Study of the January 3, 1862 Battle of Cockpit Point

Prince William County, Virginia

Prepared for:
Prince William County
Planning Office
5 County Complex Court, Suite 210
Prince William, VA 22192

American Battlefield Protection Program Grant No. GA-2255-12-017
Contract #14002NO0

Prepared by:
Kelly Arford-Horne, MA
Bradley Krueger, MA, RPA
Scott Seibel, MSc, RPA
Jeff Winstel, MS, AICP

Principal Investigator
Scott Seibel, MSc, RPA

URS Corporation
12420 Milestone Center Drive, Suite 150
Germantown, MD 20876
301.820.3000

May 2014
This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service (Grant No. GA-2255-12-017). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Interior or Prince William County.
On January 3, 1862 two ships of the Potomac Flotilla, U.S.S. *Anacostia* and U.S.S. *Yankee*, took aim at the Confederate batteries at Cockpit Point. Dozens of shots were fired by the Union ships; however the Confederates had little opportunity to return fire. Union commanders had correctly predicted that the batteries at Cockpit Point could not fire on certain positions up the Potomac River. When *Yankee* moved within range of the Confederate guns, one shot passed through the hull and lodged in a berth on the starboard forecastle of the ship, doing some damage and slightly wounding one seaman. The Battle of Cockpit Point was one event in the month’s long conflict, known as the Potomac Blockade that took place between Confederate and Union forces on the shores and channels of the Potomac River in October 1861 through March 1862.

In collaboration with Prince William County, and funded by a grant from the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP; Grant No. GA-2255-12-017), URS completed a study of the Battle of Cockpit Point (ABPP Site Number VA 100). The focus of the study was a 16.2-acre parcel of land containing the historic location of the batteries and other related features in Prince William County. The parcel is proposed for donation to the County by the current owners, the SunCal development company. The current study included background research, KOCA documentation, and the definition of study area, core area, and potential National Register of Historic Places boundaries. The study also included an assessment of the current conditions of above-ground features, historic viewsheds, archeological potential, and potential threats to the earthworks.

As a result of the study, it was determined that historic viewsheds have been altered as a result of industrial construction surrounding the location of the historic batteries. That construction includes structures associated with the Nustar industrial complex just north of the batteries, the Virginia Power electrical station south of the batteries, and the railroad, which runs immediately west of the current project area. The core area of the battle remains largely intact and unaffected by modern disturbances. Due to the lack of modern disturbance, the potential for identifying archeological resources related to the Battle of Cockpit Point is high. These resources could provide information relevant to the interpretation of the actual battle, as well as to the campaign of the Potomac Blockade.

Features associated with the battle retain integrity; however procedures to ensure the continued preservation of the Civil War resources should be implemented. Those procedures should include maintenance of the surrounding forest to protect surviving earthworks and steps to prevent vandalism.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... i

1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1-1

2.0 HISTORIC CONTEXT ................................................................................................... 2-1
   2.1 The Civil War in Virginia ......................................................................................... 2-1
   2.2 The Civil War in Prince William County ............................................................... 2-1
   2.3 The Potomac Blockade ........................................................................................... 2-2
   2.4 Potomac Flotilla ..................................................................................................... 2-13
   2.5 The Batteries at Cockpit Point .............................................................................. 2-16
       2.5.1 Roads .............................................................................................................. 2-16
       2.5.2 Troops .......................................................................................................... 2-24
       2.5.3 Construction and Layout ............................................................................. 2-25
       2.5.4 Guns .............................................................................................................. 2-38
       2.5.5 Reports of Action .......................................................................................... 2-39
       2.5.6 Withdrawal .................................................................................................... 2-42
       2.5.7 Dismantling .................................................................................................. 2-43
   2.6 The Battle of Cockpit Point .................................................................................... 2-45
       2.6.1 Order of Battle .............................................................................................. 2-46

3.0 PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS .................................................................................... 3-1

4.0 METHODS .................................................................................................................... 4-1
   4.1 Research ............................................................................................................... 4-1
   4.2 Fieldwork .............................................................................................................. 4-1
   4.3 KOCOA Analysis .................................................................................................. 4-2
       4.3.1 Analysis of Maritime Battlefields ................................................................. 4-3
       4.3.2 Determination of Fields of Fire ................................................................... 4-4
   4.4 Definition of Study Area, Core Area, and Potential NRHP Boundaries .............. 4-4
       4.4.1 National Register Eligibility Criteria ......................................................... 4-4
       4.4.2 Archeological Sites ...................................................................................... 4-4
       4.4.3 Battlefields .................................................................................................. 4-5

5.0 MILITARY TERRAIN ANALYSIS ............................................................................. 5-1
   5.1 KOCOA Analysis .................................................................................................. 5-1
       5.1.1 Key Terrain .................................................................................................. 5-1
       5.1.2 Observation and Fields of Fire .................................................................... 5-3
       5.1.3 Cover and Concealment .............................................................................. 5-7
       5.1.4 Obstacles ..................................................................................................... 5-7
       5.1.5 Avenues of Approach .................................................................................. 5-8
   5.2 Defining Features ................................................................................................. 5-8
   5.3 Study Areas .......................................................................................................... 5-9

6.0 FIELD INVESTIGATIONS ........................................................................................... 6-1
   6.1 Historic Impacts ................................................................................................... 6-1
   6.2 Current Site Conditions ....................................................................................... 6-1
   6.3 Viewshed Analysis ............................................................................................... 6-5

7.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................... 7-1
   7.1 Context of the Battle ............................................................................................ 7-1

    iii
APPENDIX A: Qualifications of Investigators
APPENDIX B: Gun Ranges

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2-1. Summary of Action Reported at Cockpit Point in Official Records .................................................. 2-40
Table 4-1. KOCOA Battlefield Evaluation System (adapted from NPS) ................................................................. 4-2
Table 5-1. Summary of Fields of Fire .................................................................................................................. 5-5
Table 5-2. Defining Features ............................................................................................................................... 5-8
Table 7-1. Cockpit Point Battlefield Threats Matrix ............................................................................................ 7-3

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1. Project Location .................................................................................................................................. 1-2
Figure 2-1. Sketch of U.S.S. Seminole under fire from batteries at Evansport on October 15, 1861 (Sands 1861) ........................................................................................................................................ 2-5
Figure 2-2. Batteries along the Potomac (Based on Haynes 2008) ........................................................................ 2-6
Figure 2-3. 1861 Map Showing Union and Confederate Batteries on the Potomac and the Position of Union Troops (Sneden 1862) .................................................................................................. 2-7
Figure 2-4. Sketch of Federal Battery at Budd’s Ferry (Harper’s Weekly 1861) .................................................. 2-9
Figure 2-5. Sketch of Federal Troops in the Potomac near Indian Head, Maryland (Unknown Artist 1861a) ........................................................................................................................................... 2-10
Figure 2-6. Sketch of a Federal Picket on the Potomac across from Confederate Batteries (Unknown Artist 1861b) ........................................................................................................................................... 2-10
Figure 2-7. Sketch of Virginia and Rebel Camps and Batteries (Small 1861) ......................................................... 2-12
Figure 2-8. Flotilla of the Potomac River, Aquia Creek, and Freestone Point (Lumley 1861) 2-14
Figure 2-9. Sketch of the Battle of Aquia Creek Showing Ships of the Potomac Flotilla, Including U.S.S. Anacostia and U.S.S. Yankee ........................................................................................................ 2-15
Figure 2-10. Sketch of U.S.S. Yankee (Lumley 1862) ............................................................................................. 2-15
Figure 2-11. Map Showing Depths of the Potomac River in 1862 (Coastal Survey 1862) ................................. 2-17
Figure 2-12. 1864 Map of Prince William County (Hoffman 1864) ...................................................................... 2-18
Figure 2-13. 1927 USGS 7.5 Minute Quantico Quadrangle ...................................................................................... 2-20
Figure 2-14. 1901 Map of Prince William County (Brown 1901) ........................................................................ 2-21
Figure 2-15. Map of the Cherry Hill Peninsula (Haynes 2008) ........................................................................... 2-22
Figure 2-16. Map Showing Union and Confederate Batteries along the Potomac in 1862 (Williamson 1862) ........................................................................................................................................ 2-23
Figure 2-17. Sketch of Cockpit Point (Waud 1862) ................................................................. 2-27
Figure 2-18. Sketch of Cockpit Point (Lumley n.d.) ................................................................ 2-28
Figure 2-19. Sketch of Federal Battery at Budd’s Ferry Showing Cockpit Point in the Distance (Waud 1862) ...................................................................................................................... 2-29
Figure 2-20. Civil War Features at Cockpit Point ...................................................................... 2-31
Figure 2-21. Measured Drawing of Battery A from NRHP Nomination Form showing Topographic Contours ....................................................................................................... 2-32
Figure 2-22. Overview of Battery A – Facing Northeast ............................................................. 2-32
Figure 2-23. Measured Drawing of Battery B from NRHP Nomination Form showing Topographic Contours ....................................................................................................... 2-33
Figure 2-24. Overview of Battery B – Facing Northeast ............................................................. 2-33
Figure 2-25. Measured Drawing of Battery C from NRHP Nomination Form showing Topographic Contours ....................................................................................................... 2-34
Figure 2-26. Overview of Battery C – Facing East ..................................................................... 2-34
Figure 2-27. Measured Drawing of Battery D from NRHP Nomination Form showing Topographic Contours ....................................................................................................... 2-35
Figure 2-28. Overview of Battery D – Facing South ................................................................. 2-35
Figure 2-29. Trench Feature – Facing North ............................................................................ 2-36
Figure 2-30. Detail of Bricks at Southern end of Trench Feature – Facing North ..................... 2-36
Figure 2-31. Features in Drainage South of Battery A – Facing Northeast ......................... 2-37
Figure 2-32. Detail of Hut Feature – Facing Northwest ............................................................. 2-37
Figure 2-33. Artillery of Hooker’s Division Shelling the Rebel Battery at Cockpit Point from across the Potomac River (Sneden 1862) .......................................................................... 2-41
Figure 2-34. Sketch and Description of the Dismantling of the Batteries at Cockpit Point (Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper 1862) ................................................................................ 2-44
Figure 5-1. KOCOA Defining Features of the Cockpit Point Battlefield .................................. 5-2
Figure 5-2. Potential Ranges of Union and Confederate Guns ................................................ 5-4
Figure 5-3. Previous Study Area and Core Area ...................................................................... 5-11
Figure 5-4. Modified Study Area, Core Area, and Potential NRHP Boundary ....................... 5-12
Figure 6-1. 1903 Nautical Chart of the Potomac River .............................................................. 6-2
Figure 6-2. Bluff Face Between Batteries A and B – Facing North ........................................... 6-3
Figure 6-3. Aerial Photos Showing Accretion of Historic Shoreline ....................................... 6-4
Figure 6-4. Detail of Typical Erosion seen on Earthworks – Facing North .............................. 6-6
Figure 6-5. Example of Treefall Damage to Trench – Facing Southeast ................................. 6-6
Figure 6-6. Probable Looter Hole at Battery A – Facing East ................................................... 6-7
Figure 6-7. View of Cockpit Point Batteries from the Vicinity of Freestone Point, Facing South ........................................................................................................................................... 6-9
Figure 6-8. View of Cockpit Point Batteries from the Maryland Shore, Facing Northwest .... 6-10
Figure 6-9. View of Cockpit Point Batteries from the Potomac River, Facing West ............... 6-11
Figure 6-10. View of Cockpit Point Batteries from the Potomac River, Facing Southwest ..... 6-11
Figure 6-11. View of Maryland Shore from Cockpit Point Batteries, Facing East ................. 6-12
In collaboration with Prince William County (PWC), URS Corporation (URS) completed a study of the Confederate batteries at Cockpit Point, located in Dumfries, Virginia. In 2012, PWC received a grant from the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP; Grant No. GA-2255-12-017) to complete baseline documentation, including a military terrain analysis, of the Cockpit Point Battlefield and document the battlefield’s viewsheds. The goals of this project were to present PWC with a clear understanding of the Battle of Cockpit Point; to determine defining features of the battle; to assess the current condition of the battlefield, including an examination of modern viewsheds; and to prepare a Battlefield Management Plan. The project also intended to use study results to refine the limits of the core areas of the battle and potential National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) boundaries, which were previously proposed by the ABPP and Civil War Sites Advisory Commission (CWSAC; ABPP Site Number VA 100).

In order to accomplish these goals, URS completed extensive background research on the Civil War with specific focus on the Potomac Blockade of 1861-1862 to create a context for the Battle of Cockpit Point. A detailed examination of the Confederate occupation of the batteries at Cockpit Point during the duration of the Potomac Blockade was also completed. The study also incorporated an evaluation of the Battle of Cockpit Point using the KOCOA (Key Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach) approach to military terrain analysis. All research and fieldwork followed the standards and guidelines of the ABPP Survey Manual (Lowe 2000), The Secretary of the Interior’s Standards and Guidelines for Archeology and Historic Preservation, the National Park Service Cultural Resource Management Guidelines, and the VDHR’s Guidelines for Conducting Historic Resources Survey in Virginia (2011 version).

