams for officers to follow when investigating immigration status, a list of factors that can lead to reasonable suspicion about a person's immigration status, and information about acceptable documents for proving one's identity. Both PWCPD and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security developed hypothetical scenarios that officers might encounter in carrying out General Order 45. A representative of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security also provided an overview on immigration law and deportation procedures.

In total, PWCPD devoted 4,884 officer-hours, or the equivalent of 611 officer-days, to this effort. As we discuss below, PWCPD officers felt that the training prepared them well for implementing the immigration policy.

After the suspension of General Order 45 at the end of April 2008, PWCPD retrained officers for the execution of General Order 45.01 which took effect on July 1, 2008. This retraining was relatively simple, requiring only 500 officer-hours in total.

### **5.1.3 Establishing the Criminal Alien Unit**

In keeping with the PWC Board's mandate that PWCPD undertake a cooperative 287(g) enforcement program with ICE, PWCPD also established a 7-member Criminal Alien Unit (CAU) to undergo federal 287(g) training. PWCPD allocated six officers and a crime analyst to the CAU and tasked them with a mission to focus specifically on the apprehension and deportation of serious immigrant offenders and to conduct special investigations into operations like document mills that provide false identification. In order to avoid alienating the legal immigrant and broader Hispanic community, PWCPD has kept the CAU focused on serious offenders and has not used the unit to conduct sweeps or round-ups of suspected illegal immigrants.

CAU members underwent an intensive 4-week federal training regimen that totaled 1,300 hours collectively. This training qualifies CAU members to serve as deputized federal immigration officers.

### **5.1.4 Community Outreach**

From the outset, PWCPD commanders have been concerned about the public's perception of the immigrant enforcement policy and about the policy's impact on police-community relations, particularly as they pertain to PWC's immigrant and larger minority community. The PWC Board of County Supervisors was also sensitive to this issue and thus required PWCPD to "...engage in [a] public outreach effort, particularly [to the] minority and/or immigrant communities."

Accordingly, PWCPD designed a public education effort with two broad goals. One was to assuage fear and distrust that the policy might cause in the immigrant community. The other goal was to

inform the broader public, and particularly those in favor of the policy, as to what the police could and could not do under the policy.

As of early September 2008, PWCPD had conducted more than 100 meetings to discuss the policy with religious organizations, educational and special interest groups representing all sides of the issue, and the media, most of which the Chief attended (PWCPD presentation to the PWC Board of County Supervisors, September 9, 2008). The Department had also held sessions with over 300 County employees that included school faculty, school security personnel, and staff from social service agencies. The Department's senior commanders in particular devoted much time to these efforts.

In each meeting, the Department personnel discussed their philosophy of carrying out the new mandate in a fair, lawful and reasonable manner. They also emphasized three elements of the policy:

- It would focus on criminal illegal immigrants meaning those who are in the US illegally who commit crimes.<sup>50</sup>
- The Department would protect crime victims and cooperative witnesses regardless of their immigration status; and
- The Department would not engage in racial profiling.

PWCPD also prepared informational materials, provided in both English and Spanish, to educate the public about the policy. These have included news releases and brochures distributed through meetings, everyday police-citizen contacts, and the Department's website. The current brochure available from PWCPD provides background and key points about the current immigration enforcement policy. It also includes a "frequently asked questions" section that addresses questions like the following:

- What is the difference between the revised policy and the original policy?
- If a police officer gives me a summons (ticket), can that officer question my immigration status?
- Is it true that immigrants should be afraid of reporting any crimes to the police because if they do, they may be turned over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)?
- Does the policy require police officers to ask everyone they encounter for proof of legal residence/status?
- Do I have to carry some form of ID with me wherever I go?
- What forms of identification will officers accept?

In sum, PWCPD devoted considerable effort to the planning and implementation of the policy. Further, many of these efforts and their associated costs are ongoing. We return to these and other implementation issues below in discussing PWCPD's experiences with implementing the policy.

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<sup>50</sup> Being in the country without legal documentation is considered a civil rather than criminal offense.



## 5.2 Officers' Views and Experiences with Regard to the Immigration Policy: Survey Results

In the fall of 2008, we conducted a survey of all sworn personnel in PWCPD to examine their views on the Department's immigration policy and their experiences implementing it. Officers completed self-administered, anonymous questionnaires during roll-call meetings at the start of their shifts. The survey was completed by 379 officers and commanders, or 73% of the Department's sworn force. Approximately one year later, we again questioned PWCPD sworn personnel about these issues in a follow-up survey that was completed by 299 officers and commanders, using the same methods. In the section below, we highlight key results from the responses of 287 officers and commanders who completed both surveys (a group representing approximately 56% of PWCPD's sworn personnel and 76% of those that did the time 1 survey).<sup>51</sup> Many of their views and experiences were consistent over time. Unless otherwise stated, differences between the responses in the first and second surveys were not statistically significant (a statistically significant difference is one that has only a small likelihood of being due to random fluctuation rather than a true change in the officers' beliefs). We supplement this discussion with information gathered during interviews, focus groups, and ride-alongs with PWCPD personnel. (A more detailed description of the survey methodology and the time1-time2 comparisons is presented in Appendix C. The time 1 survey results are also discussed at length in our 2009 interim report.)

### 5.2.1 Officers' Knowledge of the Policy and General Views on the Policy

In our survey of PWCPD personnel, officers were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements designed to assess their knowledge of and comfort with PWCPD's current immigration policy (General Order 45.01). Response options included "strongly agree", "agree", "neither agree nor disagree", "disagree", and "strongly disagree." Table 5-1 shows the percentage of officers who agreed or strongly agreed with each item at both points in time.

Overall, officers' views have remained stable over time.<sup>52</sup> In both surveys, about 80% of officers agreed or strongly agreed that it is clear how to implement the current policy. Similarly high percentages of officers felt that they had the knowledge, training, and skills to enforce the policy, including competence in asking questions about immigration status and in reviewing identification documents. Our discussions with personnel in various ranks throughout the Department also suggested that officers have a clear understanding of the policy and are very comfortable with implementing it.

**Table 5-1. PWCPD Officers' Knowledge and Implementation of the Current Immigration Policy.**

<b>"Knowledge" Item</b>	<b>Time 1 (2008) "Agreed" or "Strongly Agreed"</b>	<b>Time 2 (2009) "Agreed" or "Strongly Agreed"</b>
Currently, I believe it is clear how to implement the	82.4%	79.8%

<sup>51</sup> Note that the figures presented here for the time 1 (2008) survey results differ slightly from those shown in our 2009 interim report because the results presented here are based on a subset of those officers who completed the time 1 survey. (The differences are generally very minor.) Also, unless otherwise stated, missing data were insubstantial (less than 5%) for each item.

<sup>52</sup> A test of officers' average scores for this full set of items showed no statistically meaningful change over time (see Appendix C).

PWC immigration policy.		
I believe I have enough knowledge about the current policy to enforce the policy correctly.	84.2%	83.2%
The training I have been provided by the PWCPD has adequately prepared me to enforce the PWC immigration policy.	82.1%	80.7%
My personal beliefs are supportive of the current PWC immigration policy.	63.0%	54.0%
My personal beliefs will have no effect on how to enforce any lawful PWC immigration policy.	92.2%	91.9%
When appropriate, I have the necessary skills to ask immigration status questions.	88.7%	88.0%
I have the necessary skills to review identification (e.g., driver's license) for fakes.	78.5%	83.6%

Philosophically, officers also generally agree with the policy. At both points in time, more than half of the officers (54%-63%) agreed or strongly agreed that their personal beliefs were supportive of the policy. Only 9-10% disagreed with the policy at either time (the remainder neither agreed nor disagreed). Moreover, 92% of officers agreed in both surveys that their personal beliefs would have no effect on their implementation of the policy. Interviews with officers revealed further complexity in their views; many seem to feel that the policy is reasonable and prudent, although they also have sympathy for illegal immigrants seeking work and a decent living in PWC. Some noted that the current policy has also had the benefit of standardizing the Department's approach to immigration inquiries, which helps to insulate the Department against charges of racial profiling. The focus groups in 2009 provided continued evidence of the officers' support for the revised policy. The officers felt that the revised policy shows that the department has tried to do something to address the illegal immigration problem. The focus groups of patrol officers felt that on balance the policy has had the effect of driving many illegal immigrants out of the County.

### 5.2.2 Officers' Experiences with Implementing the Policy

In the first survey, 63% of the respondents indicated that they had questioned at least one person about their immigration status during a police stop between July 1, 2008 and the time of the survey (October– November 2008). In our second survey approximately one year later, only 47% of these same respondents reported having questioned someone about immigration status during a police stop sometime during the prior year. This decline, which was statistically significant, indicates that officers have become less likely over time to question people about immigration status. This may reflect a change in officers' behavior, a reduction in the prevalence of illegal immigrants, or some combination of the two.

Officers who had questioned anyone about immigration status were also asked to indicate the approximate number of people they had questioned.<sup>53</sup> The responses included five categories ranging from one to 16 or more. As shown in Table 5-2, the distribution of responses was fairly similar in both surveys. At both points, the most common response, offered by roughly a third of

<sup>53</sup> At time 2, 10% of respondents could not recall whether they had questioned anyone about immigration status during the prior year. Among those who had questioned one or more persons about immigration status, 15% could not estimate the number.

officers, was that they had questioned 2-5 people about immigration status.<sup>54</sup> About one quarter had questioned 6-10 according to each survey, and 19% to 28% had questioned 16 or more.<sup>55</sup> However, considering that the reference period for T1 (roughly July 1, 2008 through October/November 2008) was notably shorter than that for T2 (one year), these results also suggest that officers were questioning people about immigration status more frequently during the early period of the policy.<sup>56</sup>

**Table 5-2. PWCPD Officers' Estimates of Persons They Questioned About Immigration Status**

Number	Time 1 (2008)	Time 2 (2009)
1	6.2%	3.8%
2-5	37.9%	30.8%
6-10	28.8%	26.0%
11-15	8.5%	11.5%
16 or more	18.6%	27.9%

In both surveys, officers indicated that a majority of people they questioned about immigration status were Hispanic.<sup>57</sup> However, the prevalence of Hispanics among these detainees declined over time. In the first survey, 83% of respondents indicated that more than 50% of the subjects they questioned were Hispanic. This percentage dropped to 68% in the second survey.

Officers generally reported that they were well prepared to handle these contacts. In both surveys, the vast majority of officers indicated that the training in immigration issues was “somewhat” helpful (53%-56%) or helpful “to a great extent” (25%-26%) in making immigration queries. Almost all of the officers were either “very confident” (53%-56%) or “somewhat confident” (39%-42%) in their ability to question a person on their immigration status.

Other survey items also suggest that officers have had, by and large, a positive or at least neutral experience with the current policy: in both surveys, about two-thirds of officers either agreed or strongly agreed that the immigration policy is a useful tool for PWCPD,<sup>58</sup> and only about 11% to

<sup>54</sup> We found no statistically significant difference over time in the proportion of officers who had questioned five or more people.

<sup>55</sup> Note that these figures appear to include contacts with persons who were not illegal immigrants and who were not arrested. In the second survey, two-thirds of the officers that had questioned people about immigration status reported that they had arrested fewer than three-quarters of these subjects (this issue was not examined in the first survey). By way of comparison, over 80% of PWCPD's contacts with officially-identified illegal immigrants result in arrest (unpublished data provided by PWCPD).

<sup>56</sup> On a related note, we also analyzed data from PWCPD's records management system to determine if there was a spike in traffic stops by PWCPD officers during March and April of 2008 when the original version of the policy (General Order 45) was in effect. Traffic stops rose during the latter part of 2007 and reached a new plateau in January 2008 (similarly, traffic citations increased 11% from 2007 to 2008—see PWCPD, 2009: 17). Traffic stops oscillated at higher levels throughout 2008 but did not spike in any pronounced way during March and April.

<sup>57</sup> Among those officers who had questioned one or more persons about immigration status, about 8% could not recall the proportion of questioned persons who were Hispanic in the time 1 survey, and 11% could not recall in the time 2 survey.

<sup>58</sup> Most of the remainder neither agreed nor disagreed. Few respondents disagreed.

13% felt that the policy is too restrictive (Table 5-3). Further, only about one-third of officers in each survey felt that the County should take a stronger stance against illegal immigration.

**Table 5-3. Officer Perceptions of General Order 45.01 .**

<b>Statement</b>	<b>Time 1 (2008): Agreed or Strongly Agreed</b>	<b>Time 2 (2009): Agreed or Strongly Agreed</b>
The policy is a useful tool for PWCPD officers.	64.6%	66.4%
The policy is too restrictive for PWCPD officers to do their job.	10.9%	13.2%
Prince William County should take a stronger stance against illegal immigration.	36.2%	36.6%

Officers were also asked about their overall experience with General Order 45.01 on a five-point scale with response categories of “very positive”, “somewhat positive”, “neutral”, “somewhat negative”, and “very negative.” As shown in Table 5-4, 41% to 46% rated their overall experience with the policy as very or somewhat positive at each time point. About half rated their experience as neutral; few rated it as negative. Our discussions with PWCPD personnel suggest that the neutral response of many officers in the survey likely reflects a mixture of concerns including potentially negative consequences of the policy for police-community relations (see discussion below), doubts about the policy’s impact on crime, and, in some cases perhaps, empathy for the plight of some illegal immigrants. However, this stance also likely reflects the fact that the policy has had little impact on the everyday work of patrol officers, according to most patrol officers and other staff we interviewed. This is particularly true of the current policy. Officers indicated to us that they currently deal with immigrants in much the same way that they did before General Orders 45 and 45.01 were implemented. The policy has also had little if any impact on officers’ handling of calls, traffic stops, or other self-initiated activities.<sup>59</sup>

**Table 5-4. Officers’ Overall Experience with the Policy**

<b>Question</b>	<b>Time 1 (2008): Very or somewhat positive</b>	<b>Time 2 (2009): Very or somewhat positive</b>
What has been your overall experience with General Order 45.01?	41.0%	45.9%

### **5.2.3 Officers’ Perceptions of the Policy’s Impact on the Community and Police-Community Relations**

The officer surveys also had items assessing officers’ views of how the policy impacted the community and the Department’s relations with the community, particularly as the latter pertain to relations

<sup>59</sup> In the wave 1 survey, we also asked officers to contrast their experiences with the original version of the immigration policy (General Order 45) and the current version of the policy (General Order 45.01). These findings are discussed in our 2009 interim report. In short, officers did not draw stark differences between their experiences with the policies, but they seem to find the current policy easier to implement and appear to be doing somewhat fewer immigration checks under the current policy.

between PWCPD and the local immigrant community. As discussed earlier in this report, this issue has greatly concerned PWCPD's leadership since the outset of the immigration debate in PWC.

As shown in Table 5-5, a substantial majority of officers in both surveys agreed or strongly agreed that the policy has caused illegal immigrants to leave PWC. However, this share dropped from 73% in the fall of 2008 to 66% in the fall of 2009, a statistically significant change. This is consistent with the notion that there has been some rebound in the illegal immigrant population as fear about the policy has ebbed (see discussion below). In contrast, officers were much less likely to believe that the policy has caused *legal* immigrants to leave PWC. In both surveys, roughly 36% to 40% agreed that the policy had caused legal immigrants to depart.

**Table 5-5. Officers' Perceptions of the Policy's Impact on PWC's Immigrant Population**

Statement	Time 1 (2008): Agree or Strongly Agree	Time 2 (2009): Agree or Strongly Agree
The policy has resulted in <u>illegal</u> immigrants leaving PWC.	73.0%	66.2%
The policy has resulted in <u>legal</u> immigrants leaving PWC.	40.1%	35.9%

Officers were also asked how commonly they had witnessed various problems or issues linked to the immigration issue using a four point scale of "regularly/all the time", "often", "occasionally", and "never." These items included several measures reflecting community attitudes towards the police and the community's level of cooperation (or lack thereof) with PWCPD. As shown in Table 5-6, these problems ranged from negative attitudes towards the Department to attacks on officers. On average, officers reported that these problems occurred occasionally in both surveys, and there was little change over time in their ratings.<sup>60</sup> Less than 5% of respondents ranked any of these problems as occurring regularly/all the time as of 2009, with the exception of crime reporting by illegal immigrants, which was rated as a regular problem by 10% of respondents (also see our discussion of crime reporting in Section 8).

We cannot say whether the problems in Table 5-6 have become more or less common since the immigration policy because we do not have measures of how officers perceived these problems before the policy. Nonetheless, our post-policy surveys suggest that these problems are not highly frequent and that they have remained relatively stable over the two years that the policy has been in effect.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>60</sup> This section of the survey also contained a number of items corresponding to crime and disorder problems. These items are discussed in Section 8. We created a scale based on the full set of items and found that the average score did not differ significantly across the two waves of officer surveys (see Appendix C).

<sup>61</sup> As reported in our 2009 interim report, the fall 2008 survey also asked officers to compare the effects of the current and original versions of the policy (i.e., the July 1, 2008 and March 1, 2008 versions) on police relations with the immigrant community. While most respondents agreed that both policies had negatively impacted the Department's relationship with the immigrant community in PWC, they were more likely to feel that relations have been better under the current policy than under the original policy.

**Table 5-6. Frequency with which Officers Witnessed Problems between Police and the Community (1=never, 2=occasionally, 3=often, 4=regularly/all the time).**

<b>“Problem” Item</b>	<b>Time 1 (2008)</b>	<b>Time 2 (2009)</b>
Charges of biased policing against PWCPD.	1.88	1.79
Negative feelings directed against the PWCPD by PWC residents.	2.19	1.99
Poor relations with the legal immigrant community in PWC.	2.08	1.91
Difficulty in forming community policing partnerships between the police and the immigrant community.	2.04	1.84
Problems getting non-immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	1.91	1.90
Problems getting legal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	1.84	1.80
Problems getting illegal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	2.38	2.20
Problems getting witnesses to cooperate with the police.	2.20	2.07
Physical attacks against officers.	1.51	1.59
Verbal threats against officers.	1.80	1.83
Low levels of support among most PWC residents for this policy.	1.90	1.86
More difficulty in recruiting minority candidates to join PWCPD.	1.49	1.45

### **5.3 Officers’ Views and Experiences with Regard to the Immigration Policy: Interview and Focus Group Results**

Below, we complement the survey results with insights obtained from focus groups conducted with PWCPD personnel at various points from 2008 through 2010. In 2008, we conducted focus groups with sworn personnel at all levels of PWCPD (ranging from patrol officers to the Department’s command staff). In the summer of 2009, we conducted follow-up focus groups with patrol officers, supervisors, and mid-level managers. We then held follow-up interviews with PWCPD’s commanders and recruitment staff in early 2010.

#### **5.3.1 Implementation Issues**

Representatives of PWCPD interviewed by the project team identified few serious operational problems associated with the implementation of General Orders 45 and 45.01. Although these policies may have had a large impact on the perceptions of PWC residents, according to PWCPD personnel, they have been small changes in operational terms. This is particularly true of the current policy (General Order 45.01), which makes minor changes to the procedures and paperwork that follow an arrest. Below, we review some of the points that arose in our discussions of day-to-day operational challenges and issues.

The command staff focus groups revealed no important changes to the policy since the main revision (General Order 45.01). The commanders noted that there have been some “housekeeping and administrative” issues associated with the policy but no major implementation problems. The main concern that emerged was the proper use of the field interview card and having officers complete these cards appropriately when handling illegal immigrants. In early 2010, the command staff conducted an extensive audit of field interview cards for 2009 and found that officer compliance in filling out the cards had dropped. This necessitated a reemphasis on the issue within the Department.

Beyond this, commanders indicated that there were very few incidents involving problems related to the implementation of the policy. In one incident, woman was arrested when she was not able to produce what the officer considered to be a legitimate driver’s license. As it turns out, she was the wife of a diplomat and had a driver’s license issued by the U.S. State Department that the arresting officer did not recognize. The PWCPD ended up apologizing to the woman, as did the arresting officer, who was also disciplined. There were also two other incidents involving immigrants but they were not directly related to the implementation of the policy.<sup>62</sup>

An initial eight-hour block of training on the original policy was provided to all sworn staff. With the policy in place, the training of the policy is handled as a four-hour block in basic training, and no other formal in-service training has been deemed necessary. Issues associated with the policy are handled during roll calls (e.g., the importance of completing field interview cards, further instruction on the loitering ordinance as it relates to laborer sites, and what counts as proper identification during a police stop). New officers receive training on the policy as part of their training in the police academy.

For the command staff, however, the policy has placed a tremendous toll on their time (although this burden has gradually lessened), including: time working with community groups answering questions, various speaking engagements, and preparing officers for its likely impact. Senior commanders also review almost all the field interview cards related to the policy. This work by senior staff has continued through 2010.

Officers interviewed for the focus groups (in 2008 and 2009) were mixed in their view on the effectiveness of the policy, but most of them felt that the policy was not difficult to implement (e.g., most felt that the field interview cards could be completed in about five minutes, and they had little trouble asking the illegal immigration questions of arrestees), except if extensive communication with the suspected illegal alien was required (there is still a shortage of Spanish speaking officers in PWCPD). The officers in the focus groups were unaware of any cases where officers were not following the policy or otherwise ignoring a suspect’s potential illegal status. Also, the officers provided anecdotes on some successes associated with the Department’s heightened efforts in addressing illegal immigration. For example, one officer mentioned a case where an illegal immi-

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<sup>62</sup> In one incident at a Hispanic baptism party where officers were responding to noise complaints, officers used a stun gun on the home owner and others at the party. While the officers were judged to have been within the Department’s use-or-force policy guidelines, the incident resulted in bad publicity that got the attention of the national media and required meetings with a number of foreign consuls over the incident. In another prominent incident at an informal day laborer site (parking lot), officers arrested some Hispanic day laborers for loitering. The issue that emerged in this case was that the officers did not give a proper warning to the laborers first. This incident received significant press coverage as a case of biased policing.

grant that the PWCPD had arrested was linked to a kidnapping/smuggling case in Texas. In this case, PWCPD was able to provide police in Texas with information to aid a kidnapped person being held for ransom.

Initially, there were concerns within PWCPD that the policy would place substantial time burdens on patrol officers. For instance, there was concern that time spent by patrol officers on immigration checks would lead to slower response times to calls and less proactive work by officers. Personnel with whom we spoke felt that these fears were not realized. However, the initial policy, which posed a greater risk of this possibility (officers noted that this version of the policy was more complex and time consuming), was only in effect for two months, which may have been too short a time for such impacts to be fully felt. Over time, officers continued to feel that there were no noticeable effects from the policy on calls for service, nor did the policy seem to affect the officers' ability to do proactive work. It is not that the officers do not come into contact with illegal immigrants. Many officers in fact have at least weekly contact with suspected illegal aliens (especially in the areas of public intoxication and other low level offenses). Instead, officers are getting better at managing the calls related to illegal immigrants and their service to the community is not being slowed.

The officers in the focus groups had noted little change in the calls for service related to the new policy. The biggest issue in the handling of calls-for-service has not been the new policy but the lack of more new officers related to the canceling of academy classes associated with cutbacks in the County's budget. Budgetary cutbacks in PWC have led to a loss of officer positions through attrition and the restricted use of overtime funds. As in other areas, the effects of the policy are difficult to separate from the effects of the lagging economy.

Nevertheless, command staff have continued to express concerns about the cumulative effect on the Department's resources of time spent by officers filling out field interview cards, running immigration checks on arrestees, and arresting and processing illegal immigrants for minor violations that would normally result in a summons (such as traffic offenses). Further, planning and implementation of the policy has required considerable time and effort from PWCPD's command staff, which has diverted some of their attention from other matters including crime fighting. That being said, analyses presented elsewhere in this report suggest that these demands have not undermined the Department's effectiveness in controlling crime or in maintaining high levels of satisfaction among most residents of PWC. Further, the Department's outreach efforts seem to have helped repair much of the damage that the policy did to its relationship with the immigrant community in PWC.

The need for Spanish-speaking officers and translators has also been an ongoing challenge (from the early stages of the policy through 2010), as it is for many departments across the country. While PWCPD has taken a number of steps to increase the number of Spanish speaking officers (they recruit officers at Hispanic cultural events and offer a five percent increase in pay for officers that speak Spanish and pass a Spanish test), it had only 20 to 25 officers as of our 2010 interviews that were receiving extra pay for speaking Spanish. (Below, we review data on PWCPD's use of language translation services.)

Finally, personnel that we interviewed generally had few recommendations for changing the policy. However, a few in the early focus groups felt that further community education efforts about the policy and about the process for becoming a citizen would be helpful.



### 5.3.2 Effects on the Community and Police-Community Relations

Interviews and focus groups with PWCPD personnel in 2008 indicated that both the announcement of the policy in July 2007 and the implementation of the first policy in March 2008 created a substantial amount of fear and distrust of police in the Hispanic community in PWC. This was aggravated by misunderstandings and misinformation about the policy in the Hispanic community. In particular, there was a misperception among some in the immigrant community that the PWCPD would be seeking out illegal immigrants.<sup>63</sup> Many officers felt that this contributed to an outflow of immigrants from PWC, though the declining economy in the county was also thought to have caused much of this out-migration. Some officers also perceived that crime victims and witnesses in the Hispanic community were more reluctant to cooperate with police for fear that police would check their immigration status.<sup>64</sup> Overall in the interviews, officers reported that the net effect of the policy on police-immigrant relations had been negative.

At the same time, PWCPD personnel also believed that this situation had improved by the latter part of 2008 due to the Department's educational outreach efforts—including dissemination of informational materials, attendance at community meetings, and recruitment efforts in the Hispanic community—and to its everyday interactions with residents and workers. A telling example of these changes came from an officer who described how in the early days of the policy Hispanic restaurant patrons would stop their meals and leave when he and other officers entered a restaurant. At one of these establishments, the officer and his colleagues talked at length about the policy with the restaurant's Hispanic owner, who in turn conveyed this information to her customers and others she knew in the community. Following this, the officer saw fewer signs that patrons in the restaurant were fearful of the police; on the contrary, officers felt that they could interact informally with patrons without causing fear. Anecdotally, officers also reported seeing other signs that fear and distrust were easing among immigrants. These included improvements in daily interactions with immigrants and a modest rebound in persons at day laborer sites.

Our interviews and focus groups in 2009 and 2010 suggest that this progress has continued. While the earlier 2008 focus groups reported tensions in the community based on the new policy, by the time of the 2009 focus groups with patrol officers, there was not much attention to the issue of the immigration policy in the community. The officers felt that the deteriorating economy and associated collapse in jobs related to home building were having more of an effect on illegal aliens leaving the County than was the policy. The officers felt that many illegal immigrants had left PWC during the early phase of the immigration policy, but that over time fewer illegal immigrants were leaving and some were even coming back. The officers in the focus groups felt that there was some anecdotal evidence of the illegal immigrants leaving the County after the policy was established such as fewer "hit and run" accidents (also see Section 8), fewer laborers at labor sites, and fewer complaints about overcrowding in houses and public urination. As the home building industry has rekindled, more illegal immigrants seem to be coming back to PWC, based on officer comments in the 2009

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<sup>63</sup> As described in footnote 56, traffic stops by PWCPD increased considerably from 2007 to 2008 (as did traffic citations—see PWCPD, 2009: 17), and this may have fueled fears about enforcement of the policy. However, this increase (which could reflect increases in both proactive policing and traffic violations) began in 2007, and there was no indication of a surge corresponding to the implementation of the policy.

<sup>64</sup> In this sense, the policy has arguably hurt PWCPD's community policing efforts. However, officers have also pointed out that the Department's community policing efforts have suffered more generally due to rising demands for police service. This trend, combined with the Department's growing emphasis on the use of special units to address street crime, has limited the time that officers have for conducting proactive activities and for interacting informally with residents and workers.

focus groups. Also, some local night clubs that were associated with illegal aliens had most of their customer base disappear in the early days of the new policy, but by 2010 the officers in the focus groups were reporting these clubs back closer to pre-policy levels. The focus group officers had similar observations in 2009 related to local Hispanic soccer teams (14 soccer teams down to zero and back to 8 teams as of 2009). The focus group officers noted that many immigrants began to recognize that the police are not rounding up immigrants and that the policy is being implemented fairly. For those reasons, immigrants have started to return to PWC.

Some of the earlier concerns about lack of cooperation from the Hispanic community and other racial tensions that were voiced in the 2008 focus groups were not issues for the later focus groups, who felt these problems had largely disappeared. The officers in the 2009 focus groups felt that the topic of illegal immigrants had waned a bit and that it is not a big issue in the community. Much of the fervor associated with the vocal policy advocacy of the anti-immigrant groups has died down (by the time of the 2009 focus groups, it was hardly noticeable to officers).

Officers in the focus groups (in 2008 and especially in 2009) felt that a key factor in the implementation of the policy has been the waning of the topic of illegal immigrants in the local media in PWC. They felt that much of the early problems associated with the policy were related to the media “fanning the flames” and that once the media lost interest in the topic, the implementation of the policy became much easier.

In the early days of the policy, officers sometimes found themselves in antagonistic situations involving people on different sides of the immigration issue and had to manage these interactions carefully. We heard about a few instances of native residents trying to provoke situations with immigrants (in order to draw police involvement) and of people filming police with the intent of criticizing them for being too lenient or too aggressive with suspected immigrants. Such incidents have not been common, however, and may no longer be occurring. We did not hear about any such incidents during our follow-up interviews in 2009 and 2010.

Our ride-alongs with police officers in the summer of 2010 bore this out, as we witnessed many cordial or even friendly interactions on the street between Hispanic residents and the non-Hispanic officers with whom we rode. Of course, it is possible that the officers with whom we rode for the evening shifts may have been exceptional; but none of the officers or supervisors we talked with in the course of our 2010 ride-alongs felt that communication with Hispanic residents was a major problem in their daily policing work.

Similarly, officers felt that the policy prompted more calls early on about trespassing, loitering, and other such matters by people and businesses who believed that the police would remove illegal immigrants or scare them away. In essence, some community members tried to use the policy—and the police—as a tool for dealing with problems (real or perceived) that they had with immigrants. This was cited as more of a problem at the outset of the policy, however, and our analysis of trends in calls for service in Section 8 suggests that it has not significantly affected trends in calls to police. Therefore, increases in calls prompted by the policy may not have been particularly large or may have faded over time. While there are still calls from residents complaining about suspected illegal immigrants committing code violations (e.g., overcrowding in houses), officers seemed to feel by 2009 that there were generally few complaints about illegal immigrants by average residents.

The officers felt that the Hispanic immigrant community was very hesitant in the early days of the policy, but once they realized that the policy was going to be implemented fairly they became more accepting of the policy and more welcoming to the police. The 2009 focus group felt that satisfac-

tion with the police was continuing to move upwards. The focus group of commanders in 2010 also indicated that many residents complemented the Department on keeping a middle ground on the issue of illegal immigration. Notwithstanding, they noted that the Department's relationship with the community was hurt on both sides. While the criticism of the police is no longer evident, the relationship between the police and the community still has to be worked on to fully heal. Many of the officers across the ranks indicated in the focus groups that the Department is likely to continue to receive extra scrutiny because of the policy and that it will take some time before the "cloud over Prince William moves on." Similarly, while the 2009 and 2010 focus groups did not raise crime reporting by immigrants as a significant issue, additional officer survey results presented in Section 8 reveal some continuing problems with this.

The focus group officers also talked about the drop in street robberies during the period of the new policy. The officers indicated that the Department's street robbery reduction program was more likely to have caused this than was the immigration policy. That program had undercover detectives, involved seizures of guns off the streets, hot spot policing, education with the community, lectures on victimization, and directed patrol. The police also worked with the Hispanic population who were often the robbery victims.

A final but critical point is that there have been few complaints against PWCPD arising from the immigration checks according to PWCPD command staff. Other PWCPD personnel that we interviewed from 2008 through 2010 also felt that there had been few if any instances of overzealous officers using the policy (in either version) to target illegal immigrants inappropriately or aggressively.<sup>65</sup> As of this writing, the issue of racial profiling or bias had been raised in only one lawsuit against the Department, and those accusations, which had been raised secondarily in the case, were dismissed by the court.

## **5.4 The Activities and Experiences of the Criminal Alien Unit (CAU)**

The second component of PWCPD's immigration policy has been the establishment of a Criminal Alien Unit (CAU). Comprising six detectives (one of whom is a supervisor for the unit) and a crime analyst as of 2010, this unit focuses on the apprehension and deportation of serious offenders who are legal or illegal immigrants and on special projects like the investigation of "identification mills" that produce false identification cards such as drivers' licenses or green cards. Members of this unit received federal 287(g) training and status, which makes them federally deputized officers with the authority to process illegal immigrants on behalf of ICE. The CAU thus expands the capabilities of ICE while also benefiting PWCPD by facilitating more certain and swift action against immigrants who commit serious crimes.

The unit, which began operations in March of 2008 and works closely with PWCPD's gang unit, identifies targets through intelligence gathering and reviews of field interview cards, warrants, and probationers. CAU focuses on "aggravated felonies" (i.e., murder, rape, sex abuse of a minor, drug trafficking, pandering, and other violent or theft offenses with a sentence of one year or more) and crimes of "moral turpitude" (i.e., assaults against police or family, sex offenses, theft, and fraud).<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Police-citizen encounters observed by project staff also suggest that officers give subjects a fair amount of leeway before making formal inquiries into their immigration status. For example, officers seem inclined to give loiterers a warning and an opportunity to leave the vicinity before interviewing them with field cards.

<sup>66</sup> These designations are based on federal immigration law, which states that illegal immigrants are ineligible for bond when they have been convicted of an aggravated felony or at least two crimes of moral turpitude (see Morlier, 2008 as presented in PWCPD, 2008a).

Like the rest of the Department, the unit does not conduct sweeps of day labor sites or other such round ups. In conducting their work, they consider factors like seriousness of offense, criminal history, gang membership,<sup>67</sup> and drug involvement. In addition to investigating document mills, CAU has also investigated houses of prostitution (fronting as massage parlors) that employed illegal immigrants. Occasionally, they become involved in cases at the arrest stage if requested by a patrol officer. Jail officers also contact them from time to time about illegal immigrants who are suspected gang members.<sup>68</sup>

As of July 2009, CAU had issued 120 detainers (or about 7 per month), and they reported making about 30 arrests of all sorts per month. Each immigration case is very labor intensive; CAU staff estimate that it takes 16 officer-hours to conduct 287(g) processing of one person. CAU must also transport subjects to an ICE facility in Merrifield, VA.

Besides the time-consuming nature of their cases, operational problems noted by CAU members included delays in acquiring and connecting ICE computers (the unit did not receive its computers until June 2008), complexities and problems in using ICE computers, adapting to changes in ICE protocols, and the accessibility of their initial liaison from ICE during their early months of operation. However, the unit does not appear to have encountered particularly serious obstacles or problems that have impeded their efforts.

Although their working relationship with ICE appears to be good, members of CAU did acknowledge a lack of communication that exists between CAU and other staff of PWCPD. This problem seems to have persisted mainly with patrol and the CAU unit from the early stages of implementation of the policy through 2010 (the CAU officers felt that their working relationship with other special units has been very good). CAU officers noted that their cases are not publicized and, consequently, others in the Department have little knowledge of what CAU does. Indeed, this theme arose in our interviews with other members of the rank and file of PWCPD, many of whom had little knowledge of the unit's activities and questioned whether the allocation of six officers to the unit was worthwhile, especially since those positions were not backfilled as originally intended. Some officers wish to have more information about CAU's activities and for CAU to become more involved in supporting and assisting patrol officers at the street level, perhaps even assisting with monitoring of day labor sites. The patrol officers we spoke with had not worked with the CAU, though they also had not handled cases requiring CAU's assistance.

The CAU officers felt over time that there have been some improvements in their relationship with patrol. Some of these improvements are related to the in-service trainings that CAU does for officers on issues related to illegal immigration (e.g., identifying counterfeit identification) and some are related to support that CAU provides in the field for patrol and other units. Nonetheless, all the levels of officers participating in the focus groups in 2008 and 2009 noted that they knew little about the work of the CAU; some even had negative comments about the effectiveness of the CAU and what they are accomplishing.

Command staff stressed that they wish to keep CAU focused on serious crimes and plan to be careful about expansion of CAU's duties. As of 2010, the CAU had maintained their focus on

<sup>67</sup> CAU members estimate that the share of gang members who are illegal immigrants can vary from 0% to 50% among the County's numerous gangs.

<sup>68</sup> Our description of CAU's cases is based on our discussion with the unit and not upon an analysis of their cases.

serious crimes, but more recently they have also been more involved in addressing prostitution cases involving immigrants (many of whom are Korean or Chinese and are in PWC legally).

The CAU generates most of its cases through proactive investigations and referrals from other agencies. The field interview cards completed by mostly patrol officers have not been a good source of intelligence for the CAU. The FI Cards are mostly useful for statistical tracking purposes. The processing of illegal immigration cases still through 2010 continues to be a very time consuming process for the CAU officers. Processing often takes two CAU officers working two full days, but the majority of the CAU's cases where they detain an illegal alien lead to a deportation or prosecution (but these cases can take months or years to go through the federal system). The CAU's relationship with ICE is still good and has developed to an even stronger relationship over time through 2010, despite the fact that the network connection for the CAU officers and the ICE databases is still not very good. Also, ICE seems to be good at communicating with the PWCPD when ICE officers do their occasional sweeps/raids for illegal immigrants in the County.

## **5.5 Other Departmental Issues**

### **5.5.1 Minority Recruitment**

Recruitment and retention of officers is a major enterprise at PWCPD, consisting of 13 personnel (recruiters, background investigators, polygraph personnel, and administration of the unit). The main issue PWCPD recruitment faces is getting a sufficient number of quality applications. There is no shortage of applications, just quality applicants. The unit has not been getting better applications, despite the rising unemployment rate (the recruiters told our research team that they speculated that local organizations are shedding mostly their lower quality employees and that others are not leaving their positions). Over the last several years (back to 2006-2007), applications have been consistent (1,050-1,200) before and after policy.

A concern for PWCPD at the outset of its immigration policy was that the policy might hurt the Department's efforts to recruit minorities, particularly Hispanics. However, this has not been the case. Figures provided by PWCPD's Personnel Bureau show that 156 Hispanics applied to PWCPD during the 21 months prior to the implementation of the Department's immigration enforcement efforts (May 2006 – February 2008). This figure increased to 208 during the 21 months following the implementation of the policy (March 2008 – December 2009). During this same span of time, the share of applicants who were Hispanic also increased slightly from 13% to 14%.

Hispanic representation among academy recruits (i.e., persons hired) is lower but has also held steady. Hispanics accounted for 9% of recruits in the three academy classes hired just before the policy's implementation (January 2007, July 2007, and January 2008) and 8% of recruits in the next three classes, which spanned through early 2010 (July 2008, January 2009, and January 2010).<sup>69</sup> Finally, the overall percentage of PWCPD officers who are Hispanic has increased somewhat over the last two years, from 6.6% in January 2008 to 7.4% in January 2010.

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<sup>69</sup> Though based on small numbers, it is perhaps noteworthy that the share of recruits that were Hispanic fell in each of the three classes leading up to the policy (from 18% in January 2007 to 8% in July 2007 to 3% in January 2008) and then rose over the next three classes (from 4% in July 2008 to 7% in January 2009 to 14% in January 2010).

Although PWCPD would like to increase its representation of Hispanics and other minorities, these trends suggest that the policy has not hurt the Department's efforts in this regard. PWCPD's recruiting staff makes extensive efforts to target minorities in their selection of recruitment events and advertising, and this has perhaps helped to offset any negative impacts that the policy might otherwise have had on recruitment of minorities and Hispanics. PWCPD recruiters have also had initiatives targeting venues for Hispanics, Blacks and women. For example, the agency website has changed to target more women and minorities, testimonials from women and minorities are a part of the recruiting materials, and recruiters attend special minority festivals and career fairs. As another illustration, PWCPD recruiters made appearances on Radio Fiesta, a Hispanic radio program, nearly every month from August 2007 through September 2008. This gave recruiters an opportunity to both explain the Department's immigration policy to the Hispanic community and bolster Hispanic recruitment. PWCPD recruiters with whom we spoke also indicated that they had not seen or heard anything specific about the policy having negative effects on recruitment. They also noted that many Hispanic officers in PWCPD are military veterans or persons who have lived in PWC for a considerable length of time. The policy may be less likely to affect sentiment toward the police among Hispanics from such backgrounds.

Overall, the recruitment staff interviewed by the research team did not feel that the illegal immigration policy had any effect on recruitment for good or ill. As in other areas, the recruiters felt that the economic crisis has been a major factor in affecting hiring trends in PWCPD, not the illegal immigration policy.

### 5.5.2 Use of Language Translation Services

As discussed in Section 7.2, PWCPD and 911 dispatchers in the County have used a telephonic language interpretation service to assist officers and dispatchers in communicating with non-English speakers since 2006. At peak times during 2006, officers and dispatch personnel used the interpretation service as often as 800 to 900 times per month (see Figure 7-5). The vast majority of these calls were for assistance with Spanish speakers.

It was anticipated that the immigration policy might affect the use of this service in a number of possible ways. If the policy prompted officers to conduct more stops, field interviews, and immigration checks of Hispanics, it would have led to substantial increases in the use of the language line and in the costs for its use (including monetary costs and lost time). If, on the other hand, the policy caused Hispanics, particularly those who were illegal immigrants, to leave the County and/or made them less likely to call police, then the need for the service would have declined.

Trends shown in Figure 7-5 are more consistent with the latter possibilities. After a number of ups and downs during 2006 and early 2007, use of the language service declined fairly consistently from the latter half of 2007 (following the PWC Board of County Supervisors' announcement of the policy in July 2007) through the latter part of 2008. From that point, usage stabilized through early 2010, generally varying between 250 and 400 calls per month.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>70</sup> From May 2006 through April 2010, PWCPD also used a Spanish "rehire" team of on-call bilingual officers who received overtime pay for helping with these situations. Based on its dates of operation, the deployment of this team does not appear to have impacted the trends shown in Figure 7-5 (however, we do not have data on the volume of the team's operations). PWCPD discontinued the team in the spring of 2010 due to budgetary constraints; at least one officer who had participated in the program reported that usage of the "rehire" officer services had been declining as the program reached an end.

### 5.5.3 Costs of the Policy

The immigration policy has also imposed significant start-up and ongoing costs on PWCPD. As noted earlier, the costs of the Department's start-up activities tallied \$1.3 million as of the fall of 2008. In addition, PWCPD reports that its ongoing annual costs are between \$700,000 and \$750,000. These costs cover staffing of the CAU, ongoing training for officers, participation in various community events, and evaluation efforts (notably, funding for this study). Hence, costs to PWCPD as of this writing have been on the order of \$2.7 to \$2.8 million.<sup>71</sup>

A related point also noted previously is that PWCPD's command staff has expressed concern about the cumulative effects of time burdens that the policy has placed on the Department. PWCPD reports that its senior staff has collectively spent thousands of hours planning and executing the Department's implementation strategy, participating in community meetings (before and since the policy's implementation), responding to inquiries from community groups, the media, and other entities of local government (such as the County Board of Supervisors), responding to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and monitoring implementation of the policy (e.g., reviewing field interview cards). These activities have diverted senior staff from other managerial duties, potentially affecting other aspects of the Department's performance.

Officers in the field must also undertake additional tasks such as filling out field interview cards when they encounter suspected illegal immigrants. Although officers have not felt heavily burdened by the policy, PWCPD recognizes that some of the illegal immigrants they arrest must be taken into custody for offenses that could otherwise result in a summons (e.g., traffic violations), were it not for their status as illegal immigrants. The time that officers spend processing each of these arrests is normally 1.5 to 2 hours. In addition, PWCPD estimates that Spanish-speaking officers are needed for translation in about half of the arrests involving illegal immigrants, which typically adds an additional hour of officer time per arrest.

In assessing these burdens, the most critical issue is arguably whether they have detracted from the Department's ability to prevent crime and provide other quality services. Indeed, one may argue that the additional arrests have had some value in reducing crime. While these questions are hard to answer definitively, our analyses of crime and citizen satisfaction with police (see Sections 8 and 10) suggest that the demands of implementing the policy have not undermined PWCPD's ability to control crime or reduced satisfaction with other police services among most PWC residents.

## 5.6 Summary

To summarize, PWCPD undertook thorough measures to prepare internally for the implementation of the policy and to educate the community about the policy. Implementation of the policy has generally gone smoothly. Officers have been comfortable implementing the policy, particularly in its current form, and it does not seem to have had a major impact on their work. The CAU, for its part, has played a modest but important role in the Department's immigration enforcement efforts, focusing on proactive investigation of more serious offenders in coordination with ICE. Although the policy has placed additional burdens and costs on PWCPD, and especially on its command staff, the agency seems to have adapted well to these demands (further illustrations of this are contained in the coming sections on crime and community satisfaction with police).

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<sup>71</sup> Financial costs to ADC from its participation in the 287(g) program are discussed in Section 6.

PWCPD personnel believe that the policy initially caused fear in the immigrant community, thereby contributing to the exodus of immigrants from the County and undermining the immigrant community's trust of the Department. However, PWCPD personnel feel that their outreach efforts and their administration of the policy have helped to ease these fears and at least begun to restore the agency's relationship with the immigrant community. Generally, officers rate their relationship with the community as being good; they regard most problems with police-community relations as only occasional. Further, some of the Department's initial concerns that the policy would hurt recruitment efforts and increase racial bias complaints have not been realized. The change from General Order 45 to General Order 45.01 (which was made by the PWC Board County Supervisors at PWCPD's urging) and PWCPD's efforts to implement the policy in a professional and impartial manner have almost certainly helped to stem the latter. Nevertheless, the policy continues to be an issue that hangs over PWC and PWCPD and that can magnify the impact of problems (and problem incidents) for PWCPD.



## 6 The Experiences of the Judiciary, Jail, and ICE in Processing Illegal Immigrants in Prince William County

In this section, we examine the experiences of other criminal justice organizations that handle illegal immigrants in PWC. Although we were not tasked with evaluating the policies and practices of these organizations, their operations are relevant because they have ramifications for the outcomes of PWCPD's efforts and for assessing the overall impact of PWC and State of Virginia policies that deal with crime and immigration. Our discussion focuses on: 1) magistrates and the judiciary; 2) the local jail (ADC); and 3) the federal Immigrations and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE).<sup>72</sup>

### 6.1 Magistrates and the Judiciary

As discussed in Section 4, PWCPD officers bring arrestees before state-appointed magistrates who make decisions about pre-trial release and bail. Magistrates take immigration status into account in their decisions, but they are not required to detain suspected illegal immigrants who do not have either an ICE detainer or a previous felony conviction that resulted in deportation.

Magistrates answer directly to State of Virginia circuit court judges and are not under the control of PWC officials. Although they were not consulted during the development of the PWC immigration policy, magistrates work with PWPCD and ADC officials in processing illegal immigrants. Magistrates typically give officers time to complete immigration checks when the officers suspect that an arrestee is an illegal immigrant. When they take arrestees before the magistrates, PWCPD officers, in turn, inform the magistrates of the arrestees' immigration status. Although magistrates release some suspected illegal immigrants on personal recognizance, we did not hear complaints about this from PWCPD officers. Suspected illegal immigrants released by magistrates appear to be minor offenders who pose a low risk of subsequent offending or failure to appear in court.<sup>73</sup> Officers from ADC's 287(g) unit (see below) also coordinate with magistrates when needed to prevent the release of arrestees with ICE detainers who have been detained in ADC but are scheduled to be released on bail.<sup>74</sup> In sum, the immigration policies of PWCPD and ADC seem to have had little direct or indirect effect on magistrates, nor have the magistrates' actions had much impact on the implementation of these policies by PWCPD and ADC.

Based on anecdotal accounts from police officers, one problematic issue involving the judiciary more generally is that judges sometimes dismiss criminal cases against illegal immigrants, presumably to relieve strain on the justice system, based on the expectation that the immigrants will be deported anyway. If such an offender later returns to the community—as PWCPD officers have witnessed in at least few cases—the prior case will not be on his record, thus preventing police and prosecutors from using it against him should he commit a new offense. A related point is that judges sometimes forego a sentence of incarceration for immigrant offenders that plead guilty and can be deported. We do not have data on the prevalence of either of these types of cases, but we recommend that PWCPD, prosecutors, and the judiciary make efforts to track them.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> See Section 4 for a general description of the processing of illegal immigrants by magistrates and ADC.

<sup>73</sup> However, we do not have specific statistics on this issue.

<sup>74</sup> This could occur in cases where the initial PWCPD check did not reveal the ICE detainer, perhaps due to problems in making a definitive identification of an arrestee.

<sup>75</sup> On a related note, ADC data discussed in Section 4 suggest that fewer than 9% of illegal immigrants processed by ADC are later returned to ADC for new offenses.

## 6.2 The Prince William – Manassas Regional Adult Detention Center (ADC)

The ADC serves as the local jail for PWC and for the cities of Manassas and Manassas Park. The ADC is overseen by a Regional Jail Board that consists of ten members including the PWC Sheriff, seven members appointed by the PWC Board of County Supervisors, and two members appointed by the Manassas City Council. The ADC and Regional Jail Board operate under authority of state law. When the 287(g) program began operating at the ADC in July 2007, the facility had the capacity to house approximately 500 inmates, with an additional 100 housed in its work-release center (Prince William-Manassas Regional Adult Detention Center, 2007). ADC housed additional inmates at other regional and local facilities when needed due to space limitations. A new central ADC facility with an operational capacity of 667 persons was opened near the end of 2008 (see <http://www.co.prince-william.va.us/default.aspx?topic=040048>), which has helped to alleviate crowding problems that were at one point also aggravated by the processing of illegal immigrants (see below). ADC's average daily population in 2009 was 878.

ADC selected a group of officers for 287(g) training in 2007 and began running 287(g) checks on inmates in July 2007. ADC statistics show that by April 2008, the 287(g) unit was running immigration checks on all (or virtually all) persons of foreign birth committed to the facility (see Section 4).

The 287(g) unit recently acquired a new officer, bringing its total to 12. ADC officers conduct their own inquiries into immigration status; communication with PWPCD about the latter's checks on the immigration status of arrestees is informal, according to ADC officials. Also, the ADC 287(g) unit does not handle cases being processed by PWCPD's 287(g) unit (the CAU). ADC's 287(g) officers issued 2,783 detainers and released 2,499 people to ICE through June 2010 (see Section 4).<sup>76</sup> As noted in Section 4, ADC officials do not know how many of these subjects have been deported by ICE.

ADC's 287(g) unit now operates in the new jail facility and is physically located closer to the jail's intake unit (as are the magistrates that operate in the facility). Initially, the 287(g) unit operated from 5:00 a.m. to midnight, but its operations were expanded to 24 hours a day in October 2008. Operations at the jail have also been enhanced since 2008 by the introduction of the automated LIVESCAN fingerprint and photograph matching system, which links to federal data systems. LIVESCAN has helped with the identification and verification of suspected illegal immigrants' identity for a history in the justice system. Through the recent Secure Communities project (see Section 4), LIVESCAN matches the fingerprints of arrestees to ICE databases, among others.

The 287(g) jail unit is now supervised by the ICE's Office of Detention and Removal, which has a person on site for a few hours every day during the work week. ICE also provides daily pickups of individuals on whom the 287(g) has placed immigration detainers. Some of those individuals (e.g., low risk illegal aliens) are released in Prince William County rather than being transferred to another facility and released there.

The 287(g) program has imposed costs on ADC. Costs for the program over its first three fiscal years were approximately \$3.5 million, and ADC has had to divert people from other functions to

<sup>76</sup> Prior to the start of ADC's 287(g) program, ADC officers cooperated with ICE agents more informally, primarily by coordinating on the handling of inmates with immigration detainers.

staff the 287(g) unit.<sup>77</sup> However, the federal government does compensate ADC for the additional detention time necessary for preparing detainees and holding illegal immigrants for ICE.

At an earlier stage of the program, slow follow-up by ICE also exacerbated crowding conditions at ADC and contributed to an increase in ADC inmates sent to other regional and local jails (referred to as “farm-outs”). “Immigration prisoner days” per month—i.e., the time spent by illegal immigrants in ADC for detainees after the closing of their state and/or local charges—increased from an average of 11 in 2007 to 29 in 2008, before declining to 7 in 2009 (unpublished data provided by ADC). This also may have contributed to an overall increase in ADC’s average daily population from 731 in 2006 to 736 in 2007 to 742 during the first 10 months of 2008 (before full operation of ADC’s new facility). This issue was resolved, however, through a Memorandum of Agreement between ICE and ADC, and ICE agents now pick up (or allow the release) of 287(g) cases within 48 hours. An ICE agent works closely with the 287(g) unit and is regularly on-site at ADC. In other respects, the ADC’s 287(g) program appears to work smoothly, despite day-to-day difficulties that make the 287(g) process rather time consuming (complications in using federal data systems, dealing with language barriers, etc.) and periodic adjustments required by turnover among ICE staff.

### **6.3 The Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency**

The federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) is the primary agency responsible for the enforcement of federal immigration laws. Illegal immigrants processed by 287(g) personnel in PWCPD and ADC are eventually transferred to ICE agents, who then decide whether or not to prosecute and/or deport them. Coordination between ICE and both PWCPD and ADC is governed by a Memorandum of Agreement.

Two ICE divisions, the Office of Investigations (OI) and the Office of Detention and Removal (DRO) work with PWC on immigration issues. OI is responsible for the investigation of criminal activity by immigrants, and it oversees the cases of PWCPD’s Criminal Alien Unit (CAU). Until September 2008, OI was also tasked with handling illegal immigrants processed by ADC. This task has been assumed by DRO, which is responsible for housing incarcerated immigrants and physically removing illegal and criminal immigrants from the country.

ICE officials have stressed to PWC that their focus is on immigrants, both legal and illegal, who are serious offenders or repeat immigration violators (i.e., persons who have been deported previously). Trying to deport all illegal immigrants in PWC and elsewhere in the country would simply overwhelm the agency.<sup>78</sup> Accordingly, ICE officials state that the agency often uses release on recognition or electronic monitoring for illegal immigrants who have not committed serious offenses and who have not previously been deported (also see Schriro, 2009). They also note that there are also various waivers under which federal immigration judges may allow illegal immigrants to remain in the country (e.g., an impending marriage or the presence of strong community ties). Further, ICE does not take juvenile cases. All of this suggests that many illegal immigrants arrested by PWCPD and processed by ADC for minor offenses are not likely to be deported from the country.<sup>79</sup> However, specific figures on the outcomes of illegal immigration cases from PWC are unavailable. To date, officials from PWCPD and ADC have been unable to acquire this information from ICE, which

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<sup>77</sup> A few of the full-time equivalents (FTEs) needed to staff the program were provided by the County.

<sup>78</sup> Due to various appeals and procedural complexities, the process of removing immigrants from the country often takes a few months to a year. In addition, the cost of holding illegal immigrants is \$90 per day.

<sup>79</sup> Of course, reentering the country may also be relatively easy for those deported. PWCPD officers have noted cases of persons returning after deportation.

arguably represents a notable gap in ICE's coordination with PWC agencies. In August 2010, the Chairman of PWC's Board of County Supervisors, Cory Stewart, requested that ICE provide the County with aggregate figures on the outcomes of PWC's immigration cases. That request was still pending as of this writing.

That issue aside, senior officials that we interviewed from ICE's OI are supportive of PWCPD's efforts through the 287(g) program. With only 120 agents available for all missions in Virginia and Washington, D.C., OI officials feel that PWCPD's CAU is a valuable complement to their workforce and that coordination between the two agencies has been good. OI officials estimate that CAU sends them 7 to 12 cases per month. OI and CAU also use a task force approach in which they plan strategy case by case, based on potential penalties available at the federal and local level. OI officials estimate that they still receive the same number of violent immigrant cases that they received before the CAU began operating, but that CAU's assistance makes the handling of these cases much less cumbersome.

Initially, OI agents also handled the removal of immigrants from ADC due to a personnel shortage in DRO. This put substantial strain on OI, which is not as well equipped and staffed to handle these duties. This led in turn to delays in the removal of illegal immigrants from ADC and contributed to overcrowding in the facility, as discussed above. This issue was corrected by 2008, and DRO has since taken responsibility for transporting illegal immigrants from ADC or allowing their release within 48 hours of identification.

Nevertheless, cooperating with PWC's immigration policy has been very demanding for ICE. In the summer of 2008, ICE proposed cutting back on the types of cases referred from PWC, but it agreed to continue the current arrangement after further consultation with PWC officials. However, ICE indicated that it would not enter into any additional 287(g) agreements in the region for at least the remainder of fiscal year 2008, and that other current and future 287(g) agreements would not be as broad as that established with PWC because ICE does not have the capacity to operate in that manner with many jurisdictions.

Indeed, concerns about the net-widening effects of the 287(g) program and other efforts nationally<sup>80</sup> led the Obama administration to implement changes in the program in October 2009. In that month, ICE established a new standardized memorandum of agreement (MOA) to govern all current and future 287(g) agreements, including those with PWCPD and ADC. The new MOA emphasizes a focus on immigrants who have committed serious crimes, pose a threat to public safety, and/or have been previously ordered removed from the country (Rodriguez et al., 2010). Under the new agreement, ICE will take custody of immigrants under the following circumstances: 1) the subject has been convicted of a State, local, or Federal crime and has completed any term of incarceration for that offense(s); 2) the subject has prior criminal convictions and his/her immigration detention is required by statute; or 3) ICE decides on a case-by-case basis to assume custody of a subject not meeting the previous criteria (ICE Memorandum of Agreement with PWCPD, effective October 16, 2009).

The new MOA also seeks to solidify ICE's control over the priorities of 287(g) personnel conducting field operations. In addition to making administrative changes regarding issues such as background checks and certification of officers, the new agreement establishes priority levels for different types of criminal offenders and requires ICE approval for operations focusing on immigration

<sup>80</sup> The number of persons removed from the country by ICE nearly doubled from 185,431 in FY 2006 to 356,739 in FY 2008 (see [http://www.ice.gov/pi/reports/annual\\_report](http://www.ice.gov/pi/reports/annual_report)).

enforcement and immigration arrests involving no state or local charges. Top priority, or “level 1”, targets for arrest and detention include immigrants who have been convicted of or arrested for “major drug offenses and/or violent offenses such as murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, and kidnapping.” Level 2 subjects are those convicted of or arrested for “minor drug offenses and/or mainly property offenses such as burglary, larceny, fraud, and money laundering.” Finally, level 3 offenses include those who have been convicted of or arrested for “other” offenses.

However, PWCPD and ADC officials indicate that this new MOA has had relatively little impact on their operations, which have always been oriented towards the enforcement priorities stated above. Irrespective of whether an identified illegal alien is incarcerated or not, and regardless of ICE policies regarding prosecution, PWCPD notifies ICE of the alien’s presence. As shown in Section 4, moreover, detainers issued by ADC remained steady from 2009 through the first half of 2010.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Figure 4-4 of Section 4 shows that there was a temporary decline in releases to ICE (and in the ratio of releases to detainers issued) around the time of the new agreement. It is unclear whether this was due in some manner to the new MOA; either way, releases rebounded to their prior levels by early 2010.

## 7 Changes in the County's Hispanic Population and the Number of Illegals

### 7.1 Changes in the County's Hispanic Population

Did Prince William County's illegal immigrant population decrease after the Police Department implemented General Orders 45 and 45.01? This is a challenging question to answer because no official statistical source actually counts illegal immigrants as an identifiable category of persons. As has already been noted, during the same period that the policy was being debated and initiated (July 2007 through March 2008), housing and other construction, which had been booming in Prince William County, decreased dramatically. In January 2001, the Bureau of Labor Statistics documented 9919 employed construction workers in PWC. In June 2006, the number of construction employees had grown to 15,786. By January 2008, the figure had fallen almost 4,000 to 11,909.<sup>82</sup> This section of the report looks at the available evidence to assess changes in the County's Hispanic population, to determine whether or not the County's illegal population decreased in number, and to consider if these changes are attributable to the County's immigration policy or to other causes.

Because the policy's public debate and implementation occurred at the same time that the housing market and its associated construction collapsed, it is challenging to disentangle the effects of the policy from the effects of the economy. However, the economic downturn was not limited to Prince William County, but affected all parts of the metropolitan region. It is therefore instructive to compare Prince William's rates of growth and change with those of the rest of the region. We know that, generally speaking, the population of Northern Virginia grew rapidly between 2000 and 2006 and then slowed down noticeably.<sup>83</sup> This six year period saw a 16% increase from 1,847,594 to 2,142,968, but from 2006 to 2007 Northern Virginia's population grew only 0.8% to 2,160,891 and increased by 1.2% between 2007 and 2008. Prince William County recorded similar broad trends, except that its population growth rate in the first half of the decade (27%) was twice that of Northern Virginia as whole. After 2006, this growth rate declined significantly to 0.8% up to 2007 and 1.2% between 2007 and 2008, when the total population stood at 346,734. However, this growth likely resulted from natural increase, since population estimate data from the University of Virginia's Weldon Cooper Center show that up to 2006, in-migration accounted for two-thirds of the county's population growth (69 percent), but this ratio changed sharply after 2006, with natural increase accounting for 85 percent of population growth up to 2008.

Meanwhile, the county's Hispanic population saw explosive growth between 2000 and 2006, charting a 150% increase. Paralleling the County's overall population trend, this growth rate fell precipitously to only 1.2 percent between 2006 and 2007 and 0.7% between 2007 and 2008.<sup>84</sup> Thus, Prince William County changed from being a place where (after 2000) Hispanic growth greatly outpaced that of Northern Virginia or the metropolitan region as a whole, to a place where Hispanic growth was slower than elsewhere in the region. Essentially, the Hispanic population of the County leveled off after 2006, while it continued rapid growth in the metro area, as can be seen clearly in Figure 7-1. From 2006 to 2009, the Hispanic population of Prince William County grew by only 3.6 percent, while in the same period the Hispanic population of the metro area as a whole grew by 18.8 percent;


<sup>82</sup> U.S. Department of Labor. Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for the Private Construction Industry, Prince William County. Washington, D.C.: Author. Data extracted and downloaded on May 21, 2009 from the State and County QCEW database.

<sup>83</sup> This calculation includes the following counties: Arlington, Fairfax, Fauquier, Loudoun, Prince William, Stafford, and Spotsylvania.

<sup>84</sup> These data derive from the American Community Survey.

taken together, the metro DC jurisdictions outside of Prince William County (“metro minus PWC”) had a Hispanic growth rate of 23.0 percent, nearly six times faster than the growth rate of Hispanics in the County. As Figure 7-1 makes clear, from 2000 to 2006 Prince William County alone accounted for all of the growth in the metropolitan area’s Hispanic population; after 2006 it accounted for a very small share of that growth.

**Figure 7-1. Hispanic Population Trend: PWC vs. DC metro area and balance of metro**




## 7.2 Indicators of decrease in the number of illegal immigrants: data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey

Through an analysis of the Public Use Micro Sample [PUMS] data sets that are made available to analysts by the U.S. Census Bureau, based on the results of the American Community Survey [ACS], we are able to learn more details about changes in the composition of Prince William County’s Hispanic population.<sup>85</sup> Using the PUMS data, available from 2005 to 2008, we can look within the Hispanic population to see some of its changing characteristics. In this data source, we cannot separate Prince William County from the independent cities of Manassas and Manassas Park, so these are treated as one geographic unit that we label “PWC + cities.” The ACS and the decennial

<sup>85</sup> The American Community Survey is a continuous, nationwide data collection by the U.S. Census Bureau that replaces the “long form” formerly used in the decennial census to collect socio-demographic data from a sample of U.S. households. By continuously sampling households across the country, the ACS gathers sufficient data to make estimates for social, demographic, and housing characteristics annually for large localities (like PWC) and on a three-year or five-year basis for smaller localities and census geographic units. The PUMS data sets make available to researchers actual individual records from the ACS, de-identified so that no person can be identified in the data set. Large localities and metropolitan areas can be identified in the dataset. PUMS data are made publicly available through the iPUMS website, a service of the Minnesota Population Center. For more information, see [www.ipums.org](http://www.ipums.org).


census do not ask or record whether a person is in the United States legally, but they do count those who are U.S. citizens and those who are not. Of course, non-citizens include both those in the United States legally and those who are illegal. These data show that, compared to the rest of the Washington, D.C. metro area, the percentage of Hispanics who are non-citizens increased noticeably until 2006 and started declining thereafter. This decline accelerated after 2007, whereas the proportion of non-citizen Hispanics in the Washington, D.C. metro area, which had been growing up until 2007, declined more gradually thereafter (Figure 7-2).

**Figure 7-2. Percent of Hispanics who are Non-Citizens, in the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area and in Prince William County-Manassas- Manassas Park City**




A similar pattern is seen when we look at the percentage of Hispanics who have low English proficiency. These include those who speak no English and those who are reported to speak English “poorly.” As seen in Figure 7-3, the percentage of Hispanics in PWC + cities who speak little or no English increased to about one third in 2006, but then dropped to only a little over one fifth in the two years following the implementation of the policy.



**Figure 7-3. Low English Proficiency of Hispanics, PWC and Rest of DC Metro**

A similar result is observed in the data for “linguistic isolation” among Hispanic residents of the County (plus the two cities). The census bureau defines a person as linguistically isolated if the person does not speak English and also resides in a household in which no person speaks English ‘very well’ or speaks only English. Figure 7-4 shows the changes in the percentage of Hispanics who are linguistically isolated in Prince William County (plus the two cities) from 2005 to 2008, again based on our analysis of ACS PUMS data. The percentage of Hispanics who were linguistically isolated rose to a high of 42 percent in 2006, then fell to about 28 percent by 2008, two years after the policy was implemented. In the rest of the metro area, the percent of linguistically isolated Hispanics stayed steady at near 30% from 2005 to 2007, then dropped in 2008. As the graph illustrates, the rise and fall of Hispanics lacking English and lacking access to a good English speaker in their household changed by larger proportions in PWC than in the rest of the metro area. In 2006 the Hispanic population of Prince William was considerably less acculturated than the Hispanic population of the rest of the metropolitan area; by 2008 the population had a level of acculturation (as measured by language proficiency) that was not much different from the rest of the metro area.

**Figure 7-4. Linguistic Isolation of Hispanics in PWC and Rest of the DC Metro Area**

The change in language pattern seen in the ACS data is borne out by data from an entirely different source: the records of the Prince William Police Department's use of the "language line." The language line is a contractual service through which a police officer can call for immediate help, via telephone, from a language interpreter when, during the course of duty, the officer must converse with someone who does not speak English. Figure 7-5 is based on the monthly billings from the language service, which records and bills for each time the service is used by an officer. As can be seen in the figure, the vast majority of the calls for interpretation services were for Spanish translation. These calls display peaks and valleys that reflect the normal seasonal trends in police calls (with more activity in warmer months). The language-line calls have been trending downwards, with a sharp decline notable in the latter half of 2007, after the introduction of the immigration resolution.<sup>86</sup> Language-line calls went down further in 2008, and still further in 2009.


The change in activity on the language line is quite substantial. There were more than 500 calls in every month from January 2006 through October 2007, but no month from November 2008 through April 2010 had more than 400 calls. Data for 2010 are not complete, but may show a small upward trend from the 2009 low. That increase may be due to the fact that the Department discontinued an alternative translation source, the "Spanish hireback" program, provided by bi-lingual PWCPD officers who were paid overtime to provide translation help on call. That service was available from May of 2006 to April 2010. The termination of the internally provided service was driven primarily by budgetary considerations, but one officer who had been part of the translation detail told us that their level of activity had declined markedly from the busy days of 2007.

The decline in the number of Hispanics with low English proficiency is strong evidence that the number of illegal immigrants declined in the County. We do not mean to imply, of course, that no

<sup>86</sup>The exceptionally low data points in September and October 2008 are reporting anomalies due to the fact that the Police Department changed vendors for the language service.

illegals can speak English nor that one must speak English well to be a legal resident. It is nonetheless clear that Hispanics with low English proficiency are less acculturated, that newer Hispanic immigrants are less likely to know English well, and that illegals are less likely to know English well. We can be confident that the percentage of illegals is higher among Hispanics of low English proficiency than it is among the more acculturated English-speaking Hispanics.

**Figure 7-5. Usage of Telephonic Language Interpretation Service by PWC Police and Communications**




As indicated previously, the rate of growth in the Hispanic population slowed drastically after 2006, declining to only 1.2 percent between 2006 and 2007, where it had stood at 150 percent between 2000 and 2006. The 2007-2008 rate was even lower, coming in at only 0.7 percent. Detailed analysis of American Community Survey data for 2007 and 2008 underlines this slowdown, showing that the net increase in the Hispanic population was only 510 individuals; but this net increase obscures the fact that a substitution effect occurred among Hispanics. In this one year period, the percentage of Latin American-born individuals in the county declined by 10.4 percent, while that of American-born Hispanics increased by 17.4 percent (primarily Cubans, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans).

Other ACS data show that the portion of the Hispanic population experiencing decline was concentrated among young Hispanic males (Figure 7-6). Immigrants in this age group left Prince William County in disproportionate numbers, compared to the Washington metropolitan area as a whole. For example, in the Washington metro area Hispanic males in the 20-24 age cohort saw a population decline of 3 percent between 2006 and 2008, and 25-29 year olds declined by 5 percent. During the same period, Prince William County registered declines of 26 percent and 20 percent among Hispanic males in the same age categories. This represents a decline of about 2,000 males in these two age groups in Prince William over two years. A reasonable conclusion is that many of these were

illegal immigrants – likely Central Americans, considering the high proportion of these immigrants living in the Northern Virginia area. Of course, the downturn in available construction jobs played a role in causing young Hispanic men to leave the area, since many had come to the area to work in construction. However, the construction downturn was not by any means confined to the Prince William area. The sharp difference in the rate of decrease in these population groups in the County compared to the rest of the area suggests that this was an effect of the County’s immigration enforcement policy.

**Figure 7-6. Decline in Male Hispanic Population, Aged 16-30: Washington, D.C. Metro Area and Prince William County-Manassas City-Manassas Park City**



The impact of these changes in the Hispanic community can be seen by looking at one of the demographer’s favorite analysis tools, the ‘population pyramid’ that graphs male and female populations by age group in opposite bars on a single graph. For comparison, consider the population pyramid for the non-Hispanic population of Prince William County in 2006, as seen in figure Figure 7-7. It shows a fairly typical suburban population, with high proportions of baby-boomers (ages 35 to 65), fairly low proportions of elderly residents, and substantial numbers of children in all age groups except 18-19-year-olds, many of whom are away at college or in the military. Notably, the percentages in each age group are roughly equal for men and for women in each age category.


Figure 7-8 shows the population pyramid for County Hispanic residents in the same year, 2006. This shows a far younger population, as is typical for new immigrant groups, with higher percentages in the younger adult cohorts and in the younger ages of the children. But also notable is the strong imbalance in the gender ratios, with young Hispanic men far outnumbering young Hispanic women. A high ‘sex ratio’ is typical of areas of rapid in-migration generally, as the first in-migrants are very often young men seeking work who are either unattached or migrate without bringing their families with them from their place of origin. The 2006 population pyramid shows clearly that there were large numbers of unattached young males among the Hispanics in the County; it is safe to surmise that this group, many of whom came to the County to work in the construction jobs that were still plentiful in 2006, included a large proportion of illegal immigrants.



The population pyramid for County Hispanics from 2009, after the immigration policy had been proposed, debated, and implemented for over a year, shows a noticeably different pattern (see

Figure 7-9). Three changes are evident compared to the 2006 population distribution: (1) the number of younger adults (below age 35) has gone down for both men and women, (2) the excess of men over women in the young-adult ages has diminished, and (3) the age distribution of children has shifted to the younger ages. Given that there was no decline in the overall Hispanic population in these years, all of these suggest that the Hispanic population has become more typically suburban, including more married (or at least partnered) adults, and more parents of young children.

This fits with the anecdotal reports we have heard from various sources of overcrowded houses populated by many young Hispanic males in 2006 becoming vacant after the introduction of the policy, and then later being occupied by young families, often Hispanic. It can be inferred, then, that the introduction of the policy stabilized the Hispanic community of Prince William County not only by changing the rate of overall growth but by significantly altering the structure of the Hispanic population.

**Figure 7-7. Population Pyramid for non-Hispanics, PWC 2006**



**Figure 7-8. Population Pyramid for Hispanics, PWC 2006.****Figure 7-9. Population Pyramid for Hispanics, PWC 2009.**

### 7.3 Informant reports about population changes

The trends suggested in these quantitative data are fully supported by the information we gathered in our interviews with social service providers, Police Department personnel, County staff, business people, pastors and other community leaders. Evidence taken from these informant interviews suggests a rise in the general level of anxiety among Hispanics and a decline in the illegal immigrant population after 2006. These data do not tell us the magnitude of the movement, but are broadly consistent with demographic data showing a sharp decline in the county's population growth rate after that year. Illustrating the rising anxiety levels, one minister recounted how some parishioners had started taking identification cards with them everywhere, in case they were stopped and asked to account for their presence. Fear such as this caused some illegal immigrants to leave the county. As an employee in a large PWC institution said,


At the grocery stores you don't see as many of them—at the grocery store—I mean I'll stop here before I head home, and I'll see it.

A Health Department employee reported,

The number of WIC clients decreased. A fair amount went to Fairfax ... We noticed the decrease because they were asking for their information to be transferred. Initially staff reported that people were requesting the records and moving because they were scared.

#### 7.3.1 Other indicators of population change

Trying to disentangle the size of the policy's effects from those of the economic recession with respect to outmigration is critical in assessing the policy. It is also very challenging because many social service agencies, whose information might be useful in estimating the loss of illegal immigrants in the county, do not gather immigration status data. In many cases, there are good reasons for this. Illegal immigrants fear deportation and avoid government agencies and other places where they might be asked their status. Depending on the agencies' missions, it may be more important to ensure that people use agency services than to ensure that those people who use those services are in the country legally. For example, public health departments aim to ensure the health of entire populations and a process which deters people from using public health services, such as requesting information about immigration status, may endanger the agency's mission. However, since the bulk of the County's illegal immigrant population are Hispanics, it is useful to look at what other data sources can tell us about changes in the Hispanic population of the County and the adjacent small cities.

**Figure 7-10. Hispanic school enrollments, selected counties**

Data from a number of other sources support the conclusion of a decline in the illegal immigrant population since 2006. For example, demographic impacts of the policy are apparent in data on school enrollments. Looking first at Hispanic students as a percentage of school enrollments, as seen in Figure 7-10, we see that the Hispanic percentage rose rapidly in PWC from 2002 through the 2006-07 school year, but then leveled off in the next three years. In contrast, the Hispanic percentage of pupils in Fairfax County rose more sharply from 2007 to 2010 than it had in prior years, and Arlington County, which had experienced several years of declining Hispanic percentages in its schools, suddenly saw an increase after 2007-08, when the PWC policy was implemented. This is one of several demographic data sets that suggest (along with our informant interviews) that some Hispanics relocated from PWC to Fairfax and to Arlington in immediate response to the policy's enactment.


The trend in the county's ESOL enrollments also indicate a reduction in the county's Hispanic—and possibly illegal immigrant—population. Again, we can assume that children who do not know English are more likely to be newcomers to the United States and more likely to be illegally present than those who do know English. As one county official noted, after the County passed its resolutions, her children's play groups became less Hispanic. Another resident said that his church's ESOL classes for adults was “decimated” and is now more diverse, with Asians along with Hispanics. In the 8 years before fall 2008, ESOL enrollments in Prince William County had been steadily rising by an average of 1,450 students a year, an almost twelve-fold increase. In fall 2008, the number of ESOL students dropped by 247 (see Figure 7-11).<sup>87</sup> Although the press and some of our informants reported a fairly large drop in the ESOL student population between Fall 2007 and April 2008 (over 700 students), a look at the county's data over time indicates that the population of ESOL students typically drops between September and June every year by about the same number. The more reliable figure is 247 because it measures the change between one fall (2007) and the next (2008) and does not reflect academic year fluctuations in student enrollments due to things such as dropping

<sup>87</sup> Virginia Department of Education (2008).





out of school or, perhaps, moving back to the country of origin. This drop not only suggests that some illegal immigrants left the county, it also indicates that some dynamic—the policy or the economy—deterred immigrants from moving into the county. As is seen in Figure 7-11, the numbers of ESOL students enrolled in Fairfax County, Alexandria, and Arlington all registered increases from 2007 to 2008. ESOL enrollments in PWC rose again in 2009, while enrollments in Fairfax County leveled off; this suggests a return to the County—or a fresh influx—of less-acclimated Hispanics with children. Despite this latest upturn, the number of ESOL students would have been far higher in Prince William if the rate of growth seen in the years from 2000 to 2007 had continued in 2008 and 2009.

**Figure 7-11. Growth in ESOL Population in PWC and Surrounding Communities, 1999-2009**



Another indicator of change in the Hispanic population in the County and the nearby cities is found in Virginia Health Department statistics on births to Hispanic women.<sup>88</sup> As can be seen in Figure 7-12, births to Hispanic mothers rose rapidly in Prince William from 2000 to 2006, then fell sharply from 2006 (2,384 births) to 2008 (1,776 births), a 25 percent decrease over two years. In contrast, births to Hispanic mothers continued to rise in Fairfax County from 2007 to 2008 and, to a lesser extent, in Loudoun County. Figure 7-13 shows that similar downturns occurred in the adjacent cities of Manassas and Manassas Park, while other small northern Virginia cities (Fairfax City and Fall Church) experienced no decline in Hispanic births during this period. Once again, the pattern of change in Prince William and the adjacent cities is distinctly different from that seen in nearby jurisdictions.

<sup>88</sup> Births are recorded according to the residence address of the mother, not the location of the hospital where the birth took place.

**Figure 7-12. Births to Hispanic women, PWC and other counties****Figure 7-13. Births to Hispanic women, small cities**

## 7.4 By how much did the number of illegal immigrants decline?

Given the available information, the decline in the illegal immigrant population appears to have been substantial, although it may have been experienced as even more so by people living in areas where immigrants are highly concentrated. If several houses on a block are overcrowded, that can have a tangible impact on people's daily lives when it comes to parking a car; if these houses are vacated, the local effect will be substantial.

How many illegal immigrants were there in Prince William County to begin with? Unfortunately, there is no way to know with any great certainty. Census data indicate that in 2006—a year before the first resolution—the Hispanic population stood at 68,418, many of whom were immigrants.<sup>89</sup> Our analysis of the 2006 ACS PUMS dataset indicates that 50.3 percent of the Hispanic residents were non-citizens in 2006—about 34,000 Hispanic non-citizens. Some national studies indicate that undocumented immigrants constitute at least 30 percent of the immigrant population.<sup>90</sup> That percentage could vary widely across states and localities, and there is no such percentage estimate available that can be confidently applied to the Prince William case. It is plausible that this percentage might be higher in Prince William County because of the size and nature of the recent population in-flows to the County. If we assume (conservatively) that anywhere from 25% to 33% of Hispanic non-citizens in Prince William were present illegally, we would bracket the number of Hispanic illegals (of all ages) at somewhere between 8,600 and 17,200 people; small additional numbers of illegal residents of other ethnic backgrounds were also present. We can thus say with considerable certainty that the number of illegals in the County, including all nationalities, probably numbered in the tens of thousands; the great majority of these were Hispanic.<sup>91</sup>

Although we cannot determine the number of people who left the county as opposed to changes in the numbers who might have moved in, some estimates of the overall change in the illegal population are possible. The ACS tells us that there were 69,731 Hispanics of all ages in the County in 2008. Our analysis of ACS PUMS data shows that in 2008 only 37.7% of these were non-citizens, meaning that there were 26,300 Hispanic non-citizens in the County, down from about 34,000 in 2006. That is, non-citizens dropped by 7,700 among Hispanics (plus some small number of non-Hispanics). This represents a 22 percent drop in the number of Hispanic non-citizens in two years. If we assume, conservatively, that legal and illegal non-citizens were affected equally by the introduction of the policy, and also assume (as above) that one-quarter to one-third of Hispanic non-citizens are in the U.S. illegally, then the net decrease in the number of illegals would be between 25 and 33 percent of that figure: that is, the decrease in illegals would be, by the most conservative estimates, between 1,925 and 2,567 persons. On the more plausible assumption that the policy would have caused many illegal non-citizens to leave (or not move in) while having far less effect on legal non-citizen residents, or if one assumes that the percentage of illegals among non-citizens was higher in Prince William than the national average for Hispanics, then the net decrease in illegals could plausibly be anywhere between 3,000 and 6,000 persons. All our data sources taken together indicate that in the two years after the policy was introduced, the number of illegal immigrants in the

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<sup>89</sup> Singer et al (2009). The Census Bureau's American Community Bureau places the number for 2005-2007 at 64,402. See B03001. HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN BY SPECIFIC ORIGIN - Universe: TOTAL POPULATION; Data Set: 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates; <[http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?geo\\_id=05000US51153&ds\\_name=ACS\\_2007\\_3YR\\_G00\\_&mt\\_name=ACS\\_2007\\_3YR\\_G2000\\_B03001](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?geo_id=05000US51153&ds_name=ACS_2007_3YR_G00_&mt_name=ACS_2007_3YR_G2000_B03001)>; accessed March 4, 2009.

<sup>90</sup> Passel (2006, March 7).

<sup>91</sup> The Pew Report also estimated that 78 percent of all undocumented immigrants are Hispanic, Ibid.

County was substantially reduced, probably by no more than 5,000 persons overall, but certainly by more than a thousand.

According to an informant in a county hospital:

We can chart some of the movement out of the county—it has not been as overwhelming as I thought it would be for our clients—one of our workers was collecting some data for us, I don't know how accurate it is, but I wanted to see in terms of our Spanish speaking population if there were fluctuations, and really it's about the same. There are spikes, but those tend to be seasonal spikes—there are particular months—October is a big month for us and July and August are down.

Whatever the size of the population loss, it is clear that the trajectory of rapid growth in the immigrant population was substantially altered around the time of the policy's adoption due to a convergence of circumstances already described.

#### 7.4.1 Why Did People Leave?

It is unclear how much of this substantial decrease was attributable to the immigration enforcement actions of the police (that is, people getting arrested and turned over to ICE), fear of the policy as initially enacted, the highly publicized anti-immigration sentiment voiced in the controversy, or the economic downturn. All four of these factors probably played a role. As the policy was being debated, a serious downturn in the housing market began and foreclosures in Prince William County rose precipitously. As it was being implemented, the entire economy entered a recession. In Prince William County, for example, the number of construction jobs in the county, which had risen by 41 percent between 2000 and 2005 decreased significantly by 2007. Seventy-five percent of the earlier gains in construction jobs were lost. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, about 4,000 construction jobs were lost in PWC due to the mortgage and foreclosure crisis between June 2006 and June 2008;<sup>92</sup> some of the workers in these jobs were immigrant day laborers who may have left the county primarily for economic reasons.

Many interviewees acknowledged the impossibility of disentangling fear, arrests and the severe economic downturn as causative factors in possible Hispanic outmigration. The highly politicized nature of the policy means that people have tended to interpret the outmigration according to their policy position. People in support of the policy have tended to report that the policy had a large impact on the change:

Yes, our street at this time last year—my block—probably has about 30 homes on it, and this time last year it probably had 10 homes that were overcrowded, my wife didn't feel it was safe to take the kids out for a walk in the evening—there were concerns about being in the street, being out in front of the house—issues of drunken drivers—folks who had their cars smashed into by drunken drivers—only the back yard could be considered safe.

Greg Letiecq,  
Help Save Manassas

People opposed to the policy have two interpretations. Members of Mexicans Without Borders, an advocacy group, suggested that the county had become a hostile environment for all immigrants, leading to an exodus of legal immigrants, as well as those in the country illegally:

I know in my neighborhood the number of Latino families that have left—it's a lot—my street alone, probably about 8 families who have left—we know how many people have left—when we call meet-

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for the Private Construction Industry, Prince William County, Virginia.

ings—we used to have several hundred people come to those meetings, and a large number of them have gone, the ones that have remained cannot sell their homes—people don’t want to live in a county that is as unwelcome as PWC, if I could leave, I would. There are business owners that are re-locating. If you believe that people should be treated as human beings and not be judged by the color of their skin [then you don’t want to stay in this county].

Nancy Lyall,  
Mexicans Without Borders

Here we have one of the very few points upon which some opponents of the policy agree with its advocates. Others, however, deny that the policy had an effect:

More than half my 10,000 parishioners are Hispanic...The press has made it sound like because of the resolution hordes of people have left PWC in reaction to this racist resolution. That is wholly inaccurate. Certainly there has been a number who have left the county but not because of any perceived racism or they are afraid of being stopped by the police. The vast majority of illegal immigrants have left simply for economic reasons. Because this whole thing happened at the same time as the huge downturn in the housing market, and it’s a vicious circle for Hispanics because I would say that the majority of Hispanic men in my parish work in construction. Construction is down so they lose their jobs...Now, interestingly, our numbers here of Hispanics in the parish have grown over this time. The number of registrations is up and the number of people coming to Mass is the same or higher. So we have not experienced any significant decrease in the number of Hispanics. That being said, whenever I go out to Hispanic restaurants—which I do frequently—or Hispanic businesses which I know in the area, I notice that the numbers have fallen. I think a lot of that has more to do with economics than with persecution.

Rev. Donald J. Planty, Jr.,  
Holy Family Catholic Church

Father Planty’s observations fit well with our analysis above of the recent figures from the ACS, showing that the characteristics of the County’s Hispanic population changed but that its size did not diminish.

Although trying to determine how many people left because of the policy and how many left because of the economy is impossible, the evidence is relatively strong that both played a role in people’s decisions to leave. First, if estimates from the Government Accountability Office about the proportion of people that ICE deported from 287(g) programs hold for Prince William County, about 65% of the people who were turned over to ICE as a result of both the Jail’s and the Police Department’s 287(g) programs probably did not return to the county because they were detained or deported. By the middle of 2010, the number of people turned over to ICE since the initiation of the policy was 2,499. Second, as we saw in Section 5.2.3, many police officers think that both illegal and legal immigrants left as a result of the policy. Also, information from interviews suggests that the policy played a role in people leaving the county. Carlos Castro, a businessman who maintains extensive contacts with the county’s Hispanic population because of his many businesses catering to that community, has argued that the period leading up to passage of the resolution in 2007 frightened some Hispanics into leaving the county. Among his businesses, Mr. Castro runs a travel agency, and he stated that some Hispanics had bought one way tickets back to their homelands. Others migrated to different counties. He also reported:

I don’t have anything scientific way of proving it, but Manassas is a ghost town when it comes to Latinos. Also, in day-to-day contacts with my business, I knew of people who were moving out who were citizens. I told them not to move but they said that some of their relatives would not come to visit them in PWC.

Mr. Castro emphasized the need for care in interpreting the issue of possible outmigration by county Hispanics. He argued that though, initially, some had been frightened into leaving, once the community realized that the resolutions did not mean mass deportations the fear subsided and the outflow ceased. Again, our analysis of the ACS and other data sources suggests that a process of replacement was in effect in which departing Hispanics who were illegal were replaced by other Hispanics who were more acculturated and thus more likely to be legally present in the U.S.

In a similar vein, officials reported that in March 2008, when General Order 45 went into effect, there was a very large drop in attendance at the most popular day labor site in the county. Before that month 30 to 60 men congregated at the site; afterwards the number of men was in the single digits. If the drop was due only to the economy, one would not expect to see such a sudden large drop. And later, even as the economy worsened significantly, attendance at the site began to rise; police officials attributed the rise to greater comfort with the policy. By early fall it had risen to about 75 percent of what it had been prior to the policy by fall 2008, according to police commanders. It is possible, of course, that none of the people who waited for work at the site in fall 2008 were those who had waited at the site prior to March 2008. But it is probably more likely that the group consisted of both old and new day laborers.

A patrol officer who works in a neighborhood where most of the residents are Hispanic reported:

Initially we saw less [sic] illegal immigrants. I have a buddy [who] is a Fairfax officer, and he works [in an area of the county] where they have a majority [of] immigrants, too. And he said that once our policy took effect their population like tripled, and he said it is now starting to come down. They are coming back [to Prince William County] for work.

Finally, the policy might have contributed to the high numbers of foreclosures. Foreclosure rates in PWC were much higher than those in surrounding counties. One County employee explained the issue this way:

There's a lot of vacant property. This is my own personal opinion: that the environment in the county in the summer of 07 to the fall of 07 was increasingly inhospitable to the immigrant population; and as the rhetoric and the news media and the coverage—it was all ramped up everyday; people were talking about it. You read the newspapers, there was a constant back and forth in the Op Ed pages of people's opinions; so it was very much at the forefront of what people were talking about for a period of time at the same time that the effects of the mortgage crisis became known; and those first resets were happening, where people's loans were resetting from 3 and 4 percent to 8, 9, 10, 12, 15 percent. The construction industry had gone flat...My own personal opinion was that the environment was so inhospitable and the money issue was so severe that instead of trying to stay in their homes, and figure out ways that they could keep this home, they pretty much tossed in the towel. Because we found that a lot of places, addresses we had been called to previously, in previous years, for overcrowding, and cars: These were the ones we were now being called out on for tall grass, vacant structures that needed boarding, trash left behind: that sort of thing. So it seemed to me that people just didn't want to stay and fight for this house. Either they couldn't financially or, if they could, they chose not to; that they would rather move on somewhere else because the atmosphere in the community was really not conducive to good relations if you're an immigrant.

## 7.5 Summary

Despite the challenges associated with attributing changes in the community to the policy vs. the economy, the data suggest that Prince William County's immigration enforcement policy resulted in some important changes in the community. While Prince William County accounted for most of

the growth in the metropolitan area's Hispanic population from 2000 to 2006, after the policy's introduction nearly all Hispanic growth in the metro area occurred outside of Prince William. We know that the number of non-citizens in the County decreased substantially, and we have firm data from U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey, police records, and other sources, that indicate a decrease in the number of illegal immigrants, as indicated by a variety of proxy measures that all point in the same direction. We estimate that the number of illegal immigrants in the County decreased by an amount between 2,000 and 6,000 persons from 2006 to 2008, depending on one's assumptions about the percentage of departing non-citizens who are illegal. Although we cannot determine how many left because of the policy or because of the economy, and both contributed to the declines in the immigrant population, the fact remains that the declines seen in Prince William's non-citizen and non-aculturated Hispanics were not nearly matched by changes elsewhere in the metropolitan area. The County's immigration policy must have played a role here, whether by itself or in conjunction with the severe economic changes that hit the County (and the rest of the metro area) at the same time. We also note that fewer immigrants and fewer Hispanics are moving to Prince William County, although this again is probably attributable to the same range of causes. The overall result was a sudden leveling off of what had been rampant Hispanic population growth in the County, a decrease of several thousand in the number of illegal immigrants, and a restructuring of the Hispanic population as unattached young adults (mostly male) left and were replaced by Hispanic married couples, somewhat older adults, and families with small children, all more likely to be English speakers.

## 8 The Impacts of the Immigration Policy on Crime and Disorder in Prince William County

This section of our report provides an assessment of the impact that immigration enforcement has had on crime in PWC. PWC's Board of County Supervisors placed substantial emphasis on public safety in promoting the County's immigration policy, and some have credited the policy with recent reductions in crime in PWC. Accordingly, we examine this issue drawing upon interviews and surveys of PWCPD personnel, a review of PWCPD data on arrests of illegal immigrants, our own analyses of multi-year trends in offense reports and calls for service to PWCPD, a comparison of crime trends in PWC to those in other jurisdictions in the DC area, and changes in victimization as measured in surveys of County residents.

To summarize, we find that the policy has not affected most types of crime in PWC, in large part because illegal immigrants account for a small to modest share of offenders for most types of crime. However, there was a substantial drop in serious assaults following the announcement of the policy and the initiation of immigration checks at ADC in July 2007. We attribute this primarily to the publicity surrounding the adoption of the policy in its original form, but we caution that some of this drop may have been due to a reduction in reporting of assaults by illegal immigrants. That being said, the policy in its current form appears to be a reasonable way of targeting illegal immigrants who are serious offenders—a policy goal on which there is broad agreement.

In the subsections below, we provide some brief background on crime in PWC and review some of the factors that make it challenging to gauge the impact of the immigration policy on crime in PWC. Next, we review PWCPD statistics on recent trends in officially reported crimes and arrests in PWC—including post-policy arrests of illegal immigrants—and offer some interpretations of those data. We then present original analyses of:

- Trends in calls for service to PWCPD for various types of crime and disorder from 2000 through 2009;
- Trends in serious crimes reported to PWCPD from 2003 through 2009;
- Trends in serious crimes in PWC in comparison to those of other DC area jurisdictions from 2005 through 2008;
- Changes from 2008 to 2010 in victimization and crime reporting among PWC residents as measured in community surveys; and
- Changes from 2008 to 2009 in officers' perceptions regarding crimes related to crime and immigration in the County.

Finally, we provide a summary of our key conclusions.

### 8.1 Background on Crime in PWC

We begin with a few general observations about crime in PWC. In 2007, the last full calendar year before the implementation of PWC's immigration policy, PWCPD reported 620 Part I violent crimes (including 10 murders) and 7,125 Part I property crimes (PWCPD, 2009).<sup>93</sup> The County's rates of violent and property crimes, 163 per 100,000 and 1,822 per 100,000 respectively, were


<sup>93</sup> These counts are based on Part I "index" crimes as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Part I violent crimes consist of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Part I property crimes consist of burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.



substantially lower than the national averages and the averages for other suburban areas (see PWCPD, 2009 and [www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007](http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007)).

In general, the crime rate in PWC has been falling since the mid-1990s (see PWCPD, 2009; 2010). Trends from 2000 through 2009 are displayed in Figure 8-1. Crime generally declined through the decade until 2007. Since then, the crime rate has hovered between 19.5 and 20.1 (PWCPD, 2010: 8). In sum, PWC is not a high-crime county, nor has its overall crime rate increased in any straightforward way with the growth of its immigrant population.

**Figure 8-1. Crime Rate in PWC, 2000-2009 (crimes per thousand).**




Behind this general trend, however, there has been substantially variability in recent trends for different types of offenses. Violent crimes, primarily robbery and aggravated assaults, climbed from 2004 to 2006 but fell sharply during 2007 and 2008. The decrease in violence was driven by reductions in aggravated assault and robbery, but particularly by trends in the former. Aggravated assaults dropped from 310 in 2007 to 197 in 2008, a 36% decline, before rebounding somewhat to 216 in 2009 (see Figure 8-2 and PWCPD, 2010: 11).<sup>94</sup> Robberies dropped 9% in 2008, from 272 in 2007 to 248 in 2008, and increased slightly to 255 in 2009. Not surprisingly, these trends have stirred debate over whether the immigration policy contributed to the county's drop in violent crime.

<sup>94</sup>Note that PWCPD's published counts of aggravated assaults in 2008 and 2009 differ from those published in the FBI's annual Uniform Crime Reports publication, *Crime in the United States*. The FBI's report shows 262 aggravated assaults reported by PWCPD in 2008 and 339 in 2009. According to records personnel in PWCPD, there was a change in the data reported by PWCPD to the UCR reporting program for 2008 and 2009. Consequently, the 2008 and 2009 FBI figures for PWCPD are not compatible with those reported for earlier years. Therefore, we use the aggravated assault counts reported by PWCPD in its annual reports (which were not affected by this change) in our assessment of trends in crime in PWC.

The decreases in robbery and aggravated assault began in 2007, following two years of increases in 2005 and 2006 (PWCPD, 2009: 10). In 2007, robbery declined 22.5% while aggravated assault declined 18%. Both crimes continued to decline in 2008, though the decline accelerated for aggravated assault and slowed for robbery. Within PWCPD, the decline in robbery has been attributed in part to the Department's robbery reduction initiative launched in 2006, well before the introduction of the immigration enforcement policy (PWCPD, 2009: 10; also see PWCPD presentation to the PWC Board of County Supervisors, September 9, 2008).<sup>95</sup> The reason or reasons for the decline in aggravated assault seem less clear.

**Figure 8-2. Aggravated Assaults in PWC, 2005-2009.**



In contrast, serious property crimes (burglary, larceny, and auto theft) have been relatively stable since the implementation of the immigration policy, rising 5.3% from 2007 to 2008 and declining 2.7% in 2009. Less serious offenses have shown mixed trends. Arrests for simple assault, for example, increased 2.5% in 2007 (PWCPD, 2008: 9), remained steady in 2008, and then rose 9% in 2009 (PWCPD, 2008: 9; 2009: 13; 2010: 14).<sup>96</sup> As discussed below, the two crime types in which illegal immigrants are most heavily involved are public drunkenness and driving under the influence (DUI). Arrests for the former declined 9.3% in 2008 and 16.9% in 2009 (though unpublished figures provided by PWCPD show that much of the latter decrease was due to a PWCPD policy

<sup>95</sup> In 2008, PWCPD received a national award for its robbery suppression initiative from the National Association of Counties.

<sup>96</sup> Note that PWCPD presents both offense reports and arrests for Part I crimes. For most other crimes, including vice, public order, and drug/alcohol offenses, PWCPD reports only arrests (this is customary among police agencies). For these latter crimes, we must infer changes in occurrence based on changes in arrests.

change that reduced arrests for drunkenness at a local concert venue). In contrast, arrests for DUI increased 13.6% in 2008 and declined by only 2.8% in 2009 (PWCPD, 2009: 13; 2010: 17).

## **8.2 Considerations in Assessing the Policy's Impact on Crime and Disorder**

In the sections below, we present more extensive analyses of the immigration policy's impacts on several categories of crime in PWC using a number of data sources and approaches. Before presenting those analyses, we begin by reviewing four key issues that complicate any assessment of illegal immigration and crime in PWC.

### **1) Data are not available to specifically assess changes over time in crimes committed by illegal immigrants.**

The most critical limitation in assessing the effects of the immigration policy on crime is that there are no historical data on crimes committed by illegal immigrants in PWC. How much crime in PWC was committed by illegal immigrants prior to the immigration policy is unknown. PWCPD did not begin collecting data on arrests of illegal immigrants until it implemented General Order 45 in March of 2008. Those data, discussed below, suggest that illegal immigrants account for a small to modest share of offenders for most types of crime, but they do not indicate the involvement of illegal immigrants in crime prior to the policy.<sup>97, 98</sup>

All of the pre-post trends discussed below, measured from officially-reported incidents and calls for police service, are based on crimes committed by all offenders in PWC. Consequently, it is possible that any recent changes in crime (for better or worse) have been due to changes in offending by native residents, legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, or some combination thereof.

### **2) It is conceivable that the policy has had multiple and opposing effects on actual and reported crime.**

Reducing crime by illegal immigrants: To begin with, the policy may have reduced crime by illegal immigrants through some combination of incapacitation and deterrence. From March 2008 through June 2010, PWCPD arrested nearly 2,400 illegal immigrants. Further, ADC issued roughly 2,800 detainers and released 2,500 illegal immigrants to ICE from July 2007 through June 2010 (see Section 4). Although the dispositions of these persons are not known, many of them are likely to have been incapacitated permanently or at least temporarily through deportation (which is perhaps best viewed as incapacitation in this context) or detention in local, state, or federal facilities. Illegal immigrants who have been arrested in PWC or even just questioned about their immigration status—PWCPD had about 3,000 recorded contacts with suspected illegal immigrants through June 2010—may also be less likely to commit new offenses in PWC, or even return to PWC, for fear of future punishment and deportation. (This is akin to what criminologists call specific deterrence.)

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<sup>97</sup> Data on crimes committed by illegal immigrants at the national level are also very limited. As an approximation, estimates from the late 1990s and early 2000s suggest that 4% to 7% of persons held in U.S. jails and prisons are non-citizens (Bureau of Justice Statistics at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.html>; Hagan and Palloni, 1998).

<sup>98</sup> Other studies on immigration and crime generally suggest that immigrants are actually less involved in criminality than the native population (e.g., Butcher and Piehl, 1998a; Hagan and Palloni, 1998; Sampson, 2008), though these studies do not typically distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants. Similarly, a number of local and national studies have concluded that growth in the immigrant population does not increase crime and may in fact reduce it (e.g., Akins et al., 2009; Butcher and Piehl, 1998b; Hagan and Palloni, 1998; Lee et al., 2001; Martinez, Jr. et al., 2010; Sampson, 2008).

In addition, the policy may have had more general deterrent effects in the community. That is, some immigrant offenders and would-be immigrant offenders may have left PWC voluntarily, while others that remained may have become more reluctant to commit crimes, whether serious or minor, due to the policy. Illegal immigrants who are serious offenders presumably face greater risks of being proactively targeted (by CAU) or of having their status discovered if detained or arrested for any kind of offense. It seems quite plausible, furthermore, that effects from the policy have spread beyond the serious offenders on whom PWCPD and ICE have focused, fueled by a more general fear among illegal immigrants that encounters with police will lead to detection and deportation, and perhaps by a perception that police are acting aggressively to target illegal immigrants. Although we have no specific figures on changes in the illegal immigrant population in PWC, our analysis of changes in the County's demographics strongly suggest a substantial decline in the population of illegal immigrants, as discussed above in Section VII. Moreover, between two-thirds and three-fourths of police officers that participated in our PWCPD surveys in the fall of 2008 and 2009 agreed or strongly agreed that the policy has resulted in the departure of illegal immigrants from PWC (see Section 5.2.3 above). Those who remain, whether or not they have a prior record of criminal offending or deportation, may be more cautious about engaging in any behavior that makes contact with police more likely. For all of these reasons, one might expect to see a general drop in both serious and minor offenses by illegal immigrants.

Reducing victimization of illegal immigrants: A related possibility is that the policy may have prompted the departure from PWC of illegal immigrants who were at high risk for victimization. In this sense, the policy may have reduced the population of both potential offenders and potential victims. Indeed, among PWCPD personnel with whom we spoke, there is a general perception that, relative to native residents, immigrants are less likely to commit serious predatory offenses and, if anything, more likely to be victimized in such crimes. As an illustration, Hispanics overall (regardless of immigration status) accounted for 48% of robbery victims in 2007 but only 21% of robbery suspects (unpublished data provided by PWCPD).

Reducing crime reporting by illegal immigrants: At the same time, it is also possible that the policy has discouraged reporting of crimes by victims and witnesses who are illegal immigrants, or even by persons who are connected in some way to illegal immigrants.<sup>99</sup> This could lead to reductions in reported crimes that are illusory. Indeed, PWCPD has cautioned that the recent drop in reported violent crimes could be due in part to a decline in reporting of crime by Hispanics (PWCPD, 2009: 5).<sup>100-101</sup> As discussed elsewhere in this report (section 8.5)], Hispanics are victimized at a somewhat higher rate than are other segments of the population in PWC, and their level of satisfaction with police dropped in the immediate wake of the policy (section 10.1). Despite the efforts of PWCPD to assure the community that they do not check the immigration status of crime victims and witnesses, reporting by illegal immigrants is still a concern; in our surveys of PWCPD officers in 2008

<sup>99</sup> In the context of judging the recent drop in aggravated assault, it is perhaps worth noting that criminologists generally consider reporting and recording of aggravated assaults to be less reliable than those of homicide and robbery (e.g., Blumstein, 2000). We cannot say whether this applies to reporting of aggravated assaults in PWC.

<sup>100</sup> As an illustration, PWCPD documented several cases during 2007 and 2008 in which robbery suspects admitted to committing unreported robberies of Hispanic victims. In some cases, suspects stated that they intentionally sought Hispanic victims because they thought Hispanics would be less likely to report the crimes (PWCPD memorandum from PWCPD's Assistant Chief for Criminal Investigations to Chief Deane, September 2, 2008).

<sup>101</sup> Similarly, a study of a public controversy regarding local police and immigration enforcement in Cost Mesa, California suggests that Hispanic residents became less likely to report crime in the wake of the policy and that their perceptions of police became more negative (Vidales et al., 2009).

and 2009, 30%-40% of officers reported that problems in getting illegal immigrants to report crime occur often or regularly (see Section 5.2.3 and Appendix C).<sup>102</sup>

Increasing crime or crime reporting: On the other hand, it is also conceivable that the policy has led to increases in some crimes and greater reporting of others. Victimization of illegal immigrants, for example, might now be higher if potential predators believe that victims and witnesses who are illegal immigrants are less likely to report offenses to the police. Such an increase, moreover, might not be apparent from police data for the reasons discussed above. As discussed in Section 5, PWCPD officers also believe that the policy has prompted greater reports of trespassing, loitering, and other disorder problems by some in the community who see the policy as a tool for removing or at least intimidating suspected illegal immigrants (though this problem seemed more prevalent in the early days of the policy). Hence, a change in reporting behavior could have led to an increase in reports for some categories of minor crime.

Finally, we should also consider that the policy has arguably diverted PWCPD resources from other crime-fighting efforts. One example is the transfer of detectives to the CAU. In addition, the policy has probably caused officers to arrest many illegal immigrants for minor violations (such as traffic offenses) that would normally result in the issuance of a summons. Officers must also spend additional time filling out field interview cards and running immigration checks on arrestees. Although line officers interviewed for the project did not feel heavily burdened by the policy, PWCPD commanders have expressed concern about the policy's cumulative impacts on resources across the agency. Moreover, planning and implementation of the policy have also required considerable time and effort from PWCPD's command staff, which has diverted some of their attention from other matters, possibly including crime fighting.

### **3) The likely timing of the policy's effects is not clear.**

Arguably, there are at least two key intervention dates that should be considered in assessing the policy's effects. One is March 2008, at which time PWCPD implemented immigration checks under General Order 45. It is also possible, however, that perceptual and behavioral effects associated with the policy began in July 2007 with the initial, exploratory action on the policy by the PWC Board of County Supervisors, the simultaneous start of 287(g) checks for arrestees admitted to ADC, and the beginning of the widely covered and acrimonious public debate over the proposed policy. In the analyses of crimes reported and calls for service presented below, we test for impacts of the policy using both dates.<sup>103</sup>

### **4) Factors other than the immigration policy may have impacted recent crime trends in PWC.**

One key factor in this regard has been the county's economy. The construction boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s was a primary attractor for the recent influx of immigrants (both legal and illegal) to PWC (e.g., see Singer et al., 2009). Conversely, the recent downturn in PWC's economy, particularly in the housing sector, is believed to have driven many immigrants away. And while the economic downturn has likely prompted the departure of many illegal immigrants—thus reducing their contribution to crime in PWC—it may have also increased the propensity to commit crime among native residents, legal immigrants, and illegal immigrants who have remained. Either way,

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<sup>102</sup> Our surveys do not show whether this problem has increased since the policy.

<sup>103</sup> We assume that any effects caused by PWCPD's immigration enforcement efforts began after March 1, 2008 and that they were not substantially enhanced or diminished by either the suspension of General Order 45 at the end of April 2008 or the implementation of General Order 45.01 in July 2008.

distinguishing the unique effects of the immigration policy from those of the local economy can be a difficult task.

Other PWCPD initiatives may have also affected recent crime trends in PWC. The beginning of the downward trend in violent crime in 2007, for example, coincided with PWCPD's robbery suppression initiative launched in 2006 (also see Section 5). This focus on violent predatory offenders may have contributed to the declines in both robbery and aggravated assault. Also, PWCPD has been operating a gang task force since 2004 (PWCPD presentation to the PWC Board of County Supervisors, September 9, 2008). Considering that gang members are involved in a high share of serious assaults (e.g., homicides and gun assaults) in many jurisdictions around the country, it is possible that PWCPD's anti-gang efforts have also helped to reduce aggravated assaults in PWC. To our knowledge, this issue has not been studied explicitly.

In the analyses presented below, we attempt to control for these factors by accounting for trends in crime that predated the policy. We also test for changes in crime that coincided closely with the policy's announcement and implementation.

### **8.3 Arrests of Illegal Immigrants**

To begin our assessment of the policy's impact on crime in PWC, it is instructive to examine statistics on arrests of illegal immigrants, which PWCPD began to collect in March 2008. These data can show us how much crime is currently attributable to illegal immigrants and whether there have been any recent trends in their offending. As noted earlier, PWCPD arrested nearly 2,400 illegal immigrants from March 2008 through June 2010. During 2009, the first full year during which the policy was in effect, PWCPD made 1,150 of these arrests. Below, we focus largely on the 2009 figures, which are the most recent available. As shown in Table 8-1, 121 arrests of illegal immigrants in 2009 were for Part I offenses, and these arrests accounted for 6% of all Part I arrests that year. The share of Part I arrestees who were illegal immigrants ranged from 0% for murder to 9% for aggravated assault and was no more than 4% for most crime types. And with the exception of larceny, the number of arrests involving illegal immigrants was quite low for each of these offenses—typically no more than eight.

Illegal immigrants also account for low numbers and percentages of arrests for many other common offenses (see Table 8-2). For UCR Part II classification offenses (e.g., drug and weapons offenses, simple assault, disorderly conduct, forgery, etc.), illegal immigrants accounted for 6% of arrestees overall in 2009. For most such offenses, arrests of illegal immigrants numbered less than 10 and/or accounted for less than 5% of arrests (see PWCPD, 2010: 17).

Arrests of illegal immigrants are most substantial, both in number and as a percentage of arrests, for public drunkenness (269 arrests accounting for 20% of all public drunkenness arrests in 2009), DUI (286 arrests representing 13% of all DUI arrests in 2009), and driving without a license (205 arrests constituting 10% of all arrests for driving without a license in 2009). These offenses are highlighted in Table 8-2.

**Table 8-1. Arrests of Illegal Immigrants in PWC for Uniform Crime Reports Part I Crimes**

Part 1 Crimes	Total Persons	Illegal Immigrants	Illegal immigrants as % of Arrestees
Murder	12	0	0%
Rape	37	3	8%
Robbery	117	4	3%
Aggravated Assault	175	16	9%
Burglary	191	8	4%
Larceny	1,467	88	6%
Motor Vehicle Theft	54	2	4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,053</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>6%</b>

Taken from PWCPD's 2009 Crime Statistics (PWCPD, 2010: 16)

**Table 8-2. Arrests of Illegal Immigrants in PWC for Other Selected Crimes**

Other Crimes	Total Persons	Illegal Immigrants	% Illegal Immigrants
All Part II Arrests	12,254	774	6%
Public Drunkenness	1,365	269	20%
DUI	2,138	286	13%
No Operators License	2,085	205	10%

Taken from PWCPD's 2009 Crime Statistics (PWCPD, 2010: 17)

Overall, the arrest data show that illegal immigrants currently contribute rather modestly to most forms of crime in PWC. These figures may not provide a reliable guide as to the share of crimes committed by illegal immigrants before the policy, and they cannot be used to directly assess changes in crime caused by the policy. They imply nonetheless that the policy has had only small to modest effects on most types of crime in PWC. They are also consistent with the views of criminal justice practitioners interviewed for the project, who felt that illegal immigrants, on the whole, have not contributed heavily (or disproportionately) to serious crime in PWC.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>104</sup> Other studies on immigration and crime generally suggest that immigrants are actually less involved in criminality than the native population (e.g., Butcher and Piehl, 1998a; Hagan and Palloni, 1998; Sampson, 2008), though these studies do not typically distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants. Similarly, a number of local and national studies have concluded that growth in the immigrant population does not increase crime and may in fact reduce it (e.g., Akins et al., 2009; Butcher and Piehl, 1998b; Hagan and Palloni, 1998; Lee et al., 2001; Martinez, Jr. et al., 2010; Sampson, 2008). A more subtle point is that the PWC data provide no clear indication as to whether illegal immigrants are overrepresented or underrepresented among arrestees in PWC compared to their representation among the population of PWC. Although we have no firm basis for judging this, available estimates suggest that roughly one-third of immigrants in Virginia and the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area are in the country illegally (Fortuny et al., 2007). If this statistic can be generalized to PWC, it implies that illegal immigrants account for approximately 7% to 8% of PWC's total population (immigrants in general represent 22% of PWC's population). This suggests in turn that illegal immigrants are slightly underrepresented among offenders in most crime categories but that they are overrepresented in a few categories like public drunkenness and driving without a license. On the other hand, it is

Another pattern that is apparent from PWCPD reports is that arrests of illegal immigrants have been increasing since the policy was implemented. Table 8-3 presents monthly arrests of illegal immigrants in total and for selected crimes during the final ten months of 2008 and all of 2009. Overall, monthly arrests of illegal immigrants rose from 63.7 in 2008 to 95.8 in 2009 (see bottom row). Table 8-3 also shows total arrests for July through December of 2008, the first six months during which the current version of the policy was in operation. Arrests of illegal immigrants were also lower during this portion of the year in comparison to 2009. Likewise, monthly arrests of illegal immigrants increased from 2008 to 2009 for Part I crimes, public drunkenness, and DUI (statistics for these crimes were only available for March through December of 2008). This trend could reflect the return of some illegal immigrants to PWC as fear of the policy has ebbed, an improvement in the ability of PWCPD and ADC to identify illegal immigrants over time, or some combination of these factors.<sup>105</sup>

**Table 8-3. Trends in Arrests of Illegal Immigrants, 2008-2009**

Crime Category	2008 Arrests per Month	2009 Arrests per Month
Part I crimes	6.3 (Mar. – Dec.)	10.1
Public drunkenness	15.4 (Mar. – Dec.)	22.4
DUI	11.1 (Mar. – Dec.)	23.8
Total arrests	63.7 (Mar. – Dec.) 72.6 (Jul. – Dec.)	95.8

Calculated from PWCPD's 2008 and 2009 Crime Statistics (PWCPD, 2009, 2010). Statistics for 2009 are based on the full calendar year.

This pattern has notable implications. Most importantly, it suggests that any deterrent effect that the policy may have had on crime most likely occurred prior to the policy's implementation by PWCPD. In other words, the announcement of the policy by the Board of County Supervisors in July 2007 and the attendant public controversy, coupled perhaps with the implementation of immigration checks by ADC, may have had a greater impact on crime (and/or crime reporting) by illegal immigrants than did PWCPD's implementation of the policy in March 2008. Enforcement of the policy since March 2008 has not produced a gradual abatement of crime by illegal immigrants, as measured by the trends in arrests. We investigate the policy's impacts on crime, and the timing of those changes, in more depth in the next section.

The arrest statistics also raise questions as to whether the policy can be credited with recent reductions in public drunkenness in PWC, despite the heavier involvement of illegal immigrants in this form of disorder. After increasing 12% in 2007, arrests for public drunkenness declined roughly 13% in 2008 and 10% in 2009 (these statistics exclude arrests at a major concert venue in PWC and thus differ in magnitude but not direction from published statistics that were cited earlier). Yet, as shown above, arrests of illegal immigrants for public drunkenness ran contrary to this overall trend

also quite likely that illegal immigrants have recently declined as a share of PWC's immigrant population, in which case these generalizations are less tenable. A related point is that we do not have data from other jurisdictions against which to compare the PWC arrest statistics. Consequently, we cannot say whether illegal immigrants account for more arrestees in PWC than in other comparable jurisdictions.

<sup>105</sup> ADC statistics on detainees issued for illegal immigrants show a steady trend during this period (see Section 4) in contrast to the increase shown in arrest statistics. However, neither data source shows any evidence of a decline in crime by illegal immigrants since the time when the PWCPD policy was put into operation.



from 2008 to 2009. Below, we investigate the policy's impact on longer term trends in public drunkenness and other forms of disorderly conduct in PWC.