The current project focused on a 16.2-acre parcel located at 17998 Cockpit Point Road in Dumfries, Virginia, which contains the remains of the Cockpit Point batteries and portions of an associated camp (Figure 1-1). The parcel is scheduled for donation to PWC, which is investigating ways of providing access to the public. Working with PWC, URS conducted public meetings to inform stakeholders and interested parties about the project and allow for public input pertaining to details of the battlefield and information concerning the history of the batteries. A field survey provided information regarding the current conditions of defining features of the battle.

Scott Seibel served as Principal Investigator for the project, and Heather Crowl was the Project Manager. Kelly Arford-Horne served as terrestrial archeologist, Bradley Krueger served as nautical archeologist; Matthew Harris provided a review of the military terrain analysis. Mark Edwards and Jeff Winstel provided support with the battlefield management plan, and Kevin McMaster served as GIS manager.
2.0 HISTORIC CONTEXT

2.1 The Civil War in Virginia

Following years of tension, the United States of America broke out in Civil War in the spring of 1861. In the preceding months seven southern states had seceded from the Union and formed the Confederate States of America (CSA) under the leadership of Jefferson Davis. On April 12, 1861 cannons under control of the newly formed Confederate government in South Carolina fired on Fort Sumter. The action at Fort Sumter and the subsequent call by President Lincoln to raise 75,000 federal troops motivated politicians in Virginia who had been struggling with internal disagreement about secession. In a vote by the Virginia Convention on April 17, 1861 the state elected to officially break ties with the federal government and join the Confederacy.

2.2 The Civil War in Prince William County

The first decisive battle of the Civil War occurred in Prince William County in July of 1861 when Confederate forces met with advancing Union forces near Manassas Junction, where the Orange & Alexandria Railroad met the Manassas Gap Railroad. The railroad junction was a strategic location for both armies because it offered access to the Shenandoah Valley in the west, points close to Washington, D.C. in the east, and connections to other lines in central and northern Virginia (Gray 2011). It was also where the fledgling Confederate Army of the Potomac was forming with the intention of creating a defensive line that would resist Union attacks in northern Virginia. The Confederates hoped that by creating a strong defensive line the Union would be discouraged from repeated attacks, therefore putting an early end to the war. On the Union side, it was hoped that an early victory in northern Virginia would open the approach to Richmond and put an swift end to the Confederate uprising. Unfortunately for the Union, several factors, including inexperienced and unprepared troops and officers, led to a hasty retreat of Union troops back to Washington, D.C. and a Confederate victory at the Battle of First Manassas. The reality of battle was likely not only a shock for those untested soldiers, but also for the residents of Prince William County, who would see their property abused and fought over by both armies for the remainder of the war.

In the months following the Battle of First Manassas, minor skirmishes continued to occur throughout the county (Townsend 2011). In the late summer of 1861 Confederates initiated the construction of batteries along the Potomac River in Prince William and Stafford counties. A detailed discussion of those batteries is presented below. By July of 1862, both armies were maneuvering around Richmond and were steadily making their way toward another decisive battle near the site of the Battle of First Manassas. Following weeks of fighting, portions of both armies met near Groveton on August 29 and 30, 1862. The resulting battle, known as the Battle of Second Manassas, was again devastating for the Union Army, who retreated toward Washington pursued by Confederate forces. The battle was not only another embarrassment to the Union Army in Prince William County, but also opened the way for the first Confederate invasion of the north, which represented a major shift in tactics. It was believed the Confederacy needed to establish an offensive strategy if it was to gain international support.
Throughout the following years of the war a number of skirmishes would occur in Prince William County, many involving the cavalry and specifically a group of partisan rangers under the command of John Mosby (Townsend 2011). Mosby primarily acted behind Union lines to disrupt supply lines, communications, and transportation. Mosby worked throughout northern Virginia and was generally successful in causing difficulties for the Union Army.

By October of 1863, Confederate and Union armies again found themselves face to face in Prince William County, this time in the vicinity of Bristoe Station. The new location proved favorable for the Union Army who managed a decisive victory over the Confederates. This Union victory came only months after a crushing victory at Gettysburg that essentially ended the Confederate hope for foreign intervention and put them back on the defensive. After the Battle of Bristoe Station, the Army of Northern Virginia retreated from Prince William County for the last time, although small skirmishes continued there throughout the remainder of the war (Townsend 2011).

### 2.3 The Potomac Blockade

As individual states were choosing sides in the spring of 1861, both the Union and the Confederacy were rushing to make preparations for the looming war. Shortly after the secession of Virginia and the decision of Maryland to stay with the Union, the Federal government began efforts to secure its borders in Maryland, specifically surrounding Washington, D.C. This included securing its resources on the Potomac River, where the government seized four steamboats in service of the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad (RF&P) for federal use (Wills 1975:15). The conflict surrounding the Potomac had begun.

Reacting to rumors of the construction of Confederate batteries along the Potomac, U.S.S. *Anacostia* and U.S.S. *Pawnee* patrolled the river in late April on watch for Confederate activity, but found the rumors of battery construction to be false (ORN Series 1, Vol. 4:422; Wills 1975:16). They did, however, take notice of the Confederate steamer *George Page*, which was moored outside of the railroad terminal at Aquia Creek (ORN Series 1, Vol. 4:422). On April 27, 1861 President Lincoln set forth a proclamation to extend the Union blockade of the southern states to include both Virginia and North Carolina. As a result, the Potomac Flotilla was formed in May and appointed with the tasks of keeping the Potomac open to federal traffic, restricting communication between Maryland and Virginia, and defending Washington, D.C. (Wills 1975:17).

The first major action of the Flotilla on the Potomac was an attack on the armed port at Aquia Creek, where Confederates had constructed a battery in early May. The attack was designed to test to the strength of the Confederate defenses on the Potomac, with concern that the Confederates might attempt a blockade of the Potomac and Washington, D.C. (Wills 1975:25). The battle took place over the course of two days between May 31 and June 1 and included five ships of the Flotilla: U.S.S. *Pawnee*, U.S.S. *Thomas Freeborn*, U.S.S. *Anacostia*, U.S.S. *Reliance*, and U.S.S. *Resolute*. By the end of the two-day battle, hundreds of shots had been fired, however there were no reported casualties. Damage was reported to *Freeborn* and *Pawnee*, and Confederate forces suffered some damage to earthworks, buildings, and the train tracks.
The next major action on the Lower Potomac came in late June when the commander of the Potomac Flotilla, James Harmon Ward, became eager to dispose of the newly formed Confederate presence on Mathias Point. Mathias Point is located on a bend in the river, which both the Union and Confederates agreed was strategically important to the open navigation of the Potomac. Theoretically, a battery at Mathias Point could effectively close the river to navigation (Wills 1975:33-34). After a short reconnaissance where Confederate troops, but no batteries were discovered at Mathias Point, Ward decided a dispatch of the Flotilla should attempt to clear the point of vegetation and Confederate soldiers and construct a Union battery.

On June 27, the vessels *Thomas Freeborn* and *Resolute* stood offshore and shelled the point to drive the residing Confederates away. Ward then landed a party of soldiers on the shore to complete the work under watch from the ships; however, four or five hundred Confederates began firing on the landing party, forcing them to return to their landing boats and wait off the point. Ward fired on the Confederates from *Resolute* and *Thomas Freeborn*, again forcing them to retreat, and the Union soldiers returned to finish their job. The Confederates then regrouped and fired on the Union soldiers a second time. This time, the Union soldiers were forced to abandon their work and supplies and return to the ships; however, the ships provided no cover for the retreating soldiers, and four members of the landing party were wounded. On *Thomas Freeborn*, Commander Ward was fatally wounded by a Confederate sharpshooter. The Confederates reported no casualties. The battle revealed to both sides the strategic importance of Mathias Point; however, neither side would construct a battery on the point during the war. The Confederates maintained a presence there for many months, and ships from the Potomac Flotilla regularly bombed the point to try to keep it clear of batteries (Wills 1975:39).

Those early battles were precursors to the Confederate blockade of the Potomac River. Since early May the Confederates had been contemplating the placement of heavy batteries in Virginia to create a blockade of the Potomac. It was not until after the Battle of First Manassas, though, that the Confederates had the resources to construct and operate those batteries (Balicki et al. 2002; Wills 1975:33). The battery at Aquia Creek had been constructed with the intention of protecting the RF&P railroad and avenues toward Fredericksburg. The Confederates were now looking to open the way for friendly navigation of the river (Wills 1975:22). They chose to focus on an area between Freestone Point and Shipping Point, where the river was sufficiently narrow to allow the batteries range across the river (Wills 1975:63). While a battery at Mathias Point had been considered for taking control of the river, it was eventually decided to first construct batteries at Evansport. The first official orders for the construction of the batteries came on August 22, 1861, when General Johnston wrote to the Inspector General that an engineer should be sent to superintend the construction of a battery at Evansport (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:801).

Construction of several batteries at Evansport subsequently began under the direction of General Isaac R. Trimble (Wills 1975:65). The first battery at Evansport was completed in late September while the construction of batteries at other locations along the river was underway. Those locations included Shipping Point, near the batteries at Evansport, Freestone Point, at the confluence of Neabsco Creek and the Potomac, and Cockpit Point approximately 2.5 miles south of Freestone Point.
On September 25, U.S.S. Jacob Bell and U.S.S. Seminole opened fire on Freestone Point, where intelligence suggested a battery was under construction (Wills 1975:69). The Confederate battery returned fire and continued to fire at passing ships until 3PM that day, confirming its presence and causing some damage to Valley City. The batteries at Evansport remained silent until October 15, when Pocahontas fired in their direction, not knowing if a battery was present there or not (Wills 1975:78). The batteries returned fire, targeting Seminole, which was traveling behind Pocahontas (Figure 2-1). Seminole returned fire, acquiring some minor damage during the battle. The next day Pawnee was fired upon by the batteries at Evansport as it passed in the early dawn. The ship also sustained some minor damage.

On October 18, the trees were taken down at Cockpit Point, revealing yet another battery on the Virginia side of the Potomac. The exposure of the battery had an immediate effect on the operation of the U.S. Navy along the Potomac, as the Confederates confirmed an intimidating presence over approximately 15 miles of the Potomac River (Figures 2-2 and 2-3). Commander Welles followed the account of the opening of the battery at Cockpit Point by saying “in consequence of the extended line of the rebel batteries, I have deemed it proper to detain all vessels bound down the river tonight” (ORN Series 1, Vol. 4:726). Shipping traffic was essentially brought to a standstill that night and would not open again for another five months.

Although records are not complete, it is known the batteries blockading the Potomac were supported at least in part by a portion of the brigade of General W.H.C. Whiting, who was in charge of protecting the Potomac and Occoquan front. In January of 1862, General Johnston reported the forces near Dumfries under the command of Brigadier-General Whiting included: a brigade consisting of the 4th Alabama Infantry, 2nd Mississippi Infantry, 11th Mississippi Infantry, 6th North Carolina Infantry, 1st Tennessee Infantry, and Staunton Artillery (Virginia); Brigadier-General Wigfall’s brigade consisting of the 5th Alabama Battalion Infantry, 18th Georgia Infantry, 1st Texas Infantry, 4th Texas Infantry, and 5th Texas Infantry; Colonel Hampton’s brigade consisting of the 14th Georgia Infantry, 19th Georgia Infantry, 16th North Carolina Infantry, and Hampton’s Legion (South Carolina); and a Detachment including Reilly’s artillery (North Carolina), Rives’ battery (South Carolina), Shannon’s cavalry (South Carolina), and Thornton’s cavalry (Virginia; OR Series 1, Vol 5:1030).

It is likely that troops from the Aquia District were stationed in support of batteries farther south at Aquia Creek. Those troops were under the command of General French, who had replaced General Trimble, and included the 14th Alabama, 2nd Arkansas Infantry, 35th Georgia Infantry, 22nd North Carolina Infantry, 2nd Tennessee Infantry, 47th Virginia Infantry, Braxton’s Artillery, Maryland Flying Artillery, Carolina Light Dragoons, and Stafford Rangers, Cavalry (OR Series 1, Vol 5:1031).

Whiting had a notable academic history, graduating from West Point first in his class in 1845 and then working with the Corps of Engineers until the start of the war, when he was appointed Major of Engineers in the Confederate States of America and ordered by Jefferson Davis to inspect and improve the defenses at Charleston Harbor (OR Series 1, Vol. 1:258). However, it
Figure 2-1: Sketch of U.S.S. Seminole Under Fire from Batteries at Evansport on October 15, 1861 (Sands 1861)
was not generally agreed that he was a successful commander, and he was often defensive and short-tempered in his correspondence. As early as November 1861, General Whiting was clearly frustrated with the organization and dispersal of troops. In a letter to General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, Whiting expressed his dissatisfaction "What are they sending me unarmed and new regiments for? Don’t want them. … Can’t feed nor use them. I want re-enforcements not recruits. They can do no good here, and will only seriously embarrass all operations” (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:961).

Life on the Potomac front was not easy for the Confederate troops, many of whom were inexperienced in warfare. Union reports after the abandonment of the batteries suggest the camps were disorganized and unclean. They also discovered evidence of the high mortality rate in the Confederate camps, due largely to sickness. In one company, it was reported that almost half had died during the winter (Cudworth 1866:131). At Aquia Creek, the 14th Alabama had 200 men die of the measles, and General Holmes requested the 35th Georgia be relieved from as many duties as possible in order to let them recuperate from diseases that had spread through that regiment (Balicki et al. 2002:51). Though in general provisions were good, food and supplies were often lacking for some troops, partly due to the difficulty of travel and poor condition of the roads, it seems some soldiers fared better than others. One Captain from the 4th Alabama, stationed 4.5 miles north of Dumfries, claimed to enjoy fine wine and food daily, while another soldier from the regiment made frequent claims of being near starvation and lacking in supplies (Crouch 1978:108; Stocker 1996).