## **8.4 Time Series Analysis of Crime Reports and Calls for Police Service**

### **8.4.1 Data and Methods**

In this section, we utilize interrupted time series methods to examine changes over seven to ten years in several categories of crime and calls for service as recorded in PWCPD's records management system. These analyses provide a more rigorous assessment of the policy's impacts that takes into account longer term trends and patterns in crime in PWC.

First, we investigate pre- and post-policy trends in PWCPD incident reports for UCR Part I violent and property offenses from January 2003 through December 2009. We examine trends in total violent crime (i.e., murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and total property crime (i.e., burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). In addition, we present analyses focusing on robbery and aggravated assault.

We complement the analysis of offense reports with an assessment of trends in calls for service (CFS) for several types of crime and disorder in PWC using data from PWCPD's computer-aided dispatch system for the period of January 2000 through December 2009. CFS data provide an alternative source for studying trends and patterns in crime and disorder, and they have a number of strengths relative to other data sources (Sherman et al., 1993; Warner and Pierce, 1993). CFS represent an unscreened look at events that the public feel require police response, resulting in many more criminal events than would be captured in official records (i.e., reported crimes and arrests) and victimization surveys. Other forms of official data rely on interpretation of the event by official agents, and a decision to file a report. CFS are similar to other official data in that they reflect criminal behavior coupled with citizen willingness to report that behavior, but they eliminate police discretion (i.e., official reaction to criminal behavior). Further, CFS data capture instances in which victims or complainants desire a police response to a situation but do not wish to file a report—a consideration that could be particularly salient to cases involving illegal immigrants. In addition, CFS data do not require the victim to make the call, as bystanders may call the police about crimes in progress. CFS data are particularly valuable for studying trends in minor offenses (e.g., disorderly conduct) because official incident and arrest counts for these offenses can be heavily influenced by officer discretion and changes in agency policy.

Our analysis focuses on calls for five types of incidents defined below. (The specific call designations included in each category are listed in Appendix D.)

- Personal crimes: crimes involving violence (fights and other assaults, rape, robbery, etc.), discharging of firearms, or bomb threats.
- Property crimes: burglary, vandalism, theft (including auto theft), and fraud (in the form of bad checks).
- Disorder crimes: disorderly conduct, public drunkenness, loud parties, trespassing, and the like.
- Drug-related crimes: drug-related complaints and calls about overdoses.
- Driving under the influence (DUI)

A more detailed discussion of the incident and CFS data and our procedures for processing them is available in Appendix E.

For each of these call categories, we examine changes in the weekly average of incidents or calls for each crime category following both key policy dates discussed above—July 1, 2007 and March 1, 2008. We thus present one set of models in which the former date is treated as the key intervention date and another set of models using the latter date as the intervention point. We determined the direction, magnitude, and statistical likelihood of these changes using statistical models that controlled for seasonal patterns and trends that predated the immigration policy (e.g., increases in offenses or CFS linked to population growth over the last several years). Using these models, we assessed whether post-policy changes were greater than would be expected to have occurred by chance, given the normal variability of crime over time in PWC. We judge observed pre-post changes to be statistically meaningful—i.e., “statistically significant” in scientific terminology—if their likelihood of occurring due to natural variation was less than 5%.

Most of the analyses presented below are based on data for the entire County (or, more specifically, those parts of the County policed by PWCPD). For certain offenses, we also examine trends in heavily Hispanic areas of PWC where we expect that illegal immigrants were most prevalent.

#### 8.4.2 Results

We describe our methodology and results in more detail in Appendix E. Here, we summarize our key findings. Pre-post changes in the examined crime and disorder categories appear in Table 8-3. Changes that appear with one or more asterisks beside them were statistically significant.

**Table 8-4. Pre and Post-Policy Percent Changes in Crime Reports and Calls for Police Service, 2003-2009 (Crime Reports) and 2000-2009 (Calls for Service)**


Offense / CFS Category	Models using July 1, 2007 as intervention date		Models using March 1, 2008 as intervention date	
Reports for all Part I violent crimes	-10.16%	*	-10.76%	*
Reports for aggravated assault	-27.23%	***	-27.50%	***
Reports for all Part I property crimes	1.25%		-0.18%	
CFS for personal crimes	-8.37%	***	-8.74%	***
CFS for property crimes (2000-2009)	-1.02%		-4.12%	
CFS for disorder crimes	-4.94%		-5.98%	
CFS for drug-related crimes	2.89%		2.36%	
CFS for DUI	-1.02%		7.87%	

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$


Overall, the immigration policy did not affect most categories of crime and CFS. Post-policy changes in property crimes (as measured by both CFS and reports for Part I property offenses), disorder crimes, drug offenses, and DUI were modest, variable in direction, and not statistically significant.

In contrast, we found indications of a statistically significant reduction in violence based on both reports for Part I violence and CFS for personal crimes.<sup>106</sup> Part I violent crimes declined by 10% to 11% after the policy, while CFS for personal crimes declined 8% to 9%. The reductions in violence were nearly the same whether using the July 1, 2007 or March 1, 2008 intervention date. This suggests that the impact of the policy predated PWCPD's implementation of the policy in March 2008. This can also be seen in the weekly trends for these offenses as illustrated in Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4. Indeed, reports for Part I violent crimes rebounded after March 2008, though this was not enough to completely offset the decline that occurred during late 2007 and early 2008.

**Figure 8-3. Part I Violent Crimes in PWC, 2003-2009 (Weekly).**




<sup>106</sup> The reduction in the violent crimes index is largely driven by the reduction in aggravated assaults.

**Figure 8-4. Calls for Person Offenses in PWC, 2000-2009 (Weekly).**

We probed the violence trends in greater depth by using the offense reports to examine three specific categories of violence: aggravated assault (Part I), robbery (Part I), and simple assault. Models for these offenses indicate that the drop in violence was driven by trends in aggravated assault, which are shown in Table 8-3 and Figure 8-5. Beginning shortly after July 2007, aggravated assaults dropped by 27% (this is the model-based estimate of change) and remained at a lower level through the end of 2009.<sup>107</sup> The timing of the drop strongly suggests that it was caused by the announcement of the policy (and perhaps the initiation of immigration checks at ADC), though we again caution that this may reflect a drop in reporting as well as a drop in assaults.

As discussed in Appendix E, results for robbery varied considerably based on model specification, with some models suggesting a post-policy decline and others suggesting an increase (for this reason, we did not present the robbery results in Table 8-3). On balance, however, the evidence suggests the policy did not significantly affect trends in robbery. Results for simple assault were also mixed and varied depending on the intervention date. The model for the July 2007 intervention point showed a statistically significant increase in simple assaults, but this change appeared to be temporary, as the March 2008 model showed a statistically non-significant decline.

<sup>107</sup> We also examined the timing of the drop in aggravated assault by running a series of models testing for changes six months prior to July 2007, three months prior to July 2007, three months after July 2007, and six months after July 2007. These tests provided further confirmation that the impact occurred between July and December of 2007. The model coefficients associated with these dates were as follows: 1.4 for January 2007, -0.6 for April 2007, -2.2 for July 2007, -2.7 for October 2007, and -2.3 for January 2008.

**Figure 8-5. Aggravated Assaults in PWC, 2003-2009 (Weekly).**

#### 8.4.2.1 Geographical and Demographic Patterns in the Trends for Aggravated Assault

As a further test of the violence trends, we examined the effects of the policy on violence within areas of PWC having high concentrations of Hispanic residents. Specifically, we analyzed crimes reported in PWCPD patrol beats corresponding to Woodbridge, Dumfries, and areas in and around Manassas (see Singer et al., 2009: 13).<sup>108</sup> These are also the areas where most illegal immigrants are arrested, as shown in Section 4, and they account for two-thirds of the violence in the County. Accordingly, we hypothesized that the policy's effects would be most apparent in these areas.

We aggregated offense reports across the police beats in these areas and estimated models testing the policy's impact on total violence and aggravated assaults. The model for total violence confirmed that violent crime declined significantly in these areas after July 2007 (see Appendix E). Further, the decline in violence in these areas accounted for roughly half of the countywide reduction. Estimation of models for aggravated assault was more difficult due to the small number of assaults per week in these areas. Nonetheless, the models suggest—at least tentatively—that 70% of the County's decline in aggravated assault occurred in these areas.

Using data reported by PWCPD to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) program, we also examined changes from 2005 through 2009 in the demographics of offenders and victims involved in aggravated assault.<sup>109</sup> The percentage of arrestees who were Hispanic varied between 21% and 28% over these years and did not follow a consistent pattern. Trends in victims were more difficult to assess due to missing data. However, the percentage of victims who were of Hispanic or unknown ethnicity fell from roughly half during 2005-2007 to roughly one-third in 2008 and 2009 (this was due to a reduction in victims with an unknown ethnicity). Also, among those victims whose

<sup>108</sup> Note again that PWCPD does not have responsibility for policing Manassas City or the nearby location of Manassas Park City.

<sup>109</sup> These results are based on a custom run of UCR data on file by the Virginia State Police, which was ordered and paid for by our project. Our thanks to Dr. Norma Westerberg for facilitating and helping to specify this data purchase.

ethnicity was identified, the ratio of non-Hispanic to Hispanic victims increased steadily over the years, from 1.87 in 2005 to 2.88 in 2009 (an increase of over 50%). This suggests that victimization of Hispanics fell relative to that of non-Hispanics during the post-policy years, at least with respect to reported assaults.<sup>110</sup> We caution that trends for Hispanic victims and offenders may not be an accurate proxy for trends among illegal immigrants. Nonetheless, these figures imply that an important component of the drop in aggravated assault was likely a decline in actual and/or reported victimization among Hispanics that may have been attributable in large part to illegal immigrants.

#### **8.4.2.2 Summary of the Trend Analysis**

Our analysis of trends in crime suggests that the policy did not reduce most forms of crime and disorder in PWC. However, aggravated assaults declined considerably after the announcement of the policy in its initial form. We again caution that the decline in aggravated assaults could represent changes in reporting as well as changes in offending and victimization. Indeed, anticipating that reporting might decline, the Department's outreach effort urged people to continue to contact the police if they saw or were a victim of a crime. In the next section, we examine data relevant to this issue from the University of Virginia's annual survey of PWC residents.

### **8.5 Crime Victimization and Reporting by County Residents**

Our study also has data revealing post-policy trends in victimization and crime reporting among PWC residents. Our study team added new questions to the 2008, 2009, and 2010 versions of the Prince William County Citizen Survey asking residents if they (or anyone in their household) had been the victim of any kind of crime, and (for those who said yes) whether or not they reported the crime to the police. The results of the interviews, conducted in the summer months of each year, are seen in Figure 8-6 and Figure 8-7.



For these years, the level of victimization of Hispanic residents (13%-15%) was somewhat higher than among other residents (11%-12%), though this difference was not statistically significant (Figure 8-6).<sup>111</sup> Moreover, victimization rates have been stable for both Hispanics and non-Hispanics over the last three years. This reinforces our other findings that the policy has not affected most forms of crime and that those impacts the policy has caused occurred largely before the policy's implementation in 2008.

Among those who were victims of a crime that occurred in PWC, the rates of reporting were nearly identical for Hispanics and non-Hispanics, and were statistically indistinguishable within the survey's margin of error (Figure 8-7). (Overall, the data suggest a slight increase over the last few years in reporting among both Hispanics and non-Hispanics, but this was not a statistically significant trend.) While the sample size of crime victims is small (due to the low overall crime rate in the county), these data do not suggest that there is a problem of under-reporting of crime by Hispanics in PWC.

However, since we do not have comparable data from any earlier surveys, we cannot say with certainty whether there have been pre to post-policy changes in either the rate of victimization or crime reporting in the Hispanic community. Moreover, we cannot directly address trends in crime victimization or crime reporting among illegal immigrants with these data.

<sup>110</sup> A caveat to this conclusion is that the aggravated assaults reported by PWCPD to the UCR program in 2008 and 2009 included some varieties of assault that had not been reported in prior years (see footnote 96). Whether this affected trends in the ethnic composition of offenders or victims could not be determined from the available data.

<sup>111</sup> These statistics are based on victimization that occurred within PWC.

**Figure 8-6. Trends in Victimization among PWC Residents by Ethnicity, 2008-2010.****Figure 8-7. Crime Reporting among PWC Residents by Ethnicity, 2008-2010**

## 8.6 PWC Crime Trends in Comparison to Other Jurisdictions

Next, we compare recent crime trends in PWC to those in several other localities in the Washington, DC area. These comparisons show whether crime in PWC has improved or worsened relative to other DC area jurisdictions and provides further insight into how crime in PWC has been affected

by both the immigration policy and larger social forces in the Washington, DC region.<sup>112</sup> We focus primarily on DC area cities and counties of 100,000 or more persons, which we believe provide the most appropriate comparison jurisdictions for PWC. However, we also compare PWCPD's reported crime figures to those in Manassas City, which is the largest independent city within PWC (with a population of approximately 35,000) and an area where Hispanics constitute a large share of the population (e.g., see Singer et al., 2009: 13). A map of the Washington, DC area, taken from Singer et al. (2009), is shown in Figure 8-8.

Unless otherwise noted, we contrast PWCPD's reported annual crime figures from 2005 through 2009 with those of the comparison jurisdictions as reported in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (see <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm#cious>).<sup>113</sup> A limitation to the analysis is that we do not have the data necessary to conduct a detailed examination of whether trends in the comparison jurisdictions changed specifically following July 2007 or March 2008.

We focus on total violent crime, aggravated assault, and total property crime. For each jurisdiction and crime category, we first computed the jurisdiction's average rate of crime per 100,000 persons for the years 2005 and 2006 (i.e., the pre-policy period). We then computed the average rate for the years 2008 and 2009 (i.e., the post-policy period) and examined the change in the averages from 2005-2006 to 2008-2009. These changes are expressed as percentage changes in Table 8-6..

### 8.6.1 Trends in PWC and Manassas City

As shown at the top of Table 8-5, both PWCPD and Manassas City reported reductions in total violence, aggravated assault, and total property crime during this period. In both cases, the reductions were greatest for violent crime and aggravated assault. However, the reductions were much larger for the County overall, as reflected in PWCPD's numbers, than for Manassas City. The average rates of total violent crime and aggravated assault declined 31.9% and 46.7%, respectively, for most of the County during this period. These crimes also declined in Manassas City, which provides further confirmation that crime was falling in areas with large Hispanic populations. However, the reductions in violence in Manassas City were in the more modest range of 7% to 10%.

<sup>112</sup> If other DC area localities have experienced reductions in violence similar to those in PWC (or even greater), this would suggest that factors other than the immigration policy affected violence in PWC. Conversely, a finding that violence has declined more substantially in PWC than elsewhere in the DC area would provide additional evidence that the drop in violence in PWC was due at least in part to the policy. Similarly, a finding that other types of crime have increased throughout the DC area while remaining steady in PWC could also suggest that the immigration policy has helped prevent increases in other forms of crime in PWC.

<sup>113</sup> See our discussion of PWCPD's UCR figures in footnote 96.



**Table 8-5. Changes in Crime Rates in PWC and Other Washington, DC Area Jurisdictions (Percentage Changes in Two-Year Averages, 2005-2006 to 2008-2009)**

Jurisdiction(s)	% Chg Total Violence	% Chg Aggravated Assault	% Chg Total Property
Prince William County	-31.9%	-46.7%	-8.1%
Manassas City	-9.7%	-7.2%	-3.0%
<b>Other Virginia Jurisdictions</b>			
Alexandria City	-37.6%	-43.5%	-4.8%
Arlington County	-26.1%	-27.8%	6.7%
Fairfax County	-14.7%	-2.1%	12.1%
Loudoun County	32.8%	75.7%	-8.3%
Spotsylvania County	37.5%	15.2%	27.0%
<i>Average</i>	-1.6%	3.5%	6.5%
<i>Std. Deviation</i>	(34.6)	(46.3)	(14.1)
<b>Maryland Jurisdictions</b>			
Prince George's County	-19.9%	-18.1%	-15.1%
Montgomery County	-4.8%	0.3%	3.6%
Frederick County	2.7%	5.3%	4.4%
Charles County	-3.0%	-1.5%	-9.0%
<i>Average</i>	-6.3%	-3.5%	-4.0%
<i>Std. Deviation</i>	(9.6)	(10.1)	(9.6)

### 8.6.2 PWC in Comparison to Other Northern Virginia Localities

Next, we examine other jurisdictions of 100,000 or more persons in northern Virginia. These include Alexandria City and the counties of Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Spotsylvania.<sup>114</sup> (Stafford County, Virginia was excluded from this analysis because it did not report complete data to the Uniform Crime Reports for all years under study.<sup>115</sup>) Like PWC, most of these counties have a substantial immigrant, particularly Hispanic, population. Foreign-born persons account for 21% to

<sup>114</sup> The data for Virginia counties are based on reports from the primary law enforcement agency in each county. Some of these counties have independent cities and townships that report their own data to the UCR, though the primary county agencies are responsible for the vast majority of the counties' populations and reported crime. Data for Fairfax County did not appear in the UCR for 2005; therefore, the 2005-2006 figures for Fairfax are based on 2006 alone. The 2009 population of these jurisdictions ranged from 121,000 in Spotsylvania County to over 1 million in Fairfax County. PWC's population was estimated at 386,394 in 2009.

<sup>115</sup> Crime figures from the Stafford County Sheriff's Office do not appear in the 2005 and 2006 editions of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. Stafford County figures for these years do appear in Crime in Virginia, a report published annually by the Virginia State Police that serves as the basis for UCR reporting in Virginia. Based on their omission from the FBI reports, however, we infer that Stafford's data were incomplete or otherwise problematic for those years.

27% of the population in Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax, and Loudoun (Singer et al., 2009: 8). (In PWC, they account for 22%.) The exception is Spotsylvania County, where only 6% of the population is foreign-born (see the U.S. Census Bureau's American Fact Finder at <http://factfinder.census.gov>). In most of these counties, the immigrant population has been relatively stable in recent years. However, Loudoun County, which neighbors PWC, experienced a nearly 200% increase in its foreign-born population between 2000 and 2006, which exceeded the 144% growth in foreign-born persons in PWC (Singer et al., 2009: 7).

A number of these jurisdictions were also conducting some level of immigration enforcement as of late 2009, according to our survey of DC area jurisdictions (see Section 4 and Appendix B). The Loudoun County Sheriff's Office entered into a 287(g) task force agreement with ICE in June of 2008 (Rodriquez et al., 2010: 25) and began running immigration checks on arrestees and other lawfully detained persons believed to be in the country illegally in July 2008.<sup>116</sup> Correctional authorities in Loudoun had begun immigration checks approximately one year earlier. Police in Alexandria and Arlington also reported in our survey that their local jails had been running immigration checks since August 2006 and January 2008, respectively. Further, Fairfax became part of the Secure Communities program in the spring of 2009, approximately one year before the program was implemented throughout the state (see discussion in Section 4).<sup>117</sup> However, immigration enforcement activities in these jurisdictions did not receive the same publicity—and associated notoriety—as did those in PWC.

Crime trends were highly variable among the Virginia counties. Total violence, for example, declined by an average of 1.6% across these localities, but the changes for individual jurisdictions ranged from a decline of 37.6% in Alexandria to an increase of 37.5% in Spotsylvania County. Indeed, the typical variation around the average rate of change (i.e., the standard deviation in statistical terminology) was plus or minus 34.6 percentage points.

Compared to these jurisdictions, PWC had one of the largest reductions, if not the largest, in each category. With respect to violence, PWC had the largest drop in aggravated assault and the second largest drop in total violence. However, changes in PWC were not outside the range of variability for crime trends in northern Virginia.<sup>118</sup> Alexandria and Arlington experienced reductions in total violence (37.6% and 26.1%, respectively) that were greater than or comparable to those in PWC. Alexandria had a decline in aggravated assaults (43.5%) very similar to that of PWC, and Arlington also had a substantial drop (27.8%).

On the other hand, PWC did particularly well relative to the other outer suburban counties of Loudoun and Spotsylvania. The comparison of PWC to neighboring Loudoun County may be particularly telling, given their proximity and the similarity of both their recent immigration trends and their immigration enforcement policies. The sharp divergence of crime trends in PWC and Loudoun would seem to imply that the drop in certain crimes in PWC was due largely to the substantial publicity surrounding PWC's immigration policy and/or to factors besides immigration enforcement (e.g., economic trends and other police initiatives).

<sup>116</sup> Sheriff's deputies in Loudoun also document contacts with suspected illegal immigrants as do PWCPD officers.

<sup>117</sup> The Fairfax County Police Department and the Spotsylvania Sheriff's Office did not complete our survey.

<sup>118</sup> Expressing PWC's change as a standardized score (i.e., a statistical z score) relative to the average rate of change and standard deviation for Virginia jurisdictions yields a statistically non-significant value.

### 8.6.3 PWC in Comparison to Maryland Localities

The Maryland counties of Prince George's, Montgomery, Frederick, and Charles appear in the bottom rows of Table 8-5 (page 98).<sup>119</sup> Among the Maryland counties, Montgomery and Prince George's have foreign-born populations representing, respectively, 29% and 19% of their total populations (Singer et al., 2009: 8). Although its immigrant population is relatively small (9%), Frederick County experienced a 150% increase in its foreign-born population from 2000 to 2006 (Singer et al., 2009: 7).

The Frederick County Sheriff's Office entered into a task force 287(g) agreement with ICE in February 2008 (Rodriguez et al., 2010: 24) and began running immigration checks on arrestees in August 2008. The local jail also entered into the 287(g) agreement and began immigration checks earlier that year.<sup>120</sup> Police in Prince George's County have also been running immigration checks on arrestees since at least 2007.<sup>121</sup> Police in Montgomery and Charles counties reported in our 2009 survey that neither they nor their local jails conduct immigration checks.

On average, aggravated assaults and other violent crimes declined roughly 3% to 6% in the Maryland counties, and property crime declined 4%. Prince George's County experienced reductions of 18% to 20% in violence, but other Maryland counties had relatively small increases or decreases, particularly in comparison to the changes in PWC.

### 8.6.4 Summary of Comparisons

In sum, comparisons of PWC to other jurisdictions in the Washington, DC area show that PWC was not entirely unique in the magnitude of its recent crime reductions. Crime, particularly violence, declined substantially in a number of jurisdictions around the area. Hence, general trends in northern Virginia and the wider DC region may have played some role in sustaining crime reductions in PWC even if they did not precipitate them. One such factor discussed elsewhere in this report is the decline in the residential construction market that occurred in several counties across the area beginning in 2006 and 2007.

At the same time, PWC had one of the largest drops in violence in the region, and it had the single largest reduction in aggravated assaults. Comparisons between PWC and other DC area localities are further complicated by the fact that a number of the comparison areas had some form of immigration enforcement during the study period. Nonetheless, there was no clear tendency across the region for crime to decline in places doing immigration checks (note especially the increases in crime in Loudoun and Frederick counties). However, the publicity surrounding the initial announcement of PWC's immigration policy and the subsequent fear that it caused in the County's Hispanic community were unique relative to the experience of other jurisdictions. In its original form, the PWC policy was more aggressive and far reaching than that of most other jurisdictions,

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
<sup>119</sup> The figures for the Maryland counties were obtained from the Maryland Governor's Office of Crime Control and Prevention and are aggregated to include all law enforcement agencies in each county (see <http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/msac/crime-statistics.php>). The populations of these counties in 2009 ranged from approximately 144,000 in Charles County to approximately 964,000 in Montgomery County.

<sup>120</sup> The city of Frederick, Maryland, which has a population of approximately 60,000, has its own police department. The Frederick Police Department has not entered into a 287(g) agreement and does not conduct immigration checks. However, its arrestees are still checked for immigration status by the local jail authorities.

<sup>121</sup> The implementation date of this policy was not specified in our survey, but the agency did indicate that their policy had not changed in the last two years.

and its announcement by the PWC Board of County Supervisors generated much more publicity and controversy than did immigration enforcement efforts in other local areas. This notion is

**Figure 8-8. Map of the Washington, D.C. Region (from Singer et. Al, 2009).**



consistent with our earlier findings that violence in PWC began to drop after the announcement of the policy in July 2007. It may also help to explain why the drop in violence was smaller in Manassas City, which is not under the authority of the PWC Board of County Supervisors and is not policed by PWCPD, than in the County that surrounds it.

### **8.7 PWCPD Officers' Perceptions of Crime and Disorder Problems and the Policy's Effectiveness in Controlling Them**

Finally, as a complement to our analyses of trends in crime and CFS, we examine PWCPD officers' perceptions of various crime and disorder problems in PWC as measured in our 2008 and 2009 surveys of PWCPD personnel. We also assess their views about the effectiveness of the policy in controlling crime and disorder as expressed in the surveys.

Using a four-point scale ("never", "occasionally", "often", and "regularly/all the time"), the 2008 and 2009 PWCPD surveys asked officers about the extent to which they had observed several crime

and disorder problems in PWC.<sup>122</sup> As shown in Table 8-6, these problems included violent and property crime, fear of crime, attacks and threats against officers, disorderly behavior, traffic problems, housing code violations, crime reporting, and witness cooperation. (Further detail about the survey is provided in Appendix C.) Table 8-6 also shows the average score for each item at time 1 and time 2. On average, officers witnessed most of these problems “occasionally.” Further, there was no change in officers’ views of the prevalence of these problems from 2008 to 2009. This is also consistent with our earlier findings that the policy had an early effect on serious assaults but no effect on most types of crime.

**Table 8-6. Frequency with which Officers Witnessed Crime and Disorder Problems (1=never, 2=occasionally, 3=often, 4=regularly/all the time)**

“Problem” Item	Time 1 (2008)	Time 2 (2009)
Problems getting non-immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	1.91	1.90
Problems getting legal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	1.84	1.80
Problems getting illegal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	2.38	2.20
Problems getting witnesses to cooperate with the police.	2.20	2.07
Physical attacks against officers.	1.51	1.59
Verbal threats against officers.	1.80	1.83
Violent crimes in PWC.	1.92	2.04
Property crimes in PWC.	2.17	2.27
Problems with public disorder (e.g., loitering, public drinking, etc.)	2.51	2.60
Problems with traffic violations.	2.42	2.59
Problems with housing code violations (e.g., occupancy violations)	2.43	2.42
Fear of crime in certain parts of PWC.	2.14	2.22

N=274

Problems that officers most commonly listed as occurring regularly/all the time included the following:

- Public disorder (e.g., loitering, public drinking, etc.) (T1=17.5%, T2=18.3%)
- Housing code violations (e.g., occupancy violations) (T1=16.6%, T2=15.5%)
- Traffic violations (T1=13.9%, T2=18.7%)
- Getting illegal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime (T1=12.7%, T2=9.5%)
- Property crimes in PWC (T1=7.6%, T2=6.9%)
- Fear of crime in certain parts of PWC (T1=6.7%, T2=7.9%)

Note that only about 10% to 13% of officers reported that getting illegal immigrants to report crime was a problem occurring regularly or all the time. However, in the second survey, about 30% reported that this problem occurred at least often if not regularly (this was down from 40% in the

<sup>122</sup> The fall 2008 officer survey asked respondents how often they had witnessed these problems since the current policy’s implementation in July 2008. The fall 2009 officer survey asked how often they had witnessed them over the past year.

first survey). Although these figures provide no basis for assessing pre and post-policy changes in crime reporting by illegal immigrants, they reinforce our earlier caveat that the post-policy drop in violent crime may have been due in some measure to a decline in crime reporting by illegal immigrants.

Finally, in both surveys, approximately half of the surveyed officers agreed or strongly agreed that ‘the policy is an effective approach to reducing crime in PWC.’ This shows that officers’ views are mixed on whether the policy has reduced crime in PWC and that this has not changed over time. This finding is consistent with the view often expressed by PWCPD personnel that illegal immigrants do not contribute heavily to serious crime in the County.<sup>123</sup>


## 8.8 A Note on Traffic Violations

Our investigation of the policy’s impact on crime has focused on major categories of serious and minor crime. Before concluding, however, we also note that the policy seems to have helped reduce some types of traffic violations involving illegal immigrants. From 2008 to 2009, for example, illegal immigrants declined as a percentage of people arrested for operating a vehicle without a license, from 14% in 2008 to 10% in 2009 (PWCPD, 2009: 16; 2010: 17).<sup>124</sup> In addition, hit and run accidents dropped from 347 in 2006 to 245 in 2007 and to 182 in 2008 (see Figure 8-9).<sup>125</sup> Although statistics on arrests of illegal immigrants for hit and run are only available for 2009—during which illegal immigrants accounted for 9.4% of these violators (PWCPD, 2010: 17)—this offense is believed to be one that involves a higher share of illegal immigrants. It is also difficult to attribute the sharp drop in hit and run accidents to other causes. Although total traffic crashes also declined 17% in 2007 and 7% in 2008 (PWCPD, 2008: 10; PWCPD, 2009: 17), the decline in hit and run accidents was steeper at 29% in 2007 and 26% in 2008.

<sup>123</sup> However, other questions from the 2008 survey suggested that two-thirds of the officers felt that the policy has helped reduce both crime and disorder problems associated with illegal immigration (see our 2009 interim report).

<sup>124</sup> The figures for 2008 are based on partial year data.

<sup>125</sup> The data come from annual reports by the PWCPD Crash Investigations Unit. These figures include all hit-and-run accidents in the County that occur on public ways and are sufficiently serious to warrant reporting to the State Police. Reportable hit-and-run incidents either involve property damage greater than \$1,000, or personal injury.

**Figure 8-9. Hit and Run Accidents in PWC, 2004-2009.**

## 8.9 Summary

Subject to the caveats noted throughout this section, our investigation of data from several sources suggests that the immigration enforcement policy has not affected most forms of crime in PWC. Overall, illegal immigrants currently make up a relatively small proportion of arrestees for serious crimes, and a substantial majority of arrested illegal immigrants are charged with traffic offenses or misdemeanors, particularly public drunkenness and DUI. Given the lack of pre-policy data on arrests of illegal immigrants, we cannot determine whether or not those proportions have changed since the policy's implementation.

Our analysis of trends over several years in both offense reports and calls for police service indicates that most types of serious and minor crime did not decline (or increase) following the policy's announcement in July 2007 or its implementation in March 2008. Other indicators also suggest that enforcement of the policy over time has not led to ongoing reductions in crime: arrests of illegal immigrants for criminal and traffic violations rose from 2008 to 2009, and post-policy surveys assessing trends in both crime victimization among County residents and perceptions of crime and disorder among PWCPD officers have shown no significant changes in levels of crime and disorder since the policy's implementation in 2008. Finally, officers' opinions are quite mixed as to whether the policy has reduced crime overall, and their general view is that immigrants do not contribute heavily to serious crime in PWC.

However, our analyses also show that PWC experienced a substantial reduction in violent crime, namely aggravated assault, following the announcement of the policy and the implementation of immigration checks by the local jail (ADC) in July 2007. This decline coincided very closely with the announcement of the policy, which makes it less likely that the drop was precipitated by factors like the County's economic trends or other PWCPD crime-reduction initiatives. Further, while several

jurisdictions in the Washington, DC area had reductions in violence in recent years, the decline in aggravated assault in PWC during 2008 and 2009 was greater than that experienced by any other large county or city in Northern Virginia or suburban Maryland, including those doing varying levels of immigration enforcement. All of this suggests that aggravated assaults in PWC declined in response to the publicity and controversy surrounding the PWC Board of County Supervisors' announcement of the initial version of the policy, which required officers to inquire about the immigration status of all lawfully detained persons that they suspected of being illegal immigrants. Once this decline occurred, it is conceivable that ongoing enforcement of the policy, economic conditions in the County, and perhaps other regional factors helped to prevent any rebound from occurring.

The decline in aggravated assault likely reflects a combination of reduced offending, reduced victimization, and possibly reduced crime reporting among illegal immigrants. We cannot say how much of the drop was due to each of these factors, but PWCPD data on the ethnicity of victims and arrestees for aggravated assault tentatively suggest that a decline in victimization and/or reporting account for at least part of the decline. Without a more detailed incident-level assessment of assault cases before and after the policy, it is not clear why the policy would have an impact specific to this type of crime. We speculate, however, that the policy's announcement reduced serious assaults by reducing the number and/or changing the behavior of people at risk of becoming involved in disputes, particularly young, unattached immigrant men. Reporting effects may have also been more pronounced for aggravated assaults because, relative to other offenses like robbery, the actors involved (and perhaps the witnesses as well) are more likely to be family members, friends, or acquaintances (e.g., see Rand, 2009; Roberts, 2008). The propensity of actors or witnesses to notify police in these situations may well have declined after the policy's announcement. As discussed above, a substantial minority of PWCPD officers, about one-third, believe that reporting of crime by illegal immigrants is still a significant problem in PWC. Our surveys of PWC residents run counter to this notion, showing that crime reporting by Hispanics is equivalent to that of non-Hispanics, and that reporting by Hispanics did not decline from 2008 to 2010. Nevertheless, those figures are based on small numbers of respondents (which could make them unreliable), and they cannot be used to specifically assess crime reporting by illegal immigrants or to examine before and after changes associated with the policy.<sup>126</sup>

The magnitude of the drop in aggravated assault following the policy's announcement, about 27% according to our estimates, may also imply that the policy had collateral effects extending to assaults that did not directly involve illegal immigrants. Post-policy arrest data suggest that illegal immigrants are currently the perpetrators of 9% of aggravated assaults in PWC.<sup>127</sup> The notion that an additional 27% of aggravated assaults involved illegal immigrants as offenders and/or victims prior to the policy is perhaps debatable. Again, there are no historical data on crimes by illegal immigrants that can be used to address this issue. However, it is conceivable that the policy also reduced assaults or reporting of assaults by people who are not illegal immigrants. Hispanic residents connected to illegal immigrants in some way—through, for instance, household residence or networks of family and friends—may have become less likely to report assaults to police for fear that they might draw

<sup>126</sup> The decline in aggravated assaults did not extend to simple assaults, which suggests that people were less deterred from committing and reporting these particular offenses. Perpetrators and victims may have felt that arrests or extensive police investigations were less likely in these cases. PWCPD arrest data also indicate that illegal immigrants are more heavily involved in aggravated assaults than simple assaults; in 2009, illegal immigrants accounted for 9% of arrestees for aggravated assaults and 3% of arrestees for simple assault (PWCPD, 2010: 16-17).

<sup>127</sup> This assumes that the composition of offenders who are not arrested is comparable to that of arrestees.



the attention of police to their family or associates who were in PWC illegally. Some legal Hispanic residents may have also felt that police in PWC would be generally suspicious of them. Research outside PWC suggests that controversies surrounding immigration enforcement can reduce the inclination of Hispanics to report crime to police (Vidales et al., 2009), and our own surveys in PWC show that Hispanics became less satisfied with PWCPD immediately following the policy's initiation.

In addition, accounts from our informant interviews indicate that social life and routine activities became more subdued in PWC's Hispanic community following the policy. Some restaurants, night clubs and entertainment spots, for example, closed or had fewer patrons. Some neighborhoods became quieter with less active street life. After the announcement of the policy, these sorts of places may have drawn fewer people of all sorts—native residents and visitors as well as legal and illegal immigrants. Consequently, there may have been fewer places and social situations that created conditions conducive to assaultive behavior (such as crowds of people drinking in night-clubs).

On balance, our conclusions about the policy's impact on crime must be cautious, due in large part to the lack of historical data on crimes committed by illegal immigrants. The announcement of the policy does seem to have caused a substantial decline in aggravated assault, but this decline could reflect a reduction in reporting of crime as well as a reduction in serious assaults. The policy has not affected most other forms of serious and minor crime, though we note that it seems to have alleviated some traffic-related offenses, notably hit and run accidents. There clearly are limits to using subsequent deportation by ICE as a crime fighting strategy, since many of those detained are not deported and some who are deported ultimately return to the area. Since the County does not receive any data from ICE on the disposition of illegal aliens turned over to ICE, the efficacy of the strategy is more difficult to assess. We nevertheless reiterate that the current version of the policy, which mandates immigration checks only for arrestees, appears to be a reasonable way of targeting illegal immigrants who commit criminal violations, and that there is fairly broad agreement on this as a goal for law enforcement.

## 9 The Policy's Effects on Neighborhood Problems

One of the major reasons there was so much support for the immigration enforcement policy was related to negative changes in the quality of some PWC residents' lives. To investigate the possibility that the policy improved conditions, we examine residents' comments about the policy on the annual community surveys, review results from questions on these surveys about specific neighborhood conditions, examine data from the County's Neighborhood Services Division, which handles residents' complaints about overcrowded housing and property upkeep, and look further into recent data from the U.S. Census. All of these are relevant to evaluating the success of the County's immigration policy in its goal of reducing overcrowded housing problems, neighborhood nuisances and public disorder, such as loitering at day labor sites and public intoxication.<sup>128</sup>

### 9.1 Results from informant and community interviews

Our interviews in 2008 with neighborhood activists and County staff suggested that the passage of the policy brought immediate and noticeable changes in some blocks and streets. Proponents of the policy told us excitedly of particular houses that had been occupied by several families or by numbers of young men (whom they presumed to be illegal immigrants) which were suddenly vacated. Opponents of the policy blamed the policy for causing immigrants to leave and therefore contributing to the County's growing problem with vacant properties that developed as the mortgage crisis intensified.

Our police focus groups and our informant interviews agreed that the number of men hanging out at the County's several active day labor sites dropped sharply when the policy was passed. However, interviews conducted later in our evaluation period were more ambiguous about changed neighborhood conditions. There was general agreement that the day labor sites had become more populated again by the middle of 2009; police focus groups and informant interviews agreed on this.

As for other neighborhood conditions, opinions varied. In 2010 we conducted eighteen in-depth interviews with randomly selected respondents who had taken our citizen survey in that year. We asked them if there had been any notable changes in their neighborhoods. Only two of these respondents described any dramatic changes over the past several years. Those two reported that houses in their neighborhood had become boarding houses for multiple residents in the years leading up to the foreclosure crisis and immigration law:

I guess Prince William County passed the law, the immigration laws, and all of a sudden, all those rooming houses stopped being rooming houses. ...Well, I think it was a combination of between the immigration laws, I guess a lot of the boarders, I guess, moved I guess moved out of the County and the owners, I guess, couldn't afford to pay the mortgages and then the mortgage crisis hit and they all went up for foreclosure. Well, in the last year, year and a half. No, maybe two years now. I don't know, when did the big foreclosure strike? They all went up for foreclosure and actually on our street, we had— I counted at one time last year I guess we had like 15 houses up for foreclosure and now we have one. ...People have bought the others. Actually, on both sides of us, we have some nice new neighbors. ...Well, it seemed like we only had a real problem here [with vacant houses] for like maybe six months...Well, it's totally changed. It's like the neighbors on the one side of us, we used to call it a village because there were about—it had to be 15, 20 people there living there all the time. Yeah, and the one house on the [other] side, and they lost their house to foreclosure [too], and now it's two couples [who live in the houses]. They're both young couples, you know, kind of Spanish, but they each have a child and they're just—they're really nice.

<sup>128</sup> The changes in arrests for public drunkenness were addressed in section 8 above and are not repeated in this section.

Six people reported that there had been a lot growth and new neighborhoods built in the last five years. The remaining ten people reported that there had been little change in their neighborhoods over the past several years. These ten people reported that they lived in very different types of neighborhoods: Two people indicated that they lived in neighborhoods that had insufficient street parking, but they also indicated that street parking was a long-term problem. Another suggested that there was insufficient parking because some of the older neighborhoods were built when families only had one car per household and now families have two or more, which made it difficult for people to park all their cars on the street.

We found similarly mixed results in the thirty focused in-depth interviews we conducted in 2010 as follow-ups to the community survey. Reports on neighborhood change were decidedly mixed, with many respondents having no major changes to report.

Although the number of in-depth interviews is not large, the results—taken together with our informant interviews and other data discussed below—suggest that some undetermined number of overcrowded houses did either became vacant or returned to normal levels of occupancy shortly after the policy went into effect. But they also suggest that most neighborhoods in the County were not changed, that they changed in response to other causes, or that they changed in slower and more subtle respects that residents did not generally notice.

## **9.2 Comments about policy implementation**

As discussed in section 10.2 below, our annual citizen surveys from 2008 onward asked respondents how satisfied they were with the job the police were doing in implementing the immigration enforcement policy. Those who were “very satisfied” with the enforcement were asked, in an open-ended format, to say why they were satisfied. Appendix H lists the responses we got to this question. In the annual Citizen Survey of late Spring 2008, about 20 percent of residents who reported that they were very satisfied with the job that the police were doing volunteered that they were satisfied with the Police Department’s work because community conditions had improved. In 2009, 39 percent explained their satisfaction in these terms, and in 2010, 35 percent mentioned positive results of the County’s policy. A few of these respondents (around five percent of the very satisfied) specifically mentioned declines in day laborers and other people loitering on street corners and the Seven-Eleven. Reductions in crime were mentioned a bit more frequently, by 12 percent of very satisfied respondents in 2010.

We also received some reports about illegal immigrants moving out of overcrowded houses in the community surveys, especially in 2008 directly after the new policy was implemented. Several of the comments transcribed by our telephone interviewers and shown in Appendix H specifically mention alleviation of overcrowded housing issues:

It is helping. Twenty-one people were living all in one house beside him with 9-13 cars parked outside. He has reported zoning violations to the county with no result but since the enforcement these folks have disappeared and moved out of the area.

My husband and I live across the street from a house that has had a lot of people there and they have really stayed on top of that. It was bad at first but they stayed right on it and it is no longer a problem.

A larger number of comments described illegal immigrants moving away, but did not mention overcrowding.

### 9.3 Survey questions on neighborhood conditions

In an attempt to learn more about community perceptions of change in neighborhood conditions, we added more direct questions to the 2009 and 2010 community surveys. We focused on four problem areas:

- “residential overcrowding: that is, too many people living at one residence”
- Problems “with vacant houses or properties that are not well kept up”
- Problems “with occupied homes or apartments that are not well kept up”
- Problems “with loitering, that is: groups of people hanging out on street corners or in store parking lots”

For the first three problems, respondents were asked to think about their neighborhood. For loitering, they were asked to think about “places you drive or walk to in Prince William County.” For each problem, they were first asked “how big a problem is there now,” and they could answer “a big problem,” “somewhat of a problem,” or “not a problem.” They were then asked:

Compared to one year ago, has this problem gotten a lot better, gotten a little better, stayed about the same, gotten a little worse, or gotten a lot worse?

Tables Table 9-1 and Table 9-2 show the results for this series of questions. The tables show that County residents are divided in their perceptions about each of these problems. Residential overcrowding is not a problem in the neighborhood for over 70 percent of residents. Overcrowding is a big neighborhood problem for only 7 to 8 percent of residents; the rest see it as somewhat of a problem. There is no significant change in perception of the problem from 2009 to 2010. Table 9-2 shows that there are somewhat more people who see this problem improving than those who think it is worsening, but most residents see no change in the overcrowding problem. In interpreting these results, it should be kept in mind that over-occupancy does not present itself very prominently to the outside observer. Complainants to the Neighborhood Services Division, for example, very often describe an overcrowding issue as “too many cars,” excessive trash or things stored outside inappropriately while saying that they see a lot of people coming and going. We do not know if survey respondents were able to translate these conditions into a judgment about “residential overcrowding.”

The problem of upkeep of vacant houses, a problem which emerged strongly in the 2007-2008 mortgage crisis, was seen as a big neighborhood problem by over 10 percent of residents in 2009. This percentage went down significantly in 2010, with only 6 percent thinking it was a big problem. And there was a strong, significant shift in perceptions of improvement in this problem. In 2009, more residents saw the problem worsening over the previous years than improving, while just the opposite was the case in 2010 when nearly 30 percent saw improvement and only 10 percent saw it getting worse. This is the one problem of the four in which clear improvement is registered in the responses from our annual survey of the county-wide population. This result reflects real change in the County, as bargain-hunters have begun to buy up the vacant properties, new tenants or owners have begun to occupy them, lending institutions increased their capacity for maintaining vacant properties, and the County developed some more effective tools for ensuring that still-vacant properties are kept up.<sup>129</sup>

<sup>129</sup> The county now has legal authority to mow tall weeds or grass and to remove abandoned trash from vacant properties, with or without the owner’s permission, and then to recover the cost by placing a lien on

**Table 9-1. How big are these problems? 2009, 2010 survey results.**

<i>How big a problem is ...</i>		<b>A big problem</b>	<b>Somewhat of a problem</b>	<b>Not a problem</b>
<b>Residential Overcrowding</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>7.2%</b>	<b>18.9%</b>	<b>73.8%</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>7.6%</b>	<b>21.3%</b>	<b>71.2%</b>
<b>Upkeep of Vacant Houses*</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>10.2%</b>	<b>27.3%</b>	<b>62.6%</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>6.4%</b>	<b>23.1%</b>	<b>70.5%</b>
<b>Upkeep of Occupied Homes</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>3.1%</b>	<b>20.2%</b>	<b>76.7%</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>5.1%</b>	<b>21.1%</b>	<b>73.9%</b>
<b>Loitering</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>11.4%</b>	<b>31.9%</b>	<b>56.7%</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>13.6%</b>	<b>35.4%</b>	<b>51.0%</b>

*\* Asterisk indicates that there is a significant difference between 2009 and 2010.*

the property. When the owner transfers the property, the County is compensated for its costs in keeping up the property.

**Table 9-2. Did problems get better or worse? 2009, 2010 surveys.**

<i>Compare to one year ago ...</i>		<b>A lot better</b>	<b>A little better</b>	<b>About the same</b>	<b>A little worse</b>	<b>A lot worse</b>	<b>Never had this problem</b>
<b>Residential Overcrowding</b>	<b>2009</b>	7.0%	11.7%	57.4%	8.1%	2.7%	13.0%
	<b>2010</b>	5.5%	10.7%	59.2%	8.6%	4.4%	11.6%
<b>Upkeep of Vacant Houses*</b>	<b>2009</b>	4.8%	11.1%	54.1%	13.1%	6.9%	10.0%
	<b>2010</b>	6.6%	15.2%	57.3%	7.3%	2.5%	11.2%
<b>Upkeep of Occupied Homes</b>	<b>2009</b>	3.6%	7.0%	68.0%	8.1%	1.6%	11.8%
	<b>2010</b>	4.0%	10.3%	67.5%	6.9%	1.2%	10.1%
<b>Loitering*</b>	<b>2009</b>	8.0%	13.8%	57.5%	7.9%	3.8%	8.9%
	<b>2010</b>	4.8%	11.6%	64.6%	9.8%	3.7%	5.5%

\* Asterisk indicates that there is a significant difference between 2009 and 2010.

Of the four problems we asked about, the upkeep of occupied properties is the least widespread, with only three to five percent of residents saying this is a big problem in their neighborhood. The great majority of residents say either that there has been no change in this problem in the past year or that they never had this problem, and there is no significant change from 2009 to 2010 in the number who say it has gotten better or worse.

Loitering, as seen at the County's informal but fairly fixed day labor sites, is more likely than the others to be seen as big problem or somewhat of a problem than the other three we asked about, with only about half of County residents saying it is not a problem in the places where they go. While the increase in the percent saying it is a 'big' problem is not statistically significant, Table 9-2 (page 111) shows a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents who thought the problem was getting better. These results fit with the qualitative data we gathered, suggesting that the problem was initially lessened quite noticeably, but then gradually came back as men became more comfortable with the immigration policy and the day laborers returned to their established areas for obtaining work.

#### **9.4 Day labor sites declined temporarily but are still active**

In the course of our ride-alongs with police officers in September 2010, we had occasion to make direct observations of the County's active day labor sites and to learn more about their operation from accounts of the officers on the beat. There are three main sites where day laborers gather. One is at a convenience store just off Route 234 in the Coverstone area of Prince William, near Manassas. The other two are located on Route 1 in Woodbridge, not far from each other. One is at a convenience store, with groups of men also congregating on adjacent, partially wooded church property, where they had—for a time—been given permission to gather, and others waiting for work in the outlying portions of a shopping-center parking lot, directly across the highway from the convenience store. The other Woodbridge location is just a short distance to the north, outside a taco restaurant and near to the entrance to a mobile home park that is home to many immigrants from Mexico. The officers explained that the workers tend to sort themselves by nationality, with the first Woodbridge location being frequented by men from Central America, and the other being a gathering place for Mexican men.

Fairly late on two successive autumn weekday mornings (between 9:00 and 11:00 am) we observed a combined total of about 100 men waiting for work at these three sites. The men waiting at these sites all appeared to be Hispanic. The job market was very quiet at that time of the morning, as we did not observe any contractors arriving or being solicited for work during nearly an hour of total observation time. Still, the men waited, congregating in small groups and chatting while watching for any signs of someone looking for workers. We assume that there is more job traffic at earlier hours. We can also infer that these sites serve as social gathering places for unemployed men as much as they serve as effective spot labor markets.

The convenience store on Route 1 allows the men to congregate during the day without complaint to the police. However, in the evening hours the store broadcasts an annoying electronic chirping sound from loudspeakers around its property, which seems to be effective in preventing loitering by teenagers after dark at that location.

Police officers report that the day labor sites present only minor problems from a law-enforcement perspective. As long as the men stay on private property, they are not seen as violators unless the store managers file a complaint; and the store managers at the three sites appear to be quite accom-

modating of their presence. If there is a complaint, the first police response is to ‘trespass’ the offender, which means a form is read, signed, and filed for future reference to show that the property owner has declared the offender to be a trespasser and notified him not to come onto the property. On the strength of that, if the incident is repeated, the officer would then have grounds for an arrest on trespassing charges. According to the officers, such arrests are rare. More common, they say, is that some men start to drink alcoholic beverages as the day wears on, so that occasional intervention or arrests for public drunkenness are needed. At one point, the police learned of a man who was selling marijuana at one of the sites; when they ‘trespassed’ him (lacking evidence for a drug arrest in that instance) he left the area and never returned.

Officers shared their impression that moving vans do not seem to solicit for day labor at the three main sites, which are dominated by Hispanic workers. A fourth, smaller day labor site is located off the main highway and near to the warehouse locations of several area moving companies. This is where moving trucks sometimes pick up their extra labor. On the day we observed, that site was occupied by six men: five Anglo whites and an African-American.

“Casual” labor markets may operate in the legal shadows, but they serve an important function in the economy, linking marginal workers with paid employment that might otherwise be out of their reach for a variety of reasons, and allowing employers immediate access to labor without the usual (and the legally required) red tape. Given the needs these sites serve, it is unlikely that they can easily be made to go away. But it should also be noted that the problem of loitering at these sites is mentioned quite regularly by our survey respondents as one of the presenting problems associated with illegal immigration.<sup>130</sup> Some respondents (females primarily) spontaneously reported feeling vulnerable or unsafe when their errands take them to a convenience store surrounded by dozens of idle men.

The Board of County Supervisors recently passed new legislation to assist in control of day labor sites. The ordinance, passed in July 2010, prohibits distribution of literature to occupants of motor vehicles on highways, roadways and medians and also prohibits sale of merchandise or services to occupants of motor vehicles on highways or public roadways and medians. This effectively prohibits men from soliciting for work on a public street. (This law was already in effect at the time of our observation of the day labor sites). As long as the men looking to be hired as day laborers stay on the parking lots of the convenience stores and shopping centers that allow their presence without complaint, they are not subject to intervention from the police (unless they break some other law).

## 9.5 Data from the Neighborhood Services Division

The County’s Neighborhood Services Division, a part of the Department of Public Works, is responsible for Property Code Enforcement [PCE] and also runs a variety of community-based programs aimed at identifying problems and encouraging such problems to be solved ‘neighbor to neighbor’ through voluntary compliance. The Division has shared with us its statistical reports and information on its PCE program initiatives. Their statistics are particularly relevant to our assessment of whether residential overcrowding was lessened by the adoption of the immigration policy, and whether the problems with vacant housing might have been worsened by it. However, as will be evident below, for a variety of reasons these statistics prove to be inconclusive in their measurement of trends.


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<sup>130</sup> Examples of these comments can be seen in Appendix H, which lists open-ended comments to our 2008 question about satisfaction with enforcement of the policy.



As can be seen in Figure 9-1, there has been a very large increase in the number of PCE complaints handled by the division, especially in the number initiated by complaint. These numbers are driven by several factors. Underlying the trend is the simple fact that Prince William County's housing stock includes, in some areas, a high proportion of aging structures, dating back to waves of suburban growth in the 1960s and 1970s. The sharp increase in cases handled by the Division in 2005 was accompanied by a significant increase in staffing. The rise in cases of all types also coincides with the increase in the presence of immigrants in the County from 2000 to 2006. But another driver of the caseload is the volume of citizen complaints about violations. Starting in 2007, there were organized efforts by activist groups to bring possible overcrowding violations to the attention of authorities. However, a large proportion of overcrowding complaints turn out, upon investigation, to be unfounded once the housing situation is assessed against the letter of the law. Nevertheless, as the department continued to work in closer liaison with neighborhood groups, the volume of formal PCE complaints of all types increased further, with more than 7,000 cases being handled annually in 2008 and 2009.

**Figure 9-1. Annual Property Code Enforcement cases, PWC Neighborhood Services**



In the years between 2005 and 2008, the number of complaints to the Neighborhood Services Division rose dramatically, from 3,341 in FY 2005 to 7,126 in FY 2008.<sup>131</sup> The number of founded violations (of all types), however, dropped from 97 percent of all complaints to 69 percent of all complaints, although the absolute number of founded violations rose, from 3,226 to 4,975. Although these figures indicate that residents were making a higher proportion of unfounded complaints, which represents their concerns over the quality of life in their neighborhoods, they also represent actual changes in the neighborhoods during those years.

Table 9-3 shows the specific trends in occupancy complaints (i.e., complaints about overcrowded houses). The rapid rise in complaints about occupancy (associated with both increased problems and increased activism by residents on the issue) is seen from 2004 to 2006. Comparison of the second and third column shows that many occupancy complaints resulted in no violations, but many also resulted in violations being found other than actual violations of the occupancy ordinances. In fact, many occupancy complaints are expressed by the complainant in terms of parking issues, abandoned vehicles, or bulk trash on the premises of the property. For example, in FY 2008 there were 510 complaints revolving around occupancy issues. Of these, 237 or 46 percent resulted in no

<sup>131</sup> Prince William County Police Department (2008, September 9).

violation being found, leaving over half in which a violation was found. But only in 61 cases, representing 12 percent of the complaints and 22 percent of the violations, was the violation actually related to the occupancy ordinances. The others were violations of parking, refuse, control of tall grass and weeds, or other areas covered by the property code. Another factor affecting these statistics was the Divisions active efforts to educate the public about how to identify probable overcrowding problems and make and document complaints; this also helped to increase the proportion of cases that were, upon investigation, found to be valid by the Division.

**Table 9-3. Occupancy complaints, 2004-2010**


	Occupancy Complaints	All Violations Found	Occupancy Related Violations	All PCE Complaints	All PCE Violations
FY 2010	346	N/A	123	7,891	5,593
FY 2009	401	N/A	70	7,010	5,227
FY 2008	510	273	61	7,126	4,965
FY 2007	460	200	57	3,977	3,668
FY 2006	540	227	49	4,077	4,343
FY 2005	458	200	35	3,341	3,226
FY 2004	128	39	5	2,271	972

Another change that affects the Division's statistics is that they introduced in 2008 new tools for investigation that proved to be quite effective. For example, the Division required that evening inspections be performed as part of investigating overcrowding complaints. This involved paying overtime wages to staff, but made it more likely that the number of occupants in a household would be accurately assessed (since more occupants would be home from work and school in the evening).

Figure 9-2 plots the trends in overcrowding complaints handled by the Neighborhood Services Division. The figure cogently summarizes the seemingly contradictory trends. Complaints about


overcrowded housing surge in 2005 and 2006, years of peak migration into the County, and then recede noticeably in the years after the immigration policy is put into effect. On the other hand, the number of founded occupancy complaints—a small but increasing fraction of the occupancy complaints—shows a continuous increase. We can conclude that the increase in founded occupancy complaints is a product of both better-developed complaints from the public and more effective tools for investigation and enforcement.

**Figure 9-2. Occupancy complaints by fiscal year, 2004-2010.**



The map in Figure 9-3 shows the geographic location of all PCE violations (founded complaints) in the three year period from 2005 to 2008. It is clear in the map that violations of various kinds can and do occur in all parts of the County. It is also clear that overcrowding violations were concentrated in the two areas of high concentration of Hispanic immigrants, with overcrowding violations especially prevalent in the Sudley area, immediately north of Manassas and Manassas Park.


Neighborhood Services Division staff told us in interviews we conducted with them that they tended to receive more complaints about overcrowding from that area. This pattern may be due in part to the fact that the activist citizen group Help Save Manassas was organizing resident complaint activity in that part of the County. Staff indicated that similar conditions that might exist in the eastern sections of the County seemed less likely to generate complaints from residents. However, the map does show that overcrowding violations were found in Dale City and Woodbridge. The pattern in this map helps to clarify the pattern of responses we reviewed above in section 9.3; many residents have little or no perceived overcrowded housing cases in their neighborhoods, while for others the complaint was fairly frequent and acute.