The Union responded to the construction of the Confederate batteries by sending General Hooker and approximately 12,000 troops to Charles County, Maryland on the opposite shores of the Potomac. Union forces began construction of a battery at Budd’s Ferry on November 11, 1861 where they could exchange fire with the Confederates (Figure 2-4; Wills 1975:96). Earthworks were also constructed around field artillery in the vicinity of Indian Head. Federal artillery at the Union batteries included two rifled Parrot guns and some rifled Whitworth guns (Balicki et al. 2002:47; Wills 1975:96). Union batteries concentrated their fire on the batteries at Evansport, exchanging fire with the other Confederate batteries only rarely.

Hooker set up headquarters six miles north of Budd’s Ferry and constructed warehouses and a wharf at Rum Point Landing on Mattawoman Creek (Herbert 1944:57). In early 1862, Hooker’s Division included General Sickles’ Brigade, the 1st and 11th Massachusetts, 26th Pennsylvania, 2nd New Hampshire and 3rd Indiana Cavalry, Colonel Samuel Starr’s 5th through 8th New Jersey Volunteers, and the 1st through 5th Excelsiors, which consisted of the 70th through 74th New York Volunteers (Figures 2-5 and 2-6; Wills 1975:93).

The situation on the eastern side of the river seemed to be more comfortable for the Union troops than it was for the Confederate troops under Whiting’s command. The Union troops set up winter quarters on the Potomac and, according to a history written by the Chaplain of the First Massachusetts Infantry, their huts were “uniform, spacious, (and) comfortable” (Cudworth 1866:103). The First Massachusetts, stationed at Budd’s Ferry, celebrated a grand Thanksgiving celebration that year complete with a greased pig chase for entertainment and gift boxes containing “nearly an hundred dollars’ worth of stockings, suspenders, towels, mittens, &c.” (Cudworth 1866:105). As for the Thanksgiving meal, Cudworth maintained that “very few were
Figure 2-4: Sketch of Federal Battery at Budd's Ferry (Harper's Weekly 1861)
Figure 2-5: Sketch of Federal Troops in the Potomac near Indian Head, Maryland (Unknown Artist 1861a)

Figure 2-6: Sketch of a Federal Picket on the Potomac across from Confederate Batteries (Unknown Artist 1861b)
the Massachusetts tables spread with food greater in abundance or variety” (Cudworth 1866:105).

During the blockade, Union forces utilized a recently instituted method of observation by balloon (Figure 2-7). Hooker was in need of detailed information concerning the numbers of Confederate troops stationed in support of the batteries, and other sources had proved unreliable (Wills 1975:130). On November 11, 1861, Professor Thaddeus Lowe, director of the newly formed Balloon Corps, along with William Paulin, assistant aeronaut, and General Daniel Sickles ascended in the balloon Constitution from the deck of G.W. Parke Custis near Mattawoman Creek. Custis had recently been outfitted with a flat deck to be used for launching the balloon. From the balloon the men were able to observe troops at Freestone Point and campfires all the way to Dumfries, confirming a large Confederate presence on the Virginia side of the Potomac. The trip marked the first ever recorded balloon expedition by water (Wills 1975: 130; ORN Series 3, Vol. 3:265).

For the duration of the Potomac Blockade, merchant shipping from the Potomac was diverted to Baltimore Harbor and supplies reached the Washington, D.C. via the single-track branch line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad (Wills 1975:15). Food, fuel, and forage were in short supply for the approximately 60,000 citizens of Washington, D.C. and an army of over 200,000 that was camped in and around the city. Shortly after the closing of the Potomac, U.S. Navy Commandant John Dahlgren sent an agitated letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, explaining that he had gone to the quartermaster for some hay and was told there was scarcely more than a day’s supply for the horses because of the shipping blockade (ORN Series 1, Vol. 4:735). Shortages in fuel, which could not be shipped by rail in the quantities necessary to meet the needs of the army and the civilians, drove up prices and forced limits on consumption. The basic needs of the population were stressed, and the army resorted to cutting down the city’s trees in order to construct housing for the men and the horses (Wills 1975:99).

The blockade was a victory for Confederate morale insofar as it was politically embarrassing for the Union to have their capital in an economic stranglehold. In her book The Confederate Blockade of Washington, D.C., Wills estimated the batteries contained approximately 37 guns and fired approximately 5,000 rounds during the blockade (Balicki et al 2002:47; Wills 1975:110,112). Although few casualties occurred as a result of gunfire during the conflict, the effect on the Union was significant. Months into the blockade, Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War, confessed he “did not go to his bed at night without his cheek burning with shame at this disgrace up on the nation” (Williams 1972:116). The batteries were often discussed during war meetings with President Lincoln, who urged General McClellan to remove the blockade on several occasions. McClellan characteristically refused to attack, forcing Lincoln to write Presidents General War Order No. 3 on March 8, 1862, which made clearing the navigation of the Potomac a military priority. The Confederates, however, were already on the move. The day after the announcement of the President’s war order, ships of the Potomac Flotilla fired on the Confederate batteries and found them unoccupied. The Confederate forces had moved south toward Richmond, and the blockade was lifted.
2.4 Potomac Flotilla

The Civil War caused unprecedented growth in the size of the U.S. Navy. The number of ships in commission of the Navy jumped from 42 before the start of the war to 671 by the end of the war (Tucker 2006). Changes in technology and organization accompanied the expansion of the Navy, as both the Union and Confederate forces attempted to change the outcome of the war on the water. One of the first changes enacted by the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, at the onset of the Civil War was the dissolution of the Mediterranean, Brazil, Pacific, East Indian, and African squadrons (Tucker 2006). Those ships were reorganized into the Home Squadron, the Gulf Coast Blockading Squadron, and the Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

The Potomac Flotilla was created as part the Atlantic Blockading Squadron and specially charged with the defense of Washington (Figure 2-8; Tucker 2006). Due to the distance to the flagship, the Potomac Flotilla would shortly become independent (Wills 1975:16). Among the many duties of the Flotilla were to keep the Potomac open to Federal traffic and to limit Confederate activities on the river. This was in accordance with President Lincoln’s proclamation on April 27, 1861 to extend the Union blockade of the southern states to include both Virginia and North Carolina.

In May, James Harmon Ward was selected to command the newly formed Potomac Flotilla. Initially the flotilla consisted of a mixture of warships and repurposed civilian vessels. The fleet included two side-wheel steamers (Thomas Freeborn and Mount Vernon), two small screw steamers (Reliance and Resolute), a screw steamer (Anacostia), a screw sloop (Pocahontas), and a steam sloop-of-war (Pawnee) (Wills 1975:17). The home port of the Flotilla was the Washington Navy Yard, which was located in Washington, D.C. on the Anacostia River close to its confluence with the Potomac River. These ships would lead the first active naval operations of the Civil War (Soley n.d.).

While the Potomac Flotilla contained a number of vessels, the two directly involved in the Battle of Cockpit Point were Yankee and Anacostia. Anacostia was a screw steamer built in Philadelphia 1856 and was first commissioned as a merchant tug in Middletown, Connecticut under the name M.W. Chapin (Figure 2-9; Naval History and Heritage Command [NHHC] 2013). The vessel then performed duties as a canal boat before being chartered by the U.S. government and sent to Paraguay on official duty. Anacostia measured 129-feet long by 23-feet in beam, with a 5-foot depth of hold, and registered at 217 tons. The vessel was purchased by the U.S. Navy shortly before the start of the Civil War and stationed at the Navy Yard. Shortly after the start of the war, Anacostia joined the Potomac Flotilla and began patrolling the Potomac River under the command of Lt. Napoleon Collins with a crew composed of soldiers from the 71st New York Regiment (NHHC 2013). The ship remained with the Flotilla for the duration of the Potomac Blockade and participated in battles at Aquia Creek, Freestone Point, and Cockpit Point (NHHC 2013). At the end of the blockade Anacostia aided in the dismantling of the batteries at Cockpit Point and Evansport. Following its involvement in the Potomac Blockade, Anacostia continued to patrol the Virginia shore as a part of the Potomac Flotilla. The ship was sold into private ownership after the end of the war and was destroyed by fire in 1868 (NHHC 2013).
Figure 2-9: Sketch of the Battle of Aquia Creek Showing Ships of the Potomac Flotilla, Including USS Anacostia and USS Yankee

Figure 2-10: Sketch of USS Yankee (Lumley 1862)
Yankee was built in 1860 in New York City and was almost immediately chartered by the U.S. Navy (Figure 2-10; NHHC 2013). The vessel was a side-wheel steamer measuring 146-feet long by 25-feet 7-inches in beam and registered at 328 tons, a much larger vessel than Anacostia. In early April 1861, the vessel participated in the evacuation of the Norfolk Navy Yard. For the remainder of April and through the end of May, Yankee performed duties off the shores of Maryland and Virginia. On July 9, 1861, after receiving repairs at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, the vessel joined the Potomac Flotilla. Yankee engaged in several conflicts during the blockade, including the Battle of Cockpit Point, and also participated in the dismantling of the batteries at Cockpit Point and Evansport. After the end of the Potomac Blockade, Yankee spent the remainder of the war patrolling the shores of Virginia as a part of the Potomac Flotilla and briefly as a part of the James River Flotilla. The vessel was decommissioned after the war and was sold to George B. Collier at public auction in September 1865 (NHHC 2013).

2.5 The Batteries at Cockpit Point

While a battery at Mathias Point was generally considered from both the Union and Confederate sides to be the best location for effectively shutting down shipping traffic on the Potomac, the Confederates worried it was too distant from the main camp to be properly supported (Wills 1975:41). The high ridge at Possum Nose, known historically as Cockpit Point, north of Aquia Creek, provided an excellent location for a battery according to reconnaissance from the both the Union and Confederacy. On September 27th, General Barnard, an engineer with the Union Army, reported that “(b)atteries at High Point and Cockpit Point, and then to Chopawamsic cannot be prevented.” A federal Navy report from October 26th stated Cockpit Point “is in some respects a remarkable military position. It commands Freestone Point on the north, Ship [Shipping] Point on the south…and it projects farther into the Potomac. In the rear it is defended by Power’s [Powell’s] Creek, the low grounds of which are commanded by it” (ORN Series 1, Vol. 4:737). While the location at Cockpit Point may not be as high as Freestone Point, it does have the advantage of being situated along a narrower section of the river. When standing at the batteries, one can see clearly upriver to Freestone Point and downriver toward Shipping Point. Almost all of the Potomac in front of the batteries is contained in river channel, allowing ships the opportunity to pass close to the Maryland shore (Figure 2-11).

2.5.1 Roads

No Confederate maps of the area surrounding the Cockpit Point batteries have been located, and contemporary descriptions of the roads are generally limited to comments concerning their condition. In the absence of records regarding details of the batteries at Cockpit Point, a close examination of historic maps can provide information concerning methods of travel to and from the batteries. Historic maps show few roads present between Powell’s Creek and Quantico Creek during the mid-nineteenth century. Maps generally include one or two roads connecting Dumfries to Cockpit Point and/or Otterback’s Wharf (Ollenback’s Warf, Caterback’s Wharf), just north of Quantico Creek and near the modern-day intersection of Possum Point Road and Cockpit Point Road (Figure 2-12). Cockpit Point Road is not seen on maps until depicted on the 1966 USGS map.
While it is likely some changes to the paths of the roads occurred over time, the two roads typically depicted on nineteenth century maps closely resemble the paths of modern-day Possum Nose and Cherry Hill roads. While Possum Nose Road essentially follows paths shown on historic maps, Cherry Hill Road as seen today has some notable differences. Modern-day Cherry Hill Road/River Heritage Boulevard intersects with Route 1 just north of Dumfries and extends east, ending at the edge of the Potomac River just north of the Cockpit Point landform. The road shown in this vicinity on nineteenth century maps begins at the town of Dumfries and ends directly at the Cockpit Point landform. This discrepancy is likely due partly to minor errors and generalizations by the mapmakers of the nineteenth century and partly due to periodic changes in the path of the road.

The 1927 USGS map depicts the road leading from Route 1, north of Dumfries and to its current terminus at the river; however, it also depicts a road connecting Cherry Hill Road to Possum Nose Road (Figure 2-13). This connecting road is also shown on a 1903 map of the area and corresponds with Keys Ridge Road, which has since been cut off and today consists of an approximately 0.25-mile long drive leading to several private residences off of Cherry Hill Road. Keys Ridge Road intersects with Cherry Hill Road at a distinctive point where the road makes an approximately 90 degree turn to the north. This is a cause for some speculation about the original path of the road. It would seem if the road continued straight instead of making a sharp turn, it would lead directly to Cockpit Point, as shown on earlier maps.