**Figure 9-3. Location of PCE violations, 2005-2008**

If we look in more detail at the nature of the changes at the time the immigration policy was adopted, it suggests that problems associated with overcrowding rose through June 2006 (a year before the Board of County Supervisors passed the first immigration enforcement resolution) and then began to fall. Between July 2005 and June 2006, parking on an unimproved surface violations (in other words, parking on lawns), which is associated with overcrowding, reached a high of 828

violations before dropping to 516 in the period July 2007 and June 2008.<sup>132</sup> These data support the strong feeling in the community that there were overcrowding problems in some neighborhoods. Parking-on-grass complaints dropped somewhat as the policy was getting off the ground.<sup>133</sup>

**Figure 9-4, Founded Neighborhood Services Complaints, 2005–2008.\***



\*Data on maintaining a dump heap and parking on an unimproved surface come from fiscal years (July 1 through June 30). The weed and tall grass violations refer to calendar years for the 2005–2006 and fiscal years for 2007 and 2008. Thus, the weed and tall grass violations for 2007 are for only part of the year (January–June 2007), and the drop in 2007 for those violation is due to that change in the period. Had all of 2007 been counted in that column, we would expect to see a steady rise in weed and tall grass violations. Data retrieved from a September 9, 2008 presentation on the immigration enforcement policy to the Board of County Supervisors.

However, here again we have evidence that two forces—the economic downturn and the policy—were at work in ameliorating the neighborhood overcrowding that had motivated the policy. At the same time that complaints associated with overcrowding were diminishing, complaints associated with vacant homes were rising: Total weed and tall grass violations rose from 561 in 2006 to 1,128 in 2008. The fact that a large decline in parking on unimproved surfaces occurred between July 1, 2006 and June 30, 2007 may indicate that problems with overcrowding were already declining prior to the introduction of the policy. This suggests that the foreclosure crisis accounted for at least some of the drop in overcrowding; stricter code enforcement and increased staffing at Neighborhood Services could also have played a role. In addition, the County modified its overcrowding ordinance on May 19, 2009, making it easier for a case to be judged as being in violation. The current housing occupancy ordinance is shown in Appendix F.

In summary, the statistics on activity by the Neighborhood Services Division show a large increase in overcrowded housing complaints, but little sign of a drop-off in such complaints (or in violations) after the introduction of the illegal immigration policy. However, these statistics reflect not only the prevalence of actual overcrowding violations but a combination of changes that affected the statistics: increased complaint activity from one part of the County especially; increased staffing; enhanced education of citizens and liaison of the Division with neighborhood groups; new enforcement tools such as the after-hours inspections; and changes in the underlying law. The statistics, in

<sup>132</sup> The data for parking-on-grass [POG] complaints are affected by a zoning change. Some of these complaints were found to be unsubstantiated and/or not made since they were grandfathered in by the POG zoning change.

<sup>133</sup> The Neighborhood Services Division also provided data on other founded violations, such as maintaining outside storage, complaints involving inoperative vehicles on the property, and complaints about housing maintenance.

short, reflect increased and increasingly effective enforcement as much or more than they reflect an increase in the magnitude of the problem. In fact, it is quite possible that overcrowding was alleviated by all this enforcement in that, according to the Division, 95% of all PCE complaints result in voluntary remediation.

## 9.6 Changes in complex households in the Hispanic communities

We can turn to the U.S. Census's ACS PUMS data for a different statistical window on the overcrowding issue. It should be recognized that some ethnic minority groups in the United States—Hispanics and Asians in particular—are known to have a different pattern of household occupancy than do the majority of Americans. They are more likely to live in “complex households” that include more than the members of one nuclear family.<sup>134</sup> This means quite simply that a neighborhood populated by Hispanics is likely to have more adults per household than a neighborhood that is populated by Anglo whites. As some neighborhoods in Prince William changed by becoming more Hispanic, they also became more crowded. The number of cars parked outside a typical home in these neighborhoods would be higher. If the household members in the complex family are all related to one another by blood or marriage, then it is unlikely that they could be found to be violating the County's occupancy ordinance, which is reproduced in Appendix F. Yet to a worried neighbor the household might indeed seem “overcrowded.”

The American Community Survey allows us to look at the changing prevalence of complex households. It includes questions that allow the Census Bureau to identify the relationship of each household member to the first person counted on the inventory of persons for the household. From these data, the ACS derives measures of how many families a household includes, and how many subfamilies a family includes. A family consists of related persons who live together. A subfamily includes either a couple within the family (other than the primary person and his or her partner) or a mother-child pair within the family (other than the primary person or primary couple and her/their child). To see whether there have been changes in occupancy in Prince William's households as a result of the immigration resolution and its associated population changes in the Hispanic community, we computed a simple indicator of complex households, using these ACS variables. We count a household as “complex” if it either (1) includes more than one family or (2) includes one or more subfamilies. This is a solid indicator of what, in common parlance, might be thought of as families ‘doubling up’ in housing.

When we look at the metropolitan area as a whole, the tendency of Hispanic households to be more complex is strongly evident: totaling across the years 2005 to 2008, for the entire DC metro area, the percent of Hispanics who reside in a complex household (34 percent) is more than twice as high as the percent of non-Hispanics in such households (16 percent). Although complex households are common in Hispanic families generally, it is reasonable to expect that illegal immigrants, whether single or partnered, would be especially likely to live with others who are not in their immediate family and thus they and the others in their household (who might be legally present or not) would be counted as living in a complex household.

<sup>134</sup> See Laurel K. Schwede, Rae L. Blumberg and Anna Y. Chan, eds. *Complex Ethnic Households in America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.



**Figure 9-5. Complex households among Hispanics, PWC+cities and rest of metro area, 2005-2008.**





Figure 9-5, based on our analysis of ACS PUMS data, shows the percent of Hispanics in Prince William who reside in a complex household, tracking changes in this percentage from 2005 to 2008 and comparing it to the balance of the metropolitan area. As the immigration wave peaked in Prince William, there was a dramatic increase in this percentage, changing from 27 percent of Hispanics in 2005 to 40 percent living in complex households in 2006. As the policy was proposed, passed, and implemented, this percentage dropped somewhat, standing at 34 percent in 2008. That was about the same as the percentage for Hispanics in the rest of the metro area. This result helps to clarify the somewhat confusing picture from the Neighborhood Services Division's statistics. The Division's data show surging levels of complaint and increasing numbers of violations, but the ACS PUMS data indicate that the net result was indeed a modest reduction, after the implementation of the immigration policy, in the number of Hispanic residents who were living in complex households.

Fortunately for our analysis, Prince William County is big enough that the PUMS allocates two study areas (called PUMAs) to the County. As shown on the map in Appendix I, one includes the entire western portion of the County, as well as encompassing Manassas and Manassas Park. The other includes the eastern portion, including Woodbridge and all the population along I-95 and Route 1. Figure 9-6 shows the trend in complex households in these two broad regions, which together coincide exactly with the boundaries of the County (with the two small cities also included).

It is clear that the trend in complex households for Hispanics was quite different in the two parts of the County. In the Western PUMA (which includes the two cities), the percentage of Hispanics in complex households rose from a third to nearly a half from 2005 to 2006, but then fell sharply in 2007 and 2008, when the percentage stood at about 28 percent, lower than the 2005 percentage and lower than the 34 percent prevalent for Hispanics in the rest of the metro area in that year. This is the pattern we might expect if illegal immigrants were leaving the County, but it could also be the result of vigorous enforcement of the property code and the occupancy law. Like the Western part of the County, the Eastern PUMA saw a big increase in complex households from 2005 to 2006, but the percentage stayed the same in 2007 and then actually rose, reaching almost 40 percent in 2008. This pattern could be the result of some Hispanics losing their homes as a result of the mortgage

crisis, and then doubling up with other family members or friends, creating new complex households. The contrast in the patterns of change between West and East echoes the pattern we saw in the map of violations (Figure 9-3), with more complaints and correspondingly more enforcement activity in the Western end of the County, just outside Manassas and Manassas Park. In short, these data, together with the map, suggest that overcrowded housing was reduced much more in the parts of the County near Manassas than in the Woodbridge and Dale City areas. Again, this helps to make understandable the mixed results from our survey question about overcrowding that was asked of County-wide samples of residents: the degree of observable improvement in overcrowding depended greatly on where in the County one was living.

**Figure 9-6. Complex households, West PWC+cities and East PWC, 2005-2008.**



Indeed, there is some support for this conclusion in the survey data from 2009 and 2010. Since we know the ZIP code in which each respondent resides, we can group them into three broad geographic groups, corresponding to those who live near Manassas, those who live near Woodbridge or Dale City and those who live in parts of the County where Hispanics immigrants are not numerous. In 2009, the percentages saying that overcrowding had gotten a little or a lot better were about 22% in the area around Manassas and about 21% in the Woodbridge/Dale City area, compared to only 10% in the outlying parts of the County. In 2010, however, there is greater difference between the first two areas, with 18 percent of the Manassas-area respondents saying overcrowding is better, compared to 14 percent in the Woodbridge/Dale City area and about 12 percent in the rest of the County. Correspondingly, in 2010 there are fewer respondents in the Manassas area who say overcrowding has gotten worse (9%) than in the Woodbridge/Dale area (14%). These are not dramatic differences, but they do corroborate the difference in areas suggested by our analysis of the ACS PUMS data and the Neighborhood Services map of overcrowding violations.

## 9.7 Summary

To assess the degree to which the County's immigration enforcement policy caused a lessening of specific neighborhood problems, we have looked at data from several sources. Some of the results are seemingly contradictory and there is considerable division among our survey respondents about how bad the neighborhood problems are and whether or not they have noticeably improved. The



aging of the County's housing stock in the areas that were built up thirty or more years ago means that some increase in neighborhood problems would have occurred irrespective of the increase in immigration that the County experienced after 2000. Putting together all the indicators, we are nevertheless able to reach a few conclusions about the policy's effects.

- Prior to the policy's implementation, there was a significant problem of overcrowded housing in the County, associated with the increasing presence of illegal immigrants but localized in a few areas. There were also several active day labor sites that caused real concern for some residents.
- We have strong, clear reports from informants, in-depth community interviews, and respondents to the annual community telephone survey that particular overcrowded houses became vacant or changed to normal occupancy very soon after the policy was passed.
- Some community survey respondents who are satisfied with police efforts to enforce the policy mention specific improvements in neighborhood conditions as a reason for their satisfaction.
- Survey respondents are divided on the extent of the neighborhood problems and the degree to which they have improved or worsened. We attribute this partly to differences in where they live, as each of the problems was highly localized.
- Vacant housing became a major neighborhood issue at around the time the resolution was implemented. This development was primarily a result of the mortgage crisis, but the problem may have been worsened by the flight of some immigrants from the County.
- Responses to the annual citizen survey, as well as reports of informants, show that the problems with upkeep of vacant properties have lessened significantly in the last year.
- There are consistent reports in our qualitative data that loitering at day labor sites went down sharply when the policy was first implemented, but then returned to significant levels of activity at the sites within a year or so.
- Our direct observation and interviews with police officers in the Fall of 2010 verified that the three main day labor sites in the County continue to be quite active, involving scores of primarily Hispanic men each day. New legislation was passed in 2010 to limit the activities of day laborers soliciting for work on public streets, but the day labor problem in the County persists.
- There was a marked increase in the capabilities of the Neighborhood Services Division to guide and respond to complaints from residents about Property Code Enforcement issues. In the years before, during and after the policy's implementation the Division expanded its staff, improved its enforcement tools and practices, worked with neighborhood groups to educate them about how to make effective complaints, and benefited from a modification of the County's occupancy ordinance. As a result, the Division's caseload of complaints did not recede as the policy was put into effect, but continues at a high level.
- There were more complaints and founded violations of overcrowding and related property violations in the areas near Manassas than in the Eastern portion of the County. Perhaps as a result of this, there is evidence in both the ACS PUMS data and in our community survey data that overcrowded housing (or housing that may appear overcrowded to some residents even if not in violation of code) was reduced in the area around Manassas but did not decrease in the Eastern part of the County.
- As noted in section 8 above, arrests for public drunkenness are down in the County, although we do not have evidence that would attribute this change to the immigration policy.


Taken together, our results indicate that the implementation of the County's immigration enforcement policy did have significant effects on some of the neighborhood problems that had been of concern to activist groups and to members of the Board when they framed the policy. However, some of the effects (such as the effect on loitering at day labor sites) proved to be temporary and others (such as the effect on overcrowding) were apparent in some parts of the County but not in others. The aging of the housing stock and the severe economic changes that occurred in 2007 and 2008 probably worked to worsen some neighborhood conditions at the same time that the action on illegal immigration may have been having positive effects. Concurrent with the policy's implementation was a series of improvements and innovations in the Neighborhood Services Division that leave the County far better equipped than it was earlier in the decade to work with neighborhood groups to identify and correct problems in property code enforcement and to handle the increased, continuing caseload.

## 10 The Policy's Impact on Community Relations with the Police

In this section, we consider how the immigration policy has affected citizen satisfaction with police and other aspects of police-community relations, particularly as they pertain to relations between PWCPD and PWC's immigrant community. These results are directly relevant to the policy goal of maintaining the Police Department's reputation for professionalism and maintaining community confidence and trust in the police. As discussed earlier in this report, the issue of police-community relations has greatly concerned PWCPD's leadership since the outset of the immigration debate in PWC. We reported in section 5 above on police-community relations in PWC based on two sources: 1) our survey of PWCPD officers in the fall of 2008 and in fall of 2009; and 2) interviews and focus group discussions with officers, supervisors, detectives, commanders, and human resource specialists in PWCPD. In this section, we examine trends in citizen satisfaction with police as measured in annual surveys of PWC residents (the most recent of which was conducted in August of 2010). We also report on the results of semi-structured interviews we conducted, which can tell us the extent to which residents understand the current immigration policy of the County.

The opinions of police officers about community relations are certainly informative, but we have access to much more direct evidence of any changes in community attitudes toward the police by examining the results of the annual Citizen Surveys that the University of Virginia Center for Survey Research has conducted for the County since 1993. These are large, high quality, comprehensive surveys of citizen satisfaction with a broad variety of services. The surveys are conducted by telephone, using random-digit dial sampling and, starting in 2008, also including samples of cell-phone users. (For an account of the survey methods, see Appendix H.) These surveys have long included questions about citizen satisfaction with the police, satisfaction with police attitudes toward citizens, and perceptions of public safety. In 2008, the evaluation team added specific items to the survey that would be relevant to this evaluation. The survey questionnaire does not inquire about any respondent's citizenship or immigration status, so we cannot identify immigrants or illegal immigrants in our results. We do, however, ask respondents about their race and whether or not they consider themselves to be of Hispanic origin. Thus, we can identify the opinions of Hispanic residents and those of African-Americans, but not those of immigrants.

It should be noted that earlier surveys contained a limited number of Hispanic respondents (less than 40 per year), and it was not until the 2000 year survey that their percentage started to increase. Using the unweighted data, Figure 10-1 presents the percentage Hispanic by year. This pattern reflects the population trend reported in the 2009 Brookings report and in section 7 of this report, as well as variability due to sampling. Two changes in method also affected the representation of Hispanics in the survey series: our introduction of Spanish language interviewing in 2006, and the inclusion of cell phone users in the sample starting with the 2008 survey. (Hispanics are more likely than others to be cell-phone only users.) In the time-series graphs below that compare views of Hispanics to those of other groups, we will exclude the survey results from years prior to 2000 because the small number of Hispanic respondents renders the results statistically unreliable.

**Figure 10-1: Percentage of Survey Respondents who were Hispanic, by Year (un-weighted data)**

Following the practice of the U.S. Census, our survey interview treats race and ethnicity as separate variables. We first ask respondents a yes/no question about whether they consider themselves to be Hispanic. All respondents are then asked to identify their race, and Hispanic is not listed as a race, since (according to Census definitions), Hispanics can be of any race. It is quite common for those who identify themselves as Hispanic to classify themselves as ‘other’ on the race question, while other Hispanics identify themselves as white, black, etc. Thus, the ‘other’ category on our race question is primarily constituted of Hispanics who think of that term as a racial category. For that reason, results for Hispanics and those who choose ‘other’ on the race question are often very similar.


As in previous years, the 2008-2010 Prince William County Citizen Surveys asked respondents to rate their satisfaction with various county public safety services. These included police performance, police attitudes and behaviors toward citizens, efforts to reduce illegal use of drugs and gangs’ activities, fire department performance, and rescue service performance. New questions were added to the series in 2008 about the police implementation of the immigration resolution, the fairness of the police, and the types of crimes residents are victims of in the county.<sup>135</sup>

### 10.1 Overall Satisfaction with the Police

In our 2008 survey, taken after the policy was put into effect, the vast majority of residents, 89 percent, said they were satisfied with the overall performance of the Police Department. However, that rating was lower than the ratings reported in the previous five years, and the drop in ratings was statistically significant. In 2008, overall satisfaction with the police was strongly related to the race or ethnicity of the respondent. For contrast, in 2005 when overall satisfaction was 94 percent, blacks were 91 percent satisfied and Hispanics the most satisfied at 97 percent, with all others at 94 percent. In 2008, the rating for whites is virtually unchanged, but satisfaction among blacks had dipped to 84 percent and Hispanic satisfaction with the Police had decreased to 73 percent (see Figure 10-2).

<sup>135</sup> The results of the crime victimization and reporting questions are reported in section 8.5.

**Figure 10-2: Satisfaction with Overall Performance of the Police Department by Race/Ethnicity, 2008**



In contrast, the 2010 survey results show that the gap between Hispanics and whites has narrowed down to a statistically insignificant 3-point difference. In general, the racial and ethnic groups are more similar in their satisfaction with the police in 2010 than they were in 2008.

**Figure 10-3: Satisfaction with Overall Performance of the Police Department by Race/Ethnicity, 2010**





Figure 10-4 shows overall performance ratings of the Police Department by race/ethnicity over the years, starting with the year 2000. In this graph (and the similar graphs in following sections), a simpler grouping by race and ethnicity is used. Survey respondents are divided into just three mutually exclusive groups: Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and all others. The graph shows that ratings of the police by “All Others” (that is, Anglo whites, Asians, plus a small number from less numerous races) are very consistent over the years. In contrast, the ratings by Hispanics started to drop as early as 2007; at the time of our 2007 survey, local debate about immigration issues was

increasing in prominence, but the County Board had not yet considered the immigration resolution. In 2008, after the policy was adopted and implementation had already begun, satisfaction ratings by Hispanics and by non-Hispanic blacks<sup>136</sup> show a sharp and significant decrease. In 2009, blacks' satisfaction with police once again matched those of the majority group, only to fall back a little in 2010. Hispanic satisfaction rose to 85.5 percent in 2009, a partial but statistically significant recovery from the 2008 level of satisfaction. By the time of our August 2010 survey, the percent of Hispanics satisfied with police nearly matched the "all others" rating of 93.5%. (Again, the "all others" group includes both non-Hispanic and whites and Asians, who are listed separately in Figure 10-3). With the 2010 results, Prince William County returned to showing survey results in which there is no statistically significant difference between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in their overall satisfaction with the services of the police.

**Figure 10-4: Satisfaction with Overall Performance of the Police by Race/Ethnicity and by Year, 2000–2010**



## 10.2 Satisfaction with police implementation of the immigration policy

In regards to the immigration resolution, respondents were asked the following question:<sup>137</sup>

The Prince William County Board of County Supervisors recently ordered the Department of Police to be more active in checking the citizenship or immigration status of people, to see if they are in violation of federal immigration law. How satisfied are you with the job the Police Department is doing in carrying out this policy? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?


The percent expressing satisfaction with the police department's efforts in carrying out the policy was 80.5 percent in 2008, the first year of the policy's implementation. That percentage went up significantly in the 2009 survey, to 85.0 percent. However, in 2010 the percent satisfied dropped

<sup>136</sup> Satisfaction of blacks may be slightly different from satisfaction from non-Hispanic blacks, as the latter group is a subset of the former group.

<sup>137</sup> Our survey does not ask residents directly whether or not they support the County's immigration policy, but on this question respondents could decline to rate the performance of the police if they were in opposition to the policy.

below the 2008 level, to 76.0 percent of all our respondents. That is, of those who offer a rating in 2010, three out of four respondents said they were satisfied with the job the Police Department is doing in carrying out the policy, with about 2 out of 5 (43.3%) saying that they were “very satisfied” (Figure 10-5). Not accounted for in these satisfaction ratings are those respondents (4.3%) who, because of their opposition to the policy, declined to rate it and those respondents who did not know about the policy or felt unable to rate these police activities (26.7%). The percent declining to rate it due to their opposition to the policy was lower in 2010 than it was in 2008 (changing from 7.7% in 2008 to 4.3% in 2010).

**Figure 10-5: Satisfaction with the Job the Police Department is Doing in Carrying Out the Immigration Policy, 2010 (n=915)**



Respondents who reported that they were very satisfied or very dissatisfied with the job the Police Department is doing in carrying out the policy were asked a follow-up question about the reasons for their satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This question was asked in an open-ended format and each respondent could provide more than one answer. Respondents' verbatim responses were coded for analysis.

Table 10-1 presents the grouped responses for those respondents in 2010 who said they were very satisfied (n=412). Of these respondents, 394 responded to the open-ended question. About one third (32.8%) had favorable comments on police actions, and 35 percent had positive comments on the policy itself. Nearly a third (31.6%) cited favorable results of police enforcement of the policy. About one-sixth (14.3%) of those who were satisfied had (negative) comments on the problem of illegal immigration, stressing its disadvantageous aspects. These results are fairly similar to those obtained in 2008, which are detailed in our Interim Report, and those of 2009, which are reported in our separate report on the 2009 citizen survey.



**Table 10-1. Reasons for Satisfaction with the Job the Police Department is Doing in Carrying out this Policy (2010, n=394)**

Comments	Responses	% of respondents mentioning
<i>Respondent said s/he was satisfied with the job the Police Department is doing because...</i>	n	%
Illegal immigration causes problems in the community	56	14.3%
The policy is good/needed	138	35.0%
The policy's enforcement is having positive results	124	31.6%
The police have been doing a good job of carrying out the policy.	129	32.8%
Haven't experienced, no opinion, other reasons, answers cannot be coded	44	11.3%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>492</b>	<b>394</b>

*Some respondent answers were coded into more than one category of response. The "Responses" column indicates the number of responses coded for each response category. The column "percentage of respondents mentioning" presents the number of people with responses in each category as a percentage of the number of respondents (394). On average, each respondent's answer was coded into 1.17 responses.*


Table 10-2 presents the 125 responses from those 2010 respondents who said they were very dissatisfied with the job the Police Department is doing in carrying out the policy. By asking for their reason for being dissatisfied, we are able to distinguish between those who would like to see stronger action against illegal immigration, and those who object to the policy or object to the actions being taken by police under the current policy. In the first group, only 1.5% of dissatisfied respondents in 2010 felt that the policy does not go far enough; this contrasts sharply with the 25.9% of dissatisfied respondents who voiced this opinion when we first asked this question in 2008. It thus appears that the effectiveness of the policy is no longer widely questioned by residents who wanted stricter enforcement on illegal immigration. Nearly a third (31.0%) of the very dissatisfied respondents felt the policy was not being vigorously enough enforced by the police. Turning to those who oppose the policy or its enforcement practice, about a quarter of the very dissatisfied respondents (27.7%) had unfavorable comments about the Prince William County policy in general. (In 2008, this percentage was substantially larger, 48.2 percent.) About one in twelve (8.5%) indicated unfavorable outcomes or negative effects from the policy or from police enforcement in general. Only one in five (20.7%) of the very dissatisfied respondents mentioned the actions of the police among their reasons for being dissatisfied. Note that all of these percentages pertain only to the very dissatisfied respondents; the respondents who, for example, mentioned racial profiling or discrimination by the police are just 23 out of 1,402 respondents who were asked about the policy's enforcement. It is apparent from the open-ended follow-ups that the question elicited responses based as much on residents' orientations to the immigration controversy and feelings about the County's new policy than on actual assessment of the Police Department's performance as executor of the policy.

**Table 10-2. Reasons for Dissatisfaction with the Job the Police Department is Doing in Carrying out this Policy (2010, n=113)**

Comments	Responses	% of respondents mentioning
<i>Respondent said s/he was dissatisfied with the job the Police Department is doing because...</i>	n	%
Illegal immigration causes problems in the community and the policy does not adequately address them	2	1.5%
The policy is bad	31	27.7%
The results of enforcing the policy are negative	10	8.5%
Approves of policy but problems with enforcement exist	35	31.0%
The police are discriminatory/racial profiling	23	20.7%
Haven't experienced, no opinion, other reasons, answers cannot be coded	24	21.3%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>113</b>

Some respondent answers were coded into more than one category of response. The “Responses” column indicates the number of responses coded for each response category; there were 101 coded responses in all. The column “percentage of respondents mentioning” presents the number of people with responses in each category as a percentage of the number of respondents (85). On average, each respondent’s answer was coded into 1.19 responses.

Satisfaction with the job the Police Department is doing in carrying out the immigration policy was far lower among Hispanic respondents (34.2%) than among non-Hispanic respondents (84.4%) (see Figure 10-6). This is a more extreme ethnic contrast in views than was seen in the more general question about overall police satisfaction. Further analysis shows that opinions of Hispanics interviewed in English were more favorable about immigration enforcement than those of Hispanics interviewed in Spanish; more on this issue below.

**Figure 10-6. Satisfaction with the Job the Police Department is Doing in Carrying Out the Policy by Race/Ethnicity, 2010**

### 10.3 Satisfaction with attitudes and behaviors of the police

Residents were also asked as in previous years about their satisfaction with police attitudes and behaviors toward citizens. In 2008, this question was asked in a split ballot format with one-third of the respondents answering the question with the word *citizens* and the remaining two-thirds answering the question with the word *residents*.<sup>138</sup> In that year, slightly more than three-quarters (79.3%) of respondents expressed satisfaction with the traditional question (using the word *citizens*), while 78.4 percent expressed satisfaction with the new wording (using the word *residents*).<sup>139</sup> Using the rating of 79.3 percent for comparative purposes, the analysis showed that satisfaction with police attitudes and behaviors towards citizens in 2008 was significantly lower than previous ratings experienced since 2003. Since there was no significant difference based on the change in question wording, in 2009 and 2010 the old wording was discarded and all respondents were asked about attitudes and behaviors toward “residents.”

In 2008, race of the respondent was related to opinions about police attitudes and behaviors. In 2008, the data showed that respondents of “other races” and Hispanics were least satisfied with the attitudes and behaviors of the police, a significant change from previous years. For example, in 2004, blacks were most satisfied at 87 percent, and, in 2005, Hispanics were most satisfied at 91 percent. These figures changed significantly in 2008, with 73 percent of blacks and only 54 percent of Hispanics reporting that they were satisfied with police attitudes and behaviors.

The ethnic and racial gap in satisfaction with these aspects of police conduct lessened somewhat by 2010 but was still statistically significant. (see Figure 10-7). In 2010, 76.3 percent of Hispanics were satisfied with police attitudes and behaviors, compared to 86.4 percent of non-Hispanics. Black and Hispanic respondents had very similar levels of dissatisfaction, and each group was less satisfied than whites.

**Figure 10-7. Satisfaction with Police Attitude and Behaviors by Race/Ethnicity, 2010**





Figure 10-8 shows the satisfaction ratings with police attitudes and behaviors towards citizens by race/ethnicity and by year. From 200 to 2007, the gap in satisfaction between Hispanics and “all others” was not very large and in some years Hispanic satisfaction was the same as for the other non-blacks. After implementation of the policy in 2008, satisfaction went down for members of all

<sup>138</sup> In prior years, the question referred to “citizens,” which was meant to be understood as a synonym for “resident.” In light of the immigration policy, CSR decided to clarify the question’s wording by using the term “resident.” The split ballot was used to determine if the wording change would affect responses.

<sup>139</sup> Analysis of these ratings shows no significant differences between the two wordings of the question.

three race/ethnicity categories, but especially so for Hispanics, who fell (as noted previously) to 54 percent satisfied. Hispanic satisfaction rose substantially after 2008, to 68.1 percent in 2009 and then to 76.3 percent in 2010. The ethnic gap in perceptions of police attitudes was thus substantially alleviated, but a significant gap remained in 2010 on this question.


**Figure 10-8. Satisfaction with Police Attitudes and Behaviors towards Citizens by Race/Ethnicity and by Year, 2000-2010**



#### 10.4 Satisfaction with police fairness


In another survey question added in 2008, respondents were asked to rate how satisfied they were that the Police Department treats everyone fairly regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, or national origin. In 2010, nearly eight out of ten respondents (79.9%) of respondents expressed their satisfaction, with 48.6% percent saying that they were very satisfied (Figure 10-9). This level of satisfaction and the 78.8 percent recorded in 2009 were both significantly higher than the 74.3 percent who were satisfied in 2008, immediately after the policy's implementation.

**Figure 10-9. Satisfaction that the Police Department Treats Everyone Fairly Regardless of Race, Gender, Ethnicity, or National Origin, 2010**



As illustrated in Figure 10-10, in 2010 blacks (72.8%) and respondents of “other” races (58.9%)<sup>140</sup> were less likely to be satisfied than whites (85.0%) and Asians (83.4%). Hispanics in 2010 (55.7%) were also less likely to be satisfied than non-Hispanics (84.1%); this was not a large increase from the very low satisfaction with fairness that Hispanics reported in 2008, when their percent satisfied was just under half (49.4%).

**Figure 10-10. Satisfaction that the Police Department Treats Everyone Fairly Regardless of Race, Gender, Ethnicity, or National Origin by Race/Ethnicity, 2010**



### 10.5 Hispanic attitudes differ by language of interview

Starting in 2006, CSR began to offer respondents the opportunity to take the Prince William County Citizen Survey in Spanish. A full, professionally vetted translation of the questionnaire is available to our bilingual interviewers and is programmed into CSR’s Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing system. If a household is determined to be Spanish-speaking, the case is referred to a bilingual interviewer, who offers the respondent the option of taking the survey in English or in Spanish. As we have noted in passing, the ability to speak English is often taken as a key indicator of acculturation among Hispanics. Of key significance in the current context is the existence of active Spanish-language media in the Prince William area. Spanish speakers who are not proficient in English are likely to get much of their news and editorial opinion from Spanish-language media. The limitations of language may also inhibit their reception of communications from the County government and the police (although both offer Spanish-language versions for key information, including information about the immigration policy).

When we separate out the Hispanic respondents to the 2010 survey into those who were interviewed in English versus those interviewed in Spanish, there are sharp contrasts in opinion on some of the police-related items, as can be seen in Table 10-3. Only one out of eight of the Spanish-language interviewees is satisfied with the way the immigration policy is being carried out by the police, contrasting with nearly six out of ten satisfied Hispanics among those interviewed in English. Spanish-speakers are somewhat lower than English-speaking Hispanics in their satisfaction with police attitudes and behaviors and with police fairness. Interestingly, however, Spanish-speakers are as high or higher in satisfaction with the police overall. That is, the same group of Spanish-language interviewees who registered 16 percent satisfaction about the immigration policy also reported nearly 94 percent satisfaction overall with the Prince William County police.

<sup>140</sup> As explained above, most of the “others” are those who identified their race as Hispanic, which is not considered a racial category in this survey.


This quantitative result was corroborated by our qualitative research in 2010. When we conducted intensive, semi-structured interviews with Hispanic residents, some were interviewed in Spanish and others in English. We noted a similar contrast in attitudes and in knowledge between these groups. Spanish-speaking Hispanics were much more likely to express fear and misunderstanding about the policy than English speakers. At the same time they described cordial and respectful relations with the police and did not express antagonism to the police in general. We heard in both our English and Spanish semi-structured community interviews with Hispanics emphatic reports that the local and regional Spanish-language media present a distorted picture of the situation in Prince William County and foster misconceptions about the County's immigration policy and its police force.

**Table 10-3. Hispanic satisfaction with police items, by language of interview, 2010.**

2010 Items (Hispanics only)	English Interview	Spanish Interview
Overall satisfaction with Police	89.3	93.6
Police Department carrying out immigration policy	58.4	16.8
Police attitudes and behaviors	82.3	70.4
Police Department treats everybody fairly	64.2	48.6

A look back across the last four survey years<sup>141</sup> shows that the ethnic gap in satisfaction with police, discussed in section 10.1 above, was largely driven by the changing opinions of the Spanish-speakers (see Figure 10-11). Already in 2007, as the controversy of illegal immigration was beginning to become public, there was a large gap between Spanish interviewees and English-speaking Hispanics in overall satisfaction with the police. This gap persisted in 2008, with both groups dropping further in satisfaction. The closing of the ethnic gap on this question is a result of a substantial shift upwards in the satisfaction of the Spanish-speaking population, who rose to a level similar to that of the English-speaking Hispanics in 2009 and 2010.


<sup>141</sup> We exclude 2006 because the number of Spanish-language interviews in that year was too small for reliable analysis. The number of Spanish interviews increased when CSR began including cell phones in the survey, starting in 2008.

**Figure 10-11. Satisfaction with police, by language of interview, 2007-2010.**

When the two language groups among Hispanic respondents are compared over time with regard to their satisfaction with the job the police are doing in enforcing the illegal immigration enforcement policy, a remarkable pattern emerges (see Figure 10-12). In the first survey conducted after the policy went into effect, the satisfaction of the Spanish interviewees was fully 50 percentage points lower than that of the more acculturated Hispanics whom we were able to interview in English. Just one year later, this perception gap based on language had disappeared. But then, in 2010, the gap re-emerged, and Hispanics whom we interviewed in English also went down in satisfaction. There is no evidence from any source that the Prince William police actually changed their behavior or their actions with regard to the immigration policy in the time between the 2009 and 2010 surveys. Rather, we can understand this shift in opinions about the police actions on the policy to be a result of the strident controversy in national and local media that arose over the proposed Arizona immigration law, passed in late Spring of 2010 and then overturned by a federal court in the summer. At the same time, a tragic motor vehicle accident in Prince William County occurred in August, 2010, right when the 2010 survey was in the field. This accident involved an illegal immigrant, driving under the influence of alcohol, who struck a vehicle in which several Catholic nuns were riding, killing one and critically injuring two others. The accident was front-page news for several days in the metropolitan press. We interpret the dissatisfaction with the policy's enforcement expressed by Hispanics in summer 2010 to be a result of renewed fears and as sense of vulnerability on their part as renewed cries for a crack-down on illegal immigrants were heard locally and across the country; the less acculturated Hispanics whom we interviewed in Spanish feel are more likely to feel vulnerable and may find their fears to be stoked by expressions of opinion often heard in the Spanish-language media.




**Figure 10-12. Hispanic satisfaction with policy implementation, by language group, 2007-2010.**



The pattern is different when we compare the language groups on their satisfaction with police attitudes and behavior, but the comparison is equally instructive (see Figure 10-1). Satisfaction with police attitudes went down for both the English-speaking Hispanics and those interviewed in Spanish, but the latter group had a much bigger drop in satisfaction, with only 26 percent satisfied among the Spanish interviewees in 2008. After 2008 the two groups become much more similar in their satisfaction levels, but both remain below the satisfaction levels seen for Hispanics in earlier surveys.

**Figure 10-13. Hispanic satisfaction with police attitudes, by language group, 2007-2010.**



On the question of police fairness to everyone regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, or national origin (not pictured), the language gap is modest, but as with the question about policy implementation it shows those interviewed in Spanish to be less satisfied than other Hispanics in 2008 and 2010, but not in 2009. Strikingly, on specific questions about police performance on two other important community issues, efforts to reduce the use of illegal drugs and efforts to combat gangs, there is no 'language gap' at all; in fact, those we interviewed in Spanish were slightly higher in satisfaction on these items than Hispanics interviewed in English, and Hispanics as a group were no less satisfied than non-Hispanic respondents.

Taken together, these results tell us that the opinions of less-aculturated Hispanics about the Prince William Police Department are both volatile and highly focused. On a question that asks specifically about immigration enforcement, those interviewed in Spanish were very dissatisfied in 2010. In the immediate aftermath of the policy's implementation in 2008, their satisfaction with police attitudes became very low, but their satisfaction rapidly returned to a level similar to other Hispanics in the County. In 2010, Hispanics are as highly satisfied with the police overall as non-Hispanics, and they have been very satisfied with police efforts to combat gangs and illegal drugs all along. Whenever there is a large public outcry against illegal immigration, the fears and vulnerabilities of the less-aculturated Hispanics in the County find expression in concerns about the County's immigration policy and whether the police will behave fairly toward people like themselves. When the media are generally quiet on the immigration issue, as they were in 2009, these less-aculturated Hispanics are just as satisfied as English-speaking Hispanics. These patterns of change in response to the immigration climate, as expressed in different media channels, can help us to understand how the ethnic gap in satisfaction police arose in 2008, how it was eased, and why ethnic gaps persist in responses to some survey items about the Prince William police and not in others.

## 10.6 Do community members understand the present immigration enforcement policy?

The annual community survey does not ask respondents whether or not they understand the immigration enforcement policy. However, we did include in our semi-structured interviews with community members a question that asks the respondent to tell us in their own words what the current policy is. Overall, the people with whom we spoke had a relatively poor understanding of the illegal immigration enforcement policy. Of the thirty-six residents with whom we conducted more in-depth “supplemental” interviews (after they had already completed the PWC Citizen Survey interview) only six reported that police could check immigration status only after a person was arrested, such as this respondent:

**What is your understanding of the current police immigration enforcement policy?  
What do the police have to do?**

Like I said, the only thing that I’m aware of really is if they were arrested for anything then they can ask for their status, but they can’t just pull them over. If they see a whole bunch of loiterers they can’t just go up to them and ask for their verification, their ID.

The vast majority of the residents we spoke with—even those who reported that they had followed the issue closely and were fairly well-informed—indicated that they did not fully understand whom the police could check and under what circumstances.

They came to my campus and talked to us....The police department. They came to our campus. It was one of those public meetings. ...They still didn't explain it very well. ...And again, you know. I said to them, “Don't you realize now why the county is so scary?” Because they could pull you over for something, then report you, and it turns out they didn't have probably cause in the first place, but you've already been reported.

**What is your understanding of the current police immigration enforcement policy?  
Firstly, what do the police have to do?**

There is where I have to say that I'm not sure. Because they changed it so that it was not as scary, and at that point I noticed that the original law had done its damage anyway, and there weren't as many policies scaring people away. That is my take on it.

Another resident responded:

Well, check immigration status of an individual. Like I said, they won’t check into the person making the complaint. If a person makes a complaint they won’t check into their citizenship status, but that still affects them greatly, the policy.

**What triggers the police to checking someone’s immigration status?**

That’s a good question. I don’t know, but I would think that some of it would be stereotyping. English not being their strongest language. Or a nationality.

We also analyzed the transcripts from eighteen semi-structured interviews conducted with community residents who were not part of the sample for the annual CSR community survey. Among those with inaccurate understandings of what the policy was, people’s thoughts varied from those who said they had no real understanding of the policy because they had not followed it to those who

indicated that the police could check the immigration status of people they stopped to those who said that people could only check the immigration status of people they charged with a crime.

Eight out of eighteen participants explicitly stated that they “do not know” what the policy says.

“Actually, ma’am, I don’t know anything about it. I have no idea what the policy says.”

“In all honesty, I don’t want to say anything out of turn, but I don’t know honestly, what the policy is to be honest with you.”

A few of these interviewees seemed loosely familiar with the immigration policy.

“...I know one of them was you have to have a bicycle helmet when you ride bicycles. So I guess that would, more Hispanics would be more of the ones that use that mode of transportation.”

“...all I know is that the police periodically, and I think this is really good, is that they put up road blocks and that they check everybody for licensing; because if you’re not legal then you can’t get a license.”

Others residents have a fuzzy understanding of the policy. These participants could cite the involvement of the police, the importance of probable cause, and the relevance of residents’ immigration status but they did not know the facts about the law.

“Well, as I understand it, the police can stop-- I’m not certain that they have to have a reason to stop people--I believe they do--or a traffic violation or something like that, and they check their immigration status and what happens after that I’m not sure. I assume it gets turned over to the Immigration Service”

“What I understood about the policy was that, if the police stops someone, and the police has reason to believe that person is involved in criminal activities, or other illegal activities such as possession of drugs, then the police can request to see that person’s legal documents.”

Finally, a couple of residents discussed the policy in regard to what happens after an arrest is made. All three mentioned moving from an arrest to deportation.

“It is that if they’re arrested they could be, when they go to jail they can be deported.”

“Well, if the police stop them or arrest them for a certain maybe felonies or whatever, they do have the right to check their background if they’re not a citizen, they can hold them to be deported.”

“Basically, it says if you are committing a crime, the Prince William County police have the ability or the authority to ask you if you’re a legal resident and if you can’t produce document that you’re a legal resident, that’s another crime and they can effect deportation.”

An important fact about the County’s immigration policy is that it was passed and implemented in one form and then modified in mid-2008 to remove the mandate for inquiry under ‘reasonable suspicion’ and instead mandate immigration checks for all persons placed under physical arrest. Participants have little to no knowledge of the changes that were made to the policy in 2008. The majority of the participants in the eighteen community interviews responded that they “did not know” about the change.

“No, ma’am. I don’t even know.”

“I’m not sure.”

“Honestly, I’m not sure if the original policy was changed.”

Four participants were familiar with “a change” to the policy but even they were a little unsure when asked to describe it.

“I’m not very familiar with those changes, although I know that something was changed. I just never looked into it. What I do know is that after the modification, I wasn’t experiencing the same treatment as before. I wasn’t getting pulled over randomly, for example. I also never heard other people complain about this sort of treatment.”

“...there was a lot of issues regarding the policy and then I believe it became very costly for the county to keep up the program. I’m not sure. I guess they maybe backed off the policy a little bit. Not really done away but backed off. That’s the change.”

“I think I’m correct in saying that there wasn’t going to be any racial profiling. That people could gather together in an orderly manner in order to find work. And they had to actually do something wrong to be arrested and detained by the police.”

In summary, the County’s policy remains highly misunderstood and confusing to many, despite the efforts of the police to educate the community about it. Many residents—perhaps most—do not have a current or clear understanding of how the law is implemented in Prince William County. We found this misunderstanding to be most acute among Hispanic residents with limited English proficiency. In fact, some of the non-English speakers we interviewed had noticeable, unexpected difficulty comprehending the question itself: for some of the newcomers to the United States the concept of a formal “policy” that actually guides police behavior may be foreign to their thinking.

In some of our later interviews, we showed residents materials from the Police Department that are designed to explain the policy. These include materials from the Department’s webpage and the brochures prepared in 2008 for distribution after the policy was changed. It became clear that these materials could be improved. It is not necessary in 2010 to recount in detail the provisions of the original 2008 policy or the history of its modification, as is done in these brochures. Residents want to know: what will the police do if they stop me tomorrow, what will they *not* do, and what papers do I need? They need to be reassured that they will not be subject to immigration inquiry if they come forward to report a crime or act as a witness. These reassurances do appear in the current brochures, but are perhaps not given sufficient prominence. We recommend that the Department undertake a re-design of these materials. We also recommend that the Department undertake greater efforts to communicate through the Spanish-language media, to better reach those who are most fearful and uninformed about the policy and the actual practices of the Prince William police. We recognize that the Department has invested great effort in its community outreach and education campaigns around the policy, and we are impressed by the skills we have seen displayed by the bilingual officers in the department. Nevertheless, our survey and interview results show that continued effort will be needed to inform the public about the policy and to maintain and further restore positive relations with the Hispanic community, especially with those who do not speak English well.

## 10.7 Summary

One of the key goals in implementing the County's immigration enforcement policy was to maintain the Police Department's reputation for professionalism and maintain community confidence and trust in the police. The data from our annual community surveys reveal that the introduction of the policy in 2007-2008 seriously disrupted police-community relations in the County, at least temporarily. We are fortunate in having at our disposal survey data from years preceding the policy's introduction. These data show that Hispanics in the County were generally satisfied with the police at levels similar to non-Hispanics. When the policy was introduced and implemented, however, a substantial gap in satisfaction emerged between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in overall satisfaction with the police, satisfaction with the attitudes and behavior of officers, satisfaction with police fairness, and satisfaction with police efforts to enforce the immigration policy itself. The Police Department invested substantial effort in explaining the new policy and attempting to reassure members of the Hispanic community, in a series of several hundred community appearances, many involving the Chief of Police. The Department also used its website, printed brochures, media appearances, and appearances at community fairs to spread its messages. It is likely that the damage to community relations would have been considerably greater, and more permanent, without these efforts. However, they were not sufficient to prevent a palpable chill to fall over police-community relations in 2008, as seen not only in our survey results but in the everyday experiences of police officers, reported to us in the 2008 focus groups and in some of the responses to our surveys of officers.

The good news is that the chilly relations with Hispanics warmed fairly rapidly, resulting in much more positive reports from officers in our 2009 focus groups and our 2009 interviews with key informants. These perceptions were confirmed in our 2009 Citizen Survey, which showed substantial reduction in the satisfaction gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanics. By 2010, Hispanic satisfaction with the overall performance of police equaled the satisfaction of non-Hispanics. On more specific questions about police attitudes and behaviors and about police fairness, a significant ethnic gap in satisfaction remained, but the gap regarding police attitudes had narrowed considerably from what was seen in 2008. While residents in general were quite satisfied with police efforts to enforce the immigration policy, Hispanic residents were much less satisfied in 2008, rose in their satisfaction in 2009, and then went down again in 2010.

Through further analysis of the survey data and our in-depth interviews with some community residents, we found that the group that is most dissatisfied with the immigration policy is those Hispanics who do not speak English well. For a variety of reasons tied to their lack of full acculturation, their presumably closer ties to illegally present persons, and their attentiveness to Spanish-language media that may distort the situation in Prince William County, Hispanics who lack proficiency in English are—in some survey years—far less satisfied than English-speaking Hispanics with particular aspects of police performance that are related to the immigration issue. We interpret the survey results to indicate that this group is particularly vulnerable to the changes in the opinion climate on the immigration issue, as portrayed in the mass media. When the perceived volume of nativist outcry against illegals increases, the vulnerabilities felt by the less-accultured Hispanics find expression in our surveys through dissatisfaction with the County's policy and the actions its police take to enforce that policy. Fortunately, these opinions do not seem to diffuse into a more general dissatisfaction with the police, whose efforts to combat drugs and gangs are fully appreciated by Hispanics, including non-English speakers. Again, overall satisfaction with the police was fully restored among Hispanics by 2010, erasing the gap on the general police satisfaction question (but not on some more immigration-relevant police items).

Our qualitative interviews also reveal that many residents, especially Hispanics and even more so the less acculturated Hispanics, do not understand the current immigration policy. Many continue to think that the County police can and will stop anyone at any time to ask about their immigration status. They do not understand the changes that were made in the policy in 2008, nor do they understand the implications of those changes. Good police-community relations on this issue will necessarily be based on a correct public understanding of what the current policy is. While the Police Department has devoted great effort already to promoting better understanding of the policy, and our survey results do show substantial progress in repairing the wide ethnic gaps in perceptions of the police that opened up in 2008, it is clear that further and continuing effort will be required to get correct information out to the Hispanic community and to fully restore their confidence in the Prince William County police to the levels maintained before 2007.

## 11 Effects on the County's Internal and External Reputation for Inclusiveness

In this section we examine how the County's immigration enforcement policy affected residents' views of the County government, of Prince William County as a place where they want to continue to live, and their ratings of their quality of life. These results are directly relevant to the policy goal of maintaining the County's reputation as an inclusive community, both internally (to its current residents) and externally (to people outside the County). We rely primarily on two sources for this assessment: results of our in-depth interviews with community residents, and results of the annual Prince William County Citizen Survey. Since that survey was fielded in years before, during, and after the policy's implementation, these data can give us a clear picture of how residents view their community and its government over time, thus revealing key changes in the County's internal reputation. We do not have any survey data available that can show us how people outside of Prince William view the community. However, we can return to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data files to see how demand for homes in Prince William changed after the introduction of the policy.

During our in-depth interviews conducted in 2008, we heard repeatedly that the Hispanic population in general was afraid of being stopped by the police as a result of the policy despite the efforts of the Police Department to inform the population that the policy's intent was to rid Prince William County of serious criminal offenders who were illegal immigrants, not just illegal immigrants in general. We heard that Hispanics did not trust that they would be safe. We also heard from Police Department personnel that they believed people understood the policy and that people were more comfortable with the policy after months of public education forums. These competing statements led us, in our 2009 Interim Report, to investigate responses to three questions that have been part of the Prince William County Citizens Survey for a number of years: the overall quality of life rating that residents give to the County as a place to live; residents' desire to live in the County "five years from now," and trust in the County government. With the 2009 and 2010 Citizen Surveys now complete, we can now observe not only how the responses changed when the policy was implemented but consider how these attitudes changed in the succeeding years.

### 11.1 Resident ratings of quality of life in Prince William County

Each year, the Prince William County Citizen Survey asks a large, random sample of residents to rate Prince William County as a place to live. This is the first substantive question in the interview each year. The question reads:

*"Please imagine a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the worst possible community in which to live, and 10 represents the best possible community. Where on that scale would you rate Prince William County as a place to live?"*


These ratings have generally been quite high on average, and have not varied greatly over the years. However, when the survey samples are divided by race and ethnicity into the three mutually exclusive groups of Hispanic, non-Hispanic blacks, and "all others" (a category that encompasses Anglo whites, Asians, and small numbers of people from less numerous racial categories), it is clear that immigration issues and the policy affected the way Hispanics rate Prince William as a place to live. As seen in Figure 11-1, the quality-of-life ratings from non-Hispanic blacks and all others remain fairly stable over this ten year period, fluctuating only slightly between 7 and 7.5 on the scale. In contrast, Hispanic ratings increase from 2003 to 2006 (years of rapid growth in the size of the Hispanic community) to a peak score of 8.01, a full point higher than the 7.00 rating that was average for the whites, Asians and others in the "all others" category. The Hispanics' rating went



down about half a point (to 7.45) in 2007, as issues concerning illegal immigration became prominent in the media and in public discussion in the County. A year later, after the immigration policy had been proposed, debated, passed, implemented, and modified, the rating from Hispanics plummeted to 5.93, while that of the other groups remained stable. We remarked on this ethnic divide in quality of life ratings in our Interim Report.

As Figure 11-1 also shows, however, this gap disappeared completely in just one year's time. In 2009, average ratings from Hispanics had returned to their 2007 level (7.51). In 2010, amid the renewed national and local debate about illegal immigration, Hispanic ratings dropped a half-point again, to 7.09 (not a statistically significant change). Thus, the County has not returned to the situation of 2006, in which Hispanics were happier with the County as a place to live than other groups, but has moved past the ethnic divide of 2008 to situation in which there is no significant ethnic or racial difference in residents' ratings of quality of life.

**Figure 11-1. Overall Quality of Life in Prince William County (on a 1-10 point scale, 1 is low), 2000-2010.**



## 11.2 Residents' desire to live in Prince William County in the future

Our annual survey also asks a very simple and direct measure of community attachment:

*Would you like to be living in Prince William County five years from now, or do you hope to be living someplace else by then?*


Until 2008, this was one of the rotating series of questions that is asked only in even-numbered years. However, as part of this evaluation project we changed this question to one that appears annually.

The results for this question over the years (Figure 11-2) are similar in pattern to those of the quality of life ratings, but more dramatic in the differences they reveal. Throughout the period of rapid Hispanic influx, from 2002 through 2006, Hispanics were considerably more likely to want to stay in Prince William than others. In 2006, over three quarters of Hispanic residents (77.3%) wanted to be

living in the County five years hence, compared to 55.8 percent of non-Hispanic blacks and about half (52.8%) of all others. Two years later, after implementation of the policy, the picture had changed dramatically: in 2008 only 42.8% of Hispanics wanted to stay, while the percentages rose for non-Hispanic blacks (60.9%) and all others (63.1%). It is hard to imagine clearer evidence that the implementation of the policy caused a major change in how Hispanics perceived their place in the life of the community.

As was seen in the quality of life ratings, the large ethnic gap in the desire to stay in the County proved to be temporary. In 2009, the percentage of Hispanics wishing to stay had bounced back to 64.1 percent, identical to the 64.0 percent of “all others” who wanted to remain. The differences between the groups were not significant in 2010, either. Thus, the wide ethnic gap in community attachment that was created by the policy controversy in 2008 disappeared in a year’s time, but the situation was altered from the pre-policy years, when Hispanics were the group most wanting to stay in the County in the future.

**Figure 11-2. Percentage of Respondents Who Would Like to Live in PWC 5 Years from Now, 2002-2010.**



### 11.3 Residents' trust in County government.


For many years the Prince William County Citizen Survey has included a question about trust in the local government, patterned after the wording of government-trust questions used in many national surveys. We ask:

*How much of the time do you think you can trust the County government to do what is right – just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time*

Figure 11-3 examines survey participants' trust that the government will do what is right always or most of the time, over the last eleven years. The time series shows that the non-Hispanic whites, Asians and others we have grouped in the "all others" category are quite steady in their level of trust in the County government, with all years scoring trust percentages between 62 and 65 percent, with the exception of 2005, when only 60.2 percent were trusting. The pattern for Hispanics is quite different. Their trust level is similar to that of others for most years from 2000 to 2007, except in 2004 and 2005 when Hispanic trust reached 73.8 percent in each year. All groups were similarly trusting in 2007 (61 to 66 percent). But after implementation of the immigration policy Hispanic trust levels dipped to just 50.3 percent, contrasting sharply with the 63.1 percent trust level reported by the "all others" group. Interestingly, African-American residents of the County also dropped sharply in their level of trust, reaching an all-time low of only 44.8 percent trusting the government to do what's right all or most of the time. While we expected a decrease in Hispanics trust in government, we did not necessarily expect to see such a large decrease for blacks, but there were indications in our interviews that some blacks believed that they might also be vulnerable to police action, because they too are a minority in the community. In general, African Americans traditionally exhibit lower levels of trust in government than whites. What has been striking in Prince William County is that while African Americans have shown slightly lower levels of trust than other racial/ethnic groups, the differences had not been large until 2008. The policy, therefore, appears to have negatively affected people's trust in government in two large demographic groups. So again, we have evidence of an important ethnic divide in views of the local government that emerged in the aftermath of the policy controversy in late 2007 and 2008.

In 2009, African-Americans had regained their trust in government (62.3% trusting), but it is taking longer for the County government to recapture the trust of Hispanic residents. Trust levels for Hispanics were 53.6 percent in 2009 and 59.5 percent in 2010, compared to 66.4% for the Anglo whites and Asians in the "all others" category. For reasons we have not been able to discover, black trust in government went down again in 2010, dipping to 51.9 percent. It is fair to say that the immigration policy opened up an ethnic gap in government trust in 2008, and that the task of regaining the trust of minority groups in the County government is not yet complete as of 2010.

**Figure 11-3. Trust that the Government Will do What is Right (Always & Most of the Time), 2000-2010.**



## 11.4 How were perceptions of Prince William affected, outside the County itself?

We do not have any survey data available that can show us how people *outside* Prince William County feel about the County or its government. We have heard some of our informants express concern that outside firms might not choose to locate in Prince William because they would perceive the County to be unwelcoming of diversity, but we have no way of knowing if such perceptions are widespread or if they have affected any recent relocation decisions. We have not performed any systematic content analysis of media coverage of the controversy in the County, but the *Washington Post* expressed strong editorial opposition to the immigration policy, and having closely followed its news and feature coverage of the policy in 2007 and 2009 we can say that the coverage tended to stress its negative consequences and the views of the policy's opponents. The Spanish language press was highly critical of the County; local papers in Northern Virginia were more mixed. The documentary film *9500 Liberty* became popular on the Internet as a Youtube series, was then aired at a series of fundraisers and forums for progressive political activists, and was ultimately screened on MTV in 2010. The film does not paint a positive picture of some of the County notables who supported the original policy, and it depicts quite vividly some of the uglier expressions of nativist sentiment that emerged during the course of the public debates on-line and at public meetings. We feel confident in stating that, overall, Prince William's actions on the illegal immigration issue have received far more bad press than good up until now.

The data discussed earlier in this section show that views of the County were negatively affected among Hispanics for the most part, and not so much among non-Hispanics. Again, we do not have interview or survey data for Hispanics outside of the County. However, the data files from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act may provide some insight to how attitudes about the County might translate into a very concrete action: applying for a mortgage loan to purchase a home in Prince William. Home ownership is a good indicator of whether individuals plan on settling in a community over the long term, and data derived from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act gives a sense of this by charting mortgage applications by race and ethnicity. A review of owner-occupied home purchase loans to Hispanics living in Prince William County, Manassas City, and Manassas Park City from 2000 to 2007 shows a sharply rising trend up to 2006 and then a steep drop-off.<sup>142</sup> In 2000, on average, Hispanics accounted for 8.2 percent of loan applications for owner-occupied 1 to 4 family homes and manufactured homes.<sup>143</sup> This figure had doubled to 17.2 percent in 2003 and more than quadrupled to 39.9 percent by 2006 but fell to only 19.4 percent in 2007. Trends in Manassas Park City and Manassas (Figure 11-4) are even more telling because these urban areas house a higher concentration of Hispanics, but saw a steeper post-2006 drop than did Prince William County. Where Hispanics applied for 21.55 percent of home loans in Manassas City in 2000, by 2006 this rate had risen to 72.8 percent, but in 2007 the rate dropped to 34.2 percent. In Manassas Park City, the rate rose from 31.8 percent in 2000 to 60.9 percent in 2006 and then fell to 40.45 in 2007. Data on home construction in the county display the same trends, peaking at 12,000 permits issued in 2005 and then declining to only approximately 2,000 in 2009.<sup>144</sup> Foreclosures are the reverse side of


<sup>142</sup> The available HMDA data give us, for each census tract, the percentage of loan applications that were from Hispanics and the number of loan applications per 1,000 housing units. We added in to this data set the tract level counts of occupied housing units from Census 2000. This allowed us to estimate the number of mortgage applications in each year (based on the 2000 count of housing units) and hence the number of applications by Hispanics. Once the counts were estimated by tract, they could be totaled across the county or city to give overall percentages applied for by Hispanics.

<sup>143</sup> "Average," here, refers to the median.

<sup>144</sup> This pattern held true for all construction in the county.


the home ownership dream, and data show that the foreclosure rate for homes in the county is highly concentrated in neighborhoods where the Hispanic population is densest<sup>145</sup> – a fact that we also observed in tours through these neighborhoods. We assume that most of the former residents of these foreclosed properties have left the county.