A 1901 map of Prince William County does not show Keys Ridge Road; however, it does depict a road leading directly to the Cockpit Point landform with a second branch going north, at approximately the same intersection as Keys Ridge Road (Figure 2-14). The northern branch leads to the town of Cherry Hill, and the southern branch seems to follow the northern edge of Timber Branch toward Cockpit Point. A 1975 map of historic locations on the Cherry Hill Peninsula by James Haynes suggests a similar scenario, where historic roads diverged around the Keys Ridge Road intersection, leading alternately north toward the town of Cherry Hill and south toward Possum Nose (Figure 2-15). The branch of the road leading directly to Cockpit Point is not shown on either the 1903 map or the 1927 USGS map, which both depict one road ending north of the landform.

How roads depicted on early twentieth century maps correspond with those on maps contemporary with the Potomac Blockade is another matter of speculation. The 1862 Williamson Map likely represents a relatively accurate depiction of the roads at the time (Figure 2-16). The Williamson Map was based on observations by Captain R.S. Williamson of the Topographical Engineers for the U.S. Army and is the most detailed map of the Confederate batteries at Cockpit Point remaining from the Potomac Blockade. The map shows two roads leading toward the batteries from the west, a road leading south toward Quantico Creek from the vicinity of the batteries, and a network of smaller roads covering the Possum Nose landform. These smaller roads may represent paths no longer in existence created by Confederate troops for the transport of supplies and travel to and from important points around the batteries. The smaller roads include a road leading north from the batteries to Powell’s Creek and two side roads leading east to the river. The location of a regimental camp is marked to the west of the road.
The Cockpit Point landform is shown much smaller and much closer to Possum Point on the Williamson map than it is in reality, making interpretation of the exact location of the roads difficult. While geographical features are somewhat distorted, the roads coming from the west appear to include a road leading from the vicinity of Dumfries to the batteries and a second road converging with it just west of the batteries and coming from a location north of Dumfries. There may also be an additional north/south running road east of Route 1. One of these roads likely corresponds at least partially with modern-day Cherry Hill Road, while the others are likely no longer in existence.

A letter printed in the New York Times from a correspondent stationed near Budd’s Ferry in November 1861 references a new road constructed by the Confederates in the vicinity of Cockpit Point and Freestone Point (New York Times 1861a). The author suggests the road leads to a railroad depot, which he surmises is located at either Evansport or Dumfries. The author also notes that baggage wagons could be seen traveling on the new road. It is possible one of the roads depicted to the west of Cockpit Point is the “new road” constructed by the Confederates. The road toward Quantico Creek may correspond with Keys Ridge Road. Modern-day Cockpit Point Road likely follows portions of the historic Keys Ridge Road, close to its intersection with Possum Nose Road.

**2.5.2 Troops**

Although official Confederate records associated with the battery at Cockpit Point are limited, we do have some information about the troops who were stationed in and around the battery during the fall of 1861 and through to the abandonment of the battery in early March of 1862. According to a report from General Whiting concerning the withdraw of troops from the Potomac in March of 1862, the battery at Cockpit Point was then manned by the 5th Alabama Battalion Infantry (5th Battalion, Alabama Infantry Volunteers) and one company of the 1st Tennessee Regiment, all under the command of Captain Bushrod W. Frobel.

The 5th Alabama was originally part of what was known as the Wigfall Brigade along with the 18th Georgia Infantry, the 1st Texas Infantry, the 4th Texas Infantry, and the 5th Texas Infantry (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:1030). Brigadier General Louis Trezevant Wigfall had a short-lived military career, resigning in February of 1862 to join the Confederate Congress. While in command of his brigade, he was not well-respected by his troops and was infamous for his nervousness, fondness for alcohol, and frequency of false alarms regarding enemy attacks (Polley n.d.:10). In a letter from his camp near Dumfries, VA in January of 1862 Frank Bowen Chilton of the 4th Texas Infantry lamented

“(i)f there is anything else that I have a right to complain of in common with every member of the brigade, it is of the vagaries and hallucinations of the brilliantly astute politician now in command of the brigade… He sees a Yankee in every shadow, hears one approaching in every breeze… Colonel Archer once led the Fifth Texas half way to Cockpit Point before he learned he was on a wild-goose chase” (as quoted in Polley n.d.:11).
Colonel John Bell Hood replaced Wigfall in March of 1862, and the brigade would attain great notoriety and respect under his leadership as Hoods Texas Brigade.

In the fall of 1861 through the spring of 1862, the brigade was attached to forces under the command of Brigadier General W.H.C. Whiting. The regimental journal for the 5th Texas Infantry indicates a march to the mouth of Quantico Creek on November 7, 1861 and on November 8th an assignment to positions on the right flank of the line to both guard the batteries on the west bank of the Potomac and watch the Union troops on the east bank (Nineteenth Century Living History Association, Inc. n.d.). The regiment then set up winter quarters on Neabsco Creek in support of the battery at Cockpit Point and remained there until March 1862.

The first winter of the war was not a pleasant one for those encamped along the Potomac at the batteries and inland toward Dumfries in support of the blockade. William Frierson Fulton, Jr., of the 5th Alabama noted in his diary that he and his fellow soldiers at Cockpit Point:

“considered this winter of 1861-1862 the coldest of our lives and this high point on the Potomac, the coldest in America. So it seemed to us, and we came near freezing and starving to death that winter. We were away off to ourselves, and the roads were impassable from the rains and freezes, and rations became an item for the first time in our war life” (Fulton 1986:53).

He goes on to describe an unsuccessful attempt at foraging in the countryside surrounding the battery when he not only failed to find food, but also determined the area to be completely uninhabited. His description of picket duties further emphasizes the difficulty of their assignment along the river:

“The wind along and across the river had full sweep, as cold as the north pole, and it set in every night about time for the tide to rise… It was our custom for the messmate who went on guard to put on all the spare clothes in the mess, sometimes two or three shirts, as many drawers, coats and trousers, and this was the only way we kept from freezing” (Fulton 1986:54).

2.5.3 Construction and Layout

Confederate records regarding the battery are scarce; however, the battery was probably constructed under the direction of General Isaac Trimble, a military engineer who was appointed with the construction of batteries along the Potomac and who constructed the batteries at Evansport (Davis and Hoffman 1992:60; Townsend 1989). Trimble had graduated from West Point in 1822 as an artillery officer and engineer and was later employed as an engineer working on the Chesapeake & Ohio (C&O) Canal and several railroads. Trimble also commanded the Potomac batteries until November of 1861, when he was replaced by Samuel G. French (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:952). The construction was likely coordinated with General W.H.C. Whiting, who was in charge of the defense of the Occoquan-Potomac front (Townsend 1989).

It is not known exactly when construction of the batteries at Cockpit Point began, though building was likely underway by late September, and it is possible that preparations were being
made as early as August. On August 19, 1861, Acting Master Budd, Commander of Resolute, reported that his ship had been patrolling the Potomac between Quantico and Indian Head in search of enemy activity on the river. While they did not find any movement on the water he reported observations on Cockpit Point of “men and lights… seen in considerable numbers on the beach and adjoining heights busily moving about from 1 to 4 o’clock” (ORN Series 1, Vol. 4:620). A few days later he reported the capture of an enslaved man who was attempting to cross the river from Maryland to Virginia. The man informed his captors he was sent to “assist in the construction of a battery between Possum Nose and Cockpit Point” (ORN Series 1, Vol. 4:629). Although these incidents may have raised the suspicion of the U.S. Navy, no specific evidence of its construction could be obtained until the Confederates unveiled the battery by cutting back the trees on October 18, 1861. On that day Thomas Craven, Commander of the Potomac Flotilla, reported to the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, that the enemy had “cleared away the trees and revealed a new battery at Cockpit Point” (ORN Series 1, Vol. 4:726).

Few details of the batteries that were revealed on that day in October exist in the historic record. Sketches from the time show the batteries on the bluff overlooking the river with little to no vegetation immediately surrounding the earthworks (Figures 2-17, 2-18, and 2-19). Most sketches show the area behind the batteries contained within forest. An account from Union troops at the time of dismantling described a set of stairs constructed into the side of the bluff that was only wide enough for one person to pass at a time (Donald 1986:46). The account also described a narrow stretch of land at the base of the bluff that had previously been used as a fishing station and had been cleared of trees by the Confederates. The batteries were situated close to the edge of the bluff; however, the guns were recessed into the ground so that ships passing close to the shore could not be fired upon (Donald 1986:47). On December 15, 1861, a smaller two-piece battery was revealed between Shipping Point and Cockpit Point at Possum Nose (Wills 1975:84). The battery was constructed by troops from the 4th Texas and 18th Georgia regiments.

At the time of the evacuation of Cockpit Point in March of 1862, there were four batteries, the remnants of which are still visible today. The most detailed description of their features was presented in the New York Herald on March 11, 1862 by a correspondent who joined the Union forces sent to demolish the batteries. He described the fortifications as “perfect gems of engineering skill” and gave credit to the “genius who planned and superintended their construction” (Moore 1862:280). He went on to present a detailed description of the magazines:

“At Cockpit Point there are four heavy guns, one of which, a Parrott, was found to be in fragments. The magazines are most ingeniously contrived. On entering one of them you descend an inclined plane, and after advancing about four feet you find yourself in a passage barely wide enough to admit a man. You turn within to the right or the left, still going underground, to the distance of from fifteen to twenty feet, when you come to the magazine itself, which is filled with shelves of cedar plank, on which shot and shell and other ammunition are stowed. The passageway is lined with cedar planks, to prevent the earth from caving in” (Moore 1862:280).

He also described the fortifications that had been constructed in support of the battery:
Sketch of Cockpit Point (Waud 1862)

Orange bluff, light sand colors town at base.
"Back of the guns are a number of excavations, running underground, into which the rebel soldiers could run whenever they saw the flash from the Union guns, either on the river or on the Maryland shore. Of course, these ‘rat-holes’ are bomb-proof, and, provided a man can get into one in time, he is safe from hostile shot or shell. Like the entrances to the magazines, these ‘rat-holes’ are lined with cedar planks. Still further back, and at divergent angles, are a number of rifle-pits, where, in the event of the cannon being taken, the rebel soldiery could keep the Union troops at bay; and about half a mile further in the rear a large steel gun is, or rather was, mounted. This was surrounded by other rifle-pits, by means of which it was hoped that, even though the intrenchments (sic) in part might be carried, the rebels might make the last stand, and either repel the Unionists, or if the worst came to worst, secure their own final retreat.” (Moore 1862: 280)

The four batteries, magazines, and some of the “rat-holes” and rifle pits which remain visible today were mapped in detail as a part of the nomination of Cockpit Point for the NRHP in 1989 by then PWC Archeologist Jan Townsend. In the nomination, the batteries were designated A-D, with Battery A as the southernmost and Battery D the northernmost. The batteries are relatively evenly distributed along the edge of the landform, with the Battery D being slightly more distant from the remaining three (Figure 2-20). The batteries were generally configured to hold one or two guns, with cedar-lined magazines either adjacent to the gun emplacements or nearby.

Battery A is the smallest of the four batteries, measuring approximately 48 by 32 feet, likely with a detached magazine west of the battery that may be represented by a small circular depression (Figures 2-21 and 2-22; Townsend 1989). Battery B is much larger at approximately 92 by 50 feet and possibly designed to hold more than one gun (Figures 2-23 and 2-24). Two depressions on either side of the central gun emplacement likely represented magazines (Townsend 1989). Battery C is approximately 55 by 75 feet with a somewhat unusual shape (Figures 2-25 and 2-26). Depressions in the battery are stacked toward the riverfront instead of occurring side by side as they are in the other batteries. It is unclear where the magazine associated with Battery C is located (Townsend 1989). Battery D, which may be the latest of the four to be constructed, measures approximately 60 by 45 feet (Figures 2-27 and 2-28). The magazine is likely represented by a smaller depressed area located adjacent to the larger depression (Townsend 1989).

Rifle pits described in the New York Herald account are likely represented by the “zig-zagging” trench that runs from Battery B and southward beyond Battery A to the edge of a drainage (Figure 2-29). Townsend suggests that buildings were present just west of the southern end of the trench, where bricks and depressions were observed (Figure 2-30; Townsend 1989). Just east of the southern end of the zig-zagging trench were three large features cut into the northern wall of the drainage (Figure 2-31). It is unknown how or if these features relate to the battery.

Hut features from the camp just west of the batteries are apparent and were surveyed as a part of the 1990 Phase I archeological survey of the property (Stevens et al. 1990). During the survey, five hut features were identified and investigated (Figure 2-32). The features consist of holes cut...
Figure 2-20. Civil War Features at Cockpit Point

*Figure removed from this report pursuant to the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.*
Figure 2-21. Measured Drawing of Battery A from NRHP Nomination Form showing Topographic Contours

Figure 2-22. Overview of Battery A – Facing Northeast

*Figures removed from this report pursuant to the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.*
Figure 2-23. Measured Drawing of Battery B from NRHP Nomination Form showing Topographic Contours

Figure 2-24. Overview of Battery B – Facing Northeast

Figures removed from this report pursuant to the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.
Figure 2-25. Measured Drawing of Battery C from NRHP Nomination Form showing Topographic Contours

Figure 2-26. Overview of Battery C – Facing East

Figures removed from this report pursuant to the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.
Figure 2-27. Measured Drawing of Battery D from NRHP Nomination Form showing Topographic Contours

Figure 2-28. Overview of Battery D – Facing South

Figures removed from this report pursuant to the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.
Figure 2-29. Trench Feature – Facing North

Figure 2-30. Detail of Bricks at Southern end of Trench Feature – Facing North

*Figures removed from this report pursuant to the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.*
Figure 2-31. Features in Drainage South of Battery A – Facing Northeast

Figure 2-32. Detail of Hut Feature – Facing Northwest

Figures removed from this report pursuant to the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.
into the embankment of a ravine, measuring approximately 12 by 16 feet. Four of the huts contained remnants of brick chimneys (Stevens et al. 1990). The hut features are located approximately 600 feet northwest of Battery D. It is known that some of the wood used for the construction of the winter quarters at Cockpit Point was appropriated from houses and outbuildings owned by C.W.C Dunnington. On December 16, 1861 he wrote that he “found Captain Trobel (sic) at the Cockpit Point batteries, 2 miles off, erecting winter quarters out of my houses” (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:998).

2.5.4 Guns

Although the New York Herald report indicated there were four heavy guns at Cockpit Point in mid-March, the batteries likely maintained between three to six guns during their use. A description from a Union soldier regarding the demolition of the batteries indicated the Confederates left five guns at Cockpit Point, contrary to the newspaper’s report of four guns (Donald 1986:46). In his report regarding the attack on Cockpit Point on January 3, 1861, Commander Wyman of the Potomac Flotilla indicated the batteries contained four or five guns (ORN Series 1, Vol. 5:15). He also noted that their heavy gun was moved to the north face of the battery and “(a) breast-work for another battery has been thrown up, which will entirely protect them to the northward” (ORN Series 1, Vol. 5:15). He is most likely referring to the later construction of Battery D, which is the northernmost battery at Cockpit Point.

In a February 1862 correspondence to CSA President Jefferson Davis, General Johnston stated “Two of the three guns at Cockpit Point are bursted; one (a rifle) partially,” indicating there may have been only three guns at the battery in late February (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:1079). Just a few weeks later, after Union forces had taken control of the battery, Joseph Hooker reported that “all the guns in the Cockpit Point battery were left mounted on their carriages and in good condition, except the guns being spiked” suggesting the possible addition of new guns in late February or early March (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:525). On a map of the vicinity of Budd’s Ferry created by U.S. Topographical Engineer R.S. Williamson, handwritten notes indicate six guns at Cockpit Point, though it is not known when those notes were written.

It is likely the number of guns changed over time, and it is unknown exactly what type guns were used at the battery throughout its use. On November 18, 1861, Jefferson Davis wrote to General Johnston that the guns at Evansport would be removed to Cockpit Point. His report stated,

“Upon representations as to the defective construction of the batteries at and near Evansport and the hazard of bombardment by batteries recently established by the enemy on the Maryland shore, directions have been given to remove the guns to Cockpit, as recommended by General Whiting and others…… At Cockpit, if the topography has been correctly reported, our batteries will not be in danger of bombardment from the Maryland shore, but will be more liable to a land attack than when at Evansport; and, being farther removed from support by General Holmes, will need to have a larger garrison in the event supposed” (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:963).
This suggests guns were transported to Cockpit Point from Evansport, though the number and type of guns are not known. They likely consisted of at least some of the eight guns sent to Evansport in early September, which included a rifled gun taken at Manassas and three 32-pounders, one of which was also rifled (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:835). A journal entry from Private Bellard, with the 5th New Jersey, who was sent to dismantle the batteries, noted an inscription on one of the guns that said “Taken from the Yankees at Bull Run” suggesting it could have been the rifled gun sent to Evansport in September (Donald 1986:46).

After the conflict with the Potomac Flotilla in January, Commander Wyman reported that Cockpit Point contained a 12-pounder and an 80-pounder rifle gun (ORN Series 1, Vol. 5:15). The 12-pounder was from the Tredgar Works in Richmond and was received in late December. According to a correspondence from General French, the gun was placed in a position to defend a weak spot in the coverage from the batteries: “Night before last a steamer shelled the Cockpit battery; also this morning before daylight, this forenoon, and again this evening, assuming a position that the guns mounted could not reach him, and which point is to be defended by the Tredegar gun, just arrived” (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:1013). From the New York Herald description we know a Parrott gun and at least three others were located in the batteries at the time they were abandoned in March.

2.5.5 Reports of Action

The batteries exchanged fire with the Potomac Flotilla and the Union batteries on the Maryland side of the river fairly often; however, only one conflict is known to have caused damage. That battle happened on January 3, 1862 when Commander Wyman of the Potomac Flotilla ordered Anacostia and Yankee to shell Cockpit Point from positions on the river he perceived to be unreachable by the batteries (ORN Series 1, Vol. 5:15). That battle, known as the Battle of Cockpit Point, is described in detail as a part of the Battlefield Terrain Analysis section, below.

That battle and other skirmishes reported in official records are summarized below (Table 1). Those skirmishes include an incident on November 14, 1861 when the batteries reportedly fired on a schooner carrying wood up the river. The crew abandoned the schooner and shortly afterwards Confederates boarded and set fire to the ship (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:421 and 763; Townsend 1989). Troops from the First Massachusetts then rushed to put out the fire and tow the schooner to safety on the Maryland shore under fire from the guns at Cockpit Point. The 5th U.S. Artillery took up fire on the batteries during the engagement and the 1st and 4th Texas regiments, which were camped near Dumfries, marched to the river under the impression that Union troops were attempting a landing. The Texas regiments then came under fire from Union gunboat and were forced to spend the remainder of the night behind Cockpit Point (Townsend 1989; Wills 1995:106).

About a month later, on December 15, 1862, the batteries exchanged fire with Anacostia (ORN Series 1 Vol. 5:580). Union reports indicated that five shots were fired from Cockpit Point and seven were fired from Anacostia with no significant damage on either side. Later that month, on December 30, General French reported that a steamer had been shelling the battery over the course of two days, resulting in no apparent damage (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:1013). The last official report of action for the batteries before their abandonment occurred on January 12, 1862, when
Pensacola reported three shots fired at the ship from the batteries; however, the shots did not make contact with the ship (ORN Series 1, Vol. 5:17).

Table 2-1. Summary of Action Reported at Cockpit Point in Official Records

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Vessels involved in action</th>
<th>Reported shots fired from CP</th>
<th>Reported shots fired from Union</th>
<th>Damage/Injuries</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 14, 1861</td>
<td>Unnamed Schooner</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Three hits to schooner</td>
<td>(ORN Ser 1 Vol. 5: 421 and 763)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 15, 1861</td>
<td>Anacostia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>(ORN Ser 1 Vol. 5: 580)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 29-30, 1861</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>One shell landed on port bow of Yankee, slightly wounding Alexander Mitchell, ordinary seaman</td>
<td>(ORN Ser 1 Vol. 5: 15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 3, 1862</td>
<td>Anacostia, Yankee</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>(ORN Ser 1 Vol. 5: 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 12, 1862</td>
<td>USS Sloop Pensacola</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>(ORN Ser 1 Vol. 5: 17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Confederate batteries not only fired on targets in the river, they also occasionally exchanged fire with the Union batteries on the Maryland side of the river (Figure 2-33). Warren Cudworth, Chaplain of the First Massachusetts, remembered the Parrott guns at Budd’s Ferry exchanging fire with the Confederate batteries resulting in “a lively artillery duel, which sometimes lasted for hours” (Cudworth 1866:102). Private Bellard with the 5th New Jersey remembered an incident when the Union batteries fired at Cockpit Point, nearly knocking down their flagstaff (Donald 1986:43). Shots were returned from Cockpit Point missing the Union battery, but Bellard noted “that was not always the case, for on one occasion as the 7th N.J. were forming for dress parade, a shell came screeching across the river and dropped close to the band, who were playing at the time” (Donald 1986:43). Private Fulton of the 5th Alabama could remember only one incident when the Union batteries fired on Cockpit Point, which could very likely be the same incident reported by Bellard (Fulton 1986:31). According to Fulton’s description, the shots from the Maryland side of the river were “exactly in range, but a little too high” (Fulton 1986:31).

While it would appear the batteries along the western shore of the Potomac fired fairly often, it was rare that they actually struck their target. Shipping and fishing vessels would often run the blockade, usually without much, or any, damage. Private Alfred Bellard with the 5th New Jersey Infantry noted in his journal a day when “some 40 shells had been thrown at an Oyster boat” from Cockpit Point without doing any damage. On another day he wrote the batteries “had a little target practice” shooting at five passing schooners, but again it seemed there was no damage to the boats (Donald 1986:35, 37). It was generally agreed on both sides of the river that the batteries were not a major threat to shipping traffic. A correspondent with the 11th Massachusetts described the firing from the batteries as “most wretchedly executed” and estimated that not one shot in two hundred could hit a vessel traveling along the Maryland shore (New York Times 1861b).
In late February, plans to remove Confederate forces from the Potomac River in anticipation of an attack by the Union Army were proposed by General Johnston (Wills 1975:155). Johnston planned to move his troops to the banks of the Rappahannock River where they would be in a better defensive position and better situated to protect Richmond (Wills 1975:155). On February 22, 1862, he wrote to Jefferson Davis that he believed the guns on the Potomac were ineffectual and noted that, “(v)essels pass the batteries at night without much damage” (OR Series 1, Vol. 5:1079). This was partly a concession to Davis that an abandonment of the batteries would not be a strategic loss. Although the country throughout northern Virginia was generally flooded and the roads were nearly impassable, Johnston made the decision to move the troops in early March due to a noted increase in activities on the Union side of the river, which the Confederates rightly interpreted as a move to make an attack on the Virginia shore. Johnston asserted the urgency of the situation in a strongly worded appeal to Davis when he said

“(t)he condition of the country is even worse now than I described it to be and rain is falling fast. I fear that field artillery near the Potomac cannot be moved soon…. It is reported that a picket of 8 men was captured this morning near Fairfax Court-House. Reconnaissances on the Lower Occoquan and on the Potomac have been frequent, the latter in balloons as well as boats” (OR Series 1, Vol 5:1079).

Preparations for the concealed evacuation of the batteries began in late February, with some difficulty. Removal of the heavy guns was nearly impossible given the muddy conditions and the fact that the batteries were well-exposed to view from the river. General French noted in a letter to General Whiting that

“steamers guard the river closely and the enemy from the opposite shore see everything at the batteries, and you may rest assured that by the time two-thirds of them are dismounted it will be discovered and an attack be made by the steamers and from the guns opposite. Today two siege guns have been brought down into the center of an open field, where they now are and opposite Cockpit” (OR Series 1, Vol 51 Part II: 478).

The Confederates could not defend their current position at the batteries were the Union to attack, so the evacuation had to proceed. On March 7, 1862, orders were by given by General Whiting to initiate a withdrawal from the batteries:

HEADQUARTERS CAMP FISHER, VIRGINIA,
March 7, 1862.

The wagons will be hauled into the company parade grounds and the teams taken to the stables and fed. Packing will be commenced at once. Commissioned officers will see that the wagons are not overloaded, and they will be held responsible for this.

2-42
If there is any forage to be had, each team will carry a small supply. Quartermasters and wagon-masters will see to this. Quartermasters and wagon-masters will also see that wagons are not overloaded, and report all violations of this order to the colonel.

During the night two or three days' provisions will be cooked and distributed to the men, after which such of the cooking utensils as are to be carried will be put on the wagons.

During the night guards are required to maintain perfect order, silence, and discipline. Commanding officers of regiments will be held responsible for their own commands.

At daylight in the morning the trains will start, the brigade train leading, all accompanied by the train guards, and the sick, if there are any, under charge of a commissioned or non-commissioned officer.

Ammunition wagons will accompany their respective regiments and remain with them.

On march all officers are emphatically ordered to preserve the formation of rank and prevent the men from straggling. Colonels will frequently allow their regiments, to the file past them, to see that they are well closed, and will direct the field and staff to give their whole attention to the march. Brigade commanders will direct the halts. Troops will move left in front. They will remain in position until notified. The colors will be carried displayed.

W. H. C. WHITING,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division. (OR Series 1, Vol. 5: 531-532).

The following day President Lincoln issued President’s General War Order No. 3, declaring the open navigation of waters surrounding Washington, D.C. as a priority and limiting operations of the Army of the Potomac until the Potomac batteries and “other obstructions” had been cleared. It was not until the following day that reports of the abandonment of the batteries came in from the Potomac Flotilla. On March 9, Commander Wyman telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy “(t)he Cockpit Point and Shipping Point batteries are abandoned. They have been shelled for an hour without a reply from them” (ORN Series 1, Vol 5:526).

2.5.7 Dismantling

Union troops immediately moved in to inspect the batteries (Figure 2-34). They discovered what appeared to be a hasty and panicked retreat with military supplies and personal items abandoned in place. Private Bellard of the 5th New Jersey, who was charged with dismantling Cockpit Point, noted pans of bread half-baked in the ovens and tin cups half full of soup (Donald 1986:47). Sides of beef were left hanging from the trees and clothing of all sorts was scattered around the camp. The situation was the same at all of the abandoned batteries on the Potomac.
SKIRMISH NEAR FORT JACKSON, SAVANNAH RIVER,

Two spirited sketches of the engagement between our men and the rebel pickets is thus described by the correspondent of the Commercial Advertiser:

"The only thing of special interest which has occurred since last writing is a reconnoissance made by the commandant of the gunboat Western World, with a portion of his crew and a detachment from Algai's Island, commanded by Col. Barton. It was regarded as a matter of determination on the part of the enemy not to let our gunboats pass without a fight. The men were well armed, however, without loss of life. Our boats penetrated beyond Fort Jackson and Savannah, and as they passed the pa\tice were fed upon. The discharge wounded three marines and one sailor. The fire was returned, and the boats put back. Several reconnaissances of this kind have been made from Rio's Island, occupied by Hamilton's battery, and of them were esteemed with great danger, but as yet no life has been lost.