**Figure 11-4. Percent of owner-occupied home purchase loans to Hispanics for 1 to 4 family dwellings and manufactured homes: PWC, Manassas City, and Manassas Park City**



The dramatic decrease in demand for home purchases by Hispanics is evident in maps we created, based on the HMDA data for both the County and the adjacent cities. These show, for each census tract, the percentage of home loan applications that were from Hispanics. A comparison of figures Figure 11-5 and Figure 11-6 shows how the wave of Hispanic demand for housing in the County suddenly receded in 2007. In the areas of most concentrated Hispanic settlement, the majority of loans applications were still from Hispanics, but in the rest of the County the percentages of applications from Hispanics went down sharply. (Absolute numbers of loan applications were down in all locations, but Hispanic applications dropped more sharply than non-Hispanic applications.)

<sup>145</sup> Singer et al (2009), p.13.





**Figure 11-6. Percent Hispanic home purchase loans, PWC + Cities, 2007**

Figure 11-7 shows the percent Hispanic for the County combined with Manassas and Manassas Park. These data offer a window on how Prince William and the adjacent small cities, taken together, are viewed by Hispanics outside the County.

**Figure 11-7. Percent of home loan applications from Hispanics in Prince William, Manassas and Manassas Park, 2000-2007**



From 2000 until 2006, the percentage of Hispanic home mortgage applications in the County and the adjacent cities increased every year. The percentage went up from 11.6 percent in 2000 to a peak of 41.1 percent in 2006. In 2007, however, only 18.7 percent of home mortgage applications in the County region were from Hispanics, a drop to less than half their percentage in 2006. Of course, this change happened at the same time as the onset of the mortgage crisis that swept through the County and the nation, so the overall number of home loans was lower in 2007 than in 2006. It is certainly true that the mortgage crisis had differential impacts on different ethnic and economic groups, so that Hispanics would have more difficult time accessing home loan credit than non-Hispanics. Nevertheless, we think the drastic drop in Hispanic demand for homes in the Prince William area in 2007 was at least in part a product of a new perception that the County was no longer a welcoming place for Hispanics. Further research using later waves of HMDA data, and comparisons to other parts of the metro area, would be able to shed more light on how much of this drop-off in demand reflects economics and how much is a change in the choices Hispanics are making about where to live.

If Hispanic demand for homes in Prince William County were to increase again, one would expect to see a corresponding, renewed increase in the Hispanic population of the County. However, a glance back at Figure 7-1, which tracks the overall Hispanic population changes in the County compared to the rest of the metropolitan area through 2009, suggests that many Hispanics were still avoiding Prince William when choosing a place to live, since growth of the Hispanic population leveled off in Prince William while growing apace in the balance of the metro area.

### 11.5 Summary

The County's adoption of its immigration policy in 2007 and its implementation in 2008 had a strong, immediate impact on the way Hispanic residents perceived their life in the County, their desire to continue to live in the County, and their trust in the County government. On several of these indicators, Hispanics had been more positive than non-Hispanics prior to 2006. In each of these indicators, dramatic and unprecedented ethnic gaps emerged in 2008 that separate the views of Hispanics from those of non-Hispanics, whose views of the County were generally unaffected by



the immigration controversy. (The trust of African-Americans in local government was also disrupted by the change.) In the two years that followed, these ethnic gaps were largely repaired, disappearing entirely for quality of life ratings and desire to continue living in the County. The ethnic gap in government trust lingers on in 2010, but is not as wide as in 2008.

We have no direct opinion data on how Hispanics outside Prince William view the County, but data on Hispanic population trends in the metropolitan region as well as mortgage data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act show that Hispanics are avoiding Prince William County in favor of moving to other parts of the region, where their numbers continued to increase after 2006, while the Hispanic population growth of Prince William leveled off. The negative coverage of the immigration policy that was prominent in the regional press, and especially in Spanish-language media, was probably not helpful to the County in maintaining a reputation across the metropolitan region as a welcoming place for Hispanics.

Thus, the County did not initially succeed in its goal of implementing the immigration enforcement policy without damaging its reputation as an inclusive community. For Hispanic residents within the County, ratings of quality of life and desire to continue living in the County rose sufficiently by 2010 to match the sentiments of non-Hispanic residents. Although trust in government for Hispanics continues to lag somewhat, we can say that the County had by 2010 achieved a measure of success in restoring its internal reputation as a welcoming place for Hispanics—that is, its reputation among Hispanics who live in Prince William. However, the data on Hispanic growth outside Prince William—and little Hispanic growth within Prince William—suggest that there is much work to do if more Hispanics outside the County are to be convinced that they will be welcome in Prince William.

## 12 Conclusions

The preceding sections of this report have briefly recounted the history and identified the goals of Prince William County's illegal immigration enforcement policy, and presented evidence from a wide range of sources that allow us to reach some conclusions about the County's success or lack of success in attaining each of these goals. We have also considered whether various unintended negative consequences ensued from the introduction of the policy, and whether or not substantial obstacles to the policy's success emerged. We can now review these results to draw overall conclusions about the policy's success. We think the evidence is clear that the Prince William Immigration policy was smoothly implemented by the Prince William County Police Department and County staff; that the policy had wide-ranging effects, some of which were those intended; and that it also fell short of achieving some of its goals.

### 12.1 The implementation experience

The Prince William County Police Department undertook thorough measures to prepare internally for the implementation of the policy and to educate the community about the policy. Implementation of the policy has generally gone smoothly. The Department benefited from strong, experienced leadership that maintained continuity throughout the study period, with clear and strong emphasis from the top and down through the ranks that the policy would be implemented with professionalism and that racial profiling would not be tolerated. Senior staff devoted great effort to their community-outreach initiatives. Officers have been comfortable implementing the policy, particularly in its current form. They feel themselves to be well trained to deal with illegal immigration issues, and the policy does not seem to have had a major impact on the daily work of patrol officers or shift supervisors. The Criminal Alien Unit, for its part, has played a modest but important role in the Department's immigration enforcement efforts, focusing on proactive investigation of more serious offenders in coordination with ICE. Staff at the Adult Detention Center, who are not under the authority of PWC's Board of County Supervisors and who entered into the 287g program separately, have been trained as 287g officers and have been able to handle the steps and workload of checking the immigration status of detainees. The recent expansion of the ADC has made it easier for the jail to accommodate the increased number of detainees, with less need for costly "farm-outs" of the detainees. By the time our study ended in 2010, the immigration enforcement policy, procedures, and reporting requirements had been well integrated into the normal training and operations of the PWCPD and the ADC. Although the policy has placed additional burdens and costs on both PWCPD and the ADC, and especially on the police command staff, both agencies seem to have adapted well to these demands.

### 12.2 Reducing the number of illegal immigrants in the county.

Our data show clearly that Prince William County's immigration enforcement policy resulted in some important changes in the community. While Prince William County accounted for most of the growth in the metropolitan area's Hispanic population from 2000 to 2006, after the policy's introduction in late 2007 and early 2008 nearly all Hispanic growth in the metro area occurred outside of Prince William. The number of non-citizens in the County (which includes both those legally and illegally present in the U.S.) decreased substantially. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey, police records, and other sources clearly indicate a decrease in the number of illegal immigrants, as shown by a variety of proxy measures that all point in the same direction. (These data are corroborated by reports of our key informants.) We estimate that the number of illegal immigrants in the County decreased by an amount between 2,000 and 6,000 persons from 2006 to 2008, depending on one's assumptions about the percentage of departing

non-citizens who are illegal. Although we cannot determine how many left because of the policy or because of the economy, and we are sure that both contributed to the declines in the immigrant population, the fact remains that the declines seen in Prince William's non-citizen and non-acculturated Hispanics were not nearly matched by changes elsewhere in the metropolitan area. The County's immigration policy must have played a role here, whether by itself or in conjunction with the severe economic changes that hit the County (and the rest of the metro area) at the same time. Fewer immigrants and fewer Hispanics are moving to Prince William County, although this again is probably attributable to the same range of causes. The overall result was a sudden leveling off (from 2007 onward) of what had been rampant Hispanic population growth in the County, a decrease of several thousand in the number of illegal immigrants, and a restructuring of the Hispanic population as unattached young adults (mostly male) left and were replaced by Hispanic married couples, somewhat older adults, and families with small children, all more likely to be English speakers.

### **12.3 Improving public safety and reducing crime.**

Our conclusions about the policy's impact on crime must be cautious, due in large part to the lack of historical, pre-policy data on crimes committed by illegal immigrants. Our investigation of data from several sources suggests that the immigration enforcement policy has not affected most forms of crime in PWC. Overall, illegal immigrants currently make up a relatively small proportion of arrestees for serious crimes, and a substantial majority of arrested illegal immigrants are charged with traffic offenses or misdemeanors, particularly public drunkenness, driving without a license, and DUI, which together account for 70 percent of their arrests. Given the lack of pre-policy data on arrests of illegal immigrants, we cannot determine whether or not those proportions have changed since the policy's implementation.

Our analysis of trends over several years in both offense reports and calls for police service indicates that most types of serious and minor crime did not decline (or increase) following the policy's announcement in July 2007 or its implementation in March 2008. However, our analyses also show that PWC experienced a substantial reduction in violent crime, driven by a drop in aggravated assaults, following the announcement of the policy and the implementation of immigration checks by the local jail (ADC) in July 2007. This decline coincided very closely with the announcement of the policy, which makes it less likely that the drop was precipitated by factors like the County's economic trends or other PWCPD crime-reduction initiatives. Further, while several jurisdictions in the Washington, DC area had reductions in violence in recent years, the decline in aggravated assault in PWC during 2008 and 2009 was greater than that experienced by any other large county or city in Northern Virginia or suburban Maryland, including those doing varying levels of immigration enforcement. The decline in aggravated assault likely reflects a combination of reduced offending, reduced victimization, and possibly reduced crime reporting among illegal immigrants. We cannot say how much of the drop was due to each of these factors, but PWCPD data on the ethnicity of victims and arrestees for aggravated assault tentatively suggest that a decline in victimization and/or reporting account for at least part of the decline. All of this suggests that aggravated assaults in PWC declined in response to the publicity and controversy surrounding the PWC Board of County Supervisors' announcement of the initial version of the policy, which (until April 2008) required officers to inquire about the immigration status of all lawfully detained persons that they suspected of being illegal immigrants.

There was also a sharp decline in hit-and-run accidents that coincided with the introduction of the policy. We conclude that this change is a direct result of the policy and the departure of illegal immigrants, since illegal immigrants would have obvious incentives to leave the scene of a traffic

accident and the reduction seems less likely to be linked to possible changes in reporting of the incidents.

After 2007 there was also some reduction in arrests for public drunkenness, but we cannot attribute this to the policy because arrests of illegal immigrants for public drunkenness were increasing during this time. Further, our analysis of public order offenses more generally does not show any significant drop associated with the policy's introduction.

Despite our mixed findings, the current version of the policy, which mandates immigration checks only for arrestees, appears to be a reasonable way of targeting illegal immigrants who commit criminal violations. There is fairly broad agreement on this as a goal for law enforcement.

#### **12.4 Reducing overcrowded housing problems, neighborhood nuisances and public disorder.**

Our results indicate that the implementation of the County's immigration enforcement policy did have significant effects on some of the neighborhood problems that had been of concern to activist groups and to members of the Board when they framed the policy. However, some of the effects proved to be temporary and others were apparent in some parts of the County but not in others. The aging of the housing stock and the severe economic changes that occurred in 2007 and 2008 probably worked to worsen some neighborhood conditions at the same time that the action on illegal immigration may have been having positive effects.

Survey respondents are divided on the severity of neighborhood problems and the degree to which they have improved or worsened. We attribute this partly to differences in where they live, as each of the problems was highly localized.

Prior to the policy's implementation, there was a significant problem of overcrowded housing in the County, associated with the increasing presence of illegal immigrants but localized in a few areas. There were also several active day labor sites that caused real concern for some residents. We have strong, clear reports from some informants that particular overcrowded houses became vacant or changed to normal occupancy very soon after the policy was passed.

Vacant housing became a major neighborhood issue at around the time the resolution was implemented. This development was primarily a result of the mortgage crisis, but the problem may have been worsened by the flight of some immigrants from the County. Responses to the annual citizen survey, as well as reports of informants, show that the problems with upkeep of vacant properties have lessened significantly in the last year.

There are consistent reports in our qualitative data that loitering at day labor sites went down sharply when the policy was first implemented, but then returned to significant levels of activity at the sites within a year or so. Our direct observation and interviews with police officers in the fall of 2010 verified that the three main day labor sites in the County continue to be quite active, involving scores of primarily Hispanic men each day. New legislation was passed in 2010 to limit the activities of day laborers soliciting for work on public streets, but the day labor problem in the County persists.

There were more complaints and founded violations of overcrowding and related property violations in the areas near Manassas than in the Eastern portion of the County. Perhaps as a result of this, there is evidence that overcrowded housing (or housing that may appear overcrowded to some

residents even if not in violation of code) was reduced in the area around Manassas but did not decrease in the Eastern part of the County.

There was a marked increase in the capabilities of the Neighborhood Services Division to guide and respond to complaints from residents about Property Code Enforcement issues. In the years before, during and after the policy's implementation the Division expanded its staff, improved its enforcement tools and practices, worked with neighborhood groups to educate them about how to make effective complaints, and benefited from a modification of the County's occupancy ordinance. As a result, the Division's caseload of complaints did not recede as the policy was put into effect, but continues at a high level. Prince William County is now far better equipped than it was earlier in the decade to work with neighborhood groups to identify and correct problems in property code enforcement and to handle the increased, continuing caseload.

### **12.5 Saving money by delivering fewer services to illegal immigrants.**

This study did not directly measure the fiscal effects of the provisions in the County's immigration enforcement policy that call for denial of certain services to illegal immigrants. A study by County staff, mandated by the Board's July 2007 resolution, found that the list of services that could legally be denied to illegal immigrants was quite short and that list did not include the most costly categories of County services. Most of the more costly services that illegal immigrants can receive through the County are federally funded and therefore cannot, by law, be denied to anyone based on their immigration status. Most notably, education must be provided to all students regardless of legal status, as mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Office of the County Executive informs us that any funding saved by restricting services to illegal immigrants in programs such as homeless intervention was shifted to citizens and legal immigrants. We do not know the amounts of these reallocations of resources, but it is clear that these are not large amounts.

Our results suggest, however, that there may have been some savings for the County if the expenditures after 2007 are compared to what they might have been in the absence of the policy. No one can be certain about population trends that might have occurred without the policy, but we do attribute the leveling off of ESOL enrollments in the County's schools to the introduction of the policy. The number of ESOL students remained high after 2007 and Federal law mandates that this program be funded to meet the need for it. But it is quite possible that, in the absence of the immigration policy, ESOL enrollments would have continued to climb along with their associated costs.

### **12.6 Maintaining the Prince William County Police Department's reputation for professionalism, and maintain community confidence and trust in police.**

The data from our annual community surveys reveal that the introduction of the policy in 2007-2008 seriously disrupted police-community relations in the County, at least temporarily. When the policy was introduced and implemented, new and substantial gaps in satisfaction emerged between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in overall satisfaction with the police, satisfaction with the attitudes and behavior of officers, satisfaction with police fairness, and satisfaction with police efforts to enforce the immigration policy itself. As has been noted, the Police Department invested substantial effort in explaining the new policy and attempting to reassure members of the Hispanic community. It is likely that the damage to community relations would have been considerably greater, and more permanent, without these efforts. However, they were not sufficient to prevent a palpable chill to fall over police-community relations in 2008, as seen not only in our survey results but in the

everyday experiences of police officers, reported to us in the 2008 focus groups and in some of the responses to our surveys of officers.

The good news is that the chilly relations with Hispanics warmed fairly rapidly, resulting in much more positive reports from officers in our 2009 focus groups and our 2009 interviews with key informants. These perceptions were confirmed in our 2009 Citizen Survey, which showed substantial reduction in the satisfaction gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanics. By 2010, Hispanic satisfaction with the overall performance of police equaled the satisfaction of non-Hispanics. On more specific questions about police attitudes and behaviors and about police fairness, a significant ethnic gap in satisfaction remained, but the gap regarding police attitudes had narrowed considerably from what was seen in 2008. While residents in general were quite satisfied with police efforts to enforce the immigration policy, Hispanic residents were much less satisfied in 2008, rose in their satisfaction in 2009, and then went down again in 2010.

Through further analysis of the survey data and our in-depth interviews with some community residents, we found that the group that is most dissatisfied with the immigration policy is those Hispanics who do not speak English well. These County residents are far less satisfied than English-speaking Hispanics with particular aspects of police performance that are related to the immigration issue. We interpret the survey results to indicate that this group is particularly vulnerable to the changes in the opinion climate on the immigration issue, as portrayed in the mass media. Fortunately, these opinions do not seem to diffuse into a more general dissatisfaction with the police, whose efforts to combat drugs and gangs are fully appreciated by Hispanics, including non-English speakers. Again, overall satisfaction with the police was fully restored among Hispanics by 2010, erasing the gap on the general police satisfaction question (but not on some more immigration-relevant police items).

Our qualitative interviews also reveal that many residents, especially Hispanics and even more so the less acculturated Hispanics, do not understand the current immigration policy. Further and continuing effort will be required to get correct information out to the Hispanic community and to fully restore their confidence in the Prince William County police to the levels maintained before 2007.

### **12.7 Maintaining County's reputation as an inclusive community, both internally (among its current residents) and externally (among people outside the County).**

The County's adoption of its immigration policy in 2007 and its implementation in 2008 had a strong, immediate impact on the way Hispanic residents perceived their life in the County, their desire to continue to live in the County, and their trust in the County government. On several of these indicators, Hispanics had been more positive than non-Hispanics prior to 2006. In each of these, dramatic and unprecedented ethnic gaps emerged in 2008 that separate the views of Hispanics from those of non-Hispanics, whose views of the County were generally unaffected by the immigration controversy. (The trust of African-Americans in local government was also disrupted by the change.) In the two years that followed, these ethnic gaps were largely repaired, disappearing entirely for quality of life ratings and the desire to continue living in the County. The ethnic gap in government trust lingers on in 2010, but is not as wide as in 2008.

We have no direct opinion data on how Hispanics outside Prince William view the County, but data on Hispanic population trends in the metropolitan region as well as mortgage data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act show that Hispanics are avoiding Prince William County in favor of moving to other parts of the region. After 2006 the Hispanic population growth of Prince William

leveled off, while the number of Hispanics continued to increase apace in the balance of the metropolitan area. In Prince William, the percentage of home mortgage applications from Hispanics fell sharply in 2007. The negative coverage of the immigration policy that was prominent in the regional press, and especially in Spanish-language media, was probably not helpful to the County in maintaining a reputation across the metropolitan region as a welcoming place for Hispanics.

Thus, the County did not initially succeed in its goal of implementing the immigration enforcement policy without damaging its reputation as an inclusive community. For Hispanic residents within the County, ratings of quality of life and desire to continue living in the County rose sufficiently by 2010 to match the sentiments of non-Hispanic residents. Thus, the County had by 2010 achieved a measure of success in restoring its internal reputation as a welcoming place for Hispanics—that is, its reputation among Hispanics who live in Prince William. However, the data on Hispanic growth outside Prince William—and the relative lack of Hispanic growth within Prince William—suggest that there is much work to do if more Hispanics outside the County are to be convinced that they will be welcome in Prince William.

## **12.8 Did serious unintended consequences emerge?**

In section 3 above, we noted that during the debate over the policy, a number of concerns emerged about possible negative consequences that might ensue if the policy were adopted. Our evaluation has been attentive to each of these concerns.

One concern was that if the policy were put into place that it might facilitate overzealous or inappropriate enforcement actions by police. This concern about police officers “going rogue” was especially relevant to the original policy, which required a check on immigration status if an officer had reasonable suspicion that a person was in the United States illegally. That policy made the immigration check mandatory under circumstances of reasonable suspicion, but officer discretion remains on whom they choose to stop and whom they choose to ignore when a minor offence is observed. In our in-depth interviews and in the comments of respondents in our community surveys, we heard two or three people say that they—or people they knew—had been stopped by the police (or stopped several times) for small traffic offenses, and they were concerned that this was because they appeared to Hispanic. However, there was no such pattern of police behavior that came to the attention of the police department. And when we analyzed the Police Department’s calls for service records, we could detect no upward spike in traffic stops during the time (from March to April 2008) when the original policy was in effect. We have no way of knowing that frivolous police stops never occurred, but we can say with assurance that no detectable pattern of over-enthused immigration enforcement developed among the County’s police officers, and we heard nothing from any quarter about any “rogue cops” abusing their discretion on this issue.

A related concern was that the introduction of the policy would generate a flood of costly litigation against the Police Department and the County government. Again, this concern was more relevant to the original policy than to the amended policy, which was designed to reduce the Department’s vulnerability to allegations of racial profiling. When the initial resolution was first passed, a class action lawsuit was filed against the County seeking to have the law overturned. The suit was thrown out of court. In 2010 a suit was filed, alleging improper use of force by officers who made an arrest at a party, and also raising the possibility that racial profiling was involved in that arrest situation. These allegations were dismissed by the court. Thus, there has been litigation against the County, but hardly the costly flood of lawsuits that some had feared. Again, we note that the amended policy, in effect since July 2008, mandates immigration checks for all arrested persons and does not seem likely to create situations that would potentially involve, or appear to involve, racial profiling.

Another concern that was voiced when the policy was debated was that it would overburden the Police Department to the point of reducing its effectiveness. For example, some worried that police officers would be tied up in lengthy inquiries about immigration status, or that their need for assistance in such inquiries would make impossible demands on the time of their supervisors. We did not hear reports of such problems during the brief time when the original policy was in effect. The current policy shifts the timing of most immigration inquiries from the time of initial detention to the time after arrest. Post-arrest processing already takes an arresting officer off the street for many minutes or even for hours, and the added duty of checking the immigration status of some arrestees has not proven to be an onerous addition to the processing steps already required. There is certainly an additional burden of time on officers from having to perform this new function for every arrest, but there is no indication that departmental effectiveness suffered as a result.

Another possible negative consequence was that the policy might generate administrative costs far greater than anticipated at the time of adoption. Keep in mind that substantial additional training, equipment, community outreach and administrative costs (totaling more than four million dollars) were anticipated and provided for when the policy was adopted, in the form of an increased budget allocation for the Police Department, based on an estimate of expected costs from the Chief of Police. Our report has documented that there were substantial demands on the time of senior staff because of the policy, as well as additional daily demands on patrol officers and their supervisors. These are real costs that will continue to affect the operating and management costs of the PWCPD, and they should be taken into account in future budgets for the department. It does not appear, however, that these costs have proven to be greatly different from the initial estimates by the department.

Another concern about the policy was that it would create fear and a sense of being unwelcome among immigrants in general, and that it might cause *legal* immigrants, or Hispanics generally, to leave the county. Because it was one of the County's goals to maintain its reputation as an inclusive place for all, including Hispanic residents, we have dealt extensively with these issues in our evaluation of the policy's goals above. We have concluded that substantial numbers of *illegal* immigrants did leave the County, and it reasonable to suppose that some *legal* immigrants also chose to leave. In fact, a few such departures were described to us by our community informants. On the other hand, the fact that the size of the Hispanic community remained stable as the illegal immigrants departed, and the age structure of the Hispanic community changed significantly after the policy was introduced, both suggest that more acculturated Hispanics remained and/or took the place of the illegal immigrants (and legal immigrants) who did choose to leave.

Finally, a major concern for the police and others was that the introduction of the policy would result in lower crime reporting from the Hispanic community, or even increase their victimization. Some police officers think that reporting has been inhibited, but many others do not. In interpreting the County's changing crime statistics, we have kept in mind that crime reporting by Hispanics may have been lowered. Our community survey shows no changes in the rate of crime victimization of Hispanics between 2008 and 2010, and the surveys also suggest (based on small sample sizes) that Hispanics who were crime victims were about as likely as non-Hispanics to report the crime to the police. On the other hand, respondents in our in-depth interviews were virtually unanimous in saying that a hypothetical crime victim or crime witness who did not speak English well and was not at U.S. citizen would probably not report the crime to the police. Our overall judgment on this issue is that illegal immigrants are less likely than others to seek contact with the police, but this was surely also the case before the policy was put into effect. While the policy may have made this problem worse, or increased the reluctance of some legally present Hispanics to report, we do not believe this effect is big enough to explain away entirely the reductions we have seen in some types of crime.



We would also expect the under-reporting problem to have become less acute as the attitudes of Hispanics toward the police and the County government returned to their pre-policy levels after hitting their low point in 2008. With all that said, the Police Department should certainly continue efforts to encourage reporting and to spread the word to everyone in the Hispanic community that PWC police will not inquire about the immigration status of persons who come forward as witnesses or call to report a crime.

## **12.9 Implementation obstacles**

Our evaluation was attentive to possible implementation obstacles that might have prevented the policy from achieving its goals. Primary among the possible obstacles were issues of system capacity. We wondered if ICE, the Federal agency responsible for processing illegal aliens who are turned over to their custody, would be able to handle the increased workload. Although there were some problems with ICE's responsiveness and capacity in the early months of the policy's implementation, these issues were ironed out and cooperation between PWCPD, the ADC, and ICE has been good. Would the local jail be able to hold the new detainees? In the early months, when the new flow of immigration detainees began and the ADC was still in its old quarters, many detainees had to be sent to detention facilities outside the County. When the ADC moved into its expanded facilities, however, the number of "farm-outs" was decreased. At no time was the activity of the police department on immigration checks curtailed because of capacity problems at the jail. Would there be money to pay for placement of detainees in outside facilities? Because the illegal immigrants were being detained on federal matters, the cost of their detention was picked up by the federal government, so this was not a cost to the County or to the regional jail. Would supervisors in the Police Department be overburdened with supervisory duties in connection with the actions of line officers in processing inquiries into the immigration status of persons encountered in the field? No issues of this kind were mentioned in our interviews, focus groups, or observations of the police.

We also wondered about a different kind of obstacle: the cooperation and capacity of line employees. Would patrol officers understand the legal complexities of the original policy and then its amendment, and would they cooperate fully in carrying out their new duties and the new documentation requirements accompanying the policy's implementation? For the most part, this was not a problem at all. Officers felt well trained on the policy and seemed to have little difficulty with the new procedures. In 2009, however, it became clear that some officers were not consistently completing the "field interview cards" that are used to report on encounters with illegal immigrants. After intervention by the management team, the backlog of missing reports was cleared and officers understood the need for completing them. This was a minor glitch in what was, overall, a smooth implementation that was never greatly hampered by the obstacles some had been concerned about.

## **12.10 Some implications and open questions**

Our nation has been embroiled for the last several years in an active, highly partisan, often acrimonious debate over what should be done about the problem of illegal immigration. It is inevitable that this assessment of Prince William County's experience with its illegal immigration enforcement experiment will attract interest from both those who favor stronger action against illegal immigration and those who oppose it. We have concluded that the Prince William immigration policy was smoothly implemented by the Prince William County Police Department and County staff; that the policy had wide-ranging effects, some of which were those intended; and that it also fell short of achieving some of its goals. Since the outcomes of the policy are somewhat mixed, there will be plenty of facts for each side to pick from as they seek support for their arguments about future policies.

Some have argued that local governments are powerless to have an effect on illegal immigration. The reasoning is that the pace and patterns of illegal immigration to the U.S. are governed by the laws, policies, and enforcement practices of the federal government on the one hand, and by large-scale and impersonal economic forces on the other. We have a long and still porous Southern border, and we have had continued strong demand for the types of work that illegal immigrants will do but many natives disdain to do. As long as these conditions hold, the reasoning goes, we must accept that illegal immigrants will be with us. One conclusion is unavoidable from the Prince William experience: this line of reasoning is incomplete. It is quite clear that the decision in Prince William to introduce a more restrictive enforcement policy at the local level had a strong and lasting effect on who chose to live in the County, causing a decrease in the number of illegal residents and significant changes in the composition of the County's Hispanic population, as well as other effects.

On April 23, 2010, the state of Arizona passed a highly restrictive law (SB1070), aimed at curtailing illegal immigration. A court injunction prevented the most controversial sections of the law from taking effect, and the Federal government intervened with a lawsuit seeking to have the law overturned. It is perhaps inevitable that people will try to compare the Arizona law to the policy in Prince William County. But the current policy in the County is quite different from what has been proposed in Arizona. The Arizona law, with its mandate for immigration checks whenever an officer has probable cause to think a person is illegal, bears a somewhat closer resemblance to the original policy in Prince William, which was in effect for only two months before being substantially amended so that it only mandated immigration checks upon arrest. We doubt that implementation in Prince William would have been so smooth and free of litigation, nor that the confidence of Hispanic residents in the police would have been restored, if the original policy had remained in place. By altering the policy, Prince William County eased many of the fears surrounding passage and implementation of the original law.

While it is important to emphasize that the policy Prince William implemented in July 2008 only mandates immigration checks at the time of arrest and does NOT include a mandate for checks under reasonable suspicion, it is nonetheless true that the original policy did include the latter mandate. The outcry, protests and criticism from opponents of the policy after July 2007 (and until March 2008) were a response to that highly controversial form of the policy. As we have seen, many of the changes that resulted from the policy's introduction (such as the departure of illegal immigrants from overcrowded houses and the reduction in aggravated assaults) date from that precise period. In general, the changes we have observed in the County do not have a pattern of gradual change that could be attributed to the slow, monthly accrual of arrests and detention of illegal immigrants. Rather, they came fairly suddenly as the newspapers, airwaves and the blogosphere were filled with strident calls for action on the immigration issue along with equally strident warnings of the bad consequences that would result for Hispanics because of possible racial profiling. The irony here is that it may have been the fear inspired by the original proposal that caused the current policy to have some of its effects.

To put this point another way: imagine for a moment that the Prince William County Police Department had quietly secured Board approval to implement the current policy, and, without much comment from the media or citizens groups, had simply started doing immigration checks on all arrested persons. Assume that this would have netted the same monthly number of arrests and detentions of illegal immigrants as actually occurred after July 2008, when the current policy was actually implemented. It is highly doubtful that such actions would have had the large effects that we actually observed in Prince William. It was probably fear that drove illegal immigrants out, and exaggerated fear that may have also driven some legal immigrants to leave, and others to decide not to move to Prince William. It is not clear that the policy would have been as consequential if the

discussion about its adoption had not been so public, acrimonious, and (for Hispanics, some members of other minority groups, and their supporters) fear-inspiring.

The great question that hangs over all our analysis is: What were the effects of the economic downturn, housing collapse, and mortgage crisis that all happened at about the same time as the policy was introduced? We have tried to give careful attention to these economic factors as we have assessed each of the policy's goals, and we are confident that many of the changes we observed are partly attributable to the economic changes. We have also identified a number of changes, such as the departures of illegal immigrants from the County and the decrease in aggravated assaults, which we judge to have been caused in part by the policy itself. That is, we are sure that economics alone cannot explain all the changes we have identified following the introduction of the policy.

But this leaves open a different question: would the policy have had these effects if the economic factors had been absent? Imagine for a moment that the housing and construction boom had continued unabated through 2010. It is possible that the continued enticements of ready employment and attainable housing in Prince William would have offset any perceived disadvantages from the new police policy and that few illegal immigrants would have changed their choice of where to live. We do not have an answer for this question, and we can only caution that effects that were seen in Prince William from its introduction of the immigration policy might not occur in some other locality if the economic conditions there are less perilous at the time a similar policy is put into effect.

We have mentioned in several places the professionalism and strong leadership that existed in the Prince William County Police Department. These institutional strengths obviously contributed to the relatively smooth implementation of the immigration policy, despite its novelty, difficulty, and controversial nature. We caution that not all local police departments in our nation have these capabilities. In the hands of a less professional and less well-resourced police department, it is not clear that a policy of this kind would have had the same results. Those who would consider implementing a similar policy elsewhere should be clear on the policy's costs and what it took to implement it competently.

As the federal government continues to experience legislative paralysis on the issue of comprehensive immigration reform, it is very likely that some state and local governments will continue to experiment with various approaches to lessening the negative impacts they may perceive from illegal immigration. Other states and localities will continue to stress the benefits of having immigrants in their midst, and will strive to protect immigrants from any inquiries into their legal status. While some argue that immigration should remain entirely a federal matter, meaning that only the national government should deal with it, the reality of a truly federal system is that governmental powers are distributed across different levels and that policy variation and experimentation across states and localities can be beneficial learning experiences as the nation struggles to find the best solutions to its problems. We have no doubt that the case of Prince William County will be instructive to all those who play a role in creating and implementing America's immigration policies, whether at the federal, state, or local levels. We close with a gentle admonition that the lessons from Prince William's experience should be applied with great caution to other places in other times.

*The views and interpretations in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Prince William County's elected leaders, the County's Executive Management, the Police Department, or any other unit of County government.*

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# Evaluation Study of Prince William County Police Illegal Immigration Enforcement Policy

## REPORT APPENDICES



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### Prepared for:

***PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT***  
Prince William County, Virginia  
November 2010



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Appendix A:  
**Resolutions and General Orders**



<b>PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL OF GENERAL ORDERS</b>		
<b>General Order: 45.01</b>	<b>Effective: 03/03/2008</b>	<b>Number of Pages: 4</b>
<b>LOCAL ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION : GENERAL GUIDELINES</b>		

- A. The purpose of this General Order is to establish a policy for the local participation of the enforcement of immigration laws. It is not intended to limit the Police Department's authority under the United States or Virginia Constitutions or under any other laws.
- B. Although immigration enforcement is vested in the Federal government, local law enforcement has an increasing role in identifying, investigating, and apprehending persons who may be in violation of federal immigration law, particularly those who commit other violations of law. Preliminary investigations shall encompass all who, through the normal course of business, are lawfully detained within the guidance provided by this General Order and the law. The primary focus of police investigative efforts will be those who may be in violation of federal immigration law who are criminal aliens, as defined in Section F.
- C. An officer may inquire into immigration status prior to the establishment of probable cause if he has reasonable articulable suspicion as part of initial identification inquiry to acquire an understanding of the facts which may lead to the discovery of additional facts that would lawfully support an extension of the initial detention for further investigation into immigration matters. However, if there is probable cause to believe a person is in violation of federal immigration law and when such inquiry will not unlawfully expand the duration of the detention, it is the policy of this Department that officers *shall* investigate the citizenship or immigration status of a person who is lawfully detained for a violation of a state law or county ordinance by following the procedures set out in this General Order. As previously stated, this General Order is not intended to limit the Police Department's authority under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
- D. Racial profiling, the practice of stopping, detaining, or searching a person based solely on factors such as their race, color, or ethnicity, is prohibited and in fact, illegal. Race, color, ethnicity, or other non-criminal traits are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify stopping, detaining, or searching a person (see General Order 2.01, C- 56).
- E. Public Safety is enhanced when victims file police incident reports. Therefore, victims and essential witnesses will not be subject to immigration inquiries as a matter of routine.
- F. Description of Frequently Used Terms;
1. **Alien** – A person who is not a citizen of the United States.
  2. **Alien Absconders** - A fugitive remaining in the United States after an immigration judge has ordered them deported.
  3. **Criminal Alien** – Aliens who have committed crimes that make them eligible to be

removed from the United States.

4. **Foreign National** – A person who is not a permanent United States resident.
5. **Illegal Alien** - A person who has entered the country illegally and is deportable or is residing in the United States illegally after entering legally (for example, using a tourist visa and remaining after the visa expires).
6. **Undocumented Immigrant** – Any person of another country who has entered

or remained in the United States without permission and without legal status.

7. **ICE** - U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
8. **LESC** - the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center.
9. **National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Wanted Status (Hits)** – At this time there are two types of Hits:
  - a) **“OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANT OF REMOVAL”** – This NCIC hit pertains to an ICE Federal *civil process*. This language in NCIC means that the individual has been ordered to leave the Country but has not complied with the order.
  - b) **“PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED FELON”** – A type of NCIC Hit that pertains to an ICE Federal Criminal Felony.
10. **Permanent Resident Alien** – Any person who is residing in the United States as a legally recognized and lawfully recorded permanent resident.
11. **Legal presence** - A person who is legally present is either a U.S. citizen or is legally authorized to be in the United States. Legal presence can be proved using a U.S. birth certificate or U.S. passport. It also can be proved using a variety of other government issued documents such as a Certificate of Citizenship or Naturalization, Resident Alien Card or a valid foreign passport with a visa, I-94 or an I-94W with a participating country. Documents presented as proof of legal presence must show the full legal name and date of birth. Virginia's legal presence law took effect on January 1, 2004. A list of accepted documents under that law is available at:

<http://www.dmv.state.va.us/webdoc/pdf/dmv141.pdf>.

12. **Probable Cause** – The legal standard of probable cause, as the term suggests, relates to probabilities that are based upon the factual and practical considerations in everyday life as perceived by reasonable and prudent persons. The presence or absence of probable cause is not to be examined from the perspective of a legal technician. Rather, probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. *Draper v. United States*, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959); *Schaum v. Commonwealth*,



215 Va. 498, 500, 211 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1975). In order to ascertain whether probable cause exists, courts will focus upon “what the totality of the circumstances meant to police officers [Page 821] trained in analyzing the observed conduct for purposes of crime control.” *Hollis v. Commonwealth*, 216 Va. 874, 877, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976). *Taylor v. Commonwealth*, 222 Va. 816, 820-821, 284 S.E.2d 833 (1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 906 (1982)

“An apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry, (that is, such inquiry as the given case renders convenient and proper,) which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe, in a criminal case, that the accused person had committed the crime charged, or in a civil case that a cause of action existed.” (Black’s Law Dictionary)

#### G. Verification of Legal Presence

For purposes of this policy, the Department shall be guided by §46.2-328.1 *Code of Virginia* in determining what forms of identification are sufficient to establish legal presence.

Generally, a **valid Virginia** Driver’s License or Special Identification card (Adult ID card, Child ID card, or Hearing Impaired Photo ID Card – commonly referred to as a “Walker’s ID”), with an **ORIGINAL issued date of January 1, 2004 or later**, shall serve as proof of legal presence, as noted in § 46.2-328.1 *Code of Virginia* (Virginia’s legal presence law took effect on January 1, 2004).

Legal presence may be determined by checking nationwide databases maintained by ICE or by contacting the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC).

#### H. Legal Authority for Enforcement of Immigration Laws (see General Order 45.02).

Warrants and detainers issued by ICE may be criminal or civil. Whether ICE is proceeding criminally or civilly against the subject controls the response of local law enforcement.

POLICE **MAY ARREST** under any of the following conditions:

- 1) The requirements of §19.2-81.6 *Code of Virginia* are satisfied.

§19.2-81.6 *Code of Virginia* - All law-enforcement officers enumerated in § 19.2-81 shall have the authority to enforce immigration laws of the United States, pursuant to the provisions of this section. Any law-enforcement officer enumerated in § 19.2-81 may, in the course of acting upon reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or is committing a crime, arrest the individual without a warrant upon receiving confirmation from the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement of the United States Department of Homeland Security that the individual (i) is an alien illegally present in the United States, and (ii) has previously been convicted of

*a felony in the United States and deported or left the United States after such conviction. Upon receiving such confirmation, the officer shall take the individual forthwith before a magistrate or other issuing authority and proceed pursuant to § 19.2-82.*

- 2) An NCIC **Immigration Violator File (IVF)** hit reads **“PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED FELON,”** a hit confirmation is received, **AND** a Criminal Immigration Detainer from ICE is received and/or issued.
- 3) An NCIC IVF hit reads **“OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANT OF REMOVAL”** (such NCIC warrants are considered civil in nature), **AND** the officer has charged a person for a separate Class 1 or Class 2 misdemeanor or a traffic infraction, for which the law requires the person be released on a summons in accordance with §19.2-74 *Code of Virginia* or §46.2-940 *Code of Virginia*, the NCIC IVF hit, absent extenuating circumstances, shall be considered as a strong factor to proceed under §19.2-82 *Code of Virginia* (Arrest without warrant), in determining whether the person is likely to disregard the summons. *NOTE; When there is probable cause to believe someone is an illegal alien but NO NCIC IVF Hit is received/returned on the person, the law is unclear as to whether the absence of such a hit is to be considered a factor in determining whether the person should be brought before the magistrate on the local charge. In such cases where there is no NCIC IVF Hit, officers shall make a determination based on all available information as to whether the person is likely to disregard the summons and shall act accordingly.*

POLICE **MAY NOT ARREST** under the following conditions:

1. Solely because a person is an illegal alien. This is because the Police Department has no legal authority to independently enforce Federal Immigration Law. When probable cause exists to believe a person may be an illegal alien a Field Interview Card shall be completed whenever possible and forwarded to the Crime Analysis Unit. The Crime Analysis Unit shall in turn forward the information to the ICE LESC.
2. Solely based upon an NCIC IVF hit which reads **“OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANT OF REMOVAL.”** These are considered civil in nature. Officers have no authority to arrest based solely on **CIVIL** administrative warrants or detainers for immigration issues. A Field Interview Card shall be completed whenever possible and forwarded to the Crime Analysis Unit. The Crime Analysis Unit shall in turn forward the information to the ICE LESC.

<b>PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL OF GENERAL ORDERS</b>		
<b>General Order: 45.02</b>	<b>Effective: 03/03/2008</b>	<b>Number of Pages: 4</b>
<b>LOCAL ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: MEMBER RESPONSIBILITIES</b>		

4/30/08

Effective immediately, General Order 45 requirements regarding pre-arrest immigration inquiries are hereby suspended by authority of the Chief of Police.

A. Officer Response:

1. Officers *shall* investigate the citizenship or immigration status of any person who, in the normal course of business, is lawfully detained for a violation of a state law or county ordinance, if (1) probable cause exists to believe such person is in violation of federal immigration laws; (2) the inquiry has not already occurred in the encounter, and (3) the inquiry will not unlawfully expand the duration of the detention. There may be circumstances under which the Fourth Amendment authorizes an earlier inquiry and officers may use their discretion in accordance with training to investigate immigration status at an earlier stage.

Officers must remain cognizant at all times of the legal justification to continue detention of a person. The permissible length of a lawful detention in every instance depends on all circumstances.

Officers are reminded there is no law compelling a person to identify himself or herself to a law enforcement officer in all instances. However, presenting false identification to a law enforcement officer is a violation of State law under §19.2-82.1 *Code of Virginia*.

2. If the officer has probable cause to believe the detained person is in violation of federal immigration law and the person does not produce any of the documents outlined below to prove legal presence, the officer *shall* inquire as to the legal presence of the person by checking nationwide databases maintained by the **U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)** or by contacting the **ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC)**. Officers shall conduct a **Query Wanted (QW)** through NCIC. This QW automatically searches the **Immigration Violator File (IVF)** contained in NCIC. ICE is the only agency authorized to enter and maintain records in the IVF.

3. Generally, a person may prove legal presence by producing a **valid Virginia** Operator's License or Special Identification Card (Adult ID card, Child ID card, or Hearing Impaired Photo ID Card – commonly referred to as a "Walker's ID"), with an **ORIGINAL** issued date of January 1, 2004 or later, as noted in § 46.2-328.1 *Code of Virginia* (Virginia's legal presence law took effect on January 1, 2004). A birth certificate from any U.S. State or Territory, or any of the documents identified by the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles,

as referenced in General Order 45.01, F-11, will also serve as proof of legal presence. If a person produces a document that establishes legal presence, members will not routinely inquire further about the person's legal presence.

4. Whenever an officer runs a wanted check on an individual through NCIC, the IVF database is automatically checked and a "hit" may be received. It has long been the policy of the Department to serve criminal warrants originating from NCIC wanted queries. Similar to other law enforcement agencies, criminal warrants obtained by ICE agents are entered into the NCIC wanted persons' file. However, ICE hits for deported felons and alien absconders are based on administrative warrants and are entered in the NCIC IVF file.

NCIC entries contain both civil and criminal immigration violations. Officers should be careful to determine the nature of the underlying offense resulting in the NCIC entry. An entry into NCIC does not guarantee the officer has actual authority to take the person into custody.

5. Officers who receive an NCIC "hit" on an Immigration Violator File shall carefully read the IVF hit received through NCIC. There are only two (2) possible responses that will appear. Several lines from the top of the response will be the words **"PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED FELON"** or **"OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANT OF REMOVAL."**

- a. **"PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED FELON"**

- i. The officer shall request a hit confirmation and Criminal Immigration Detainer, as outlined below in B-3.
- ii. If a hit confirmation and a Criminal Immigration Detainer from ICE is received and/or issued, absent other charges which require the subject be taken before the magistrate, the suspect will be brought forthwith to the Adult Detention Center (ADC) which has established policies in place with ICE. An Incident Report titled "Criminal Immigration Arrest" shall be completed.
- iii. If the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe a person has committed or is committing a crime, absent probable cause to arrest for that crime, if a hit confirmation is received from ICE, the officer shall take the individual forthwith before a magistrate and obtain an arrest warrant for a violation of § 19.2-81.6 *Code of Virginia*. Recurrent applications for a warrant under this subsection are not permitted within a six-month period, as enumerated in § 19.2-82 *Code of Virginia*.

If reasonable suspicion does not exist that the arrested person has committed or is committing a separate offense, officers may act solely on the confirmation and detainer issued by the LESC for a "Previously Deported Felon" and the arrested person shall be transported to the ADC as outlined in section ii above.

.iv. The Police Department's Criminal Alien Unit is comprised of detectives who are specially trained in ICE's 287(g) program. In certain cases these detectives may be requested to respond and further investigate the matter, if circumstances warrant.

.v. Absent independent lawful authority to detain, such as other charges that justify detention or physical arrest, if an NCIC hit is made and confirmation of a Criminal Immigration Detainer is **not** received or issued within a reasonable period of time, the person must be released. Officers will document the

detained person's identification information on a Field Interview Card and forward it to the Crime Analysis Unit.

vi. If the suspect is remanded to the ADC for another offense, the illegal immigration status shall be relayed to ADC booking personnel, which has established policies and practices in place to coordinate with ICE.

**b. "OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANT OF REMOVAL"**

- i. The majority of these ICE warrants represents civil administrative procedures and this hit typically refers to persons who have failed to appear for a hearing or failed to leave the United States after having been ordered to do so.
- ii. Officers shall **not** confirm and shall not request automatic issuance of a detaining order from the database because such detaining order will be invalid on this type of IVF hit and shall **not** take the individual into custody, unless such person is lawfully detained for another violation of the law. Officers will document the detained person's identification information on a Field Interview Card and forward it to the Crime Analysis Unit. The subject must be released.
- iii. While officers may not automatically arrest a person based solely on this hit, officers shall, absent extenuating circumstances, consider this type of NCIC IVF hit as a strong factor in deciding whether or not to release on a summons for a separate violation of the law. This section only applies when an individual is being arrested for another offense for which the law indicates the person be released on a summons unless certain factors are present.

Officers may proceed under §19.2-82 *Code of Virginia* (Arrest without warrant), **only** if the provisions of §19.2-74 *Code of Virginia* or §46.2-940 *Code of Virginia*, are satisfied and the NCIC IVF hit is confirmed.

If the officer takes the suspect before a magistrate, the officer shall request a

copy of the hit confirmation. A copy of the NCIC IVF Hit confirmation shall be presented to the magistrate. The illegal immigration status shall be relayed to ADC booking personnel, which has established policies and practices in place with ICE. If the Magistrate orders the suspect to be released officers shall document the suspect's identification information on a Field Interview Card and forward it to the Crime Analysis Unit.

- c. NCIC hits are factors which may provide legal justification to continue detention of a person. The permissible length of a lawful detention in every instance depends on all circumstances.

6. Any time probable cause exists to believe a person is in violation of federal immigration laws, a Field Interview Card shall be completed with as much information as possible and forwarded to the Crime Analysis Unit who in turn shall forward the information to the ICE LESC. However, whenever a police offense report (PD 211) is written either for a “Criminal Immigration Arrest” or for any other offense, if there is probable cause to believe a subject identified in the police report is in violation of federal immigration laws, in lieu of completing the entire Field Interview Card, the officer need only complete the back of the Field Interview Card pertaining to illegal immigration and attach the Field Interview Card to the submitted PD 211 as a supplement.
7. Officers shall cooperate with federal immigration authorities and provide or receive information about the immigration status of any person as permitted or required by law.

B. Office of Public Safety Communications (OPSC) Response:

1. When a QW (Query Wanted) transaction is conducted through NCIC, the Immigration Violator File (IVF) is automatically searched for records on criminal illegal aliens who have been deported for serious crimes. It also contains records of civil immigration violations or persons who have violated some section of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
2. OPSC shall, as requested, perform initial inquiries between the Department and the ICE LESC. Upon request, OPSC will perform an IAQ (Illegal Alien Query) through NLETS.
3. OPSC will assist members in the confirmation of criminal alien arrest warrants, in accordance with General Order 26.01, E (NCIC Hits). Once the identity of the person and the warrant or detainer is confirmed, the ICE LESC will be contacted for acceptance of a criminal hold on the suspect.
4. Requests for confirmation of active Prince William County warrants shall follow established policy, regardless of immigration status. Any suspected illegal immigration status shall be relayed to the arresting officer.
5. Citizens wishing to make a routine complaint of the illegal immigration status of an individual will be referred to the ICE public tip line. The Police Department will not routinely document or follow-up on such information.

C. Prince William County Criminal Justice Academy (Academy) Responsibility:

1. The Academy’s role with regard to this General Order is to provide training to members in the Department’s Enforcement of Immigration Laws policy.
2. New recruits will receive initial training as a component of local training.
3. All sworn members will receive mandatory initial training. In-service training will be provided to members as deemed necessary.

<b>PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL OF GENERAL ORDERS</b>		
<b>General Order: 45.01</b>	<b>Effective: 04/01/2009</b>	<b>Number of Pages: 4</b>
<b>LOCAL ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION : GENERAL GUIDELINES</b>		

- A. The purpose of this General Order is to establish a policy for the local participation of the enforcement of immigration laws. It is not intended to limit the Police Department's authority under the United States or Virginia Constitutions or under any other laws.
  
- B. Although immigration enforcement is vested in the Federal government, local law enforcement has an increasing role in identifying, investigating, and apprehending persons who may be in violation of federal immigration law, particularly those who commit other violations of law. Within the guidance provided by this General Order and the law, immigration inquiries shall encompass all who, through the normal course of business, are arrested for a violation of state or county ordinance where a physical custodial arrest is conducted. The primary focus of police investigative efforts will be those who may be in violation of federal immigration law who are illegal aliens who commit crimes as defined in Section F.
  
- C. An officer may inquire into immigration status prior to a physical custodial arrest if he has reasonable articulable suspicion as part of initial identification inquiry to acquire an understanding of the facts which may lead to the discovery of additional facts that would lawfully support an extension of the initial detention for further investigation. However, subsequent and incident to any lawful arrest for a violation of state law or County ordinance, where a physical custodial arrest occurs, officers shall inquire into the citizenship or immigration status by following the procedures set out in this General Order. As previously stated, this General Order is not intended to limit the Police Department's authority under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
  
- D. Racial profiling, the practice of stopping, detaining, or searching a person based solely on factors such as their race, color, or ethnicity, is prohibited and in fact, illegal. Race, color, ethnicity, or other non-criminal traits are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify stopping, detaining, or searching a person (see General Order 2.01, C- 56). No person shall be subject to a physical custodial arrest in order to inquire into their citizenship or immigration status.
  
- E. Public Safety is enhanced when victims and witnesses report incidents to the police. Therefore, absent a physical custodial arrest, victims and essential witnesses will not be subject to immigration inquiries as a matter of routine.



## F. Description of Frequently Used Terms;

1. **Alien** – A person who is not a citizen of the United States.
2. **Alien Absconders** - A fugitive remaining in the United States after an immigration judge has ordered them deported.
3. **Foreign National** – A person who is not a permanent United States resident.
4. **Illegal Alien** - A person who has entered the country illegally and is deportable or is residing in the United States illegally after entering legally (for example, using a tourist visa and remaining after the visa expires).
5. **Illegal Aliens Who Commit Crimes** – Aliens who have committed crimes that make them eligible to be removed from the United States.
6. **Undocumented Immigrant** – Any person of another country who has entered or remained in the United States without permission and without legal status.
7. **ICE** - U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
8. **LESC** - the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center.
9. **National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Wanted Status (Hits)** – At this time there are two types of Hits:
  - a) **“OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANT OF REMOVAL”** – This NCIC hit pertains to an ICE Federal *civil process*. This language in NCIC means that the individual has been ordered to leave the Country but has not complied with the order.
  - b) **“PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED FELON”** – A type of NCIC Hit that pertains to an ICE Federal Criminal Felony.
10. **Permanent Resident Alien** – Any person who is residing in the United States as a legally recognized and lawfully recorded permanent resident.
11. **Legal presence** - A person who is legally present is either a U.S. citizen or is legally authorized to be in the United States. Legal presence can be proved using a U.S. birth certificate or U.S. passport. It also can be proved using a variety of other government issued documents such as a Certificate of Citizenship or Naturalization, Resident Alien Card or a valid foreign passport with a visa, I-94 or an I-94W with a participating country. Documents presented as proof of legal presence must show the full legal name and date of birth. Virginia’s legal presence law took effect on January 1, 2004. A list of accepted documents under that law is available at:

<http://www.dmv.state.va.us/webdoc/pdf/dmv141.pdf>.



## G. Verification of Legal Presence

For purposes of this policy, the Department shall be guided by §46.2-328.1 *Code of Virginia* in determining what forms of identification are sufficient to establish legal presence.

Generally, a **valid Virginia** Driver's License or Special Identification card (Adult ID card, Child ID card, or Hearing Impaired Photo ID Card – commonly referred to as a “Walker's ID”), with an **ORIGINAL issued date of January 1, 2004 or later**, shall serve as proof of legal presence, as noted in § 46.2-328.1 *Code of Virginia* (Virginia's legal presence law took effect on January 1, 2004).

Legal presence may be determined by checking nationwide databases maintained by ICE or by contacting the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC).

## H. Legal Authority for Enforcement of Immigration Laws (see General Order 45.02).

Warrants and detainers issued by ICE may be criminal or civil. Whether ICE is proceeding criminally or civilly against the subject controls the response of local law enforcement.

POLICE **MAY ARREST** under any of the following conditions:

- 1) The requirements of §19.2-81.6 *Code of Virginia* are satisfied.

*§19.2-81.6 Code of Virginia - All law-enforcement officers enumerated in § 19.2-81 shall have the authority to enforce immigration laws of the United States, pursuant to the provisions of this section. Any law-enforcement officer enumerated in § 19.2-81 may, in the course of acting upon reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or is committing a crime, arrest the individual without a warrant upon receiving confirmation from the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement of the United States Department of Homeland Security that the individual (i) is an alien illegally present in the United States, and (ii) has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States and deported or left the United States after such conviction. Upon receiving such confirmation, the officer shall take the individual forthwith before a magistrate or other issuing authority and proceed pursuant to § 19.2-82.*

- 2) An NCIC **Immigration Violator File (IVF)** hit reads “**PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED FELON**,” a hit confirmation is received, **AND** a Criminal Immigration Detainer from ICE is received and/or issued.
- 3) An NCIC IVF hit reads “**OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANT OF REMOVAL**” (such NCIC warrants are considered civil in nature), **AND** the officer has charged a person for a separate Class 1 or Class 2 misdemeanor or a traffic infraction, for which the law requires the person be released on a summons in

accordance with §19.2-74 *Code of Virginia* or §46.2-940 *Code of Virginia*, the NCIC IVF hit, absent extenuating circumstances, shall be considered as a strong factor to proceed under §19.2-82 *Code of Virginia* (Arrest without warrant), in determining whether the person is likely to disregard the summons.

POLICE **MAY NOT ARREST** under the following conditions:

1. Solely because a person is an illegal alien. This is because the Police Department has no legal authority to independently enforce Federal Immigration Law. When probable cause exists to believe a person may be an illegal alien a Field Interview Card shall be completed whenever possible and forwarded to the Crime Analysis Unit. The Crime Analysis Unit shall in turn forward the information to the ICE LESC.
2. Solely based upon an NCIC IVF hit which reads “**OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANT OF REMOVAL.**” These are considered civil in nature. Officers have no authority to arrest based solely on **CIVIL** administrative warrants or detainers for immigration issues. A Field Interview Card shall be completed whenever possible and forwarded to the Crime Analysis Unit. The Crime Analysis Unit shall in turn forward the information to the ICE LESC.

PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL OF GENERAL ORDERS		
General Order: 45.02	Effective: 04/01/2009	Number of Pages: 4
LOCAL ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: MEMBER RESPONSIBILITIES		

A. Officer Response:

1. Officers shall investigate the citizenship or immigration status of all persons who are arrested for a violation of a state law or county ordinance when such arrest results in a physical custodial arrest being conducted.
2. There may be circumstances under which the Fourth Amendment authorizes an earlier inquiry and officers may use their discretion in accordance with their experience and training to investigate immigration status at an earlier stage.

Officers must remain cognizant at all times of the legal justification to continue detention of a person. The permissible length of a lawful detention in every instance depends on all circumstances.

Officers are reminded there is no law compelling a person to identify himself or herself to a law enforcement officer in all instances. However, presenting false identification to a law enforcement officer is a violation of State law under §19.2-82.1 *Code of Virginia*.