"The passage of the G. M. Pratt into the Savannah river a short time since was quite an exciting event, none of our gunboats as yet having ventured so far. Capt. Gardiner was saluted by guns from our batteries, for his daring and bravery in running up under the very guns of Fort Jackson.

"An occasional approach of a rebel gunboat within range of our batteries and gunboats ennui the bottoms of our stern, as they are nearer round the point than the dogs of war are let loose at them.

They have not recently advanced beyond a respectful distance, and there is no fear that they will. Had they a Norman at Savannah, they could soon sweep away all obstructions between them and Poolsville. Indeed, an ordinary iron-clad gunboat could pass with impunity, and, if it could carry her enough, might swing the islands in the vicinity of all opposite. Why they have not prevailed for this emergency is a mystery that time alone can solve. One sailboat steamer would be worth their whole fleet. This they have not as yet. What preparations they may be making of this description we know not now, we may know heretofore."

DISMOUNTING THE REBEL GUNS AT COCKPIT BATTERY, VIRGINIA.

Cockpit Point, on which the rebels had erected a battery, is on the York side of the Lower Potomac, close to Dumfries, of Quantico Creek. This, with other of their advanced positions, was abandoned about the 8th of March, when the rebel army made its retreat by the way of the Rappahannock. On the morning of the 18th of March the New Jersey 5th regiment of volunteers, under Lieut.-Col. Mott, crossed the Potomac, and landed at Cockpit battery. It was not then known that the enemy had retired, although it was suspected from the absence of the gun. The battery was then destroyed, as our Artizan has represented. An officer of the regiment says:

"It was supposed that the rebels had withdrawn to a short distance in the rear, where they had made a stand and would be ready to attack us. Taking this view of the case, we went fully prepared. Immediately on our landing a reconnoitering party was sent out. It proceeded about four miles in the rear, but could see nothing of the rebels. It stopped at a farm-house, and from the inmates learned that the rebels, seeing the great proportion made on our side for an advance, and fearing that they would be taken prisoners, determined to evacuate, which they did the day before, leaving everything behind them. They were also informed that many of the men were impressed into the rebel army, who professed Union sentiments. Two of the latter were taken from Cockpit battery, sent to Richmond, and hanged. As the reconnoitering party could see nothing of the enemy, it returned and reported what it had seen in substance above."

TRAGIC SCENE ON BOARD THE U. S. SHIP CUMBERLAND.

We engrave in our present paper an incident which cannot fail to impress the mind of every American. It was furnished by an officer on board that doomed but sacred vessel. We have no heart to give any needless description of the terrible scene. It tells its own tale of suffering and death. Hearsay the story of how the gallant seamen hoisted the Cumberland fought and sink with their old flag over them; at once their triumph and their fall, will stand the brightest in the scroll of American glory.
Confederates abandoned, or hoped to return for, stores of food including large quantities of pork, beef, flour, and salt (Cudworth 1866:131; Donald 1986:47). They also left personal letters, clothing, tools, furniture and an assortment of kitchen items, as well as an abundance of military items including shot, gun-sights, heavy guns, cartridges, and shells (Cudworth 1866:128; Donald 1986:47). At Shipping Point, 40,000 cigars were recovered by the First Massachusetts (Donald 1986:47). Much of what couldn’t be carried was burned or destroyed. Union troops gathered as much of what was left as they could and shipped it back across the river. By the late March, Union reports indicated there was still a large quantity of Confederate supplies in the area including tents, wagons, personal baggage, and large stores of food, much of which had been taken by the local residents (ORN Series 1, Vol. 12:13).

General Whiting was forced to defend this sizeable loss of property and supplies to Jefferson Davis, who had heard of the proposed movement of troops toward Richmond, but was not aware of the urgency for the move. Whiting put most of the blame on the terrible conditions of the roads and defended his decisions and the actions of his subordinates. He commended Captain Frobel at Cockpit Point for what he perceived to be an admirable retention of supplies, which were assembled and conveyed down the Potomac into Chopawamsic Creek. While Captain Frobel’s evacuation may have been more successful than those at other batteries, his regiment left a good haul for the Union troops, who carried off over 800 shots and shells and four of the heavy guns (Donald 1986:47).

2.6 The Battle of Cockpit Point

The Battle of Cockpit Point occurred on January 3, 1862. After numerous exchanges with the Confederate batteries along the Potomac River in the weeks prior, the commanding officer of the Potomac Flotilla, Lieutenant Robert H. Wyman, ordered two ships, U.S.S. Anacostia and U.S.S. Yankee, to make for Cockpit Point and engage the batteries to better test the rebels’ firing capabilities from positions on the river perceived to be unreachable (ORN Series 1, Vol. 5:15). It was Wyman’s belief that the batteries at Cockpit Point could fire down and across the river, but not up the river. Anacostia was built at Philadelphia in 1856 as a merchant screw-steamer (i.e., propeller) and originally named M.W. Chapin (NHHC 2013). The vessel measured 129-feet long by 23-feet in beam, with 5-foot depth of hold, and registered 217 tons. Anacostia likely transferred to the U.S. Navy sometime after May 1859 when it was outfitted with two 9-inch Dahlgren smooth bore guns. During the January 3rd battle, Lieutenant Oscar C. Badger commanded Anacostia and positioned the steamer north of the batteries somewhat opposite and above Mattawoman Creek, where it was believed the batteries at Cockpit Point could not fire (Moore 1865:3). This positioning coincides with historic river soundings in this area, recorded as between 10 and 20 feet, and the effective operating depth of the steamer (greater than 10 feet) based on its dimensions (U.S. Coast Survey Office [USCSO] 1862). Commander Badger would have likely kept Anacostia in water depths of 10 feet or greater to prevent the steamer from running aground and becoming vulnerable to fire. Anacostia’s guns had a firing range between 332 yards (point blank) and 3,450 yards depending on the weight of charge used (NHHC 2013; Navy 1866: Appx. B, No. 5). Anacostia likely engaged the batteries with its bow pointed to the east, which would allow for the greatest maneuverability in the event the steamer needed to quickly relocate.
Yankee was built at New York City in 1860 as a merchant side-wheel steamer (NHHC 2013). The vessel measured 146-feet long by 25-feet 7-inches in beam and registered at 328 tons, overall a much larger vessel than Anacostia. The U.S. Navy charted the vessel early in 1861 and outfitted Yankee with two 32-pounders. Newspaper accounts of the battle reported Yankee having different armament, which included a 64-pounder bow gun, a thirty-two pounder, a twenty-four pounder brass howitzer, and a twelve-pounder brass rifled cannon (Moore 1865:3).

During the January 3rd battle, Lieutenant Thomas H. Eastman held command of Yankee and positioned the vessel directly opposite the batteries (Moore 1865:3). Given the dimensions of the vessel, Eastman would have likely kept the steamer in water depths of 15 feet or greater to prevent it from running aground and becoming vulnerable; this should not have been much of a concern as most of the area directly across from Possum Nose consists of the river channel (USCSO 1862). Of the guns that were known to be present onboard the minimum range was 250 yards (point blank) and the maximum was 1,637 yards (Navy 1866: Appx. B, Nos. 1, 6). The effective ranges for the 64-pounder gun were unable to be located. Yankee began the engagement facing downriver (i.e., southward), but at some point change direction and made its way back north; this change in positioning is based on a lone hit sustained by the steamer that penetrated the port side and destroyed a ship’s knee.

2.6.1 Order of Battle

Anacostia and Yankee arrived at the battle site in the morning and first fire came from Anacostia at 10:00 AM (Moore 1865:3). A journal entry from Warren Cudworth, who was camped with the First Massachusetts on the Maryland side of the river, reported that the weather was clear, windy, and cold (Cudworth 1866:118). According to Wyman’s report (ORN Series 1, Vol. 5:15), gunfire from the steamers was very accurate, although details pertaining to the weight of the charges and elevation of guns are not known. The bombardment from the Union ships was so precise that it forced the evacuation of the northernmost battery. The three remaining batteries responded with only four shots, which came from an 80-pounder rifle and a 12-pounder gun. The exact number, caliber, and positioning of the Cockpit Point guns is unknown. It was alleged that the battery also featured three 32-pounders and a 30-pounder Parrott gun (ORN Series 1, Vol. 5: 835; Born 2013). It could be the case that these additional guns were located in the evacuated northern battery, which is why they were not used during the encounter.

Anacostia was well positioned and out of reach of the batteries, but Yankee was not. One of the four shells that came from the 80-pounder rifle struck the side-wheeler’s port bow. The shell passed through the hull and lodged in a berth on the starboard forecastle, the only injury from which involved ordinary seaman Alexander Mitchell as a fragment came inboard over the rail immediately after impact (ORN Series 1:15). The engagement ended when two shells, one from Anacostia and one from Yankee, simultaneously exploded inside one of the batteries, thereby dismounting the gun. Approximately 40 shots were collectively fired from the Union steamers during the battle (Cudworth 1866:118). No Confederate records of the conflict are known to exist.

The battle of Cockpit Point on January 3, 1862 was a brief engagement that was part of a much larger conflict between Confederate and Union forces on the Potomac. The Potomac Blockade,
which lasted from October 1861 to March 1862, was not strictly military, but also had high reaching political repercussions as the Union Capital was besieged by rebel forces. The battle of Cockpit Point is a reflection of that larger conflict. Union forces uncertain of the capabilities of the Confederate Army investigated to see how well their defenses would hold up to attack and assessed weaknesses in their enemy’s offensive abilities. The goals of the Confederate forces at the batteries were to disrupt Federal shipping on the river and reduce the effects of the Federal blockade on Virginia. Any Union attack could compromise their ability to accomplish those goals, and the Confederates not only needed to hold up against the attack, but to push back aggressively.
(Page Intentionally Left Blank)
3.0 PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS

In 1989, Jan Townsend, an archeologist with PWC at the time, recorded the Cockpit Point earthworks and prepared a NRHP nomination for the site (076-0302; Townsend 1989). While the site was determined eligible for listing in both the NRHP and Virginia Landmarks Register (VLR), the owners of the property at that time filed a notarized objection to the listing.

A Phase I survey by John Milner Associates, Inc. (JMA) in 1990 identified the camp area behind the battery immediately inland (west) of the earthworks (44PW556; Stevens et al. 1990:26). The Phase I survey resulted in the identification of four archeological sites: 44PW555, a potentially significant prehistoric and late eighteenth to early nineteenth century domestic site; 44PW556, the Cockpit Point Camp Site associated with the battery; 44PW557, a Late-Archaic lithic scatter recommended ineligible for the NRHP; and 44PW558, a prehistoric lithic scatter recommended ineligible for the NRHP (Balicki 1990a-d). The Cockpit Point camp site (44PW556) consisted of the remains of five huts excavated into the side of a ravine. Each of the huts had an area of approximately 150 to 215 square feet, and four of the five huts featured brick chimneys built at the base of the rear walls dug into the hill slope. The huts all showed evidence of damage by looters. A Phase II investigation was recommended for sites 44PW0555 and 44PW0556. While the survey included testing across the current project area, no testing was completed within or in the vicinity of the Civil War earthworks in accordance with their scope of work.

Additional camps were located further west of the battery, including many along the King’s Highway (Route 1). URS documented one such camp under contract to PWC. Camp Law (site 44PW1248) was the winter camp of the 4th Alabama Volunteer Infantry, which was first mustered in May of 1861 in Dalton, Georgia (Crowl and Travis 2001). After participating in the first Battle of Bull Run (Manassas), the 4th Alabama came under the command of General W.H.C. Whiting. Under Whiting’s command, the regiment supported the Cockpit Point battery. The 4th Alabama’s camp is likely one of the encampments near Dumfries shown on an 1861 sketch made by Colonel William Small of the 26th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers for General Hooker from a balloon raised in Charles County, Maryland (Small 1861).

URS’s work included developing a historic context for the 4th Alabama and documenting, through both surface and subsurface investigations, 181 features, including remnants of brick hearths, hut platforms, and roads. URS mapped the camp features and conducted subsurface testing prior to imminent destruction by a private developer. In 2003, URS completed a Cultural Resources Sensitivity Assessment of the Cockpit Point property just north of the current project area (Crowl et al. 2003). While historic data suggests features associated with the Civil War may have been located in the vicinity, the area was determined to be highly disturbed or contained within wetlands, and no additional survey was recommended.

Investigations have been completed at other Confederate batteries of the Potomac Blockade. Most recently, in 2011, JMA completed a Cultural Resources Investigation of the Confederate batteries at Aquia Creek (Balicki et al 2011). The project was funded by a grant from the ABPP and included terrestrial and underwater archeological survey. The survey revealed that little archeological evidence remained of the Battle of Aquia Creek; however, the battlefield was eligible for listing on the NRHP under Criterion A.
In 2009, JMA also completed Phase II investigations at two batteries at Shipping Point, Battery 1 (44PW1836) and Battery 2 (44PW1830; Balicki et al 2009). The survey included testing using metal detection, gradiometer, ground-penetrating radar, and resistivity, as well as hand-excavation. The survey identified Civil War-related artifacts and prehistoric artifacts. Battery 2 was found to be totally destroyed, probably by the construction of later residences. Battery 1 was found to be intact beneath disturbed layers and recommended eligible for listing in the NRHP.

In 2004, JMA also completed a Phase I archeological investigation of proposed tank trails on the Quantico Marine Corps base (Balicki et al 2004). As a part of that investigation, excavations were completed at the previously identified 44PW917. Site 44PW917 is associated with Camp French, which contained the winter camps of 35th Georgia and 22nd North Carolina Regiments, along with two other unidentified regimental camps. The camps were occupied during the Potomac Blockade in support of the batteries at Shipping Point and Evansport.

In 2003 a Phase I survey was completed by the Louis Berger Group for features associated with the 47th Virginia and 22nd North Carolina Infantry during the Potomac Blockade (44PW1412; Fiedel and Bedell 2003). The site contained hut features and had been previously identified and collected by amateur archeologists.

In 1994 the William and Mary Center for Archeological Research identified 44ST0302, which is associated with 2nd Tennessee Volunteers camp during the Potomac Blockade (Huston et al 1996). Phase II investigations at the site by Gray & Pape in 1997 uncovered 121 possible hut locations (Winter et al 1998).

The batteries at Freestone Point were listed in the NRHP and VLR in 1989 (076-0045, 076-0264, 44PW0019). The battery includes four gun emplacements located on a 95-foot high bluff overlooking the Potomac River at the mouth of Neabsco Creek. According to the site form for 44PW0019, the site was metal detected by the Prince William County Historical Society in 1979. In 2009 the Archeological Society of Virginia completed a pedestrian survey of the area surrounding the earthworks.

In 2008, John Haynes, then the archeologist at the Marine Corps Base at Quantico, Virginia, prepared three NRHP nominations and one multiple property nomination for resources associated with campaigns for control of the Potomac River (076-5312; Haynes 2008). In preparation, he conducted extensive work on the Potomac Blockade, including research on Confederate and Union batteries, guns, and associated camps. He incorporated 34 potentially associated archeological sites, including 44PW0917, 44PW1412, and 44ST0302, and analyzed the data for the entire period of the blockade using a KOCOA-informed approach. He also created a GIS database of associated sites, which was referenced during the production of this report.
4.0 METHODS

As a part of the Cockpit Point Battlefield Study, URS completed research, fieldwork, a military terrain analysis using the KOCOA approach, and a reassessment of study area, core area, and NRHP boundaries; the Battlefield Management Plan was prepared as a separate deliverable. All research and fieldwork followed the standards and guidelines of the ABPP Survey Manual (Lowe 2000), the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards and Guidelines for Archeology and Historic Preservation, the National Park Service Cultural Resource Management Guidelines, and the VDHR’s Guidelines for Conducting Historic Resources Survey in Virginia (2011 version).

4.1 Research

URS conducted documentary research in order to develop a historic context for the Cockpit Point Battlefield; identify viewsheds and battlefield features; and better apply the KOCOA approach to military terrain analysis. Research was conducted at a variety of repositories and institutions including, but not limited to: the Ruth E. Lloyd Information Center (RELIC room) in the Bull Run Public Library in Manassas, Virginia; Library of Virginia online database; Virginia Department of Historic Resources Library and V-CRIS database; Cornell University Library (Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion: Volumes 4 and 5 Operations on the Potomac and Rappahannock Rivers); the U.S. National Archives in Washington, D.C. and College Park, Maryland; the Museum of the Confederacy in Richmond, Virginia; NOAA online database of historical nautical charts; the Archives of the Naval History and Heritage Command; and the Library of Congress. Local historians were also consulted during the project.

Both Union and Confederate accounts of the Battle of Cockpit Point and the greater Potomac Blockade were consulted as much as possible in order to arrive at a fair and balanced representation of this event. While official military records offered valuable details about the engagement, virtually no Confederate records were encountered that discussed the construction, outfitting, and actions of the Cockpit Point batteries. Given the secrecy surrounding the batteries, it is quite possible that such records never existed or were destroyed during or immediately following the Civil War.

4.2 Fieldwork

Fieldwork was a principle component of the Cockpit Point Battlefield Study and consisted of two distinct elements: capturing viewsheds and conducting a reconnaissance to determine the current condition of the Civil War features at Cockpit Point. Regarding the viewsheds, the first step involved identifying key properties that were significant to the Cockpit Point batteries and the January 3, 1862 battle. PWC, in consultation with URS, coordinated with landowners of Cockpit Point and other parcels identified through research and public input as containing important battlefield defining features and/or viewsheds. Access to these properties was arranged and photographs were taken from key viewshed locations on the Maryland shore, the Virginia shore, and on the Potomac River. For this documentation, URS used a high-resolution digital camera to take color and black-and-white digital photographs from those locations; both 180 degree views and 360 degree views were recorded.
The second fieldwork component involved reconnaissance of the battlefield. URS conducted site reconnaissance of the parcel containing the remains of the Cockpit Point battery to ascertain the condition of the Civil War features and the nature of any natural or human-related threats to their integrity. During the pedestrian reconnaissance, URS archeologists located and identified earthworks and battlefield features, all of which were photographed and assessed for condition and potential threats. Locational information from key points and features was recorded using a handheld Trimble GPS unit. Locational data were uploaded to a GIS database and used to produce spatial and distributional maps using ESRI GIS software. As the batteries had already been previously documented and recorded in detail, no direct measurements were taken. Additionally, no intrusive investigative techniques were employed (e.g., shovel test pits) nor were surface artifacts observed or collected during this reconnaissance.

4.3 KOCOA Analysis

The U.S. Military developed a tool known as the KOCOA (or OAKOC) analysis for the evaluation of battlefield terrain that has recently been used to gain a better understanding of historic battlefields. The evaluation system uses defining features of the natural and cultural landscape to identify key features affecting the outcome of a battle. Features are categorized into several broad classes: K=Key Terrain; O=Observation; C=Cover and Concealment; O=Obstacles; A=Avenues of Approach (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Key Terrain</td>
<td>Areas considered favorable or important to the outcome of a battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>Areas that offer good observation/engagement opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Cover and Concealment</td>
<td>Areas offering protection from fire or observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Obstacles</td>
<td>Areas that significantly limit ship or troop movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Avenues of Approach</td>
<td>Corridors used to move ships, troops, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using these categories, a more complete appreciation of decisions and actions of the combatants based on physical conditions can be achieved, and the key physical components of the battle can be defined. Successful uses of the KOCOA analysis on historic battlefields have included investigations at Gettysburg National Military Park, where key features of the battle were identified for the rehabilitation of the historic landscape (McMasters 2011; NPS 2013). In Loudoun County, Virginia, a KOCOA analysis helped to redefine core battlefield areas for the battles of Upperville, Middleburg, and Aldie (McMasters 2011). The goal of this study is to use historic documentation to help identify portions of the existing landscape that contributed to the outcome of the Battle of Cockpit Point. This approach for defining key battlefield features follows the National Park Service (NPS) and the ABPP Survey Manual (Lowe 2000).

In order to examine the battle of January 3, 1862 using the KOCOA analysis, a variety of sources were consulted to create a better understanding of the historic natural and cultural landscapes.
Contemporary sketches and maps from the mid-nineteenth century were consulted to better grasp the locations of cultural features such as batteries, defenses, roads, and camps as well as natural features such as landforms, vegetation, and river depth. Among others, maps consulted included the 1862 Williamson map, the 1862 Nautical Chart of the Potomac River, and Small’s map of 1861. Official military orders collected in the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies and the War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies provided military accounts of events leading up to the action and summaries of the battle. Newspaper accounts were referenced for public interpretations of the battle. Personal accounts in the form of diaries, letters, and regimental histories were consulted to provide greater detail of specific events.

Following historical research and fieldwork, many of the KOCOA-defining features were converted into spatial boundaries and incorporated into a GIS database. This aided in the interpretation of these features and allowed for a more holistic view of the battlefield site. These features and boundaries were then further refined based upon expert review.

4.3.1 Analysis of Maritime Battlefields

The goal of the maritime battlefield analysis was to evaluate the environmental and cultural aspects of the historic landscape in order to determine how the Battle of Cockpit Point commenced, progressed, and concluded. Several of these aspects are the same as those listed above for the KOCOA analysis (e.g., key terrain, obstacles).

Since this battle consisted of a naval component, additional factors were considered in the analysis, most notably the ships. Ships can perform a variety of functions in a maritime battlefield setting, such as engaging the enemy or transporting resources and personnel. Therefore, it was necessary to evaluate the ships and associated nautical technology to determine what, if any, correlations exist between the maritime components and the actions of the battlefield participants. The first step in this process involved reviewing and assessing the physical attributes of the concerned ships, including, but not limited to, overall dimensions, draft, and means of propulsion. This was primarily accomplished by consulting the Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships (NHHC 2013). Environmental factors were identified through the review of historic maps, charts, and newspaper articles, such as the location of the river channel, riverine obstructions or outcrops, and weather. The social aspect of the ships was also considered, including the experience of those in command and the number and composition of crewmen. Finally, an inventory of naval ordnance was completed to determine the effective ranges of the guns and vessel positions on the water. These various information sets were then analyzed along with first-hand accounts of the battle to determine the approach, location, and actions of the vessels during the engagement.

Although the Battle of Cockpit Point consists of a naval component, it was not necessary to conduct a maritime archeological survey. Neither of the two vessels sank, and no significant nautical elements were removed as a result of the battle. Additionally, reports of the battle state that the Confederates only fired four shots toward the vessels (ORN Series 1, Vol. 5:15)). Therefore, there is not believed to be any significant material cultural from the Battle of Cockpit Point in the submerged environment of the Potomac River.
A determination of gun ranges for fields of fire played a key role in ascertaining the possible locations of Anacostia and Yankee during the Battle of Cockpit Point. Historic accounts of the battle lack specific information regarding ship locations, which is central to delineating boundaries for study areas, core battle areas, and NRHP nominations, as well as establishing key viewsheds. In determining the potential fields of fire for the battle several sources were consulted. First-hand accounts of the battle provided information regarding the positions of the ships in the river and the guns used during the battle. The assessment also included armament known to have been associated with the ships and batteries, but not conclusively involved in the battle. Contemporary river depths also played an important role in determining the possible locations of the Union ships. Ranges for guns were obtained from sources including the 1861 Instruction for Field Artillery (USAGO 1861), the 1866 Ordnance Instructions for the United States Navy, and the 1864 Military Dictionary (Scott 1864).

### 4.4 Definition of Study Area, Core Area, and Potential NRHP Boundaries

#### 4.4.1 National Register Eligibility Criteria

In order for a site, building, etc., to be considered a significant historic property, it must meet one or more of four specific criteria established in 36 CFR Part 60, National Register of Historic Places, and 36 CFR Part 800, Protection of Historic Properties. The evaluation of a prehistoric or historic archeological site for inclusion in the NRHP rests largely on its research potential, that is, its ability to contribute important information through preservation and/or additional study (Criterion D).

The NRHP criteria for evaluation are stated as follows:

The quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association, and;

- Criterion A: Properties that are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to broad patterns of our history;
- Criterion B: Properties that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past;
- Criterion C: Properties that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction; and
- Criterion D: Properties that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, important information in prehistory or history.

#### 4.4.2 Archeological Sites

While many archeological sites are recommended as eligible to the NRHP under Criterion D, this is somewhat ill-defined. In order to clarify the issue of site importance, the following...
attribute evaluations add a measure of specificity that can be used in assessing site significance and NRHP eligibility:

a. **Site Integrity**: Does the site contain intact cultural deposits or is it disturbed?

b. **Preservation**: Does the site contain material suited to in-depth analysis and/or absolute dating such as preserved features, botanical and/or faunal remains, or human skeletal remains?

c. **Uniqueness**: Is the information contained in the site redundant in comparison to that available from similar sites, or do the remains provide a unique or insightful perspective on research concerns of regional importance?

d. **Relevance to Current and Future Research**: Would additional work at this site contribute to our knowledge of the past? Would preservation of the site protect valuable information for future studies? While this category is partly a summary of the above considerations, it also recognizes that a site may provide valuable information regardless of its integrity, preservation, or uniqueness.

### 4.4.3 Battlefields

Battlefields can be determined eligible for the NRHP under any or all of the four criteria for evaluation. The period or periods of significance and integrity are both crucial aspects of evaluation. Battlefields can also contain many contributing elements, not just the immediate area of fighting. These elements can include, but are not limited to, buildings, structures, objects, landscape features, roads, and other transportation elements. Battlefields that contain a variety of contributing elements and extensive acreage should be classified as districts; otherwise they should be classified as sites.

An NRHP nomination was previously prepared, though not approved due to landowner opposition, for the Cockpit Point Battlefield. NRHP guidelines were used to re-assess the boundary previously developed for the nomination. Included in the boundary is the location of the battle and an appropriate setting. Boundaries incorporate areas where there was hostile action between opposing forces and areas where an action or reaction was generated by an opposing force while in immediate proximity to the enemy.

Definition of the boundaries for the study area, core area, and potential National Register (PotNR) area are guided by the following definitions:

1. **Study Area**: The project study area defines an area encompassing the defining features—all of the resources known to relate to the battle, the location of combat, military terrain, and the routes of troop movements immediately before and after the battle, regardless of integrity.