3. If the officer has conducted a physical custodial arrest, the officer shall inquire as to the legal presence of the person. Officers **shall initially** screen **every** physical custodial arrestee by requesting the mandatory information found on the Field Interview Card. Officers shall conduct a **Query Wanted (QW)** through NCIC. This QW automatically searches the **Immigration Violator File (IVF)** contained in NCIC. The **U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)** is the only agency authorized to enter and maintain records in the IVF. The inquiry may also include checking nationwide databases maintained by ICE or by contacting the **ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC)**.
4. When the arrestee is brought before the magistrate, if the officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee is an illegal alien, that information shall be provided to the magistrate. If the arrestee is committed to the **Adult Detention Center (ADC)**, the illegal alien immigration status shall be relayed to the ADC booking personnel, which has established policies and practices in place to coordinate with ICE. In all cases, the **arresting** officer shall be responsible to convey this information to the ADC staff. If the arrestee is likely to be transported to the ADC by another officer, the arresting officer shall telephone the ADC and inform the staff of the suspected illegal immigration status of the arrestee. The arresting officer shall, in all cases, complete the Field Interview Card with the required contact notification information.
5. Generally, a person may prove legal presence by producing a valid Virginia Operator's License or Special Identification Card (Adult ID card, Child ID card, or Hearing

Impaired Photo ID Card – commonly referred to as a “Walker’s ID”), with an **ORIGINAL** issued date of January 1, 2004 or later, as noted in § 46.2-328.1 *Code of Virginia* (Virginia’s legal presence law took effect on January 1, 2004). A birth certificate from any U.S. State or Territory, or any of the documents identified by the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, as referenced in General Order 45.01, F-11, will also serve as proof of legal presence. If a person produces a document that establishes legal presence, members will not routinely inquire further about the person’s legal presence.

6. Whenever an officer runs a wanted check on an individual through NCIC, the IVF database is automatically checked and a “hit” may be received. It has long been the policy of the Department to serve criminal warrants originating from NCIC wanted queries. Similar to other law enforcement agencies, criminal warrants obtained by ICE agents are entered into the NCIC wanted persons’ file. However, ICE hits for deported felons and alien absconders are based on administrative warrants and are entered in the NCIC IVF file.

NCIC entries contain both civil and criminal immigration violations. Officers should be careful to determine the nature of the underlying offense resulting in the NCIC entry. An entry into NCIC does not guarantee the officer has actual authority to take the person into custody.

7. Officers who receive an NCIC “hit” on an Immigration Violator File shall carefully read the IVF hit received through NCIC. There are only two (2) possible responses that will appear. Several lines from the top of the response will be the words **“PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED FELON”** or **“OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANT OF REMOVAL.”**

a. **“PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED FELON”**

- i. The officer shall request a hit confirmation and Criminal Immigration Detainer, as outlined below in B-3.
- ii. If a hit confirmation **and** a Criminal Immigration Detainer from ICE is received and/or issued, absent other charges which require the subject be taken before the magistrate, the suspect will be brought forthwith to the Adult Detention Center (ADC) which has established policies in place with ICE. An Incident Report titled “Criminal Immigration Arrest” shall be completed.
- iii. If the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe a person has committed or is committing a crime, absent probable cause to arrest for that crime, if a hit confirmation is received from ICE, the officer shall take the individual forthwith before a magistrate and obtain an arrest warrant for a violation of § 19.2-81.6 *Code of Virginia*. Recurrent applications for a warrant under this subsection are not permitted within a six-month period, as enumerated in § 19.2-82 *Code of Virginia*.

If reasonable suspicion does not exist that the arrested person has committed or is committing a separate offense, officers may act solely on the confirmation and detainer issued by the LESC for a “Previously

Deported Felon” and the arrested person shall be transported to the ADC as outlined in section ii above.

- iv. The Police Department’s Criminal Alien Unit is comprised of detectives who are specially trained in ICE’s 287(g) program. In certain cases these detectives may be requested to respond and further investigate the matter, if circumstances warrant.
- v. Absent independent lawful authority to detain, such as other charges that justify detention or physical arrest, if an NCIC hit is made and confirmation of a Criminal Immigration Detainer is **not** received or issued within a reasonable period of time, the person must be released. Officers will document the detained person’s identification information on a Field Interview Card and forward it to the Crime Analysis Unit.

b. **“OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANT OF REMOVAL”**

- i. The majority of these ICE warrants represents civil administrative procedures and this hit typically refers to persons who have failed to appear for a hearing or failed to leave the United States after having been ordered to do so.
- ii. Officers shall **not** confirm and shall not request automatic issuance of a detaining order from the database because such detaining order will be invalid on this type of IVF hit and shall **not** take the individual into custody, unless such person is lawfully detained for another violation of the law. Officers will document the detained person’s identification information on a Field Interview Card and forward it to the Crime Analysis Unit. The subject must be released.
- iii. While officers may not automatically arrest a person based solely on this hit, officers shall, absent extenuating circumstances, consider this type of NCIC IVF hit as a strong factor in deciding whether or not to release on a summons for a separate violation of the law. This section only applies when an individual is being arrested for another offense for which the law indicates the person be released on a summons unless certain factors are present.

Officers may proceed under §19.2-82 *Code of Virginia* (Arrest without warrant), **only** if the provisions of §19.2-74 *Code of Virginia* or §46.2-940 *Code of Virginia*, are satisfied and the NCIC IVF hit is confirmed.

If the officer takes the suspect before a magistrate, the officer shall request a copy of the hit confirmation. A copy of the NCIC IVF Hit confirmation shall be presented to the magistrate. The illegal immigration status shall be relayed to ADC booking personnel, which has established policies and practices in place with ICE. If the Magistrate orders the suspect to be released officers shall document the suspect’s identification information on a Field Interview Card and forward it to the Crime Analysis Unit.

- c. **NCIC hits are factors which may provide legal justification to continue detention of a person. The permissible length of a lawful detention in every instance depends on all circumstances.**

- 8. Any time an officer has probable cause to believe a person is in violation of federal immigration law, a Field Interview Card shall be completed with as much information as possible and forwarded to the Crime Analysis Unit who in turn shall forward the information to the ICE LESC. However, whenever a police offense report (PD 211) is written either for a "Criminal Immigration Arrest" or for any other offense, if there is probable cause to believe a subject identified in the police report is in violation of federal immigration laws, in lieu of completing the entire Field Interview Card, the officer need only complete the back of the Field Interview Card pertaining to illegal immigration and attach the Field Interview Card to the submitted PD 211 as a supplement.
- 9. Officers shall cooperate with federal immigration authorities and provide or receive information about the immigration status of any person as permitted or required by law.

**B. Office of Public Safety Communications (OPSC) Response:**

- 1. When a QW (Query Wanted) transaction is conducted through NCIC, the Immigration Violator File (IVF) is automatically searched for records on criminal illegal aliens who have been deported for serious crimes. It also contains records of civil immigration violations or persons who have violated some section of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
- 2. OPSC shall, as requested, perform initial inquiries between the Department and the ICE LESC. Upon request, OPSC will perform an IAQ (Illegal Alien Query) through NLETS.
- 3. OPSC will assist members in the confirmation of criminal alien arrest warrants, in accordance with General Order 26.01, E (NCIC Hits). Once the identity of the person and the warrant or detainer is confirmed, the ICE LESC will be contacted for acceptance of a criminal hold on the suspect.
- 4. Requests for confirmation of active Prince William County warrants shall follow established policy, regardless of immigration status. Any suspected illegal immigration status shall be relayed to the arresting officer.
- 5. Citizens wishing to make a routine complaint of the illegal immigration status of an individual will be referred to the ICE public tip line. The Police Department will not routinely document or follow-up on such information.

**C. Prince William County Criminal Justice Academy (Academy) Responsibility:**

- 1. The Academy's role with regard to this General Order is to provide training to members in the Department's Enforcement of Immigration Laws policy.
- 2. New recruits will receive initial training as a component of local training.
- 3. All sworn members will receive mandatory initial training. In-service training will be provided to members as deemed necessary.

**MOTION: STIRRUP**

**July 10, 2007  
Regular Meeting  
Res. No. 07-609**

**SECOND: CADDIGAN**

**RE: IMMIGRATION - REAFFIRM COUNTY POLICY WITH RESPECT TO COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL LAW AND ISSUE DIRECTIVES INCIDENT TO SUCH REAFFIRMATION TO THE PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY STAFF**

**ACTION: APPROVED**

**WHEREAS**, the Virginia State Code, Section 15.2-1700, states that any locality may provide for the protection of its inhabitants and property and for the preservation of peace and good order therein; and

**WHEREAS**, the Virginia State Code, Section 15.2-1200 states that "Any county may adopt such measures as it deems expedient to secure and promote the health, safety and general welfare of its inhabitants which are not inconsistent with the general laws of the Commonwealth"; and

**WHEREAS**, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors believes that legal immigration has been a benefit to Prince William County and the Commonwealth of Virginia, has enriched countless communities across our nation, and is one of the very bedrock principles upon which our thriving society is built; and

**WHEREAS**, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors has determined that illegal immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness in this County and that illegal immigration may be encouraged by public agencies within the County by failing to verify immigration status as a condition of providing public services;

**NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors does hereby commend the Prince William County Police Department for rescinding General Order 26.05;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors hereby reaffirms County policy with respect to the County's compliance with federal law and does also hereby issue the following directives incident to such reaffirmation to the Prince William County Police Department and the Prince William County staff:

- A. Incident to any lawful detention for a violation of a state law or county ordinance, Prince William County Police Officers shall inquire into the citizenship or immigration status of the detained person if there is probable cause to believe such person is in violation of federal immigration law and when such inquiry will not expand the duration of the detention. During such an inquiry, where a person indicates that he or she is not a citizen of, or legally present in, the United States, the Police Department shall verify whether or not the person is lawfully present in the United States, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, Subsection 1373(c). If the person is verified to be unlawfully present in the United States, the Police Department shall cooperate with any request by federal immigration authorities to detain the alien or transfer the alien to the custody of the federal government. Pursuant to the foregoing, the Prince William County Police Department shall, consistent with applicable police practices and procedures, establish
  - i) the appropriate standards for probable cause in such cases; and,
  - ii) the methods for verification of lawful presence in the United States in such cases. The Prince William County Police Department shall report back to Board of County Supervisors within sixty (60) days to update the Board as to the implementation of this directive.
- B. The Police Department of the County shall as quickly as practicable enter into a cooperative agreement with the United States Department of Homeland Security, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, Subsection 1357 (g), to designate specific County law enforcement officers qualified to exercise the enforcement powers of federal immigration officers in the United States; and to revise the Police Department immigration policy to incorporate the Adult Detention Center training and authority; and to establish a protocol for the expedited transfer of verified illegal aliens into federal custody. The Police Department may negotiate the cooperative agreement or participate in its implementation in partnership with other state or local law enforcement agencies.
- C. Except as otherwise restricted by federal or state law, no official, personnel or agent of the County, including officer and personnel of the Police Department, may be prohibited or in any way restricted from sending, receiving, or maintaining, lawfully obtained information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual, or exchanging such information with any other federal, state or local government entity for the following purposes:



**July 10, 2007  
Regular Meeting  
Res. No. 07-609  
Page Three**

1. Determination of eligibility for any federal, state or local public benefit, service or license which is restricted, in whole or in part, to persons who are not United States Citizens or non-qualified aliens, pursuant to Virginia Code Ann. 32.1-325.03; Virginia Code Ann. 63.2 – 503.1; and United States Code Title 8, Section 1621;
  2. Verification of any claim of legal domicile within the County by a person who asserts that he or she is not a citizen, national or legal resident of the United States; where legal domicile is required by law or contract;
- D. The County Executive shall, within ninety (90) days of the passage of this directive, provide the Board with a work session that outlines the enabling authority and legal conditions under which Prince William County provides public benefits and services to local residents.

This work session will assist the Board in identifying:

- i) those local public benefits that must be provided to county residents regardless of immigration status pursuant to state or federal law;
  - ii) those local public benefits that must not be provided to county residents who are unlawfully present in the country pursuant to state or federal law;
  - iii) those local public benefits for which the county has the discretion to require legal presence for the use of those services. This work session will also identify implementation strategies for verifying legal presence for those services for which the discretion to deny services to those who are not legally present exists, as well as the staff's analysis of the relative merits of exercising that discretion for each public benefit identified.
- E. The preceding directives shall be implemented in a manner fully consistent with federal law regulating immigration and protecting the civil rights of all citizens and aliens. They shall not be construed so as to prohibit the rendering of emergency medical care or any other public benefits mandated by federal or state law or the reporting of a crime or criminal activity to any law enforcement agency.

**July 10, 2007**  
**Regular Meeting**  
**Res. No. 07-609**  
**Page Four**

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors shall send a letter to our federal delegation in Congress and the President of the United States and the Governor of Virginia, advising them of the passage of this directive and requesting that they act expeditiously to enact meaningful immigration reform, which includes securing the borders of the United States to prevent unlawful entry into the country.

**Votes:**


**Ayes:** Barg, Caddigan, Covington, Jenkins, May, Nohe, Stewart, Stirrup

**Nays:** None

**Absent from Vote:** None

**Absent from Meeting:** None

CERTIFIED COPY

  
Clerk to the Board

**MOTION: NOHE**

**SECOND: BARG**

**October 2, 2007  
Regular Meeting  
Res. No. 07-828**

**RE: IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS DERIVED FROM THE  
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION SERVICE ANALYSIS AND RESTRICT  
IDENTIFIED SERVICES**

**WHEREAS**, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors and the community have expressed concerns regarding the impact of illegal immigrants in Prince William County; and

**WHEREAS**, on July 10, 2007, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors, by Resolution No. 07-609, directed staff to return to the Board in 90 days with:

Worksession that outlines enabling authority and legal conditions under which Prince William County provides public benefits and services:

- Local benefits that must be provided regardless of status
- Local benefits that must not be provided to illegal immigrants
- Local benefits for which there is discretion and the relative merits of exercising that discretion
- In a manner fully consistent with federal law
- Shall not be construed so as to prohibit the rendering of emergency medical care or any other public benefits mandated by federal or state law
- Reporting of a crime or criminal activity to any law enforcement agency

**WHEREAS**, County staff has analyzed all agency programs and services based on the direction given by the Board and has provided a detailed report on that analysis to the Prince William Board of County Supervisors; and

**WHEREAS**, staff has categorized County programs and services into the following categories:

- Services that are already restricted by law
- Services that cannot be restricted by law
- Services that are not but should be restricted
- Services that could be restricted but with cost, service and legal impacts
- Services that should not be restricted given the impact on the community
- Services that are provided for the benefit of the community as a whole and not individuals
- Services that are provided to support staff in their provision of service to the community

**WHEREAS**, the Police Chief reported to the Prince William Board of County Supervisors on September 18, 2007 regarding the Department's efforts to ascertain legal status given probable cause and to enter into a 287(g) agreement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the resources needed to implement that agreement; and

**WHEREAS**, the Police Chief proposals include the creation of a Criminal Alien Unit and appropriate staff increases to address the new immigration-related responsibilities; and

October 2, 2007  
Regular Meeting  
Res. No. 07-828  
Page Two

**WHEREAS**, staff has identified legislative initiatives the County can pursue at the state and federal level to support Prince William County's efforts to enforce illegal immigrant enforcement;

**NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors does hereby accept the reports provided by the County Executive and the Police Chief;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors authorizes the Police Department to make General Order 45 public, in view of the community interest in the subject of illegal immigration, but in so doing neither the Board nor the Police Department waives any rights the County has to continue to assert available exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act or any other law for any other General Order;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors directs staff to pursue legislative initiatives identified in the attachment;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors directs staff to explore a 287(g) agreement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Juvenile Detention Center similar to the 287(g) agreement at the Adult Detention Center with ICE.

ATTACHMENT: Immigration – Legislative Initiatives

**Votes:**


**Ayes:** Barg, Caddigan, Covington, Jenkins, May, Nohe, Stewart, Stirrup

**Nays:** None

**Absent from Vote:** None

**Absent from Meeting:** None

CERTIFIED COPY

  
Clerk to the Board

### **Immigration – Legislative Initiatives**

The US Congress and Virginia General Assembly should grant the broadest level immunity to local governments in the enforcement of federal immigration law.

Prince William County supports full implementation of the federal REAL ID Act to ensure that driver's licenses may be counted upon to indicate the holder is legally residing in this country.

Prince William County supports creation of separate civil and criminal databases in the National Crime Information Center.

The federal government should increase the level of resources provided the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, 287(g) and other public safety programs including gang interdiction and local law enforcement, so these provide 100% reimbursement of local costs in the enforcement of immigration law.

Prince William County supports the proposed recommendations of the Virginia State Crime Commission's Illegal Immigration Task Force as these will tend to promote uniformity in the administration and enforcement of federal immigration laws by Virginia localities and lessen the burden of housing illegal immigrants in local and regional jails.

**MOTION: STIRRUP**

**October 16, 2007**

**SECOND: MAY**

**Regular Meeting**

**Res. No. 07-894**

**RE: IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS DERIVED FROM THE  
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION SERVICE ANALYSIS AND RESTRICT  
IDENTIFIED SERVICES**

**WHEREAS**, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors and the community have expressed concerns regarding the impact of illegal immigrants in Prince William County; and

**WHEREAS**, on July 10, 2007, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors, by Res. No. 07-609, directed staff to return to the Board in 90 days with:

Worksession that outlines enabling authority and legal conditions under which Prince William County provides public benefits and services:

- Local benefits that must be provided regardless of status.
- Local benefits that must not be provided to illegal immigrants.
- Local benefits for which there is discretion and the relative merits of exercising that discretion.
- In a manner fully consistent with federal law.
- Shall not be construed so as to prohibit the rendering of emergency medical care or any other public benefits mandated by federal or state law.
- Reporting of a crime or criminal activity to any law enforcement agency.

**WHEREAS**, On August 7, 2007, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors, by Res. No. 07-707, budgeted, appropriated and transferred \$900,000 to the Police Department for the purpose of supporting potential immigration enforcement policies; and

**WHEREAS**, County staff has analyzed all agency programs and services based on the direction given by the Prince William Board of County Supervisors and has provided a detailed report on that analysis to the Board; and

**WHEREAS**, staff has categorized Prince William County programs and services into the following categories:

- Services that are already restricted by law
- Services that cannot be restricted by law
- Services that are not but should be restricted
- Services that could be restricted but with cost, service and legal impacts
- Services that should not be restricted given the impact on the community
- Services that are provided for the benefit of the community as a whole and not individuals
- Services that are provided to support staff in their provision of service to the community

**WHEREAS**, the Police Chief reported to the Prince William Board of County Supervisors on September 18, 2007 regarding the department's efforts to ascertain legal status given probable cause and to enter into a 287(g) agreement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the resources needed to implement that agreement; and

**October 16, 2007  
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Res. No. 07-894  
Page Two**

**WHEREAS**, the Police Chief proposals include the creation of a Criminal Alien Unit and appropriate staff increases to address the new immigration-related responsibilities; and

**WHEREAS**, on October 2, 2007, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors, by Res. No. 07-828, directed staff to a number of legislative initiatives at the state and federal level to support Prince William County's efforts to implement illegal immigrant enforcement; and

**WHEREAS**, on October 2, 2007, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors, by Res. No. 07-828 accepted the reports provided by the County Executive and the Police Chief and authorized the Police Department to make General Order 45 public pursuant to the Police Chief's recommendation; and

**WHEREAS**, on October 2, 2007, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors, by Res. No. 07-828, directed staff to explore a 287(g) agreement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Juvenile Detention Center similar to the 287(g) agreement at the Adult Detention Center with ICE;

**NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors authorizes the creation of seven (7) FTEs in the Police Department – six detective positions and one crime analyst position – to create the Criminal Alien Unit;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors directs staff to engage in a public outreach effort to educate the public, particularly minority and/or immigrant communities, regarding this resolution and its implementation, with the purpose of promoting transparency and trust in Prince William County government;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors directs staff to enter into a partnership with an independent, non-partisan consulting group (such as the Police Executive Research Forum and/or an accredited Virginia College or University) to provide consultation and evaluation of the new police department policy. The evaluation will have a two-phase tracking and monitoring process:

- Phase 1 will be a preliminary report and collection of baseline data
- Phase 2 will be a final report to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the new general order with respect to community outcomes, enforcement data, workload and the prevention of racial profiling.

The scope of the initial evaluation program shall be two years;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors directs staff to report to the Board on the progress and effects of their efforts on illegal immigration no later than August 5, 2008;

October 16, 2007  
Regular Meeting  
Res. No. 07-894  
Page Three

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors reaffirms its August 7, 2007 budgetary action and directs the staff to use up to \$575,000 of that funding to support police operations that may otherwise have been de-funded due to cuts in the State's HB599 funding, and to use any remaining funds to implement the Police Department's efforts in creating and training the Criminal Alien Unit and educating the community about the Department's new policies and procedures in the most expeditious manner possible;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors, recognizing the challenges that exist due to a projected revenue shortfall of \$10,000,000 in the FY2008 budget and remaining committed to addressing that shortfall in a fiscally responsible manner, directs staff to develop a proposal to balance the FY2008 budget in a manner that maintains funding for the Criminal Alien Unit;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors directs staff to implement processes that are consistent with state law and the existing County code to prevent business licenses from being issued to persons who cannot demonstrate legal presence, pursuant to the recommendations of the Attorney General of Virginia;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors directs staff to develop processes to restrict services identified in the attachment and report back to the Board;

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Prince William Board of County Supervisors hereby thanks and congratulates staff on the tremendous work that was done in the interest of maintaining the Rule of Law in Prince William County and in comporting with existing county, state and federal policy that mandates denial of many taxpayer-funded services to individuals who are not legally present in the United States.

ATTACHMENT: Services recommended for restriction from illegal immigrants.

**Votes:**

**Ayes:** Barg, Caddigan, Covington, Jenkins, May, Nohe, Stewart, Stirrup

**Nays:** None


**Absent from Vote:** None

**Absent from Meeting:** None

**For Information:**

Chairman, Prince William Board of County Supervisors

CERTIFIED COPY \_\_\_\_\_

  
Clerk to the Board



ATTACHMENT:

Services recommended for restriction from illegal immigrants

- Adult services to allow elderly and disabled to remain in homes
- Aging in-home services
- Sheriff adult identification services
- Rental and mortgage assistance programs
- DORM substance abuse program
- HIDTA prevention program
- Elderly/disabled tax relief program
- Tax exemption for renovation/rehabilitation of residential properties

**MOTION: MAY**

**April 29, 2008  
Regular Meeting  
Res. No. 08-500**

**SECOND: STIRRUP**

**RE: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION – MODIFY DIRECTIVES TO POLICE  
DEPARTMENT CONCERNING THE ROLE OF LOCAL LAW  
ENFORCEMENT IN ENFORCING FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW**

**ACTION: APPROVED**

**WHEREAS**, the Code of Virginia authorizes the governing bodies of counties to provide for the protection of inhabitants and property and the preservation of peace and good order (§ 15.2-1700, VA Code Ann.), and to secure and promote the health, safety and general welfare of inhabitants (§15.2-1200); and

**WHEREAS**, by resolution dated July 10, 2007 (Res. No. 07-609), the Prince William Board of County Supervisors affirmed that it shall be the policy of Prince William County that County employees will comply with all federal and state laws, including federal immigration law, to the best of their ability in the performance of their duties and they shall, by following specific directives issued by the Board, support federal authorities in their enforcement of immigration law while protecting the civil rights of all persons found within the County; and

**WHEREAS**, pursuant to the Board's policy, police officers were directed to inquire into the citizenship or legal status of individuals who they had detained in the course of their duties if there was probable cause to do so long as such inquiry did not unreasonably extend the duration of the detention or conflict with any federal or state law or Constitutional provision; and

**WHEREAS**, to mitigate the risk of false allegations of "racial profiling" against police officers carrying out the Board's policy, it was proposed that appropriate video cameras be placed in police vehicles; and

**WHEREAS**, the Board is responsible for appropriately managing legal and other risk in County operations, including law enforcement, and the Board finds that an acceptable alternative to a program of installing cameras in police vehicles is modification of the Police Department's policy, through Board directive; and

**WHEREAS**, such a modification would also serve to emphasize and clarify that Police Department actions are to be directed at illegal aliens who commit crimes in the County;

**NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED** that the provisions Directive A of Res. No. 07-609, insofar as they direct the contents of General Order 45, are hereby MODIFIED and SUPERSEDED, and in their place, the Board hereby substitutes the following directive to the Prince William County Police Department:

April 29, 2008  
Regular Meeting  
Res. No. 08-500  
Page Two

- Subsequent and incident to any lawful arrest for a violation of a state law or County ordinance, Prince William County Police Officers shall inquire into the citizenship or immigration status of the arrested person, and/or shall request that such inquiry be made by personnel the Prince William Regional Adult Detention Center before the person is released from custody. The Chief of Police is hereby directed to formulate appropriate policies and procedures with the Superintendent of the ADC to provide for the best use of their resources to streamline the process of identifying criminals who are illegal aliens.
- Police officers are not to be mandated by the Department's policies to inquire into immigration or citizenship status before a person is arrested for a violation of state law or County ordinance. Reasonable exemptions to require pre-arrest investigation of violations of §19.2-81.6 (previously deported immigrant suspected of new crime) of the Code of Virginia, and any similar offenses created in future under state law, are permitted.
- This directive is not intended, nor shall it be read to limit a police officer's ability to seek, at any time, identifying or other information from persons with whom he or she comes in contact, where such inquiries are proper under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and within the scope of the officer's law-enforcement duties. This directive merely changes the time at which immigration or citizenship status inquiries are mandated from pre-arrest to post-arrest.

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that all other provisions of Res. No. 07-609 remain unchanged and in full force and effect; and County employees are directed to continue their pursuit of those directives in accordance with the County's Vision and Values previously established by the County Executive.

**Votes:**

**Ayes:** Caddigan, Covington, Jenkins, May, Nohe, Principi, Stewart, Stirrup

**Nays:** None

**Absent from Vote:** None

**Absent from Meeting:** None

CERTIFIED COPY

  
Clerk to the Board



**Appendix B:**  
**Survey of Washington, DC Area Law Enforcement Agencies**  
**Regarding Illegal Immigration and Local Immigration Enforcement**




During the fall of 2009 and early 2010, PERF conducted a survey of law enforcement agencies in the Washington, DC region to assess their perceptions of illegal immigration in their jurisdictions and to examine their immigration enforcement practices. Our survey had four key sections. The first section contained a series of questions designed to capture descriptive agency and jurisdiction characteristics. The second section contained a series of items designed to establish the local context for immigration enforcement. The third section focused on agency policies as they pertain to illegal immigration enforcement. Fourth, the survey contained a section that asked about Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contacts.

## Sample

Our sample of this survey included the 69 separate law enforcement agencies (county or municipal governments) in the Washington, DC area (excluding the Prince William County Police Department). Of the 69 law enforcement agencies that were mailed a survey, we received a completed survey from 46 of them, resulting in just below a 70 percent response rate. Our sample of the Washington Metropolitan area mirrors the sample used by Brookings Institution in their study of local immigration issues in Prince William County. As seen in Map 1 (below), our sample included jurisdictions from as far north as Frederick County (Maryland), as far south as Spotsylvania County (Virginia), as far west as Warren County (Virginia), and as far east as Calvert County (Maryland). This area is based on the 2007 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) definition of the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV metropolitan statistical area. This definition includes the District of Columbia, five counties in Maryland, 15 counties and cities in Virginia, and one county in West Virginia.

Map 1. The Washington Metropolitan Area



## Section I – Agency Demographics

*Agency Characteristics (see Table 1).* Responding agencies employed slightly more than 276 people on average (mean=276.11); the smallest responding agency employed two people while the largest agency participating in the study had 4,594 employees. Of these employees, the average agency employed 217 sworn officers (mean=216.83) with a range of two to 4,037 sworn officers. Of these sworn officers, agencies reported having 13 Spanish speaking officers on average (min=0, max=177), with approximately the same number of sworn officers of Hispanic origin (mean=14.05, min=0, max=272).

*Jurisdiction Characteristics (see Table 1).* Responding agencies reported serving residential populations of 93,209 people on average, ranging from 586 people to 950,680 people. The respondents were also asked to provide the number of dispatched calls for service in 2008. The average agency responded to 70,150 calls for service, with a range of 400 to 705,279 calls for service. The average responding agency reported 3,410 arrests for 2008, with a range of 22 to 51,374 arrests.

Table 1: Descriptive characteristics of the sample (N=46)

	Mean	Median	Min	Max
Number of total full-time employees	276.11	52	2	4,594
Number of sworn officers	216.83	41	2	4,037
Number of sworn who are Spanish-speaking	12.76	2	0	177
Number of sworn officers of Hispanic origin	14.05	1	0	272
Residential population	93,209.09	185,000	586	950,680
Number of dispatched calls for 2008	70,150.91	21,483	400	705,279
Number of arrests for 2008	3,409.82	654.5	22	51,374

## Section II – Local Context

Respondents were asked to characterize their perception of changes in the level of illegal immigration in their jurisdiction over the last two years. More than half of the respondents surveyed indicated that illegal immigration had either increased some (32.6%, N=15) or substantially (17.4%, N=8). A plurality of respondents (43.5%, N=20) indicated that the level of illegal immigration stayed the same over the last two years, with another 6.5% (N=3) of respondents indicating that illegal immigration had actually decreased some.

The survey asked respondents to assess the impact of illegal immigration on trends in serious crime (UCR Part I offenses) in their jurisdiction over the last two years. The vast majority of respondents (71.7%, N=33) indicated that illegal immigration had little or no impact on serious crime in their



area during this time period. However, approximately one-quarter of the respondents indicated that illegal immigration had either led to some increase (23.9%, N=11) or a large increase (2.2%, N=1) in Part I offenses.

Respondents were, then, asked how much impact illegal immigration has had on trends in disorderly behavior in their jurisdiction over the last two years. The results mirrored those of the previous question; the majority (60.9%, N=28) indicated that illegal immigration had little or no impact on disorderly behavior offenses, while approximately one-third indicated some increase (32.6%, N=15) or a large increase (4.3%, N=2) in disorderly behavior offenses.

The survey also included a question asking respondents if they were aware of efforts being conducted by the Prince William County Police Department to enforce illegal immigration violations. The majority of respondents (76.1%, N=35) indicated affirmatively. Of those agencies that indicated an awareness of the efforts of PWCPD, the majority (80.0%, N=28) indicated that these efforts have not impacted their jurisdiction, while five respondents (14.3%, N=5) indicated that these efforts have had an impact on their jurisdiction, two respondents (5.7%) were unsure of the impact. Of the agencies that reported an impact, some respondents indicated that the PWCPD enforcement efforts have led to an increase in illegal immigration in their jurisdiction (60.0%, N=3), others reported that it decreased illegal immigration in their jurisdiction (40.0%, N=2), and one agency (20.0%, N=1) reported that the efforts of the PWCPD decreased crime in their jurisdiction.

### **Section III – Agency Policies**

The third section of the survey contained a series of questions about the responding agencies policies (or lack thereof) pertaining to illegal immigration enforcement. The first question in this section asked respondents if their agencies have a written policy related to checking immigration status. Most indicated that they did not (63.0%, N=29). Many of the agencies indicating that they do not have such a written policy indicated that they generally do not ask about a suspect's immigration status and, if it is done at all, it is done upon intake into the jail facility by another agency. Of those that do have a written policy, most have been in effect for one, two or three years, with a few in effect for five, 10, 20 or more years.

For those agencies that have a written policy, they were asked if their policy requires them, under certain circumstances, to make inquiries about immigration status. Most agencies (57.8%, N=26) do not have a written policy. Of the 17 agencies with a written policy, 64.7% (N=11) require their officers under certain circumstances to make inquiries about immigration status, while 35.3% (N=6) do not.

Agencies were also asked if they (as a law enforcement agency) conduct immigration checks, if the local jail conducts these checks, or if none are conducted by either entity. A plurality (43.5%, N=20) responded that neither their agency nor the jail conducts immigration checks<sup>1</sup>. Of those indicating that immigration checks were conducted, 30.4% (N=14) indicated that they were conducted by the jail, 21.7% (N=10) by both the agency and the jail, and 4.3% (N=2) by the agency alone. For those agencies indicating that their agency or the local jail conducted immigration checks, the majority initiated such checks in the years since 2006. The survey continued with a question asking if immigration checks are conducted at the discretion of the officer or if they were mandated by the agency, with equal number of respondents indicating that the checks are up to the discretion of the officer (45.5%, N=5) or mandated by the agency (54.5%, N=6). These numbers suggest that Prince

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<sup>1</sup> All agencies indicating that neither their agency nor the jail conducted immigration checks were instructed to skip to the Section IV pertaining to ICE contacts.

William County is not completely unique in the DC Metropolitan region in its policy of having its police department and jail check immigration status.

Respondents were then queried about protection provided to the victim and/or witness from being arrested if it was determined that they were illegal immigrants. Slightly more agencies reported that they did not provide such protection to either the victim or the witness (60.0%, N=6) than those reporting that they did provide such protection to both groups (40.0%, N=4).

The circumstances under which officers conduct checks on immigration status were also covered in the survey. Most frequently, officers conduct immigration status checks in the following situations:

- at any time when probable cause exists to believe the person is an illegal immigrant (50.0%, N=6);
- when arresting a suspect (50.0%, N=6);
- when booking a suspect into a holding facility (41.7%, N=5);
- during some other circumstances<sup>2</sup> (33.3%, N=4);
- during a traffic stop (25.0%, N=3); or
- during an investigative detention (25.0%, N=3).

Respondents were also asked if their agencies' policies required that immigration checks be run on all persons who are reasonably believed to be in the country illegally. Half (50.0%, N=6) of the respondents indicated that their policy does not allow checks in these situations. One-third indicated that their policy allows immigration checks only after an arrest (33.3%, N=4) or at any time after a legal police stop (16.7%, N=2). With regard to changes in the manner in which immigration issues have been handled in the past year, most indicated that there had been no change (66.7%, N=8).

Assuming an individual is stopped and/or detained; respondents were asked to identify the steps taken by the agency if the person is deemed to be an illegal immigrant. Most commonly, the agency would issue a pickup request to ICE (66.6%, N=8), document the suspect's immigration status on a written government form (33.3%, N=4), hold the person until ICE pickup (16.7%, N=2), or inform the local magistrate/judge (16.7%, N=2). Most agencies (66.7%, N=8), however, do not maintain statistics on the number of illegal immigrant arrests/contacts that are made.

For those agencies that check immigration status, the survey included a question asking the respondent if training was offered to officers on policies/procedures for handling immigration issues. A majority of those agencies surveyed (58.3%, N=7) indicated that they do offer or facilitate such training. Most commonly, all officers would receive this type of training (85.7%, N=6). This training was mainly characterized (85.7%, N=6) as short in length (i.e., less than one day).

## **Section IV – Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Contact**

The fourth section of the survey included a question pertaining to the agencies contacts with ICE. Specifically, agencies were asked if they currently participate in ICE's 287(g) program, which establishes a Memorandum of Agreement between the agency and ICE allowing the agency to perform immigration enforcement functions after participating in the ICE training program. Only 8.7% (N=4) of the agencies surveyed indicated that they participate or participated in ICE's 287(g)

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<sup>2</sup> Agencies also check the immigration status subsequent to a felony arrest or during the furtherance of an ongoing criminal investigation.

program. Of these, all four chose to participate in order to train officers to enhance local enforcement of immigration laws (100.0%, N=4); one of these agencies (25.5%, N=1) additionally indicated that they did so due to public pressure.



**Appendix C:**  
**The Wave 1 (2008) And Wave 2 (2009) Surveys Of Prince William  
County Police Department Personnel**



The Prince William County-funded “Police Officer Survey” report contains three main sections. First, we discuss the survey methods used in the project including the development of the survey instrument and our approach to distributing and collecting completed surveys. The second section covers an aggregate description of the background characteristics of our sample of respondents. The third section covers the main results of the survey comparing our time 1 results in 2008 (T1) to our time 2 results in 2009 (T2). Within the third section we have three subsection sections: (1) questions measuring an officer’s knowledge of immigration policy and implementation, (2) questions examining officer behavior related to the current Prince William County immigration policy, (3) questions pertaining to problems observed by officers over the last year.

## **I. SURVEY METHODS**

### **Survey Instrument**

The 2008 Immigration Enforcement Local Law Enforcement Survey, funded by Prince William County Virginia, was designed by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in cooperation with the University of Virginia and with input from the Prince William County Police Department (PWCPD). The survey was fielded to establish an understanding of the current state of immigration enforcement and implementation under the 2007 resolution directing that PWCPD work with the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency to detain people suspected of illegal immigration status. Specifically, the survey gathered information about officer knowledge of the PWCPD immigration policy and implementation thereof, officer behavior related to the immigration policy, and problems observed by the officers over the time period covered by the project. The survey contained a series of both open- and closed-ended questions. Surveys were collected via two waves, an initial officer survey and an additional follow up survey approximately one year later. The first officer survey contained both open and closed-ended questions. Once finalized, the survey instrument was converted into a Teleform<sup>3</sup>.

Officer participation in the two surveys was voluntary. Due to the sensitive content included in the survey, it was decided that the survey would be confidential. Rigorous precautions were taken to protect the confidentiality of survey responses. The surveys were administered at roll call. All officers were provided with a consent form. If they agreed to participate, they were to sign the consent form and place it in the white envelope. The white envelope containing the signed consent form was to be collected by staff from the PWCPD Planning and Research unit before the survey was completed. If the officer agreed to participate, each officer was to be handed another envelope with an ID label in it. The officer was to remove this ID label and affix it to the front of the survey. The ID label was used to link the officer’s responses at T1 to T2, but was not to be used to identify the officer in any other way. Once surveys were completed, the list linking an officer’s name to his/her ID number was destroyed. Upon completion of the survey, the instrument was to be placed in a manila envelope and the envelope was to be sealed. The manila envelope with the completed survey in it was to be collected at that time by staff from the Planning and Research unit.

### **Data Collection**

The *2008 Immigration Enforcement Local Law Enforcement Survey* was disseminated to all sworn officers of PWCPD. The first survey was distributed during roll call in October 2008. The second survey was disseminated approximately one year later in November 2009.

PWCPD was provided with 517<sup>4</sup> surveys for each wave of the assessment. After the initial officer survey was distributed, we received completed surveys from 379 PWCPD officers resulting in a

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<sup>3</sup> Teleform is a software application owned by PERF that allows for development of a scan readable survey.

<sup>4</sup> There are 517 sworn officers in the PWCPD. All sworn officers were eligible for the survey.

response rate of 73.3 percent. The second officer survey yielded 299 completed surveys resulting in a response rate of 57.8 percent. The denominator was 517. Some officers completed the first survey only, the second survey only, or both. There were 92 officers that completed the first assessment and not the second. The number of officers who completed the second officer survey and not the first was 12. The number of officers who completed both surveys was 287. Comparative analysis of both surveys is based on the 287 officers that completed both assessments.<sup>5</sup> This discussion focuses on tests for differences between responses on the T1 and T2 surveys; additional information about the distribution of the responses is contained in Section 5 of the main report.

## **II. RESPONDENT BACKGROUND**

Most survey respondents were Patrol Officers (62.1%), Sergeants (15.0%) or Detectives (14.3%), with slightly more than 10-1/2 years of experience. Most respondents indicated that they were either assigned to patrol (64.3%) or investigations/detective (13.3%).

With regard to the respondents' area of assignment, most officers believe that illegal immigrants are either very common (28.8%) or common (33.6%). The majority of officers (73.0%) have changed their area of assignment over the last year. For those officers who indicated that their area of assignment had changed, they were asked how common illegal immigrants were in this previous area. The response mirrored the current area of assignment; most respondents indicated that illegal immigrants were very common (27.3%) or common (35.1%).

## **III. MAIN COMPARISONS OF TIME 1 (2008) AND TIME 2 (2009) RESULTS**

The PWCPD Police Officer Survey included four<sup>6</sup> sections. The first section included questions measuring an officer's knowledge of immigration policy and implementation. The second section contained a series of questions examining officer behavior related to the current Prince William County (PWC) immigration policy. The third section of the survey was made up of questions pertaining to problems observed by officers over the last year. This section will highlight the results of the Police Officer Surveys by examining the change in responses from T1 to T2.

### **Knowledge of Immigration Policy and Implementation**

The first section of the survey contained seven questions that asked the responding officer to utilize a five-point Likert scale (1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree) to indicate their level of knowledge concerning the Prince William County (PWC) immigration policy:

1. Currently, I believe it is clear how to implement the PWC immigration policy.
2. I believe I have enough knowledge about the current policy to enforce this police correctly.

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<sup>5</sup> Figures presented here to test for differences between time 1 and time 2 responses on a survey item are based on those respondents that answered that particular item on both surveys. Consequently, they may differ slightly from those presented in Section 5 (and from those presented for the time 1 survey results in our 2009 interim report). (The differences are generally very minor.) Also, unless otherwise stated, missing data were insubstantial (less than 5%) for each item.

<sup>6</sup> The fourth section of the survey was different on the two versions of the survey. The first Police Officer Survey contained a section asking about an Officer('s) Perspective on General Order 45 (Probable Cause Standard). This section was omitted from the second Police Officer Survey because it was believed that these responses would not change from time one. The second Police Officer survey included a section on the responding officer's background. This section included basic officer demographics, such as officer rank, years of experience, type of assignment, as well as a couple of questions on the officer's area of assignment.



3. The training I have been provided by PWCPD has adequately prepared me to enforce the PWC immigration policy.
4. My personal beliefs are supportive of the current PWC immigration policy.
5. My personal beliefs will have no effect on how to enforce any lawful PWC immigration policy.
6. When appropriate, I have the necessary skills to ask immigration status questions.
7. I have the necessary skills to review identification (e.g., driver's license) for fakes.

These seven items yielded a scale with a Chronbach's alpha of .847<sup>7</sup> indicating that these items reliably are measuring the same concept. All scale items were examined to determine if their removal would increase the reliability of the scale<sup>8</sup>. Factor analysis revealed that these items loaded highly on one single factor that was deemed to be measuring knowledge of the PWC immigration policy. An average scale score was, then, created by summing the values assigned to each item response and dividing by the total number of items (seven). See Table 1 for descriptive information on each item in the scale, the scale as a whole, and Chronbach's alpha.

A t-test statistic was calculated to determine if the mean scale scores differed at T1 and T2 ( $t=.94$ ,  $p<.349$ ). From this test we concluded that the mean values for the T1 (mean=4.10) and T2 (mean=4.07) knowledge scale were not significantly different. In other words, the responses given at T1 were very similar to those given at T2; on average, officers "agree" that they have the knowledge, skills, training, and beliefs to implement the PWC immigration policy.

**Table 1: Knowledge and Views Regarding the Immigration Policy (Mean Scores and Scale Descriptive Information)**

	Item	Time 1 (2008)	Time 2 (2009)
A1	Currently, I believe it is clear how to implement the PWC immigration policy.	4.03	4.02
A2	I believe I have enough knowledge about the current policy to enforce the policy correctly.	4.09	4.08
A3	The training I have been provided by the PWCPD has adequately prepared me to enforce the PWC immigration policy.	4.06	4.04
A4	My personal beliefs are supportive of the current PWC immigration policy.	3.72	3.61
A5	My personal beliefs will have no effect on how to enforce any lawful PWC immigration policy.	4.55	4.56
A6	When appropriate, I have the necessary skills to ask	4.24	4.24

<sup>7</sup> The seven items from T1 yielded a reliable scale (Chronbach's alpha=.776). Removing any of the seven items at T1 would not have appreciably increased the reliability of the scale.

<sup>8</sup> Removing any one item from the scale at T2 yielded a less reliable measure, with two exceptions. Removing the fourth item concerning the personal beliefs of the officer supporting the PWC immigration would have increased the reliability to .859 and removing the last item concerning policy skills used to review identification would have increased the reliability to .851. Since the scale was deemed highly reliable (Chronbach's alpha=.847), and since deleting these items only marginally increased the reliability, they were left in the scale.

	immigration status questions.		
<b>A7</b>	I have the necessary skills to review identification (e.g., driver's license) for fakes.	4.01	4.07
	Knowledge scale	4.10	4.07
	Chronbach's alpha for knowledge scale	.776	.847
	t (p-value)	.94 (.349)	
	N (listwise)	285 (min=371, max=373)	285 (min=294, max=298)

Items were rated on a five-point scale: 1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree

### **Officer Behavior Related to the Current PWC Immigration Policy**

The second section of the survey contained a series of closed-ended questions designed to examine officer behavior related to the current PWC immigration policy. T-tests<sup>9</sup> were conducted on the items contained in Part II of the survey to determine if there was a significant mean difference between an officer's responses at T1 and T2.

The first item in this section asked officers if they have used their discretion in questioning any person about their immigration status. The T1 survey asked this question in reference to the period of July 1, 2008 (the implementation date of PWCPD's current immigration policy) through date when the officer took the survey, which was typically during October or November of 2008. The T2 survey, which was administered in the fall of 2009, asked officers about their contacts with illegal immigrants during the prior year. In the wave 1 survey, 61.0% of officers indicated that they had questioned someone about their immigration status. At wave 2, this figure declined to 46.0%. A t-test statistic was calculated to determine if the mean scores on this variable differed at T1 and T2 ( $t=4.306$ ,  $p<.001$ ). From this test we concluded that the mean values for the T1 and T2 knowledge scale were significantly different. In other words, officers were significantly more likely to indicate that they had used their discretion to question at least one person about their immigration status in the time prior to T1 as opposed to the time period from the T1 to T2.

Officers were also asked to indicate the approximate proportion of people they questioned who were believed to be Hispanic. The responses included six categories ranging from 0% to 76-100%. To test for differences between T1 and T2, we dichotomized the responses based on whether the estimated percentage of Hispanic subjects was above 50% and tested for a difference in this measure using a t-test. At time 1, 89.8% of respondents indicated that more than 50% of the subjects they questioned were Hispanic (see Table 3). This percentage dropped to 75.0% at time 2, a statistically significant difference ( $t=3.128$ ,  $p<.002$ ). In other words, significantly more officers at T1 reported questioning a higher percentage of people who were believed to be Hispanic than at T2.

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<sup>9</sup> A t-test was used to assess differences in proportions. While chi-square tests are more commonly used, a t-test is also appropriate.

Officers who had questioned anyone about immigration status were also asked to indicate the approximate number of people they questioned about this issue.<sup>10</sup> The responses included five categories ranging from one to 16 or more. To test for differences over time, we dichotomized the responses based on whether respondents had questioned more than five people about immigration status. This percentage was somewhat lower at T1 (56.6%) than at T2 (66.3%), but this difference was not statistically significant in a t-test ( $t=-1.58$ ,  $p<.117$ ). Considering that the reference period for T1 was notably shorter than that for T2, however, these results suggest that officers were questioning people about immigration status more frequently during the early period of the policy.

This section of the survey also included a question regarding training. Specifically, officers were asked if they felt their training in immigration aided them in their questioning of a person's immigration status. Response categories included "to a great extent", "somewhat", "very little", and "not at all." Approximately one-quarter of the respondents at T1 (26.7%) and T2 (25.0%) indicated that their training aided them "to a great extent" in these situations. Responses did not differ significantly across the time periods ( $t=.377$ ,  $p<.707$ ).<sup>11</sup>

Additionally, officers were asked about their level of confidence in questioning people on their immigration status. Response categories included "very confident", "somewhat confident", "somewhat unconfident", and "not at all confident." The percentage indicating that they were "very confident" decreased slightly from 57.0% at T1 to 52.9% at T2, but this decrease was not statistically significant ( $t=.897$ ,  $p<.371$ ).<sup>12</sup> At both times, a majority of respondents felt "very confident" in their ability to question people on their immigration status.

Officers were also asked about their overall experience with General Order 45.01 on a five-point scale with response categories of "very positive", "somewhat positive", "neutral", "somewhat negative", and "very negative." The percentage of officers rating their experience as either very or somewhat positive increased from 40.6% at T1 to 45.7% at T2, but this difference was not statistically significant ( $t=-1.43$ ,  $p<.153$ ).<sup>13</sup> At both times, fewer than half of the officers rated their experience with the order as positive, with the majority rating it as either neutral or negative.<sup>14</sup>

This section of the survey also included six items<sup>15</sup> utilizing a five-point Likert scale (1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree) designed to examine an officer's opinions pertaining to the effectiveness and workability of the current PWC immigration policy.<sup>16</sup> The first such item asked officers to rate the usefulness of the policy as a tool for PWCPD officers. Slightly more officers at T2 (mean=66.4%) agreed or strongly agreed that the immigration policy is a useful tool than at T1 (mean=64.7%). The t-test ( $t=-.569$ ,  $p<.570$ ) revealed

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<sup>10</sup> At time 2, 10% of respondents could not recall whether they had questioned anyone about immigration status during the prior year. Among those who had questioned one or more persons about immigration status, 15% could not estimate the number.

<sup>11</sup> The T1 and T2 responses were dichotomized ("to a great extent" versus all other responses) and the dichotomized variables included in the t-test.

<sup>12</sup> The T1 and T2 responses were dichotomized ("very confident" versus all other responses) and the dichotomized variables included in the t-test.

<sup>13</sup> The T1 and T2 responses were dichotomized ("very positive" and "somewhat positive" versus all other responses) and the dichotomized variables included in the t-test.

<sup>14</sup> The most frequently offered response to the overall experience with General Order 45.01 was that it the experience was neutral at both T1 (majority of officers) and T2 (plurality of officers).

<sup>15</sup> A reliable scale could not be created from these items even though they appeared to have face validity. For this reason, comparisons between T1 and T2 were made item by item instead of scale to scale.

<sup>16</sup> For the purposes of the t-tests for these items, the response categories were dichotomized ("strongly agree" and "agree" versus all other responses).

that the difference between the mean scores at T1 and T2 was non significant, however. A second item in this section asked officers if the policy is too restrictive for them to do their job. The t-test ( $t=-1.0$ ,  $p<.318$ ) revealed that there was no significant difference between the way officers responded at the two waves. At T1, only 10.9% of officers agreed or strongly agreed that the policy was too restrictive; at T2, only 13.3% agreed or strongly agreed. Officers were also asked to rate the effectiveness of the policy at reducing crime in PWC. T-test results ( $t=-1.21$ ,  $p<.228$ ) indicated that, while more officers agreed or strongly agreed with this statement at T2 (mean=52.1%) than at T1 (48.2%), the difference was non-significant. Officers were then asked to indicate if they believe that PWC should take a stronger stance against illegal immigrants. The t-test results ( $t=-.226$ ,  $p<.821$ ) were non-significant; almost exactly the same percentage of officers at T1 (mean=36.3%) and T2 (mean=37.0%) agreed or strongly agreed that PWC should take a stronger stance against illegal immigrants.

This section finished with two items regarding the potential exodus of both illegal and legal immigrants from PWC. With regard to illegal immigrants, the t-test ( $t=2.07$ ,  $p<.039$ ) revealed that significantly more officers at T1 (mean=73.0%) than at T2 (mean=66.3%) agreed or strongly agreed that the policy has resulted in illegal immigrants leaving the county. Regardless of the time, a high percentage of officers believe this to be the case. However, with regard to legal immigrants, officers were less likely to believe that legal immigrants are leaving the county as a result of the policy. T-test results ( $t=1.45$ ,  $p<.149$ ) revealed a non-significant difference between the mean percentage of officers at T1 (40.1%) and T2 (35.6%) who agreed or strongly agreed that the policy had led to the departure of legal immigrants from the County.

### **Problems Observed by Officers over the Last Year**

The third section of the survey contained 19<sup>17</sup> questions that asked the responding officer to utilize a four-point Likert scale (1=Never, 2=Occasionally, 3=Often, 4=Regularly/All the time) to indicate the extent to which they have observed the following problems or issues arising in PWC:

1. Charges of biased policing against PWCPD.
2. Negative feelings directed against the PWCPD by PWC residents.
3. Poor relations with the legal immigrant community in PWC.
4. Difficulty in forming community policing partnerships between the police and the immigrant community.
5. Problems getting non-immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.
6. Problems getting legal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.
7. Problems getting illegal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.
8. Problems getting witnesses to cooperate with the police.
9. Physical attacks against officers.
10. Verbal threats against officers.
11. Violent crimes in PWC.
12. Property crimes in PWC.
13. Problems with public disorder (e.g., loitering, public drinking, etc.)
14. Problems with traffic violations.
15. Problems with housing code violations (e.g., occupancy violations)
16. Fear of crime in certain parts of PWC.
17. Low levels of support among most PWC residents for this policy.
18. Illegal immigrants are moving out of PWC.

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<sup>17</sup> Part III actually contained 20 questions, but the last question was omitted from consideration for the scale since very few officers identified any "other" problems.

19. More difficulty in recruiting minority candidates to join PWCPD.

These 19 items yielded a scale with a Chronbach's alpha of .914<sup>18</sup> indicating that these items reliably are measuring the same concept. All scale items were examined to determine if their removal would increase the reliability of the scale.<sup>19</sup> Factor analysis revealed that these items loaded highly on one single factor that was deemed to be measuring officer observed problems in PWC. An average scale score was, then, created by summing the values assigned to each item response and dividing by the total number of items (19). See Table 2 for descriptive information on each item in the scale, the scale as a whole, and Chronbach's alpha.

A t-test statistic was calculated to determine if the mean scale scores differed at T1 and T2 ( $t=.401$ ,  $p<.689$ ). From this test we concluded that the mean values for the T1 (mean=2.05) and T2 (mean=2.04) problem scale were not significantly different. In other words, the responses given at T1 were very similar to those given at T2; on average, officers indicated that problems "occasionally" are observed.

At both T1 and T2, it was very rare for officers to indicate that any of the problems listed in Part III occurred regularly/all of the time (see Table 3). However, when specified, there was consistency between T1 and T2 with regard to which problems were most frequently rated as occurring regularly/all the time. Officers most commonly listed the following problems as occurring regularly/all the time:

- Problems with public disorder (e.g., loitering, public drinking, etc.) (T1=17.5%, T2=18.3%)
- Problems with housing code violations (e.g., occupancy violations) (T1=16.6%, T2=15.5%)
- Problems with traffic violations (T1=13.9%, T2=18.7%)
- Problems getting illegal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime (T1=12.7%, T2=9.5%)
- Property crimes in PWC (T1=7.6%, T2=6.9%)
- Fear of crime in certain parts of PWC (T1=6.7%, T2=7.9%)

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<sup>18</sup> The 19 items from T1 yielded a scale with approximately the same reliability (Chronbach's alpha=.904). Removing any of the 19 items would not have appreciably increased the reliability of the scale.

<sup>19</sup> Removing any one item from the scale yielded a less reliable measure.

**Table 2: Community Problems (Mean Scores and Scale Descriptive Information)**

	<b>“Problem” Item</b>	<b>Time 1 (2008)</b>	<b>Time 2 (2009)</b>
<b>C1</b>	Charges of biased policing against PWCPD.	1.88	1.79
<b>C2</b>	Negative feelings directed against the PWCPD by PWC residents.	2.19	1.99
<b>C3</b>	Poor relations with the legal immigrant community in PWC.	2.08	1.91
<b>C4</b>	Difficulty in forming community policing partnerships between the police and the immigrant community.	2.04	1.84
<b>C5</b>	Problems getting non-immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	1.91	1.90
<b>C6</b>	Problems getting legal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	1.84	1.80
<b>C7</b>	Problems getting illegal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	2.38	2.20
<b>C8</b>	Problems getting witnesses to cooperate with the police.	2.20	2.07
<b>C9</b>	Physical attacks against officers.	1.51	1.59
<b>C10</b>	Verbal threats against officers.	1.80	1.83
<b>C11</b>	Violent crimes in PWC.	1.92	2.04
<b>C12</b>	Property crimes in PWC.	2.17	2.27
<b>C13</b>	Problems with public disorder (e.g., loitering, public drinking, etc.)	2.51	2.60
<b>C14</b>	Problems with traffic violations.	2.42	2.59
<b>C15</b>	Problems with housing code violations (e.g., occupancy violations)	2.43	2.42
<b>C16</b>	Fear of crime in certain parts of PWC.	2.14	2.22
<b>C17</b>	Low levels of support among most PWC residents for this policy.	1.90	1.86
<b>C18</b>	Illegal immigrants are moving out of PWC.	2.54	2.27
<b>C19</b>	More difficulty in recruiting minority candidates to join PWCPD.	1.49	1.45
	Problem scale	2.03	2.04
	Chronbach’s alpha for problem scale	.904	.914
	t (p-value)	.401 (.689)	
	N (listwise)	274 (min=354, max=362)	274 (min=294, max=298)

Items were rated on a four point scale: 1=Never, 2=Occasionally, 3=Often, 4=Regularly/All the time

**Table 3: Problem Item Identified as Occurring “Regularly/All the Time”**

	<b>“Problem” Item<sup>20</sup></b>	<b>Time 1 (2008)</b>	<b>Time 2 (2009)</b>
<b>C1</b>	Charges of biased policing against PWCPD.	5.3%	2.1%
<b>C2</b>	Negative feelings directed against the PWCPD by PWC residents.	6.9%	2.0%
<b>C3</b>	Poor relations with the legal immigrant community in PWC.	5.0%	2.4%
<b>C4</b>	Difficulty in forming community policing partnerships between the police and the immigrant community.	6.4%	3.1%
<b>C5</b>	Problems getting non-immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	5.3%	4.4%
<b>C6</b>	Problems getting legal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	4.2%	2.7%
<b>C7</b>	Problems getting illegal immigrant residents of PWC to report crime.	12.7%	9.5%
<b>C8</b>	Problems getting witnesses to cooperate with the police.	6.4%	3.1%
<b>C9</b>	Physical attacks against officers.	0.3%	1.4%
<b>C10</b>	Verbal threats against officers.	2.5%	2.4%
<b>C11</b>	Violent crimes in PWC.	2.8%	3.1%
<b>C12</b>	Property crimes in PWC.	7.6%	6.9%
<b>C13</b>	Problems with public disorder (e.g., loitering, public drinking, etc.)	17.5%	18.3%
<b>C14</b>	Problems with traffic violations.	13.9%	18.7%
<b>C15</b>	Problems with housing code violations (e.g., occupancy violations)	16.6%	15.5%
<b>C16</b>	Fear of crime in certain parts of PWC.	6.7%	7.9%
<b>C17</b>	Low levels of support among most PWC residents for this policy.	0.3%	1.4%
<b>C18</b>	Illegal immigrants are moving out of PWC.	0.3%	4.5%
<b>C19</b>	More difficulty in recruiting minority candidates to join PWCPD.	0.3%	2.9%

<sup>20</sup> Missing data was generally not an issue at T1 with the items included in Table 3. Missing data represented no more than 6.1% of the cases (item C19), although most items had fewer missing cases. Additionally, missing data was generally not an issue at T2 with these same items. Missing data represented fewer than 2.7% of the cases. The lone exception was item C19 where 7.0% of the cases were missing.





**Appendix D:**  
**Time Series Data on Crime and Calls for Police Service**



## **Calls for Service (CFS)**

CFS data have a number of strengths relative to other data sources for analyzing trends and patterns in crime (Sherman et al., 1989; Warner and Pierce, 1993). CFS represent an unscreened look at events that the public feel require police response, resulting in many more criminal events than would be captured in official records and victimization surveys. Other forms of official data rely on interpretation of the event by official agents, and a decision to file a report. CFS are similar to other official data in that they reflect criminal behavior coupled with citizen willingness to report that behavior, but they eliminate police discretion (i.e., official reaction to criminal behavior). Further, CFS data capture instances in which victims or complainants desire a police response to a situation but do not wish to file a report. This could be particularly salient to cases involving illegal immigrants. In addition, CFS data do not require the victim to make the call, as bystanders may call the police about crimes in progress.

Common problems with CFS include exclusion of crimes that do not come to the attention of police through citizen calls (e.g., self-initiated activities by officers or citizens reporting incidents directly to officers in the field or at a police station), over-reporting due to multiple calls for the same event, outright lying by callers, or citizens' misunderstanding of the legal definitions of crimes. Three types of errors can result from citizens' calls to police (Klinger and Bridges, 1997). False negatives result when calls classified as non-criminal actually involve criminal behavior (e.g. when an initial call escalates into a crime). False positives results when callers classify non-criminal behavior as criminal (the most commonly cited example involves potential burglars who turn out to be homeowners). Finally, citizen misunderstanding may result in crime misclassification (e.g., a citizen says he or she has been robbed, when in fact the crime was burglary). Each of these types of errors can alter the "true" count of crime.

However, PWCPD's CFS data offer improvements to the above sources of error. Each call has an initial description, based on the call, which can be changed if the officer on the scene determines the call should be reclassified based on the available evidence. In addition, the officer can report if the call is unfounded. Finally the issue of multiple calls for the same event can be handled through cross-referencing each call. Going beyond reliance on citizen CFS, the PWC data also contain self-initiated events by officers (i.e. police response to suspicious behavior, vehicle stops, etc.) and events that come to the attention of PWC police through other police departments. Cases linked to officers' self-initiated activities have been removed from the analysis presented below because in a change in incidents uncovered through officers' self-initiated activities could represent a change in officers' behavior (perhaps resulting from a change in policies or practices) rather than a true change in crime. Nonetheless, many of the patterns described below are quite similar even with the police-initiated events included.

We used the following procedures in processing PWCPD's CFS data. First, we eliminated calls to PWC's Fire Department. Second, we dropped records that did not have a police case number so that our working database would have only one record corresponding to each incident (this was necessary because the CFS data often have multiple records corresponding to the same incident). Third, we removed cases relating to "misdials" or "lost calls." We also removed three weeks in January 2007 that showed a highly unusual spike and created extreme outliers.

In addition to analyzing weekly trends, from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2009, in total CFS, we also conducted separate analyses of trends in CFS for person crimes, property crimes, disorder, drug crimes, and driving under the influence. The coding of these categories is provided below.

## Person Crimes

FIGHT/EXPIRED	FIGHT WITH WEAPONS
ASSAULT/EXPIRED	FIGHT W/ WEAPONS W/ INJ
RAPE PAST/EXPIRED	RPTS OF SHOTS FIRED/PRI 1/EXPIRED
RAPE W/ INJ/EXPIRED	FIREARM VIOL IN-PROGRESS
RAPE IN-PROG/EXPIRED	FIREARM VIOL NEAR SCHOOL
RAPE/SCHOOL/EXPIRED	SHOOTING
BOMB THREAT/EXPIRED	SHOOT INTO OCC DWELLING
BOMB THREATSCH/EXPIRED	SHOOT INTO DWELL W/ INJ
ABDUCTION	SHOOT INTO DWELL IN-PROG
ABDUCTION NEAR SCHOOL	SHOOTING IN PROGRESS
ACTIVE SHOOTER	SHOOTING IN-PROGRESS
ASSAULT PAST	HOSTAGE SITUATION
ASSAULT WITH INJURIES	HOSTAGE SITUATION - INJ
ASSAULT IN-PROGRESS	HOSTAGE SITUATION SCHOOL
ASSAULT NEAR SCHOOL	RAPE PAST
BOMB THREAT	RAPE WITH INJURY
BOMB THREAT/SCHOOL	RAPE IN PROGRESS
CHILD ABUSE / NEGLECT	RAPE NEAR SCHOOL
CHILD ABUSE IN-PROG/INJ	ARMED ROBBERY-PAST
HOMICIDE	ARMED ROBBERY W/ INJURIES
DOMESTIC DISPUTE	ARMED ROBBERY IN-PROGRESS
DOMESTIC IN-PROGRESS	ARMED ROBBERY - SCHOOL
DOMESTIC IN-PRGRESS W/INJ	STRONGARM ROBBERY
DOMESTIC IN PROG/SCHOOL	STRONGARM ROBBERY W/ INJ
DOMESTIC/PAST/SCHOOL	STRONGARM ROBBERY IN-PROG
DOMESTIC WITH WEAPONS	STRONGARM ROBBERY-SCHOOL
DOMESTIC W/WEAPON AND INJ	SCH SHOOTING/MASS CAS/EXPIRED
FIGHT	STABBING
FIGHT IN-PROGRESS	STABBING IN-PROGRESS
FIGHT IN-PROGRESS W/ INJ	STABBING NEAR SCHOOL
FIGHT IN PROG/SCHOOL	THROW MISSILES W/INJ
FIGHT/PAST/SCHOOL	

## Property Crimes

VANDALISM/EXPIRED	LARCENY IN PROG - SCHOOL
LARCENY PAST/EXPIRED	LARCENY NEAR SCHOOL
LARC IN PROG/EXPIRED	SHOPLIFTER IN-CUSTODY
BAD CHECK	VANDALISM
BURGLARY PAST RESIDENCE	VANDALISM IN PROG/SCHOOL
BURGLARY ATTEMPT	VANDALISM IN-PROGRESS
BURGLARY TO BUSINESS	VANDALISM PAST/SCHOOL
OPEN DOOR / WINDOW	VEHICLE THEFT
BURGLARY IN-PROGRESS	VEHICLE THEFT IN-PROGRESS
BURG IN PROG/SCHOOL	RECOVERED STOLEN VEHICLE
BURGLARY/PAST/SCHOOL	VEHICLE THEFT NEAR SCHOOL
LARCENY	TAMPERING WITH VEHICLE
LARCENY IN PROGRESS	UNAUTHORIZED USE

## **Disorder Crimes**


ALCOHOL VIOLATION	INTOXICATED NEAR SCHOOL
ALCOHOL VIOLATION-SCHOOL	LOITERING IN-PROGRESS
CURFEW VIOLATION	NOISE VIOLATION
DISORDERLY	LOUD PARTY
DISORDERLY IN-PROG/INJ	PAN HANDLING
DISORDERLY IN PROGRESS	TRESPASSER
DISORD IN PROG/SCHOOL	TRESPASSER IN-PROGRESS
DISORDERLY/PAST/SCHOOL	TRESPASSER NEAR SCHOOL
INTOXICATED IN PUBLIC	RECKLESS DRIVING

## **Drug Crimes and Driving Under the Influence**


DRUG RELATED  
DRUG RELATED NEAR SCHOOL  
OVERDOSE  
OVERDOSE NEAR SCHOOL  
DRIVING UNDER INFLUENCE  
DRIVING UI NEAR SCHOOL

## Distribution of CFS Outcome Variables:


### Person Calls:




### Property Calls:




Disorder Calls:



Drug-related Calls:



## DUI Calls:



## Descriptives for CFS Outcome Variables:

### CFS Descriptives for July 2007 Pre/Post Period (Weekly)

Jul-07		Person	Property	Disorder	Drug	DUI
Pre	Mean	272.24	320.91	333.56	24.17	16.83
	N	388	388	388	388	388
	SD	28.868	42.613	81.431	6.974	6.034
Post	Mean	249.82	316.98	414.88	26.04	29.08
	N	130	130	130	130	130
	SD	27.555	34.619	73.547	6.583	8.343
Total	Mean	266.62	319.92	353.97	24.64	19.91
	N	518	518	518	518	518
	SD	30.132	40.758	86.941	6.919	8.538

### CFS Descriptives for March 2008 Pre/Post Period (Weekly)

Mar-08		Person	Property	Disorder	Drug	DUI
Pre	Mean	270.51	320.79	336.97	24.17	17.39
	N	423	423	423	423	423
	SD	29.562	42.030	81.051	6.927	6.270
Post	Mean	249.27	316.07	429.64	26.74	31.12
	N	95	95	95	95	95
	SD	26.422	34.467	70.667	6.517	8.305
Total	Mean	266.62	319.92	353.97	24.64	19.91
	N	518	518	518	518	518
	SD	30.132	40.758	86.941	6.919	8.538



## Offense Reports

In addition to CFS data, we also utilized data from PWC's Records Management System (RMS). Although representing an initial filtered view of crime, as mentioned above, the use of RMS data allows us to examine specific crimes mostly commonly used as the barometer of an areas crime rate (namely, Part I offenses). Incidents in CFS data, while a more pure source of information, may not be readily classified into specific crime categories (e.g., simple versus aggravated assault). Using the RMS data, offenses were grouped into Part I Violence and Property crime categories as defined in the Uniform Crime Reports. Part I violence consists of aggravated assault, murder & non-negligent homicide, rape and robbery. Part I property consists of burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson. From the Part I offenses we also pulled out aggravated assaults and robberies for separate analyses. In addition to Part I violence we also looked at trends in simple assaults. We analyzed these trends via weekly trends from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2009:

Part I offense classifications were based on the UCR code, or in the absence of the code, the offense description:

### Part I Violence:


<b>UCR Codes:</b>	<b>Offense Descriptions:</b>
09A	ASSAULT
09A	ASSAULT/FELONY
11A	DOM VIO/FELONY
11A	HOMICIDE
120	HOMICIDE/DEATH
13A	RAPE
13A	ROBBERY
13A	SEX, FORCE

### Part I Property:


<b>UCR Codes:</b>	<b>Offense Descriptions:</b>
200	ARSON
220	BURGLARY
220	LARCENY / THEFT
240	MOTOR VEH THEFT
23A	
23B	
23C	
23D	
23E	
23F	
23G	
23H	

## Distribution of RMS Outcome Variables:


### Part I Violence:




### Part I Property:




### Aggravated Assault:



### Robbery:



## Simple Assault:



## Descriptives for RMS Outcome Variables:

### RMS Descriptives for July 2007 Pre/Post Period (Weekly)

Jul-07		P1 Violence	P1 Property	Aggravated Assault	Robbery	Simple Assault
Pre	Mean	18.11	147.70	8.29	4.69	41.52
	N	235	235	235	235	235
	SD	4.85	20.82	3.39	2.65	8.00
Post	Mean	16.53	149.98	6.15	5.13	48.14
	N	130	130	130	130	130
	SD	4.90	20.93	2.83	2.59	9.13
Total	Mean	17.55	148.51	7.53	4.85	43.88
	N	365	365	365	365	365
	SD	4.92	20.86	3.36	2.63	8.99

### RMS Descriptives for March 2008 Pre/Post Period (Weekly)

Mar-08		P1 Violence	P1 Property	Aggravated Assault	Robbery	Simple Assault
Pre	Mean	17.99	147.62	8.14	4.76	42.10
	N	270	270	270	270	270
	SD	4.87	20.43	3.41	2.59	8.12
Post	Mean	16.32	151.04	5.78	5.11	48.93
	N	95	95	95	95	95
	SD	4.89	21.96	2.51	2.75	9.45
Total	Mean	17.55	148.51	7.53	4.85	43.88
	N	365	365	365	365	365
	SD	4.92	20.86	3.36	2.63	8.99

Appendix E:  
**Time Series Model Details**



Each of our models was estimated using interrupted time series analysis (e.g., see McCleary and Hay, 1980). Each model was tested for stationarity via the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression test (e.g., see Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993: 702-715). We found that all series were stationary either around a mean or time trend. When appropriate, based on the ADF regression results, we included a time trend variable in the time series regression.<sup>21</sup> In addition, to account for seasonality, we have also included monthly dummy variables as controls.<sup>22</sup>

Before the introduction of our monthly controls, time trend (when appropriate), and intervention variables, we examined the auto-correlation functions of each series through 52 lags.<sup>23</sup> In general, the series followed a combined first-order auto-regressive, moving average process.<sup>24</sup> After determining the best way to control for auto-correlation, we estimated our intervention models. Because of collinearity between our two intervention terms we estimated separate models for impacts stemming from the July 2007 announcement of the policy and the March 2008 implementation of the policy.<sup>25</sup> Below we present the results for the CFS outcomes: person, property, disorder, DUI, and drugs; followed by RMS outcomes: Part I violence, Part I property, aggravated assault, robbery, and simple assault.

Our final models consist of particular areas of interest in Prince William Count, namely Manassas, Woodbridge, Up County (West), and Dumfries. These areas have a large Hispanic population relative to the rest of the county. With this in mind, the impact of the policy change might be more apparent in these areas.

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<sup>21</sup> We included a time trend term in each stationarity test. If it proved significant, we retained it in the corresponding model (see Elder and Kennedy, 2001).

<sup>22</sup> We estimated our models using JMP 7.0.1 software. JMP utilizes sum-to-zero coding for categorical, indicator, and dummy variables. Under this structure, an indicator variable is given a value of one for data rows matching the indicator, a value of zero for those that do not, and a value of -1 for the reference category. The resulting parameter estimates are interpreted in relation to the impact of the indicator compared to the average across all levels, with the effect of the reference category represented by taking the sum of all indicators \* -1. This coding also applies to dummy variables classified as categorical.

<sup>23</sup> The default in JMP is 25 lags. Because we had weekly trend data we expanded this to 52.

<sup>24</sup> For each series, we estimated a variety of models having autoregressive or moving average processes of the first or second order. However, we found that the mixed autoregressive, moving average models best fit the data as determined by rank-ordering of the Akaike's information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz's Bayesian criterion (SBC) fit measures. In several of these models, the autoregressive and moving average parameters were near their respective upper bounds of stationarity and invertibility (i.e., 1.0). This was likely due to high correlations between the terms, but they remained within their proper bounds and provided the best approximation of serial correlation in the data.

<sup>25</sup> We tested for abrupt, permanent impacts associated with the policy's announcement and implementation. Although methods exist for testing for gradual or temporary impacts (e.g., see McCleary and Hay, 1980), these sorts of impacts do not appear to fit the patterns in the data (shown above), and the parameters of such models can be difficult to estimate accurately (McDowall et al., 1996). From a policy perspective, we were also most interested in testing for permanent impacts.

## Calls for Service Time Series

### Person calls:

#### July 2007 Intervention

##### Model Summary

DF	503
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	4,706.37
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	4,770.12
RSquare	0.46
RSquare Adj	0.45
MAPE	6.78
MAE	17.80
-2LogLikelihood	4,676.37

#### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>-22.7738</b>	<b>4.138145</b>	<b>-5.5</b>	<b>&lt;.0001</b>
January	-15.0604	4.822265	-3.12	0.0019
February	-13.6868	5.077019	-2.7	0.0073
March	4.3287	5.06599	0.85	0.3933
April	18.0358	5.185097	3.48	0.0005
May	40.6715	5.231746	7.77	<.0001
June	31.6494	5.323955	5.94	<.0001
July	22.8502	5.200365	4.39	<.0001
August	15.1514	5.128337	2.95	0.0033
September	26.6141	5.107146	5.21	<.0001
October	31.2812	4.930115	6.34	<.0001
November	3.8681	4.664106	0.83	0.4073
AR(1)	0.9319	0.040929	22.77	<.0001
MA(1)	0.8657	0.055906	15.48	<.0001
Intercept	258.1692	4.074096	63.37	<.0001

#### March 2008 Intervention

##### Model Summary

DF	503
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	4708.9435
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	4772.6931
RSquare	0.4592275
RSquare Adj	0.4441762
MAPE	6.7996163
MAE	17.849854
-2LogLikelihood	4678.9435

#### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>-23.6579</b>	<b>4.994276</b>	<b>-4.74</b>	<b>&lt;.0001</b>
January	-15.354	4.867612	-3.15	0.0017
February	-13.7997	5.155429	-2.68	0.0077
March	6.4333	5.176605	1.24	0.2145
April	20.1418	5.301654	3.80	0.0002
May	42.5729	5.357052	7.95	<.0001
June	33.4999	5.452842	6.14	<.0001
July	22.7089	5.328545	4.26	<.0001



August	14.797	5.241294	2.82	0.0049
September	26.488	5.203181	5.09	<.0001
October	31.0463	5.001057	6.21	<.0001
November	3.9065	4.724363	0.83	0.4087
AR(1)	0.9352	0.036413	25.68	<.0001
MA(1)	0.8582	0.052622	16.31	<.0001
Intercept	256.2743	4.181722	61.28	<.0001

## Property Calls:

### July 2007 Intervention

#### Model Summary

DF	503
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	4987.3543
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	5051.1039
RSquare	0.4947005
RSquare Adj	0.4806365
MAPE	7.4118707
MAE	23.200339
-2LogLikelihood	4957.3543

### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>-3.2468</b>	<b>10.12816</b>	<b>-0.32</b>	<b>0.7487</b>
January	-13.6136	6.24719	-2.18	0.0298
February	-24.0001	6.64462	-3.61	0.0003
March	-3.4892	6.58796	-0.53	0.5966
April	9.581	6.9197	1.38	0.1668
May	11.9884	6.9577	1.72	0.0855
June	46.2693	7.05431	6.56	<.0001
July	60.2935	6.94274	8.68	<.0001
August	50.0577	6.82131	7.34	<.0001
September	14.646	6.74175	2.17	0.0303
October	16.3319	6.44875	2.53	0.0116
November	5.2641	6.1	0.86	0.3886
AR(1)	0.9801	0.01566	62.6	<.0001
MA(1)	0.8735	0.03905	22.37	<.0001
Intercept	301.6472	9.72003	31.03	<.0001

### March 2008 Intervention

#### Model Summary

DF	503
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	4,986.11
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	5,049.86
RSquare	0.50
RSquare Adj	0.48
MAPE	7.40
MAE	23.17
-2LogLikelihood	4,956.11

**Parameter Estimates**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std Error</b>	<b>t Ratio</b>	<b>Prob&gt; t </b>
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>-13.1936</b>	<b>11.48837</b>	<b>-1.15</b>	<b>0.2513</b>
January	-13.9014	6.25472	-2.22	0.0267
February	-24.3137	6.62357	-3.67	0.0003
March	-2.5972	6.43222	-0.4	0.6866
April	10.4982	6.92005	1.52	0.1299
May	12.7529	6.92507	1.84	0.0661
June	46.9544	7.03731	6.67	<.0001
July	60.6086	6.95416	8.72	<.0001
August	50.2524	6.83324	7.35	<.0001
September	14.8142	6.76687	2.19	0.029
October	16.4025	6.46092	2.54	0.0114
November	5.2986	6.16656	0.86	0.3906
AR(1)	0.9793	0.01543	63.48	<.0001
MA(1)	0.8715	0.03756	23.2	<.0001
Intercept	303.5947	9.17966	33.07	<.0001

**Disorder Calls:<sup>26</sup>****July 2007 Intervention****Model Summary**

DF	502
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	5300.3409
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	5368.3405
RSquare	0.7975281
RSquare Adj	0.7914782
MAPE	8.9547864
MAE	30.429027
-2LogLikelihood	5268.3409

**Parameter Estimates**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std Error</b>	<b>t Ratio</b>	<b>Prob&gt; t </b>
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>-16.5427</b>	<b>17.23573</b>	<b>-0.96</b>	<b>0.3376</b>
Time Trend	0.3154	0.05765	5.47	<.0001
January	-16.931	8.48177	-2	0.0465
February	-2.0588	8.81377	-0.23	0.8154
March	59.0726	8.79252	6.72	<.0001
April	111.8696	8.93359	12.52	<.0001
May	145.4581	8.95408	16.24	<.0001
June	161.0291	9.11556	17.67	<.0001
July	133.9129	9.01096	14.86	<.0001
August	107.4933	8.85523	12.14	<.0001
September	130.1735	8.86228	14.69	<.0001
October	87.4922	8.55947	10.22	<.0001
November	30.0904	8.29684	3.63	0.0003
AR(1)	0.9832	0.01351	72.8	<.0001
MA(1)	0.9095	0.02681	33.93	<.0001
Intercept	199.8938	17.25131	11.59	<.0001

<sup>26</sup> Due to the upward trend in the disorder data, we also estimated models with the data transformed into first differences. These models also did not show any reductions associated with the policy (if anything, they suggested that disorder increased following the policy's implementation in March 2008).

### March 2008 Intervention Model Summary

DF	502
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	5,299.88
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	5,367.88
RSquare	0.80
RSquare Adj	0.79
MAPE	8.96
MAE	30.48
-2LogLikelihood	5,267.88

### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>-20.2685</b>	<b>17.38374</b>	<b>-1.17</b>	<b>0.2442</b>
Time Trend	0.3171	0.05792	5.47	<.0001
January	-17.2131	8.24491	-2.09	0.0373
February	-2.2361	7.77577	-0.29	0.7738
March	60.8129	8.60776	7.06	<.0001
April	113.7258	8.77874	12.95	<.0001
May	147.2028	8.76373	16.8	<.0001
June	162.7092	8.93044	18.22	<.0001
July	134.0276	8.80618	15.22	<.0001
August	107.4303	8.64455	12.43	<.0001
September	130.1788	8.66156	15.03	<.0001
October	87.42	8.36273	10.45	<.0001
November	30.1215	8.10525	3.72	0.0002
AR(1)	0.9841	0.0125	78.73	<.0001
MA(1)	0.9084	0.02502	36.31	<.0001
Intercept	199.0979	17.88106	11.13	<.0001

### Drug Calls:

### July 2007 Intervention Model Summary

DF	503
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	3336.0442
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	3399.7939
RSquare	0.2762775
RSquare Adj	0.2561341
MAPE	21.367214
MAE	4.733009
-2LogLikelihood	3306.0442

### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>0.703649</b>	<b>1.904782</b>	<b>0.37</b>	<b>0.7120</b>
January	1.277199	1.267999	1.01	0.3143
February	5.410046	1.323073	4.09	<.0001
March	7.148079	1.319205	5.42	<.0001
April	8.294497	1.341133	6.18	<.0001
May	9.301858	1.342265	6.93	<.0001
June	7.960277	1.363391	5.84	<.0001

July	8.03603	1.347744	5.96	<.0001
August	6.026965	1.331048	4.53	<.0001
September	8.358738	1.327535	6.30	<.0001
October	7.197634	1.284052	5.61	<.0001
November	2.936276	1.247008	2.35	0.0189
AR(1)	0.979941	0.01548	63.30	<.0001
MA(1)	0.909627	0.029275	31.07	<.0001
Intercept	18.878665	1.58655	11.90	<.0001

### March 2008 Intervention Model Summary

DF	503
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	3336.0911
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	3399.8407
RSquare	0.2762293
RSquare Adj	0.2560846
MAPE	21.375987
MAE	4.7345956
-2LogLikelihood	3306.0911

### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>0.57514</b>	<b>1.944083</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.7675</b>
January	1.279291	1.265423	1.01	0.3125
February	5.406556	1.322472	4.09	<.0001
March	7.08862	1.319277	5.37	<.0001
April	8.231682	1.342151	6.13	<.0001
May	9.239325	1.340799	6.89	<.0001
June	7.899528	1.362388	5.8	<.0001
July	8.041293	1.345857	5.97	<.0001
August	6.037404	1.328381	4.54	<.0001
September	8.364125	1.325829	6.31	<.0001
October	7.204073	1.283053	5.61	<.0001
November	2.936342	1.24789	2.35	0.019
AR(1)	0.980459	0.01524	64.34	<.0001
MA(1)	0.910272	0.029103	31.28	<.0001
Intercept	18.978515	1.542123	12.31	<.0001

## DUI Calls

### July 2007 Intervention Model Summary

DF	502.00
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	3244.40
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	3312.40
RSquare	0.60
RSquare Adj	0.59
MAPE	25.19
MAE	4.22
-2LogLikelihood	3212.40

### Parameter Estimates

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std Error</b>	<b>t Ratio</b>	<b>Prob&gt; t </b>
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>-0.175</b>	<b>1.185</b>	<b>-0.150</b>	<b>0.8824</b>
Time Trend	0.041	0.007	6.120	<.0001
January	-6.670	1.117	-5.970	<.0001
February	-3.581	1.150	-3.110	0.0020
March	-2.937	1.133	-2.590	0.0098
April	-0.924	1.129	-0.820	0.4139
May	-0.363	1.084	-0.340	0.7378
June	-0.947	1.151	-0.820	0.4110
July	-0.859	1.120	-0.770	0.4432
August	-0.323	1.083	-0.300	0.7660
September	-2.947	1.135	-2.600	0.0097
October	-2.945	1.111	-2.650	0.0083
November	-2.936	1.096	-2.680	0.0076
AR(1)	0.987	0.011	87.500	<.0001
MA(1)	0.932	0.023	40.810	<.0001
Intercept	12.123	2.143	5.660	<.0001

### **March 2008 Intervention<sup>27</sup>**

#### **Model Summary**

DF	503
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	3253.1
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	3316.8497
RSquare	0.5967277
RSquare Adj	0.5855034
MAPE	24.743266
MAE	4.223277
-2LogLikelihood	3223.1

#### **Parameter Estimates**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std Error</b>	<b>t Ratio</b>	<b>Prob&gt; t </b>
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>1.34937</b>	<b>2.228701</b>	<b>0.61</b>	<b>0.5452</b>
January	-6.79811	1.162444	-5.85	<.0001
February	-3.67506	1.199209	-3.06	0.0023
March	-3.14085	1.198687	-2.62	0.0091
April	-1.10351	1.203017	-0.92	0.3594
May	-0.52138	1.234463	-0.42	0.6729
June	-1.0739	1.21408	-0.88	0.3768
July	-0.97233	1.206714	-0.81	0.4208
August	-0.40611	1.159918	-0.35	0.7264
September	-3.00229	1.190083	-2.52	0.0120
October	-2.97348	1.158952	-2.57	0.0106
November	-2.95111	1.139127	-2.59	0.0099

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<sup>27</sup> Although our tests for stationarity suggested that this series had a time trend, we experienced some difficulties with estimation when including a time trend with the March 2008 model (the model presented above contains no time trend). Nonetheless, the model with the time trend suggested that there was a statistically significant increase in DUI calls after the policy was implemented. As an additional test, we de-trended the DUI series by regressing it on a time trend, the seasonal indicators, and the terms for autocorrelation. We saved the residuals from this model and used a t-test to examine differences in the average value of the residual series during the pre-intervention and post-intervention periods. The results of these tests also indicated that the residual series had higher values during the post-intervention period, but these differences were not statistically significant. In sum, all tests with this series indicated that the policy did not reduce DUI calls.

AR(1)	0.99873	0.001702	586.88	0.0000
MA(1)	0.92422	0.016814	54.97	<.0001
Intercept	23.86548	7.254274	3.29	0.0011

## RMS Time Series:

### Part I Violence Incidents:

#### July 2007 Model Summary

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	2182.96
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	2241.46
RSquare	0.12
RSquare Adj	0.08
MAPE	24.32
MAE	3.71
-2LogLikelihood	2152.96

#### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>-1.83902</b>	<b>0.748751</b>	<b>-2.46</b>	<b>0.0145</b>
January	1.85245	1.19014	1.56	0.1205
February	-1.25637	1.241653	-1.01	0.3123
March	1.72178	1.225071	1.41	0.1608
April	1.30203	1.227771	1.06	0.2897
May	1.06777	1.241597	0.86	0.3904
June	2.29836	1.249207	1.84	0.0666
July	4.02726	1.235855	3.26	0.0012
August	2.88127	1.23049	2.34	0.0198
September	1.70598	1.236746	1.38	0.1686
October	3.73235	1.191166	3.13	0.0019
November	2.07256	1.17453	1.76	0.0785
AR(1)	0.916	0.093387	9.81	<.0001
MA(1)	0.87295	0.114076	7.65	<.0001
Intercept	16.3932	0.9442	17.36	<.0001

#### March 2008 Intervention

##### Model Summary

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	2183.2084
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	2241.7068
RSquare	0.1153905
RSquare Adj	0.0800061
MAPE	24.273504
MAE	3.7036344
-2LogLikelihood	2153.2084

**Parameter Estimates**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std Error</b>	<b>t Ratio</b>	<b>Prob&gt; t </b>
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>-1.93797</b>	<b>0.827927</b>	<b>-2.34</b>	<b>0.0198</b>
January	1.82213	1.199681	1.52	0.1297
February	-1.2739	1.258267	-1.01	0.3120
March	1.96986	1.236134	1.59	0.1119
April	1.5553	1.245624	1.25	0.2126
May	1.31465	1.258525	1.04	0.2969
June	2.53959	1.263358	2.01	0.0452
July	4.02249	1.252199	3.21	0.0014
August	2.84206	1.24397	2.28	0.0229
September	1.69462	1.25293	1.35	0.1771
October	3.70543	1.201666	3.08	0.0022
November	2.06238	1.183555	1.74	0.0823
AR(1)	0.91753	0.080417	11.41	<.0001
MA(1)	0.87081	0.099356	8.76	<.0001
Intercept	16.17744	0.939047	17.23	<.0001

**Part I Property Incidents:****July 2007 Intervention****Model Summary**

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	3112.9297
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	3171.4281
RSquare	0.3719206
RSquare Adj	0.3467975
MAPE	9.4020846
MAE	13.698081
-2LogLikelihood	3082.9297

**Parameter Estimates**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std Error</b>	<b>t Ratio</b>	<b>Prob&gt; t </b>
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>1.8545</b>	<b>4.251189</b>	<b>0.44</b>	<b>0.6629</b>
January	-6.4777	4.423461	-1.46	0.144
February	-14.667	4.909141	-2.99	0.003
March	-8.794	5.005798	-1.76	0.0798
April	-6.6255	5.147571	-1.29	0.1989
May	1.8181	5.259849	0.35	0.7298
June	17.5704	5.174627	3.4	0.0008
July	24.3293	5.06883	4.8	<.0001
August	15.6273	4.982317	3.14	0.0019
September	4.8585	4.916372	0.99	0.3237
October	8.5984	4.547314	1.89	0.0595
November	-0.5732	4.063373	-0.14	0.8879
AR(1)	0.9207	0.055376	16.63	<.0001
MA(1)	0.8021	0.08583	9.35	<.0001
Intercept	145.0848	4.214342	34.43	<.0001

### March 2008 Intervention

#### Model Summary

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	3113.118
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	3171.6164
RSquare	0.371581
RSquare Adj	0.3464443
MAPE	9.3978515
MAE	13.695973
-2LogLikelihood	3083.118

#### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>-0.2623</b>	<b>2.555201</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>0.9183</b>
January	-6.6156	4.407159	-1.5	0.1342
February	-14.8223	4.872674	-3.04	0.0025
March	-8.9501	4.93238	-1.81	0.0704
April	-6.771	5.036637	-1.34	0.1797
May	1.6327	5.069999	0.32	0.7476
June	17.3691	5.084096	3.42	0.0007
July	24.3868	5.038967	4.84	<.0001
August	15.6801	4.963852	3.16	0.0017
September	4.9211	4.922441	1	0.3181
October	8.6441	4.576117	1.89	0.0597
November	-0.5767	4.123578	-0.14	0.8889
AR(1)	0.9176	0.0569	16.13	<.0001
MA(1)	0.7986	0.088253	9.05	<.0001
Intercept	145.8716	3.863899	37.75	<.0001

### Aggravated Assault Incidents:

#### July 2007 Intervention Only

#### Model Summary

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	1860.7203
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	1919.2187
RSquare	0.2159513
RSquare Adj	0.1845893
MAPE	45.294207
MAE	2.3519766
-2LogLikelihood	1830.7203

#### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>-2.247073</b>	<b>0.6543902</b>	<b>-3.43</b>	<b>0.0007</b>
January	-0.452103	0.7530279	-0.6	0.5486
February	-1.088065	0.7895558	-1.38	0.1691
March	1.053685	0.777786	1.35	0.1764
April	1.062129	0.7845384	1.35	0.1767
May	1.327448	0.7925268	1.67	0.0948
June	1.322361	0.7923703	1.67	0.096



July	2.142316	0.7824715	2.74	0.0065
August	2.505741	0.778743	3.22	0.0014
September	0.93281	0.7821049	1.19	0.2338
October	2.424704	0.7543845	3.21	0.0014
November	1.467969	0.7518376	1.95	0.0517
AR(1)	0.966456	0.0247843	38.99	<.0001
MA(1)	0.920089	0.035599	25.85	<.0001
Intercept	7.276465	0.6803059	10.7	<.0001

#### March 2008 Intervention Model Summary

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	1860.65
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	1919.15
RSquare	0.22
RSquare Adj	0.18
MAPE	45.29
MAE	2.37
-2LogLikelihood	1830.65

#### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>-2.407151</b>	<b>0.6445838</b>	<b>-3.73</b>	<b>0.0002</b>
January	-0.479952	0.7589667	-0.63	0.5276
February	-1.106823	0.7891058	-1.4	0.1616
March	1.359062	0.7769531	1.75	0.0811
April	1.386035	0.7820114	1.77	0.0772
May	1.648928	0.7910635	2.08	0.0378
June	1.623491	0.790497	2.05	0.0407
July	2.151146	0.7826396	2.75	0.0063
August	2.466107	0.7795095	3.16	0.0017
September	0.920605	0.7823516	1.18	0.2401
October	2.399243	0.7552129	3.18	0.0016
November	1.458641	0.7528083	1.94	0.0535
AR(1)	0.959553	0.0344892	27.82	<.0001
MA(1)	0.916918	0.0465032	19.72	<.0001
Intercept	7.020671	0.6283491	11.17	<.0001

#### Robbery Incidents:

For robbery, we present multiple sets of analyses. The first set of time series regression models shown below include a time trend, seasonal indicators, and an indicator for the post-policy period as defined based on either the July 2007 or March 2008 intervention date. These models suggest that robbery declined significantly in the post-policy period. However, the correlation between the intervention term and the time trend was approximately -0.8 in each model. This indicates that the time trend and intervention indicators are highly collinear and suggests that the coefficients and statistical tests for these variables may not be reliable.

In light of this, we tested the sensitivity of the robbery results in two additional ways. First, we estimated models without the time trend terms. These models are also presented below. With the time trend removed, the intervention effects were positive and statistically non-significant. Although the model fit measures were better for the time trend models, the models without a time trend were statistically adequate (i.e., they had no remaining residual autocorrelation) and are arguably preferable on the basis of parsimony.

Second, we de-trended the robbery series by regressing it on a time trend, the seasonal indicators, and the autoregressive and moving average terms. We saved the residuals from this model and used a t-test to examine differences in the average value of the residual series during the pre-intervention and post-intervention periods. The results of these tests (not shown) indicated that the residual series had lower values during the post-intervention period but that these differences were not statistically significant.

On balance, our judgment is that the policy has not been clearly associated with a reduction in robbery. This conclusion also fits the basic pattern in the descriptive pre-post statistics presented above, which show an increase in robbery during the post-intervention period. Because of the variability in the robbery estimates, we do not highlight them in Chapter 8, though we note that our analysis of robbery produced inconclusive results.

#### **July 2007 Intervention with Time Trend Model Summary**

DF	349
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	1707.17
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	1769.57
RSquare	0.17
RSquare Adj	0.13
MAPE	.
MAE	1.95
-2LogLikelihood	1675.17

#### **Parameter Estimates**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std Error</b>	<b>t Ratio</b>	<b>Prob&gt; t </b>
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>-1.640231</b>	<b>0.5834288</b>	<b>-2.81</b>	<b>0.0052</b>
Time Trend	0.010787	0.0026468	4.08	<.0001
January	1.556009	0.614216	2.53	0.0117
February	-0.972817	0.6464421	-1.5	0.1333
March	-1.150159	0.6364545	-1.81	0.0716
April	-0.804006	0.6332784	-1.27	0.2051
May	-0.677602	0.6385627	-1.06	0.2894
June	-0.107076	0.5740634	-0.19	0.8521
July	1.256435	0.6336511	1.98	0.0482
August	-0.694339	0.6322685	-1.1	0.2729
September	-0.197696	0.6309247	-0.31	0.7542
October	0.562843	0.6194097	0.91	0.3641
November	0.437654	0.6064721	0.72	0.471
AR(1)	0.738524	0.166886	4.43	<.0001
MA(1)	0.673651	0.1806833	3.73	0.0002
Intercept	3.508074	0.5573377	6.29	<.0001

#### **March 2008 Intervention with Time Trend Model Summary**

DF	349
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	1710.3033
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	1772.7017
RSquare	0.1591475
RSquare Adj	0.1230077
MAPE	.
MAE	1.9424569
-2LogLikelihood	1678.3033

# Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>-1.159746</b>	<b>0.5954636</b>	<b>-1.95</b>	<b>0.0523</b>
Time Trend	0.008349	0.0024931	3.35	0.0009
January	1.508558	0.6294286	2.4	0.0171
February	-1.005087	0.6688718	-1.5	0.1338
March	-1.009178	0.6622019	-1.52	0.1284
April	-0.656245	0.6643387	-0.99	0.3239
May	-0.493721	0.6668244	-0.74	0.4596
June	0.072979	0.6268424	0.12	0.9074
July	1.217434	0.6614003	1.84	0.0665
August	-0.75716	0.6590989	-1.15	0.2514
September	-0.22912	0.6621335	-0.35	0.7295
October	0.52854	0.645648	0.82	0.4136
November	0.43205	0.6263441	0.69	0.4908
AR(1)	0.785552	0.1363256	5.76	<.0001
MA(1)	0.708024	0.1540451	4.6	<.0001
Intercept	3.637426	0.5963337	6.1	<.0001

## July 2007 Intervention - No Time Trend Model Summary

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	1716.2131
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	1774.7115
RSquare	0.1411861
RSquare Adj	0.1068335
MAPE	.
MAE	1.9716096
-2LogLikelihood	1686.2131

# Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>0.197817</b>	<b>0.678468</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>0.7708</b>
January	1.352407	0.6265964	2.16	0.0316
February	-1.129788	0.6512445	-1.73	0.0837
March	-1.245471	0.6426156	-1.94	0.0534
April	-0.866961	0.6492826	-1.34	0.1827
May	-0.736476	0.6704103	-1.1	0.2727
June	-0.122254	0.6367641	-0.19	0.8479
July	1.058214	0.6458869	1.64	0.1022
August	-0.877571	0.6388611	-1.37	0.1704
September	-0.355151	0.6361507	-0.56	0.577
October	0.416339	0.6149172	0.68	0.4988
November	0.373788	0.6065485	0.62	0.5381
AR(1)	0.961535	0.0653049	14.72	<.0001
MA(1)	0.901722	0.1109695	8.13	<.0001
Intercept	4.908337	0.5918205	8.29	<.0001

**March 2008 Intervention - No Time Trend**  
**Model Summary**

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	1716.1332
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	1774.6316
RSquare	0.1414
RSquare Adj	0.1071
MAPE	.
MAE	1.9747
-2LogLikelihood	1686.1332

**Parameter Estimates**

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>0.257981</b>	<b>0.629555</b>	<b>0.41</b>	<b>0.6822</b>
January	1.353258	0.6401958	2.11	0.0352
February	-1.128153	0.6636407	-1.7	0.09
March	-1.27792	0.6566995	-1.95	0.0525
April	-0.901487	0.6666412	-1.35	0.1772
May	-0.77278	0.676951	-1.14	0.2544
June	-0.155286	0.7038651	-0.22	0.8255
July	1.052197	0.6686719	1.57	0.1165
August	-0.877046	0.6598729	-1.33	0.1847
September	-0.357318	0.6607243	-0.54	0.589
October	0.414929	0.6328123	0.66	0.5125
November	0.372959	0.6285028	0.59	0.5533
AR(1)	0.964808	0.0542507	17.78	<.0001
MA(1)	0.907782	0.0945364	9.6	<.0001
Intercept	4.918369	0.5713017	8.61	<.0001

**Simple Assault Incidents:**

**July 2007 Intervention**  
**Model Summary**

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	2572.0514
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	2630.5498
RSquare	0.2312172
RSquare Adj	0.2004659
MAPE	15.395642
MAE	6.3839432
-2LogLikelihood	2542.0514

**Parameter Estimates**

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>5.622957</b>	<b>2.519729</b>	<b>2.23</b>	<b>0.0263</b>
January	0.216582	1.748263	0.12	0.9015
February	3.166296	2.004284	1.58	0.1151
March	3.865084	1.98524	1.95	0.0523

April	3.751031	2.001706	1.87	0.0618
May	7.814942	2.029428	3.85	0.0001
June	4.870055	2.033302	2.4	0.0171
July	1.121303	1.981461	0.57	0.5718
August	1.357188	1.983903	0.68	0.4944
September	5.576421	2.009399	2.78	0.0058
October	6.948237	1.935529	3.59	0.0004
November	2.169362	1.917474	1.13	0.2587
AR(1)	0.974318	0.027227	35.78	<.0001
MA(1)	0.925001	0.035146	26.32	<.0001
Intercept	38.86219	2.12434	18.29	<.0001

### March 2008 Intervention Model Summary

DF	349
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	2571.986
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	2634.3844
RSquare	0.236863
RSquare Adj	0.2040634
MAPE	15.386662
MAE	6.3480073
-2LogLikelihood	2539.986

### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>-3.98171</b>	<b>3.281345</b>	<b>-1.21</b>	<b>0.2258</b>
Time Trend	0.03912	0.018535	2.11	0.0355
January	0.36232	2.110348	0.17	0.8638
February	3.20858	2.097329	1.53	0.127
March	4.35128	2.087563	2.08	0.0379
April	4.16998	2.095463	1.99	0.0474
May	8.0014	2.102211	3.81	0.0002
June	4.99382	2.094436	2.38	0.0176
July	1.86459	2.066604	0.9	0.3675
August	2.00548	2.048669	0.98	0.3283
September	6.05036	2.066561	2.93	0.0036
October	7.28522	1.994174	3.65	0.0003
November	2.34845	1.992747	1.18	0.2394
AR(1)	0.99189	0.007708	128.68	<.0001
MA(1)	0.93823	0.017994	52.14	<.0001
Intercept	35.85346	4.288151	8.36	<.0001

## Analyses for Specific Areas of Interest

The models below were estimated using data from PWCPD patrol beats corresponding to Woodbridge, Dumfries, and areas in and around Manassas. For these areas, we present models only for total Part I violence and aggravated assault. As a caveat, estimation of models for aggravated assault posed some difficulties due to the small number of assaults per week in these areas. We found it difficult to completely remove autocorrelation from distant lags in the aggravated assault models, but the estimated effects from the policy were consistent across models using different error term structures.

## Part I Violence

### July 2007 Intervention

#### Model Summary

DF	352
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	1984.8888
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	2035.5875
RSquare	0.0799425
RSquare Adj	0.0485769
MAPE	30.895616
MAE	2.8804406
-2LogLikelihood	1958.8888

#### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>-0.93873</b>	<b>0.3918938</b>	<b>-2.4</b>	<b>0.0171</b>
Jan	1.28658	0.9169535	1.4	0.1615
Feb	-0.90769	0.9739556	-0.93	0.352
Mar	1.03179	0.9514081	1.08	0.2789
Apr	0.93107	0.9505015	0.98	0.328
May	0.55062	0.9563356	0.58	0.5651
June	1.65062	0.9592636	1.72	0.0862
July	2.60058	0.9499067	2.74	0.0065
Aug	2.24772	0.950124	2.37	0.0185
Sept	1.50708	0.9566987	1.58	0.1161
Oct	2.31026	0.949819	2.43	0.0155
Nov	2.34245	0.9569691	2.45	0.0149
Intercept	10.53304	0.7261857	14.5	<.0001

### March 2008 Intervention

#### Model Summary

DF	352
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	1985.5617
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	2036.2604
RSquare	0.0782448
RSquare Adj	0.0468214
MAPE	30.900488
MAE	2.8873621
-2LogLikelihood	1959.5617

#### Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>-0.95917</b>	<b>0.4268582</b>	<b>-2.25</b>	<b>0.0253</b>
January	1.24322	0.918532	1.35	0.1768
February	-0.93277	0.9759232	-0.96	0.3398
March	1.14317	0.9498488	1.2	0.2296
April	1.04377	0.950175	1.1	0.2727
May	0.66218	0.9555011	0.69	0.4888

June	1.76218	0.9577412	1.84	0.0666
July	2.59215	0.9503354	2.73	0.0067
August	2.20769	0.9512442	2.32	0.0209
September	1.49415	0.9572819	1.56	0.1195
October	2.27089	0.9506947	2.39	0.0174
November	2.32884	0.9585245	2.43	0.0156
Intercept	10.42693	0.7190693	14.5	<.0001

### **Aggravated Assault**

#### **July 2007 Intervention**

##### **Model Summary**

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	1677.6764
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	1736.1748
RSquare	0.1709896
RSquare Adj	0.1378292
MAPE	.
MAE	1.8567439
-2LogLikelihood	1647.6764

##### **Parameter Estimates**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std Error</b>	<b>t Ratio</b>	<b>Prob&gt; t </b>
<b>July 2007 Intervention</b>	<b>-1.565497</b>	<b>0.3840189</b>	<b>-4.08</b>	<b>&lt;.0001</b>
January	-0.017331	0.2403357	-0.07	0.9426
February	-0.824436	0.554378	-1.49	0.1379
March	0.855468	0.5489757	1.56	0.1201
April	0.746637	0.5533086	1.35	0.1781
May	0.884729	0.5667524	1.56	0.1194
June	0.611106	0.5683482	1.08	0.283
July	1.362695	0.5616359	2.43	0.0158
August	1.776246	0.5607899	3.17	0.0017
September	0.662606	0.5614039	1.18	0.2387
October	1.911576	0.5460764	3.5	0.0005
November	1.456255	0.5405356	2.69	0.0074
AR(1)	0.9296	0.087692	10.6	<.0001
MA(1)	0.88866	0.1094728	8.12	<.0001
Intercept	4.703548	0.3947941	11.91	<.0001

#### **March 2008 Intervention**

##### **Model Summary**

DF	350
Akaike's 'A' Information Criterion	1678.3738
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion	1736.8723
RSquare	0.169346
RSquare Adj	0.1361198
MAPE	.
MAE	1.8639235
-2LogLikelihood	1648.3738

# Parameter Estimates

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
<b>March 2008 Intervention</b>	<b>-1.668308</b>	<b>0.396934</b>	<b>-4.2</b>	<b>&lt;.0001</b>
January	-0.033871	0.3609592	-0.09	0.9253
February	-0.835952	0.5861043	-1.43	0.1547
March	1.07858	0.5951156	1.81	0.0708
April	0.95757	0.593782	1.61	0.1077
May	1.082333	0.6120008	1.77	0.0778
June	0.798944	0.621581	1.29	0.1995
July	1.368903	0.5984185	2.29	0.0228
August	1.761874	0.6105157	2.89	0.0041
September	0.687712	0.6436824	1.07	0.2861
October	1.881176	0.5811646	3.24	0.0013
November	1.421538	0.6173515	2.3	0.0219
AR(1)	0.866978	0.4942581	1.75	0.0803
MA(1)	0.815366	0.5846465	1.39	0.164
Intercept	4.515672	0.4058079	11.13	<.0001



Appendix F:  
**Prince William County Zoning Ordinance**



**Prince William County Zoning Ordinance**  
**Article III. Agricultural and Residential Districts**  
**Part 300. General Regulations**

**Sec. 32-300.13. Limitation on Occupancy of a Dwelling Unit.**

1. A dwelling unit may be occupied by not more than one (1) of the following:
  - (a) One (1) person or two (2) or more persons related by blood or marriage with any number of offspring, foster children, step children or adopted children subject to the maximum occupancy limitations in subsection (2) and not to exceed two (2) roomers or boarders as permitted by Sec. 32-300.02.18, "Accessory Uses - Boarders/Lodgers".
  - (b) Two (2) single parents or guardians with their dependent children, including offspring, foster children, step children, or adopted children, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit.
  - (c) A group of not more than three (3) persons not necessarily related by blood or marriage living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit; provided that the limitation on the number of unrelated persons shall not apply to residents in a housekeeping unit by persons having handicaps within the meaning of Section 3602 of the Fair Housing Act (43 USC 3601, *et seq.*, as amended).
  - (d) Those groups identified in the Fair Housing Act, Section 15.2-2291, VA Code Ann., or like groups licensed by the Virginia Department of Social Services which otherwise meet the criteria of Section 15.2-2291, VA Code Ann.
2. The maximum occupancy of a single family dwelling unit is as follows:
  - i. For a dwelling with a total finished area up to 1,000 square feet, no more than 3 adult occupants.
  - ii. For a dwelling with a total finished area from 1,001 square feet to 1500 square feet, no more than 4 adult occupants.
  - iii. For a dwelling with a total finished area from 1501 square feet to 2,000 square feet, no more than 5 adult occupants.
  - iv. For a dwelling with a total finished area from 2001 square feet to 2500 square feet, no more than 6 adult occupants.
  - v. For a dwelling with a total finished area from 2501 square feet to 3000 square feet, no more than 7 adult occupants.
  - vi. For a dwelling with a total finished area from 3001 square feet to 3500 square feet, no more than 8 adult occupants.
  - vii. For a dwelling with a total finished area from 3501 square feet to 4000 square feet, no more than 9 adult occupants.
  - viii. For a dwelling unit over 4000 square feet of total finished area, no more than 10 adult occupants.

3. The total finished area (plus finished basement area) listed in the County residential property record card shall be prima facie evidence, subject to rebuttal, of the actual total finished living area for purposes of this section.
4. For dwelling units on private septic systems, the standards of the Virginia Department of Health relative to occupancy load supersede the dwelling unit standards of this section.

## **Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code**

### **Part Three – Existing Structures**

#### **(2006 International Property Maintenance Code)**

**404.4 Bedroom requirements.** Every bedroom shall comply with the requirements of Sections 404.4.1 through 404.4.5.

**404.4.1 Area for sleeping purposes.** Every living room shall contain at least 120 square feet and every bedroom shall contain at least 70 square feet and every bedroom occupied by more than one person shall contain at least 50 square feet of floor area for each occupant thereof.

**404.4.2 Access from bedrooms.** Bedrooms shall not constitute the only means of access to other bedrooms or habitable spaces and shall not serve as the only means of egress from other habitable spaces. **Exception:** Units that contain fewer than two bedrooms.

**404.4.3 Water closet accessibility.** Every bedroom shall have access to at least one water closet and one lavatory without passing through another bedroom. Every bedroom in a dwelling unit shall have access to at least one water closet and lavatory located in the same story as the bedroom or an adjacent story.

**404.4.4 Prohibited occupancy.** Kitchens and nonhabitable spaces shall not be used for sleeping purposes.

**404.4.5 Other requirements.** Bedrooms shall comply with the applicable provisions of this code including, but not limited to, the light, ventilation, room area, ceiling height and room width requirements of this chapter; the plumbing facilities and water-heating facilities requirements of Chapter 5; the heating facilities and electrical receptacle requirements of Chapter 6; and the smoke detector and emergency escape requirements of Chapter 7.

**404.5 Overcrowding.** Dwelling units shall not be occupied by more occupants than permitted by the minimum area requirements of Table 404.5.

**TABLE 404.5  
MINIMUM AREA REQUIREMENTS**

SPACE	MINIMUM AREA IN SQUARE FEET		
	1-2 occupants	3-5 occupants	6 or more occupants
Living room <sup>a,b</sup>	No requirements	120	150
Dining room <sup>a,b</sup>	No requirements	80	100
Bedrooms	Shall comply with Section 404.4		



For SI: 1 square foot = 0.093 m<sup>2</sup>.

a. See Section 404.5.2 for combined living room/dining room spaces.

b. See Section 404.5.1 for limitations on determining the minimum occupancy area for sleeping purposes.

**404.5.1 Sleeping area.** The minimum occupancy area required by Table 404.5 shall not be included as a sleeping area in determining the minimum occupancy area for sleeping purposes. All sleeping areas shall comply with Section 404.4.

**404.5.2 Combined spaces.** Combined living room and dining room spaces shall comply with the requirements of Table 404.5 if the total area is equal to that required for separate rooms and if the space is located so as to function as a combination living room/dining room.



Appendix G:  
**Summary of Methods, 2008 PWC Citizen Survey**





This appendix offers a brief summary of the methods used in the 2008 Prince William County Citizen Survey, conducted by the University of Virginia Center for Survey Research. For more complete documentation of the methods, including the weighting scheme and disposition reports, see Appendix B of the full survey report.<sup>28</sup> The methods used in the 2009 and 2010 Citizen Surveys are very similar, and are fully described in the separate report for each survey.

The 2008 survey is one of an annual series of sample surveys conducted by CSR for the County since 1993. As with previous years' surveys, the 2008 survey was conducted by telephone in order to ensure the broadest possible representation of results. For most households, CSR employed a random-digit dialing method that ensures that all households in the county with landline telephones were equally likely to be selected for interviews; for most others CSR utilized the electronic white pages. According to respondents, about 21.5 percent of calls were to unlisted numbers; the majority of these (91.5%) had chosen an unlisted number, as opposed to other unlisted households whose number had simply not yet appeared in the latest phone book. Finally, a third sample segment was contacted via cellphone.

This was the first year that the survey included a cellphone sample component, although CSR had conducted a separate, experimental study of cellphone sampling in the county in early 2008.<sup>29</sup> CSR prepared a separate, supplemental report that considers the impact on the 2008 results of adding the cellphone sample.<sup>30</sup> That report shows that a few questions, including satisfaction with the Police Department, would not have changed significantly if the 2008 survey had used the same, landline-based sampling method that was used in the 2007 survey. However, because cellphone respondents were included, the 2008 results were more closely representative of the county's demographic characteristics, as seen in the U.S. Census reports of the American Community Survey.

All the 2008 survey interviews were conducted from CSR's Computer-Aided Telephone Interviewing (CATI) laboratory in Charlottesville, Virginia. Production interviews were conducted from April 29 to July 25, 2008. The interviewing staff was composed of carefully trained personnel, most of whom had prior experience as CSR interviewers, and a number of whom were already familiar with the Prince William County survey specifically. A total of 80,328 dialing attempts were made in the course of the survey, involving a sample of 16,895 different attempted phone numbers. All numbers were attempted at least once, but not all were working numbers and not all working numbers were those of residences located within the study area. At least eight attempts were made before a working number was inactivated, and a portion of the initial refusals were contacted again after no less than three days. CSR completed a total of 1,666 interviews, for a final response rate estimated at 21.4 percent of the number of qualified households in the original sample. The interview took an average of 19.4 minutes to complete.<sup>31</sup>

As in the previous two years, CSR translated the questionnaire into Spanish and used Spanish-English bilingual interviewers so that the survey could be conducted as easily in Spanish as in English. Of the completed interviews, 75 were conducted in Spanish.

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<sup>28</sup>Diop A., Guterbock, T. M., Kermer, D. & Le, T. K. (2008, September). *Prince William County Citizen Satisfaction Survey: Report of Results 2008*. Charlottesville: Center for Survey Research, University of Virginia.

<sup>29</sup>Diop, A., Kim, Y., Holmes, J.L. & Guterbock, T. M. (2008, March). *Prince William County Cell-Phone Pilot Survey (A Supplement to the 2007 Citizen Satisfaction Survey): Summary Report of Results*. Charlottesville: Center for Survey Research, University of Virginia.

<sup>30</sup>Diop, A. & Guterbock, T. M. (2008, November). *Evaluation of Sample Design Changes in the 2008 Prince William Citizen Satisfaction Survey: Supplement to the Report of Results*. Charlottesville: Center for Survey Research, University of Virginia.

<sup>31</sup>These indicate the "completion time"—the time that it took the interviewer to complete the interview after selection of a qualified respondent. The total time a household respondent was on the phone for this year was an average of 21.5 minutes.

Based on 1,666 respondents, the survey had a sampling error of plus or minus 2.9 percentage points. This estimate of the margin of error takes into account the “design effect” associated with post-stratification weighting of the data (See Appendix B of the full survey report). This means that in 95 out of 100 samples of this size drawn from Prince William County, the percentage results obtained for each question in each sample would fall in a range of  $\pm 2.9$  percent of what would have been obtained if every household in the county with a working telephone (landline and cell-phone) had been interviewed. Larger sampling errors were present when analyzing subgroups of the sample and for questions asked of fewer respondents.

The survey data were weighted on two key variables, using a statistical “raking” procedure. Data were weighted to reflect the distribution of county population across seven geographic areas (defined by groups of ZIP codes), to correct for the intentional oversampling of households in the more sparsely populated study areas. The weighting also reflected CSR’s estimate of the percentage of county households having landline-only service, cellphone-only service, or both landline and cellphone service.<sup>32</sup>

When comparing the results of the 2008 survey with those of previous years, independent T-tests were used to assess statistical significance between the years. The sample size of each survey is large enough that a change of approximately 5 percent, up or down, will be statistically significant if a service was rated by most of the respondents questioned each year. However, for services that were less “visible” and rated by smaller numbers of respondents, a change of only 5 percent in satisfaction may not be statistically significant. The same T-tests were used to assess the difference between the 2008 ratings and the demographic variables. Further details on the sample and methodology may be found in Appendix B of the 2008 Citizen Survey Report.

All the T-tests performed for the 2008 report were completed using SPSS Complex Samples, an add-on module for SPSS for Windows®, which is used by CSR for data analysis purposes. This module provides more statistical precision with respect to inferences for a population by incorporating the sample design into survey analysis. It also allows the possibility to take into account the design effect, a by product of post stratification weighting, when conducting the statistical tests. Consequently, some differences in means ratings could be found statistically insignificant that would not be so identified without the module.

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<sup>32</sup> For explanation of the method used to estimate the distribution of phone service segments in the County, see Thomas M. Guterbock, *Estimating Phone Service and Usage Percentages: How to Weight the Data from a Local, Dual-Frame Sample Survey of Cellphone and Landline Telephone Users in the United States*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Hollywood, FL, May 2009. Additional details are found in Appendix B of the full 2008 survey report.

**Appendix H:**  
**Detailed Responses from 2008 Citizen Survey: Why Satisfied or**  
**Dissatisfied with the Police Policy?**



**POLSAT1: What are some reasons you are very satisfied with the job the Police Department is doing in carrying out this policy?**

<b>1. Illegal immigration causes problems in the community</b>					
<b>1.0 General negative comments on problem of illegal immigration, stressing its bad aspects</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	4	A bunch of immigrants are being flushed out of the county. They are moving, leaving because they are not afforded the welfare. Might be government services and not necessarily the police.	1.0		
PR4	323	A real problem. Performance in schools going down - since then going up. Huge problem, now turning around.	1.0		
PR1	879	Because everyone has their different views. PWC has a lot of Latin immigration and their presence if it is illegal can negatively affect our county because of foreclosures from them leaving.	1.0		
PR1	360	Because we have a problem with illegal immigrants in the area.	1.0		
PR4	107	Enforcing illegals.	1.0		
PR4	209	I'm satisfied because they've flagged down on harassing. We don't need any terrorists.	1.0		
PR1	354	There is a high amount of illegal immigrants in the county and they are checking to see if they are here illegally.	1.0	2.0	
PR4	205	They are trying to give citizens back their county.	1.0		
PR3	279	Too many illegals	1.0		

<b>1.1 Not fair that illegals are here getting benefits; not paying taxes; getting jobs that could go to Americans</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR3	273	Americans are trying to make it and people from other countries are taking the jobs and are overpopulating.	1.1		
PR4	874	Because I don't feel that one should be able to take advantage of what this country offers if you are here illegally. They don't pay taxes and if something happens and you get injured, the hospital will cover you for free and it will cost other people money.	1.1	1.0	
PR1	86	Because it is not fair to the people that pay taxes.	1.1		
PR5	409	Because we have so many illegal immigrants here and they are taking up a lot of jobs and space that could be used by citizens, we will be able to help citizens, not just illegal immigrants.	1.1		
PR1	495	Does not think that illegal immigrants should be allowed to live and benefit in Prince William County. If caught they should be deported.	1.1		
PR1	854	Don't want to pay for someone who doesn't belong here.	1.1		

PR5	265	Everybody needs to pay their taxes and pay their dues.	1.1		
PR2	59	Everyone needs to pay taxes, has no problem with people being international but they have to pay their taxes.	1.1		
PR1	208	I have a member of family associated with the police department so I know a bit about it. I'm concerned with the free services illegal immigrants receive.	1.1		
PR2	297	I pay a lot of taxes and this means that I would have to pay for services and I would rather have my money going toward people that pay taxes and not people that are illegally here.	1.1		
PR5	171	I think a lot of people around here are taking advantage of the services. Aren't taking care of property and causing housing market to go down.	1.1	1.5	
PR1	1082	I trust they will do a good job although haven't heard specific figures. Large immigrant population that's been a problem and I am glad the county is doing something about and heard many have moved on to Fairfax.	1.1	2.2	3.6
PR1	1425	If someone is illegal they should get out of here. He has seen the county change because of the illegal immigrants. They are sucking the services up and taking his tax money.	1.1	2.5	
PR1	221	If they're here illegally they shouldn't be here. They need to be paying taxes just like the rest of us. They're getting all the benefits without paying.	1.1	2.5	
PR4	348	Illegal immigrants are sucking the county dry. Hospitals are overloaded with people who don't belong here and there's no room for citizens. Getting rid of them will in the end make life cheaper for citizens.	1.1		
PR3	95	Illegal immigrants are taking jobs, no professional status for jobs.	1.1		
PR4	723	Illegal immigrants draw on services and taxes. The value added to the community is negligible and probably could enforce even more. More than the police need to do that - services should be monitoring for status as well.	1.1	2.1	
PR1	960	It is important to have policy in place because I am a tax payer and I don't want my tax monies to be used for illegal immigrants. I want it to be used for people who really need it legally.	1.1		
PR2	90	It's just I have nothing against those people I just think that allot of them are here illegally and they are not paying taxes and we are paying for their kids to go to school. I have nothing against them but if they are going to be here I think they need.	1.1		
PR4	359	My parents were illegal immigrants and they went to great trouble to become legal and I think now people are coming here for the benefits and when you read the paper and there are crimes, most of the people are Hispanic. They are a drain on the county. People are talking about them having liberties. I am not against them. I am not racist but because of my background they should try to become citizens.	1.1	1.3	
PR2	160	Not paying taxes.	1.1		
PR4	365	People around here who are not legal residents are a strain on the economy.	1.1		
PR1	87	So she doesn't have to pay for someone else.	1.1		
PR1	810	Some are here illegally and Americans can't get a job because	1.1		

		the illegals are being hired not Americans.			
PR4	789	There are too many of them in this country that are getting benefits that don't belong.	1.1		
PR1	475	They are helping people that are not citizens take over what we should be doing and the police are helping manage everything correctly.	1.1	4.3	
PR3	107	They are taking care of the illegal immigrants who are taking the jobs of citizens.	1.1		
PR4	76	Think illegal immigrants are taking young adult's jobs	1.1		

<b>1.2 Overcrowding of houses; unsightly property appearance</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR2	262	Around my neighborhood there were three overpopulated houses (10-12 people in each), noise trash issues that took up my tax money but now that they have cracked down they have moved on (maybe not arrested) but are no long using my tax dollars	1.2	1.1	
PR4	694	Because I see that the county has been overrun with immigrants and that has changed the quality of life for everyone else. Transit illegals that are not responsible about property.	1.2		
PR1	400	County overrun with illegal residences, from an employer perspective and at 7-11 hanging out.	1.2	1.4	
PR4	358	Fifteen to twenty Spanish people in one house, so they are doing a good job. Need to get them out. They are responsible for murders, triple murders, two houses away from him	1.2	1.3	
PR2	180	Helping prevent overcrowding. If people are going to be here they should be here legally.	1.2		
PR1	339	People have broken the law and do not provide to the town, don't pay taxes and be a burden and she is very satisfied that they are taking care of it.	1.2	2.2	

<b>1.4 Loitering, day laborers gathering</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	104	Hispanic men always standing around in the 7-11 waiting to be picked up for illegal jobs	1.4		
PR4	303	Most people hanging around street corners are not citizens.	1.4		
PR1	677	There are way too many illegal immigrants in the area and too many concessions have been made to them. It's an eye-sore to see them gathered in large numbers like when they're seeking day labor. They trample down the grass and cast litter about. Also they utilize allot of county services and it's the county residents who have to bear the burden of those costs.	1.4		

<b>1.5 Declining property value</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	546	It had brought property values down and crime had risen. Now all is improved.	1.5	1.3	3.5

<b>2. The policy is needed</b>					
<b>2.0 General comments on PWC's policy</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	648	Eventually it will cut down crime and negative activity at high schools	2.0		
PR1	661	Expense of carrying out program is an investment which will pay for itself.	2.0		
PR1	662	I haven't yet heard anything bad about it.	2.0		
PR4	24	I'm happy to see the policy and I think they are carrying it out appropriately. I am all for legal entrance.	2.0		
PR5	227	Overall it is a different policy from other towns.	2.0		
PR1	572	PWC was the first department to take the lead to stop immigration. The board held their grounds.	2.0		
PR4	1	Satisfied.	2.0		
PR1	576	The county seems to be more into getting the illegals out of the county.	2.0		
PR4	374	They are finally enforcing the law. Cleaning up all the people hanging out in front of 7-11. Taxpayer obligation to illegals.	2.0	3.1	
PR2	135	Very good.	2.0		
PR4	1179	Well, I don't know if it is the police department. I believe in the policy. I see less illegal immigrants waiting for jobs.	2.0	3.1	

<b>2.1 Needed to do something.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	302	Because it's a necessary job.	2.1		
PR2	311	I just hear they're working toward checking that kind of thing - it's something I feel needs to be done.	2.1		
PR4	147	I think they should be doing that.	2.1		
PR3	18	Immigration is an issue that needs to be dealt with; and they seem to be doing an effective job. The county is mopping up a Federal mess.	2.1		
PR1	93	It has to be done and understands that they are to be checking and approves.	2.1		
PR4	285	It needs to be done and I think that they're doing it within the boundaries of the law as it was written.	2.1		
PR4	282	It needs to be done and the policies and procedures that they have implemented will work fine at this particular time.	2.1		
PR4	138	It needs to be done.	2.1		
PR4	160	It's something that needs to be done.	2.1		



PR5	162	Needs to be done and they are finally stepping up to it.	2.1		
PR1	161	Somebody is doing it - the federal government is not - needs to be done.	2.1		
PR4	1122	Something we really need, not only here but in the whole USA.	2.1		
PR2	157	They need to carry out the policy because I happen to be a immigrant myself from Canada and I got my paper work down after eight years and I think everyone should do it. It's a privilege to live here. I am very happy with the policy being installed.	2.1	2.2	
PR4	426	We need to do something about this legal immigration in this county and I am very glad to see that they are doing something about it. The hospital is being affected by it, the community, the resident area, the schools. This county has been deeply affected.	2.1	1.0	

<b>2.2 Good that PWC is addressing the problem; support the policy; agree that it should exist; in favor.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	1164	Because I'm in favor of the policy and my confidence is high that they are doing the job as the law is written.	2.2	4.3	
PR1	1216	Doing it at all. Most places don't.	2.2		
PR4	313	Federal government not doing it. Illegal drivers.	2.2		
PR4	595	From what I've read, I think they're right-on with what they're doing and how. I wouldn't want them to change	2.2	4.0	
PR1	904	Glad put plan into action.	2.2		
PR4	1082	Glad that the law is in place - part of the reason she's dissatisfied with Prince William is illegals.	2.2		
PR3	180	Glad that they are being proactive for national security reasons.	2.2		
PR1	326	Glad they are doing this.	2.2		
PR4	716	Happy they have and are enforcing it. Believes that it is law enforcements duty to do it because it affects all citizens.	2.2		
PR1	432	He approves of it.	2.2		
PR1	681	He is very satisfied that the policy exists.	2.2		
PR1	426	He thinks that it is the right thing to do.	2.2		
PR1	198	Hear that they trying to take care of the situation.	2.2		
PR2	266	I agree with the policy - am glad it is being enforced.	2.2	4.0	
PR5	293	I agree with the policy and I'm satisfied that they're implementing it but I can't say anything more specific than that.	2.2		
PR3	206	I believe that it's a responsibility of the government to be looking into those sorts of things and I believe that they're the proper organization to be looking into that.	2.2		
PR1	1399	I don't know. Accountability to help ensure all get care that they need. We need to know who is in this country and who is not.	2.2		
PR1	1551	I don't really know how good of a job they are doing but I think that it is a good policy.	2.2		
PR4	580	I just read about it and it sounds pretty good.	2.2		

PR4	908	I think it's a reasonable question to ask from someone who is detained.	2.2		
PR4	927	I think it's important that they check the status.	2.2		
PR4	235	I think that they are probably the only community making an attempt to determine the immigration status of the people in the community.	2.2	4.0	
PR2	150	I think the immigration issue is an important one to focus on.	2.2		
PR1	428	I'm against profiling but I know it has to be done. I'm satisfied because I heard of any troublesome issues or abuses pertaining to the policy.	2.2		
PR4	898	I'm glad they're doing it.	2.2		
PR4	954	I'm just glad that we have a policy at all.	2.2		
PR4	869	It just seems like they're more proactive compared to what they were doing.	2.2		
PR5	38	It's an important thing to be doing and I agree with it. From what I've read they seem to be doing a good job.	2.2	4.1	
PR4	811	Just because I think it's about time that people in this country realized that they need to check people. I think it's great that someone is taking a stand on it. I know it's tough but I think they are a doing a very good job with it. I welcome everybody.	2.2	4.1	
PR1	645	Law was put for a purpose and very satisfied.	2.2		
PR1	1443	Like the policy.	2.2		
PR2	268	Not satisfied with [name], but adore our personal supervisor; but agree with the policy and think the police are doing fine.	2.2	4.1	
PR2	96	One of the first counties in Northern VA to do something about it.	2.2		
PR5	282	Proud of them.	2.2		
PR4	53	Responsibility of the feds and they are not doing it and so the county is doing it instead.	2.2		
PR1	131	Satisfied that they are moving forward with the immigration issue. She is glad that the problem is being addressed.	2.2		
PR2	302	Seen where PWC leads as far as not allowing benefits to illegals - leading the nation.	2.2		
PR1	1524	She felt that it needed to be done, but feels sympathy for those who are just trying to make a living.	2.2		
PR2	4	Should have started long ago.	2.2		
PR4	885	Taking up some of the slack that the federal government isn't.	2.2		
PR1	177	The federal government is not capable of doing the job, so he is glad that the county is taking it upon themselves to do the job.	2.2		
PR1	625	They agree with the policy and think it's something they should be doing.	2.2		
PR1	256	They are finally getting permission to do this when in the past they could not.	2.2		
PR1	896	They're doing it. Anything that's done is good.	2.2		
PR5	365	They're doing what the police department and the citizens want them to do.	2.2		
PR1	694	Very happy with changes in the past year in regards to checking immigration status.	2.2		
PR4	767	Very pro active. Improving.	2.2		

PR1	1483	We need to put a stop to illegal immigration and PWC seems to be the first to take an active role in doing so.	2.2		
PR2	11	Well I am new here. Have to go on what is on the news. They are progressing about solving issue that affects all of us. They are proactive.	2.2		

<b>2.3 Policy is fair, well-designed.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	21	I feel that we have so many illegal aliens in the area and there are so many who do commit crimes and I think that they should be checked to see if they illegal or are citizens.	2.3		

<b>2.4 If someone is illegal, that should be addressed; the law should be followed.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR5	66	Because I believe if you're not a legal American that you should be deported and that's what they're doing.	2.4		
PR4	1057	Because I feel we need to take care of the people you have come here legally and there are people who are waiting to come here. I don't have a problem with them being here but they need to do it correctly.	2.4		
PR4	964	Because they are enforcing the law against illegal immigrants.	2.4		
PR1	1315	Because we have a lot of illegals here and I'm just happy that they're checking their legal status.	2.4		
PR4	431	Believes it's the right thing to do. If they are breaking the law, they are breaking the law.	2.4		
PR1	469	Happy that the policy is being implemented because the immigrants are illegal. They should not have the same rights as citizens.	2.4		
PR1	700	He is very concerned with illegal immigration.	2.4		
PR4	746	I don't have a personal experience, but I think if you want to be a citizen of this country, it should be legal. If they want to stop people to find out if they are legal, that is all right with you.	2.4		
PR4	1041	I just think it should be happening. They're doing it illegally. They're trying to explain that you can be here, but you have to do it legally. I think they're showing the immigrants that you have to follow the rules just like everyone else.	2.4		
PR1	793	I object to illegals living here in this country so we are very pleased about this policy.	2.4		
PR4	677	I think it had to be done - for illegals - who take away services from legals.	2.4	1.1	
PR2	53	I think it's been long overdue. I think that whole illegal immigration situation has to be gotten under control.	2.4		

PR1	559	I think the policy is good because it predicts events like the shooting last Wednesday at the grocery store in Manassas. The guy recorded by the camera looked Hispanic and I feel more comfortable when there are police present on that location because of all the Hispanics who loiter around there. It's a good thing to enforce the nation's laws.	2.4	1.4	
PR2	228	If you are illegal you shouldn't be here and they are not targeting one specific group and we have higher percentage of different groups that need to be checked.	2.4		
PR1	666	I'm an attorney. People who disobey law cannot be tolerated. They cannot be given services that they demand and they degrade the safety and quality of the neighborhood. This is the first thing I've seen the county do in years that I absolutely applaud.	2.4		
PR4	1037	Instituting and following up with the NSA laws.	2.4		
PR1	963	Its important to see that they are legal.	2.4		
PR4	1226	It's the law of the land - people who want to move to and live in the U.S. should have to abide by the rules. I'm an immigrant and my family came into the country through the proper channels. The federal government has dropped the ball and the local governments are picking up the slack for them.	2.4		
PR1	616	So we know who we're getting in the USA, so we don't get criminals or drug dealers.	2.4		
PR1	506	Sovereignty of our borders. Countries that people come from need to address social ills of their country before letting them come here and complain.	2.4		
PR4	903	The fact that they are cracking down on illegal immigration.	2.4		
PR2	308	They should check for immigration status.	2.4		
PR4	1213	They're trying to reduce the number of illegal immigrants in the United States, and I'm satisfied with that.	2.4		
PR1	685	Tracking the illegals. The way they deal with it.	2.4		

<b>2.5 If someone is illegal, they should leave the country; they should not be here.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	717	Because I don't think the immigrants belong here. I try not to be racist. I try to be fair. If someone comes into our country who doesn't belong here and doesn't pay taxes and attacks people like my son was attacked two years ago by two Latinos I can't say fairly they were immigrants.	2.5	1.1	1.3
PR1	957	Because I think if you are illegal you should be sent back to your country. They should be sent home. If I go to their county illegally they would haul my butt away.	2.5		
PR1	538	Because she believes that if they are illegal then they should not be here.	2.5		
PR1	830	Fairfax needs to start it. I don't think we should have illegal immigrants.	2.5		

PR1	1147	Firmly believe in policy and they seem to be cracking down so the illegals are leaving the county so services are used by citizens.	2.5	1.1	
PR1	210	I just think if there are people here illegally, they should be asked to leave.	2.5		
PR4	951	I think that illegal residents should be sent back. They're breaking the law.	2.5		
PR4	1207	I'm one of those that say that the US has immigration laws. As long as you follow them, you're okay. Otherwise, deport them if they are here illegally.	2.5		
PR1	162	I'm tired of paying for people to live here who are not supposed to live here	2.5		
PR1	995	It is not that I don't like Mexican people, but I think they are here illegally and should go back home. I can move around in Wal-Mart now.	2.5	3.0	
PR4	845	One of the counties who tracks more than others. I think they need to get rid of illegals. They cause whatever crime and gangs there are. They could do even more. Keep being proactive, don't be talked out of it by bad press, do not be lax allowing them to stay and use our services free.	2.5	1.3	2.2
PR4	143	People here on criminal activity or illegals should be removed.	2.5		
PR1	1050	People who are illegal should not be in the US.	2.5		
PR3	311	Political reasons. Glad the immigrants sent back.	2.5		
PR3	109	They are doing what they need to get rid of illegal immigrants.	2.5		
PR4	791	They don't they should be here.	2.5		
PR4	1196	They need to be checking their statuses and the illegals need to be gone.	2.5		
PR4	178	They should run every illegal immigrant out of the county.	2.5		

<b>3. The policy's enforcement is having positive results</b>					
<b>3.0 General comments about positive results</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR5	177	Because they got the gang member and his family out of my court.	3.0		
PR1	1380	It has been very successful.	3.0		
PR3	229	It seems to be working.	3.0		
PR4	1197	It seems to cut down on the negative immigration elements.	3.0		
PR1	850	It's being very effective.	3.0		
PR4	792	It's cleaning up the neighborhood.	3.0		
PR1	703	Reading in the news papers that it's effective; places where there used to be a problem has decreased.	3.0		
PR2	144	Seems to be having an effect. my life is better because of it.	3.0		
PR1	1412	Seems to be less of a problem, from what I read in the newspaper.	3.0		
PR1	1482	She thinks that it shows that they have made progress and it seems to be working to regulate illegals.	3.0		
PR1	759	Taking burdens off the school. Should lower taxes.	3.0		

PR4	1235	They get the bad ones out and help the good ones.	3.0		
PR4	252	They have detained and are in the process of exporting the immigrants who are not supposed to be here and that is the law and that is there their job.	3.0		
PR1	466	They've done a good job in and around Manassas clearing out overcrowded houses and restoring neighborhoods.	3.0		
PR4	273	Very effective.	3.0		
PR4	56	We don't have trash all over the yard. No car parts or trashy cars. Realtors are cleaning up the area. No more urination while the kids are on the streets.	3.0		

<b>3.1 Less loitering.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	1039	Don't see illegal immigrants standing around. Less loitering	3.1		
PR1	264	Getting illegal immigrants off the streets. Protecting our country.	3.1	3.4	
PR1	249	I am seeing a reduced amount of loitering and fewer over-occupied homes.	3.1		
PR2	288	I don't really see any 'loafers' hanging around on the streets.	3.1		
PR5	55	I don't see as frequent a number of illegal aliens hanging around outside my neighborhood at the stores as I used to.	3.1		
PR1	721	I see certain areas where they hang-out that they are no longer hanging-out there, and there is no more trafficking and I don't see idleness. I guess people are moving out. It seems like prevention more than solving the problem. I think it has done a good job.	3.1	3.3	
PR3	21	I see less people loitering where they shouldn't be.	3.1		
PR1	804	It looks like it is working. I don't see as many people loitering.	3.1		
PR4	1202	It seems like in certain places they are not there anymore.	3.1		
PR1	1081	I've noticed a decrease in people hanging out and also a decrease in gang violence.	3.1		
PR2	93	I've seen a reduction in the number of people who are hanging around 7-11 and stuff like that.	3.1		
PR4	114	Less loitering. Cleaned up appearance of county.	3.1		
PR5	422	Less people hanging out outside 7-11, less people using fake IDs to purchase alcohol.	3.1	3.3	
PR4	395	Less Spanish on the corners.	3.1		
PR4	843	On Route 1 they used to be always hanging out but now it is empty. They are all gone.	3.1		
PR4	429	Reducing illegal people hanging around the corner looking for jobs is a good thing.	3.1		
PR4	194	The areas that the illegal immigrants hung out at are now deserted.	3.1		
PR3	35	There are a lot less of them hanging out in front of the Seven Eleven asking for jobs.	3.1		
PR4	963	There seem to be a lot fewer illegal immigrants hanging around the county	3.1		

PR1	284	They caught quite a few people in the first few weeks. It also seems to be making a visible difference in reducing loitering, littering and such undesirable consequences associated with illegals.	3.1		
PR4	755	They seem to be cutting down on the number of people roaming the streets that don't seem to have a place to live. In general, it stopped the people who are just roaming aimlessly on the streets and cities.	3.1		
PR1	608	They're doing a great job in getting the illegal immigrants off the street. I think they're doing it in a very fair way.	3.1		
PR1	796	Trying to clean up the area and people standing on corners. I think they are trying to help improve the community.	3.1		
PR4	1016	Well, I have noticed since they started clamping down on the immigration thing much less loitering now. Frightening before. Done on-line shopping for that reason. Better now. Husband still works. Other day at bank and officer came in and asked them to leave. Very pleased about this. Police do need more help.	3.1	3.4	
PR1	886	With loitering and standing around has decreased.	3.1		
PR1	1097	You do not see illegals hanging around anymore. You can go to the 7-11 now without walking past a large group of illegals.	3.1		

3.2 More jobs available to legals or locals.					
samp	resp	comment	code 1	code 2	code 3
PR4	976	By cracking down on illegals employed locally they open up more job opportunities.	3.2		
PR1	298	More jobs for residents.	3.2		

3.3 Less crime.					
samp	resp	comment	code 1	code 2	code 3
PR4	523	Because these people they're doing and it reduces crime.	3.3		
PR5	354	By enforcing this policy they are preventing crime, drugs and gang activity.	3.3		
PR4	809	Crackdown on crime and it's helping crime prevention by cleaning out the illegal immigrants.	3.3	1.0	
5	91	Crime prevention.	3.3		
PR1	857	Crime rate is down.	3.3		
PR1	585	Crime rates are going down - from reading.	3.3		
PR1	640	Cuts down on crime.	3.3		
PR1	395	Gets allot of people off the streets that are criminals and working with federal officials police should have cameras in cars.	3.3	9.2	

PR1	1363	Have read in the paper that crime has gone down 25% and there are fewer illegals wandering around especially on the Route 1 corridor. Drug activity has diminished as the illegals have decreased.	3.3	3.1	
PR4	510	It is, don't know how to say it, but there's been a big difference in the area. There was a lot of after-dark activity that I'm not seeing as much anymore even though I've never felt threatened. When I saw the police when coming home after dark every night.	3.3		
PR2	147	It's only what I read in the papers, but it seems to me that they've been able to find a lot of criminals. When they find them, they sometimes find it's not just a small offense they're dealing with, but a lot of crimes and I think that's one of the best benefits. It doesn't just take illegals off the streets, it takes criminals who happen to be illegals off the street.	3.3		
PR4	308	Less crime in area.	3.3		
PR4	851	Prevents crime.	3.3		
PR1	720	Prince William County, is trying to reduce the crime rate all of the time and gang activities as well.	3.3		
PR1	983	Quite a bit of crime going on lately. There seems to be less illegal drug trafficking.	3.3		
PR2	205	Seems to be cutting down on crime activity. Notice less loitering at 7-Eleven stores.	3.3	3.1	
PR1	665	Taking criminals off the street	3.3		
PR2	244	To stop illegals from committing crime when they have no business here. It has reduced the crime significantly	3.3	1.0	
PR4	412	Very important in keeping down crime, need to go through proper channels.	3.3	4.3	

<b>3.4 Feel safer.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	1151	I feel like I live in a safe environment.	3.4		
PR1	1259	I feel safer and I think it should be done for the safety of Prince William people.	3.4		
PR1	1162	Making everybody safe.	3.4		

<b>3.6 Illegal immigrants are now leaving the county.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR5	323	A lot of the illegal immigrants are leaving Prince William County because of the police department's efforts.	3.6		
PR1	874	A lot of them left.	3.6		
PR4	1098	Because half of my street was illegal and they've either been picked up or moved out.	3.6		



PR3	26	Because I completely trust them and if there are any they're going to find out anyway. I've watched them move out quite a few.	3.6		
PR4	234	Because there are like twenty houses on my street that are evacuated now and because they were illegal.	3.6		
PR1	1421	Because two houses adjacent to me were vacated shortly after.	3.6		
PR4	475	For one thing, I am seeing far fewer illegals in the county and as a result I've noticed the requirements for services has gone down.	3.6		
PR1	565	From what he reads many of the immigrants legal or illegal are moving on.	3.6		
PR4	2	Have noticed that quite a few people have ended up moving out of the county. This has been very noticeable just driving through the counties in different areas.	3.6		
PR3	218	I see less immigration, less people that don't have citizenship.	3.6		
PR2	27	I think it's reduced the number of illegals in the county which has certainly reduced the burden on the school system and probably other public services. I understand Fairfax County is screaming about it now because they all moved up there. The illegals used a lot of public services. They certainly burden the schools and public health systems and lots of them don't pay taxes.	3.6		
PR5	53	It is helping. Twenty-one people were living all in one house beside him with 9-13 cars parked outside. He has reported zoning violations to the county with no result but since the enforcement these folks have disappeared and moved out of the area.	3.6	1.2	
PR4	1030	Like the policy and think they are doing well because we have had a mass exodus of illegals and I'm very happy about that.	3.6	2.2	
PR1	306	Reduces the number of illegal immigrants and that effects a lot of surrounding areas	3.6		
PR2	25	Reduction of illegals.	3.6		
PR2	177	Seems like illegal immigrants are moving out of the area, so there are signs that it is working whether that's good or bad.	3.6		
PR1	1122	There are no illegals in this area that much any more. I think it's great that Prince William is not tolerating this anymore, even if they're going somewhere else. I'm glad Prince William is putting their foot down.	3.6	2.2	
PR4	296	They are getting rid of the people who are here illegally.	3.6		
PR1	710	They're getting them all locked up.	3.6		
PR1	231	Think the program as whole has caused a great many of these people have leaved the area traffic has gone down as well.	3.6		
PR4	227	You have been told (could be rumors) that there are fewer people on the local highways due to illegal immigrants leaving the area.	3.6		

<b>4. The police have been doing a good job of carrying out the policy</b>					
<b>4.0 General favorable comments about the Police Department and its work</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	1042	Anytime I've needed the police department they've been right here.	4.0		
PR1	1413	Because every interaction I've had with them has been very prompt and professional.	4.0		
PR2	174	Because they're cracking down.	4.0		
PR4	66	By reading in the papers and seeing what is on the news it looks like things are improving; not heard of too many problems.	4.0		
PR1	917	From what I hear they're doing a good job of trying to keep illegal aliens out of the county.	4.0		
PR2	224	From what I've seen in newspaper the number of arrests have gone up with people who then show they are not legal.	4.0		
PR1	255	Half of people checked were illegal's.	4.0		
PR5	30	He sees them around patrolling.	4.0		
PR1	757	In favor of enforcement and it's visible.	4.0		
PR5	180	My husband and I live across the street from a house that has had a lot of people there and they have really stayed on top of that. It was bad at first but they stayed right on it and it is no longer a problem.	4.0		
PR2	236	Noted that presence has increased.	4.0		
PR4	628	Nothing specific. Just no particular reason to think they are not doing well.	4.0		
PR1	584	Satisfied because does not hear of any problems.	4.0		
PR4	878	Seems like they are doing it fairly regularly. Have heard complaints that they are filling up the jails, but you can't have it both ways. The public wanted it that way.	4.0		
PR1	141	Sees on the news must be doing something right.	4.0		
PR4	487	She watches the news and notices that they are cracking down.	4.0		
PR1	225	Since the patrolling for immigration status, don't have as many worries.	4.0	3.4	
PR1	844	There seems to be more education as far as letting businesses know what there efforts are. This is important to me. It is the businesses that hire these people.	4.0		
PR1	369	They advertise it on TV and they let the citizens know what is going on. And enrollment in the schools has been reduced.	4.0	3.0	
PR1	1403	They are effective in carrying out the policy but I don't agree with it.	4.0		
PR1	1121	They seem to be doing what they are doing	4.0		
PR4	894	They're doing their job.	4.0		

4.1 Good effort/trying hard					
samp	resp	comment	code 1	code 2	code 3
PR1	705	[Name] is doing an awesome job and he is not overstepping his boundaries. He is doing it very well. If they are going to commit a crime they should prove citizenship because they most likely are illegal / they should go to jail.	4.1	3.0	
PR4	868	As far as I know, I am a teacher at school. They did a good job talking with the school. Hard for the police department as well. More paperwork.	4.1		
PR5	57	Because the police are always on patrol and on the lookout. They're active.	4.1		
PR4	952	Doing a fine job, don't step out of line, do it in a professional manner.	4.1	4.3	
PR4	572	Doing a good job.	4.1		
PR2	65	Doing a very good job.	4.1		
PR4	995	From what I hear, they have been doing a very good job with it and I agree with the policy.	4.1	2.4	
PR4	529	Good job.	4.1		
PR4	219	Handling in professional way.	4.1		
PR4	904	Have heard they are doing it well. Sounds like they are being effective. I like the policy.	4.1	3.0	2.4
PR1	851	I don't know. have not had any problems so assume they are doing a good job.	4.1		
PR1	335	I feel they are on top of things.	4.1		
PR4	385	I think they are actually doing a good job in the sense that they are making sure that the people who are here - are here legally.	4.1		
PR4	817	I think they are doing a good job	4.1		
PR4	575	I think they are doing the best they can.	4.1		
PR1	337	Immigrants are everywhere and the police are stopping them and asking for papers so they are doing their job in checking up.	4.1	4.4	
PR1	318	In favor of the policy and believes they've been doing a good job.	4.1		
PR1	215	It drove a bunch of illegals out of the county. Some are still here. They've done a good job but they need to continue. These illegals have no right to be here and they don't pay any taxes either.	4.1	3.6	1.1
PR1	349	It's good if they check on people when they have probable cause.	4.1		
PR1	234	It's hard because illegal immigration should be monitored and the IMS federally is not doing a good job; there's a lot of illegal immigration here but the local police are working to do a good job. A lot to handle.	4.1		
PR1	582	It's something they need to do, and they are on the news. Physically I've never seen it happen.	4.1		
PR5	147	Just from the news and media from what they hear they seem to be doing a pretty good job.	4.1		
PR4	919	Not much experience with it but I've heard they are doing a good job.	4.1		

PR1	746	Police check actively.	4.1		
PR1	140	Police department is trying hard. She could not list any specifics, refused to.	4.1		
PR1	347	She has found that they are doing as well as they can.	4.1		
PR2	197	So far haven't heard of them doing anything out of order and apparently having a great impact.	4.1		
PR1	839	Something that needs to be done and its unobtrusive, they are doing it only when a person is arrested.	4.1		
PR1	1512	There's no need for a complaint, they do a good job.	4.1		
PR1	307	They are doing a good job making sure to find out who is who.	4.1		
PR2	37	They are doing a good job.	4.1		
PR1	243	They are doing good work. They are doing excellent work with this policy. That's it.	4.1		
PR4	413	They are doing the job very nicely and legally.	4.1		
PR4	1053	They are working on the policies they were presented for immigrants.	4.1		
PR2	176	They have done a great job in explaining what the policy is and applying it when necessary.	4.1		
PR2	277	They respond quickly and the patrol they have is effective.	4.1		
PR1	535	They seem to be doing a good job.	4.1		
PR4	1194	They try very hard to do the right thing.	4.1		
PR1	409	They're doing a good job; it's a good policy as long as they check them only after they're arrested.	4.1	2.0	
PR1	764	They're doing the best they can making the town the best they can.	4.1		
PR4	338	They're making sure everyone is legal, which is what needs to be done.	4.1		
PR1	107	They're trying, but [name] doesn't do anything about it. Not something they can control.	4.1		

4.2 Fairness/not targeting					
samp	resp	comment	code 1	code 2	code 3
PR1	617	Because I think they are paying particular attention to it and trying to do it fairly. It is a difficult job because it has been dumped on them by the federal government.	4.2		
PR1	795	Because they are not profiling.	4.2		
PR1	527	Conscientiously doing their best and not violating anyone.	4.2		
PR1	825	Do not go looking for them - only when stopped.	4.2		
PR1	420	From the meeting that the Police chief had with representatives of the Hispanic community; I feel that they're trying to be fair and dispel fears on the part of the Hispanics of persecution; prejudice and such.	4.2		
PR4	120	I feel they are doing it fairly - not singling people out. A police officer came to our school to address this. If you are an illegal immigrant it is that you are illegal (not that you are an immigrant) that is the issue.	4.2	1.0	
PR4	266	I think with the new program it's new and unbiased. It doesn't target anyone's particular race. I think it's the best way to go about it.	4.2		

PR1	577	If they stop someone for a reason, they have every reason to be checked.	4.2		
PR4	895	It doesn't seem that they are abusing their authority in doing so.	4.2		
PR4	701	It seems that they are enforcing it satisfactorily; without targeting any particular ethnic group and it seems to be reducing. We've seen a reduction of children in schools that aren't legally here and stuff like that.	4.2		
PR1	1181	My impression is that the police department is not using it as a weapon against people. That they are adhering to the letter of the law. I haven't seen any evidence that they are targeting people for persecution. I'm hoping that they are enforcing it.	4.2	4.3	
PR2	300	She just feels that they are doing it with respect as it should be. They are not pushing it down peoples throat and if they have to stop them, they will, but they are not doing it in a way that is demeaning to the people being stopped.	4.2		
PR1	1431	They are not showing any racial prejudice.	4.2		
PR2	251	They are not targeting people and they are only trying to check people who are being stopped for other infractions.	4.2		
PR1	1064	They are very responsive and they are very fair and unbiased	4.2		
PR3	42	They're acting very fairly. They're very professional. I don't feel that they're racists. The illegal immigrants were driving without licenses and putting a lot of people in great danger by driving drunk.	4.2		
PR4	795	They're not stereotyping or profiling, they're doing their job.	4.2		
PR4	366	Trying not to profile. Correcting.	4.2		
PR1	295	Upon reading the newspaper she believes they have been trained and are reacting fairly.	4.2		
<b>4.3 Doing what they're supposed to be doing; carrying out wht the board wants them to do</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	161	Adhering to the policy and cracking down on illegal immigrants.	4.3		
PR4	248	Because they are actually arresting and checking out suspicious people rather than just giving lip service to the action.	4.3		
PR1	794	Because you need to carryout the policy because we pay taxes and if they don't do it causes us extra money.	4.3		
PR4	667	Do their jobs.	4.3		
PR1	443	Doing their job.	4.3		
PR1	861	Following / carrying out the wishes.	4.3		
PR1	316	From what he's seen they appear to being do a good a job of actually following the law and actively participating in following through with this policy, he has very strong views about immigration policy.	4.3		
PR1	760	From what she has read they are actually enforcing.	4.3		
PR1	310	He can tell that they are doing what they are supposed to because the amount of immigrants has decreased.	4.3	3.6	

PR2	63	I know they are enforcing the law they are trying to make the community safer. They are doing the best job they can with the money that they have.	4.3	4.1	
PR5	189	I realized that they have done an extensive amount of training. Each office has gone through training to know what they can and cannot do.	4.3		
PR2	187	I think that they're doing it, and I think they're doing it in a non-intrusive way. I think they're just doing their job.	4.3	4.2	
PR1	644	If they are here illegally and are stopped then I commend the police department for doing their job.	4.3		
PR4	307	It seems like they are doing what they are supposed to be doing.	4.3		
PR2	20	Just following the law.	4.3		
PR4	72	Keeping with the resolution. I like when government made the resolution and mandated it to the citizens and the police department seem to be doing everything in their power to carry out the mandate.	4.3	2.4	
PR2	189	Let's just say I'm assuming they are following county laws, thus they are doing the right thing with this policy.	4.3		
PR1	1366	Mainly because they are carrying out the policy the way they should have	4.3		
PR4	698	Making attempts to enforce existing laws.	4.3		
PR1	521	Seems to be following up as they should, and personally noticed homes in her neighborhood being vacant that had suspicious activity.	4.3		
PR1	943	That they are abiding by the current request to question persons.	4.3		
PR1	1373	They are diligently carrying out the policy and I approve that because we are all in this together.	4.3		
PR4	176	They are directing themselves to do what they are told to do.	4.3		
PR1	860	They are doing the best they can with the board-mandated rule - it is a political motivation behind the rule in the first place.	4.3		
PR4	150	They are doing what they have been mandated to do and they are doing it impartially.	4.3	4.2	
PR4	841	They are following the guidance and requirements that they are dictated from on high to the letter.	4.3		
PR1	454	They are following through with what the county has told them to do.	4.3		
PR4	260	They are responsible to do the policy.	4.3		
PR4	263	They were told to do it and they did it.	4.3		
PR1	325	They're doing what the board is asking them to do.	4.3		
PR3	90	They're following orders. They're doing their job [to enforce the law].	4.3		
PR3	46	They've made it very public in the papers exactly what they're going to be doing and I don't think they're stalking anyone or unfairly targeting / profiling any particular group. They have been subject to a lot of grief but they're doing what they should be doing.	4.3	4.3	

PR4	507	Well, as far as I know they are carrying out the laws and we are not talking about immigrants we are talking about illegal aliens so their status should be checked.	4.3		
PR1	1282	Well, I am glad that they are doing what they are asked to do.	4.3		
PR1	671	Works for the school and was explained about specifics and felt that it sounded seemed effective, and that they are following the procedures.	4.3		

<b>4.4 Checking all ID's; checking more often</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	1197	Actually seen them stopping people for ID's.	4.4		
PR1	200	Because I see them checking the identities of people standing around - and I agree with the policy.	4.4	2.1	
PR1	441	Because they're catching a lot of people.	4.4		
PR1	164	Check almost all of the people.	4.4		
PR1	1203	Checking at mall and pulled over.	4.4		
PR1	1488	I have seen them pull people over. They have been pretty fair.	4.4	4.2	
PR1	224	I know they've had several raids on work places where they're checking the immigration status of employees.	4.4		
PR3	316	I like the fact they're checking everybody - it makes sure there is no national / ethnic/racial bias.	4.4		
PR1	145	ID's are checked more often.	4.4		
PR5	294	Police are really checking everybody.	4.4		
PR4	462	Police department should check who belongs in county and who pays taxes and who doesn't. So taxes and benefits aren't unfair.	4.4	1.1	
PR3	56	Putting forth what they are supposed to do in pulling people over and asking for proof of citizenship.	4.4		
PR2	230	Some friends were stopped, people with IDs, police weren't rough or anything but just asked for proof of identity, not harassed just asked nicely.	4.4	4.2	
PR1	204	They are checking and see in paper that their moving to other areas.	4.4		
PR1	180	They are checking everybody.	4.4		
PR4	517	They are making an effort to check, that is most important.	4.4		
PR4	1225	Think they are doing a good job of checking them, and doing something about it.	4.4	2.2	
PR2	72	We do see checks going on when we are out and feel they're doing a good job.	4.4	4.1	
PR1	195	When it needs to be checked it will be checked.	4.4		

<b>9.1 Haven't experienced, hasn't affected me, no opinion</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	274	Absence of negative information.	9.1		
PR4	1144	Have not had major crime committed against family.	9.1		
PR5	218	She doesn't know and all the information she receives is from the newspaper.	9.1		

PR4	591	We haven't had any problem or issue with it.	9.1		
PR4	127	Well I don' have any problems. I am not in contact with people who have not be stopped. It seems to be going well from what I read in the paper.	9.1		

9.2 Other reason					
samp	resp	comment	code 1	code 2	code 3
PR1	138	A murder in neighborhood, a guy blew away a wife, husband and friend, and wounded two people in the basement. The children witnessed it. Three are now orphaned and the police caught him and put him in jail.	9.2		
PR2	245	Because I do much of the same screening that they do and I would assume that whatever they are doing is a step above what I already do.	9.2		
PR1	528	Because if they are going to do something wrong, then the police have a right to check their citizenship status. Plus, she says the way most of the immigrants live is a fire hazard. She has seen some.	9.2		
PR1	604	Because I'm a neighborhood watch supervisor and I have allot of contact with the police.	9.2		
PR4	405	Grew up in Texas. A lot of illegals there.	9.2		
PR4	1222	Had a few busts in our area.	9.2		
PR1	484	Has seen it decrease in her area.	9.2		
PR4	1221	Helps with the taxes in the county.	9.2		
PR4	91	I have no contact with anyone who is an illegal alien, however, it seems to be going well.	9.2		
PR1	1175	I have noticed less suspicious characters at odd hours throughout my neighborhood. I live where there is a short-cut to Wal-Mart and would see many Hispanic families moving back and forth through the neighborhood.	9.2		
PR1	1095	I hear from the news and newspapers that is going well.	9.2		
PR1	809	I work with police at work a lot. Work at a gas station.	9.2		
PR4	1108	I'm very satisfied due to the fact that at one point, last year, that anybody illegal had until April 30th to get it straight. So, at this point, it's not right because those people had the chance to get it right. So, I think it's fair because they had the opportunity. Even though people feel like they are being harassed.	9.2		
PR4	920	It is a safe county to live and you don't have connotations with the police department.	9.2		
PR1	803	I've heard about the crack down on it.	9.2		
PR1	1337	I've heard that the jail is full so I guess they have been tracking down the illegals.	9.2		
PR4	246	No direct knowledge.	9.2		
PR1	1446	No problems.	9.2		
PR4	468	Personally don't care.	9.2		
PR4	838	Personally I think it's going to improve the quality that people receive.	9.2		
PR1	415	Read. Discovering people and bring up to authority.	9.2		
PR1	855	She's from Germany and had to go through all sorts of things to	9.2		



		get in the country. Wishes everyone would speak English because she had to.			
PR4	136	Statistics that I read.	9.2		
PR1	533	Stories read in paper.	9.2		
PR3	234	The contact I've had with police officers has been pleasant.	9.2		
PR1	1045	They are very positive.	9.2		
PR4	558	Thinks every county in the US should have one. Most positive thing done.	9.2	2.0	
PR4	1172	To see if people broke the law.	9.2		
PR4	403	Tougher rules and changes in the laws.	9.2		
PR2	254	Wise decision to inquire of anybody's citizenship, including myself, whom they have to stop to avoid profiling.	9.2		
PR1	601	Works for immigration enforcement.	9.2		

9.3 Response not codable					
samp	resp	comment	code 1	code 2	code 3
PR2	181	If you look at the number of houses that have opened up .	9.3		
PR4	1114	It is the law and should be fair and everybody needs to speak English.	9.3		
PR2	171	You think they are very human about it, it is such a tricky subject. I don't know how to feel about it. I wish they'd do it in a better way. I think everybody is just trying to breathe the air.	9.3		

**POLSAT2: What are some reasons you are very dissatisfied with the job the Police Department is doing in carrying out this policy?**

<b>1. Illegal immigration causes problems in the community and the policy does not adequately address them</b>					
<b>1.0 General comments about the inadequacy of the policy</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	375	Because there are about a zillion illegal immigrants all over Manassas.	1.0		
PR3	47	Because they are still there and getting jobs.	1.0		
PR4	157	Overall evidence looks like nothing is happening - groups trespassing.	1.0		
PR1	464	See tons of illegals driving around, and there is nothing done about it. For example the day they voted on it there where hundreds of them present and clearly nothing is done.	1.0		
PR1	1246	Still a lot of illegal people in the county.	1.0		
PR1	320	The illegal immigrants are increasing in my neighborhood.	1.0		
PR1	1239	The illegals are here, they keep shifting them from county to county. It's not fixing the problem.	1.0		
PR4	570	There are still a lot of illegal immigrants around here. Throw 7-11 cups on his lawn, sees them walking.	1.0		
PR1	1442	They are stopping them only for traffic violations but not for loitering. I'm scared to go to the 7-11 on Jefferson Davis Highway, and also the Popeye's near Prince William Plaza. They do recruiting for the MS13 gang there. An email came out saying that.	1.0		
PR4	539	They have to be creating a crime for them to arrest them and not able to check anyone.	1.0		

<b>1.1 Not fair that illegals are here getting benefits; not paying taxes.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	590	Taking our jobs.	1.1		

<b>1.2 Overcrowding of houses; unsightly property appearance.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR5	163	They seem like they are not getting everything under control. It is specifically with the Hispanics. People are moving out in the middle of the night and too many people occupy one house causing many problems. There is too much overpopulation and she doesn't feel like the police department is doing enough. Too many foreclosures and auctioning off of houses due to the overpopulation.	1.2		

<b>1.3 Crime</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	1217	It is not the police department that I'm complaining about, it is all the other resources. Gang warfare or gangs have no place in this country. They are the illegal's. If a person comes here and obeys the law, that is not as bad. A police department does not have the manpower to do everything. I would support the police picking up all the gang members aggressively.	1.3		
PR3	76	So many illegal immigrants in this neighborhood many more gang members and nothing seems to be done about it.	1.3		
PR3	285	There is too much stuff going on, it has not been handled right and seems to be increasing crime in the area and causing allot of people to move.	1.3		
PR5	405	Too many illegal's on corners around here - crime.	1.3		

<b>1.4 Loitering, day laborers gathering</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	500	Many people out in the street.	1.4		
PR1	1353	Pass legislation that feels like it has not been put in play. On Jefferson Davis Highway there is a lot of loitering and it's hurting the community economically which is why she thinks the community is going downhill.	1.4		
PR1	1392	There's a lot of loitering of possibly illegal immigrants at stores I frequent.	1.4		
PR1	259	When I drive to work in the morning and head to Woodbridge VRE at the corner there always at least 200 illegal immigrants waiting to be picked up for a job - haven't seen the number diminish at all. I know they are illegal because when a police come by they scramble into woods behind the 7-Eleven.	1.4		

<b>1.5 Declining property value</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	705	Because the property has gone down because of the immigrants.	1.5		

<b>6. The Policy is Bad</b>					
<b>6.0 General negative comments about the policy</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	1312	Dislike the policy.	6.0		
PR1	1302	I don't agree with the policy at all.	6.0		
PR1	716	I don't think they should be doing this at all.	6.0		
PR5	373	I just don't like the law.	6.0		

PR1	364	Manassas in the last eight years was a good place to have a job and send your children with no problem until now.	6.0		
PR4	185	Not that I don't think they are doing a good job rounding them up, it's just that I'm against what they are doing.	6.0		
PR1	1061	They should not be doing that in the first place.	6.0		
PR3	266	What I can tell is they are not very effective in doing it.	6.0		
PR2	141	You don't see them in this area at all. There are crimes I reported about someone vandalizing peoples' property and I actually saw the people that were doing it and they were totally on the wrong street so by the time they got to my street the people were gone.	6.0	1.3	

<b>6.1 Immigration is a federal job, not County's business to do</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	494	Because a lot of times they say they are getting people who are illegal, but most of the time they are not doing anything. To her, it doesn't make sense to bother them now because they have already invested in the communities so we shouldn't send them back to their countries.	6.1		
PR1	1151	Because that is not their job, it's immigrations job. They need to focus on their job, losing time from other concerns.	6.1	8.4	
PR1	618	It's not their job. Witch hunt by the Board of Supervisors, very narrow minded. Resources could be better allocated.	6.1	6.5	
PR1	765	People are working and are good people and left alone. People breaking the law are different.	6.1		
PR5	159	The County Police should not be enforcing federal laws.	6.1		
PR4	744	They shouldn't be doing it at all. That is a federal government function, and the county police department doing it is wasting our tax dollars.	6.1		

<b>6.2 Policy can't be monitored</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	150	They're not really monitoring it well. They jump the gun before they ask. They don't respect the individual whether the are illegal or immigrants or not and they are definitely profiling.	6.2		

<b>6.3 Policy is unfair</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	149	Because that is a subjective opinion. Policies can't be applied consistently or fairly. I work for DEA and we have guidelines that are clearly defined a-b-c-d. We have to be objective. I believe in enforcement but someone brainstormed this at the last minute to put a band-aid on it.	6.3		

PR1	404	He doesn't think it's fair. They shouldn't waste their time chasing after good people they're wasting their time they should be getting real criminals not hard working people. Kids shouldn't be afraid of having their immigration status checked on their way to school.	6.3	8.4	
PR4	376	It is one of those unfunded mandates without having any foresight into what resources may be needed to carry out this policy based on the fears of a few people in PWC and I don't believe it reflects the attitudes of the majority of PWC. I don't think they should continue these intimidation methods.	6.3	6.6	
PR1	695	It's a stupid policy. It's a waste of money at a time when the economy is in bad shape. It's not that I'm dissatisfied with how the police are enforcing it. If they'd cut that program then they could put all the others that they're cutting back in place.	6.3	6.5	
PR4	813	It's not fair. Doing it the wrong way.	6.3		
PR1	429	She doesn't support the policy. She thinks that's it unfair to go after immigrants and it has created a lot fear in the community especially the children.	6.3	7.8	

<b>6.4 Policy is discriminatory / illegal</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PS3	345	Discrimination against ALL Hispanics and aggression.	6.4		
PR1	1397	Does not believe that the policy is correct, everyone is targeted, if you look remotely Hispanic you are targeted. Racially biased. Pure prejudice.	6.4		
PR1	199	I believe it is complete and utter racial profiling.	6.4		
PR4	153	It promotes racial profiling and it should be left for federal governing.	6.4	6.1	
PS5	462	Simplemente estoy contra la ley porque nos hace sentir como criminales, apartir de que algunos pagamos taxes todo los anos. (He is against the law because it makes them as Hispanics feel like criminals and some of us pay taxes every year)	6.4		
PR4	896	They think that any foreign looking person is an illegal immigrant.	6.4		
PR1	600	Think it was a racist policy, financially irresponsible and should not exist.	6.4	6.5	

<b>6.5 Policy costs too much</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	149	Costing tax payers more money; should target more specific areas; more assertive.	6.5		

PR1	159	They have run out of money and can't do some of what they proposed to do - don't have the manpower. Seems like it was not well thought-out in the beginning. And I feel it was a bad policy - we were all immigrants once. Should have planned for them instead of trying to get rid of them. Embrace some of the other cultures. There's a way to do it.	6.5	5.2	
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<b>6.6 Manpower/resources needed elsewhere</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	534	Because the money that is spent on that program is being taken away from the school, and no other counties around theirs is embracing the same policy. It's not effective other than driving people out of PWC. Looks like were still in the 20th century.	6.6	6.3	

<b>7. Unfavorable outcomes as a result of the policy</b>					
<b>7.0 Unfavorable outcomes or negative effects from the policy or from police enforcement - general.</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR2	173	Feel that the whole issue is self-serving on behalf of the government the county has depended on the presence of immigrants that the effort to remove them has been cruel. It has separated families and brought out the worst in the community.	7.0		
PS2	321	He is against the law. He agrees that illegal immigration is a problem but is not in agreement with how the police are going about taking care of this problem since many of his friends have been unjustly treated by the police due to this law.	7.0		
PR4	941	I feel like a lot of people have left the county since this has gone on. I feel like it has influenced the housing market. Now I notice a lot of abandoned housing.	7.0	7.2	
PR2	80	I know someone who wasn't doing anything but walking down the street; and he was stopped. And now he's being deported. Also it's a waste of county resources.	7.0	6.6	
PR4	145	I think its causing the immigrants to go to another county, which is great, but it is hurting the housing market.	7.0	7.2	
PR1	679	I think they're jumping the gun. They should wait until an immigrant is charged because they're overcrowding the jails.	7.0		
PS1	1225	There are persons that wish to be legal and there are many people that take advantage of immigrants.	7.0		

<b>7.3 Hurting local businesses</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	1433	Has to do with the fact that Prince William County has been very anti-immigrant policy. Has been detrimental to the economy. Detrimental in that excessive immigration from the county. Affected the housing value. Some of people who left were living in.	7.3	7.2	

<b>7.8 Scaring people/scaring Hispanics</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	136	Thinks that the Chairman is using scare tactics to get elected. And the Chairman is scaring the immigrants for no reason. And he is very upset about this situation, the respondents whole attitude changed when asked this question.	7.8		

<b>8. Approves of policy but problems with enforcement</b>					
<b>8.0 General negative comments on police enforcement of policy</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR1	849	A close friend of mine was in accident and the other person did not want to give his information and the police did not do anything about. The guy did not give his insurance because he did not have any.	8.0		
PR1	401	I don't believe they're doing it. I reported a "run-in" with some illegals - a subcontractor damaged my house - and when I called the police they came but did not inquire as to their legal status.	8.0		
PR5	99	Need to perk it up more doing good job but need to do more.	8.0		

<b>8.1 Not trying hard enough</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR2	194	Not doing enough.	8.1		

<b>9.2 Other reasons</b>					
<b>samp</b>	<b>resp</b>	<b>comment</b>	<b>code 1</b>	<b>code 2</b>	<b>code 3</b>
PR4	50	Do not think they are doing it, do not have a plan to remove.	9.2		
PR3	149	That's the cause of the problem with our economy.	9.2		
PR1	1106	They stopped my daughter and her son - she's 40 years old and not Hispanic. Was waxing her car. No reason to do that.	9.2		
PR1	683	We have had problems here.	9.2		

9.3 Not codable					
samp	resp	comment	code 1	code 2	code 3
PR1	789	Think it's the police department who ignore the policy.	9.3		

10. The police are discriminatory/racial profiling					
10.1 The police are profiling/selectively targeting/being arbitrary.					
samp	resp	comment	code 1	code 2	code 3
PR1	664	Because that is profiling and it's not what they're supposed to be doing. It's a Federal government job. They've spent all the county's resources on this and it has caused an economic downturn. Along with the real estate crisis. They're running the county.	10.1		
PS5	434	Because the police are discriminating against all Hispanics.	10.1		
PS5	436	Claims police are discriminating against Hispanics in general.	10.1		
PR4	368	I believe it is racial profiling on so-called illegal immigrants.	10.1		
PR4	116	Racial profiling.	10.1		
PS1	1568	Racism toward Hispanics.	10.1		
PR1	636	Racist.	10.1		
PR1	981	Seems like they are harassing people.	10.1		
PR1	113	Some people are being pulled over for no reason and people are complaining of racist profiling and remarks.	10.1		
PR4	183	The target the Hispanics and they act like the Hispanics are the only race they're looking to kick out of the US.	10.1		
PR4	536	They are all racial. It doesn't matter what race except white, and they are only after the other ethnic groups.	10.1		
PR5	366	They don't do a good job. They are just racist, back-stabbing punks.	10.1		
PR1	365	They only stop Latinos. They profile. There are allot of illegals among Blacks, Asians and Indians but they always stop Latinos.	10.1		
PR1	285	This gentleman is a United States citizen but because he has dark hair and skin he is stopped by police to check immigration status and he feels this is not fair.	10.1	6.3	



Appendix I:  
**Map of Public Use Micro Areas 501 and 502,  
Representing Prince William County + Cities**



## Map of Public Use Micro Areas 501 and 502, Representing Prince William County + Cities