2. **Core Area**: Lying entirely within the study area, the core area defines the locations at which the actual battle took place, the terrain occupied between the forces, and the space in between.
3. **Potential National Register Area:** Known as the PotNR, this area is not tied solely to the historical development of the battle, as the study and core areas, but is a consideration of these areas’ current historic integrity. The PotNR, including portions or all of the study and core areas, contains the battle-related landscapes and resources that retain integrity sufficient enough to convey the historic significant and sense of place for the Cockpit Point Battlefield.
5.0 MILITARY TERRAIN ANALYSIS

URS conducted a military terrain analysis and identified the order of the battle based on the results of the research and public input. As an outcome of the research and military terrain analysis, URS created a list of defining features for the Cockpit Point Battlefield. These features include historical cultural features and natural landscape features that pertained to the battle or the actions immediately before or after. Using the KOCOA analysis and the list of defining features, URS created boundaries for the study area, core area, and potential NRHP boundary (PotNR).

5.1 KOCOA Analysis

KOCOA is an analytical tool that can be applied to archeological battlefield sites for the purpose of assigning value beyond quantitative artifact data. It is designed to be holistic approach to battlefield analysis and draw upon both natural and cultural elements to aid in determining key aspects of a battle, such as objectives, the location of the battlefield, and where the fighting began and ended. This is done by identifying defining features for each category and determining how they impacted the battle. Elements of the analysis include:

1. **Key Terrain**: Points of the landscape that offer control of an objective; e.g. high ground, choke point, and intersection.
2. **Observation and Fields of Fire**: Structures or terrain that offer a visual advantage and those within the effective range of weapons.
3. **Cover and Concealment**: Structures, objects, or terrain that allows for protection from observation or fire.
4. **Obstacles**: Structures, objects, or terrain that impede or restrict military movement.
5. **Avenues of Approach**: Routes giving access to a military objective or key terrain.

Each of these categories for the Cockpit Point Battlefield Study is discussed in detail below. Figure 5-1 shows the KOCOA defining features of the Cockpit Point Battlefield.

5.1.1 Key Terrain
(Potomac River, Bluff and Batteries)

Key Terrain refers to areas that offer a marked advantage to the forces that control it. Key Terrain often refers to the physical objective of a battle, such as taking or defending the high ground or protecting or destroying a vital line of transportation. Decisive Terrain (Critical Terrain) is a natural or cultural feature that must be controlled in order to have the advantage in a battle.

The Battle of Cockpit Point was fought between Confederate forces on land and Union forces on water. The battle was part of a larger conflict for control of the Potomac River. Both the Union and Confederate forces were, in effect, defending the Potomac River, which was a major line of transportation and communication. During the battle, Yankee and Anacostia were attempting to
Figure 5-1. KOCOA Defining Features of the Cockpit Point Battlefield

Figure removed from this report pursuant to the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.
locate positions on the Potomac River that could not be reached by Confederate guns at Cockpit Point. The river offered the ships the advantage of mobility, which allowed them to change positions for both better accuracy and better protection. According to reports, *Anacostia* was able to successfully locate a position on the river where the Confederate guns could not reach it. Both ships persistently dropped shells onto the earthworks, with the *Yankee* only sustaining a hit presumably as it was withdrawing from the engagement.

The bluff containing the batteries, which in this case was the high ground, provided Confederate forces with a means to control a section of the Potomac River. The effective range of fire from the batteries extended across the entirety of the river onto the Maryland shore, thus theoretically giving the Confederates the ability to target and hit any boat traffic moving along the river. If Union forces could control, or at least eliminate, the batteries at Cockpit Point, the effects of the Potomac Blockade would be lessened. Although the Confederates were not able to effectively use their guns against the Union ships, the protected location on the bluff allowed them to maintain control of their position and the Potomac River.

5.1.2 Observation and Fields of Fire
(Bluff, Potomac River, Ranges of Union and Confederate Guns)

Observation
The observation and fields of fire components of the KOCOA analysis refer to what the participants could visually see and how that affected the placement and use of firepower. Before fields of fire can come into play during a battle, observations of the enemy must first be made. Generally, the best observations are made from positions on high terrain, like the bluff containing the Confederate batteries. The bluff provided a principally unobstructed view up and down the Potomac River. During the day ships could likely be viewed for miles to the north and south as long as they were within the main river channel. A personal account of the weather on the day of the battle suggests the weather was cold, clear, and windy, indicating the Union ships were easily within view of the batteries on the bluff when they attacked (Cudworth 1866: 118). During the battle, the bluff offered the Confederates an advantage, as they could likely easily see the attacking ships and respond to their movements in the water.

The bluff that provided such a clear view of the river could also be seen as clearly from ships on the river. The Union ships had the advantage of mobility and could monitor the activities of the Confederate forces up and down the shores of the Potomac. The Potomac River allowed for observation by the Union ships, who knew precisely where the batteries were located and were able to drop shells into the earthworks with precision.

Fields of Fire
Fields of Fire is perhaps the most significant element of the Battle of Cockpit Point (Figure 5-2). The purpose of the attack by Union ships was to test the range and capabilities of the Confederate guns within the batteries. Accounts of the battle suggest *Anacostia* was able to locate a position on the river out of reach of the Confederate guns and *Yankee* sustained a hit only as it was maneuvering away from the engagement. A table is presented below that outlines key information for fields of fire (Table 5-1). A more detailed discussion then takes place to establish the fields of fire for both the Union and Confederate forces at the Cockpit Point.
Potential Ranges of Union and Confederate Guns

Artillery Range
Anacostia: 332 yards (min), 3,450 yards (max)
Yankee: 250 yards (min), 1,637 yards (max)
Batteries: 250 yards (min), 6,700 yards (max)

Possible Locations based on artillery range

Source: 1989 USGS Washington, DC-MD-VA 1:250,000 topographic map
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cockpit Point Battery armament</strong></td>
<td>80-pounder rifle gun and 12-pounder rifle gun (4 or 5 guns total)</td>
<td>ORN Series 1:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 80-pounder rifle gun: minimum range is 2,544 yards, maximum range is 4,700 yards, 12-pounder rifle gun: minimum range is 270 yards, maximum range is 1,660 yards</td>
<td>Scott 1862:526; United States Adjutant-General’s Office 1861: 44; United States Navy Department Bureau of Ordnance 1866, Appendix B, No. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some of the eight guns sent to Evansport, including a rifled gun and three 32-pounders</td>
<td>OR Series 1, Vol. 5:835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 32-pounder: minimum range is 250 yards, maximum range is 1,637 yards</td>
<td>United States Navy Department Bureau of Ordnance 1866, Appendix B, No. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-pounder Parrott gun (from Freestone Point)</td>
<td>David Born (PWC, personnel communication 2013); New York Herald description; James Burgess “The Search for Long Tom”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 30-pounder Parrott gun: minimum range is 660 yards, maximum range is 6,700 yards</td>
<td>United States Navy Department Bureau of Ordnance 1866, Appendix B, No. 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anacostia armament</strong></td>
<td>Two 9-inch Dahlgren smooth-bores</td>
<td>NHHC 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 9-inch Dahlgren smooth-bore: minimum range is 332 yards, maximum range is 3,450 yards</td>
<td>United States Navy Department Bureau of Ordnance 1866, Appendix B, No. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anacostia position</strong></td>
<td>“…somewhat above and opposite Mattawoman creek”</td>
<td>Moore 1865:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Likely in water 10 feet deep or greater, based on vessel dimensions</td>
<td>NHHC 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yankee armament</strong></td>
<td>Two 32-pounders (likely 27 cwt-1855)</td>
<td>NHHC 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 32-pounder: minimum range is 250 yards, maximum range is 1,637 yards</td>
<td>United States Navy Department Bureau of Ordnance 1866, Appendix B, No. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64-pounder (bow gun); 32-pounder, and 24-pounder brass howitzer, and a 12-pounder brass rifled cannon</td>
<td>Moore 1865:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 64-pounder: no range info (usually discussed alongside 10-inch shell guns, but different shot would result in different ranges) 24-pounder: minimum range is 280 yards, maximum range is 1,270 yards 12-pounder: minimum range is 270 yards, maximum range 1,085 yards</td>
<td>United States Navy Department Bureau of Ordnance 1866, Appendix B, No. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yankee position</strong></td>
<td>Opposite the battery</td>
<td>Moore 1865:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the river channel</td>
<td>Navigation chart of the Potomac River, 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Likely in water 15 feet deep or greater, based on vessel dimensions</td>
<td>NHHC 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
battlefield. The fields of fire for the Cockpit Point Battlefield can be divided into three separate categories: fire coming from the Confederate batteries; fire coming from Anacostia; and fire coming from Yankee.

**Fire Coming from Confederate Batteries**

There is little information about the armament of the Cockpit Point batteries. Historic accounts describing both the batteries and the January 1862 battle indicate there were approximately four to six guns on site, some of which came from the Evansport battery. The known guns present at Cockpit point include an 80-pounder rifle gun, a 12-pounder rifle gun, three 32-pounders, and a 30-pound Parrott gun (ORN Series 1:15; OR Series 1, Vol. 5:835). The field of fire from the Cockpit Point batteries was established by assessing the effective ranges of these guns and determining the overall minimum and maximum ranges. Of the guns that were known to be present, the minimum range was 250 yards, and the maximum was 6,700 yards (see Appendix B).

Furthermore, the firing area was established assuming a sighting directly across the river (i.e., perpendicular to shore) with a 45 degree pivot on either side, making the overall angle of the cone 90 degrees. Since it is not known which gun was used at each of the four Cockpit Point batteries, this defined area has been applied to each individual battery.

**Fire Coming from Anacostia**

The field of fire from Anacostia was established by assessing both the effective ranges of its two 9-inch Dahlgren smooth bores and determining its relative position on the river. Newspaper accounts of the battle reported that Anacostia took position opposite and above Mattawoman Creek (Moore 1865:3). Given the dimensions of the vessel, the captain of Anacostia would have likely kept the steamer in water depths of 10 feet or greater to prevent it from running aground and becoming vulnerable. Of the guns that were known to be present onboard the minimum range was 332 yards and the maximum was 3,450 yards, depending on the charge weight used (see Appendix B). Given these ranges and the river depths, Anacostia could have moved laterally across the river north of the batteries and still maintained its firing range. During the battle the steamer was likely positioned due north, out of reach of the batteries’ fire (likely due to restrictions with gun pivoting).

**Fire Coming from Yankee**

The U.S. Navy charted the Yankee early in 1861 and outfitted Yankee with two 32-pounders (NHHC 2013). Newspaper accounts of the battle reported that Yankee had different armament, which included a 64-pounder bow gun, a 32 pounder, a 24-pounder brass howitzer, and a 12-pounder brass rifled cannon (Moore 1865:3). The field of fire from Yankee was established by assessing both the effective ranges of these guns and determining the ship’s relative position on the river. The newspaper account of the battle stated Yankee took position directly opposite the battery (Moore 1865:3). Given the dimensions of the vessel, the captain of Yankee would have likely kept the steamer in water depths of 15 feet or greater to prevent it from running around and becoming vulnerable. This was likely not much of a concern as most of the area directly across from Possum Nose and the battery consists of the river channel. Of the guns that were known to be present onboard, the minimum range was 250 yards and the maximum was 1,637 yards (see
Appendix B; effective ranges for the 64-pounder could not be located and was thus omitted from the analysis).

5.1.3 **Cover and Concealment**  
(Earthworks, Bluff)

Cover refers to the ability to provide protection from fire to forces engaged in battle through features such as entrenchments, structures, or earthworks. Concealment is a slightly broader category referring to the ability of a force to shield itself from observation. Generally concealment may overlap with cover, including features such as entrenchments, structures, and earthworks, but also includes features such as vegetation or weather, which would not provide cover.

The elevation of the batteries of the bluff, along with the earthworks surrounding the guns, provided sufficient concealment to make it unclear to the Union forces the type and location of guns possessed by the Confederates. Without the elevation of the bluff or the earthworks, Union forces could easily have identified the capabilities of the Confederate batteries. The earthworks and bluff also acted to cover the Confederates and provide protection during the battle. A description by Union troops sent to dismantle the batteries indicated the presence of bomb-proof ditches and cedar-lined earthworks used for cover during attacks. Although the date of their construction is unknown, it is likely the Confederates were using earthworks for protection as the Union ships dropped shells into the batteries during the course of the battle.

5.1.4 **Obstacles**  
(Bluff, Potomac River)

Obstacles are features that restrict, prevent, or delay the movement of forces engaged in battle. Obstacles can be natural or human-made and may consist of features such as rivers, railroads, and earthworks. During the battle of Cockpit Point the bluff containing the Confederate batteries provided an obstacle for the Union forces, which could not scale the heights to gain direct access to the batteries. Union forces were compelled to fire their guns up toward the batteries from a lower position on the river.

The shallows of the Potomac River also proved to be a minor obstacle for the Union ships, restricting their movement to the river channel. According to records, *Anacostia* would have stayed within areas of greater than 10 feet of depth, and *Yankee* would have been restricted to areas of greater than 15 feet of depth. The *Yankee* was only slightly limited by the depth of the river in the immediate vicinity of Cockpit Point given that most of the river across from Cockpit Point consists of the river channel. The *Anacostia* would have been somewhat more restricted in its movement, as there are shallow areas along the Virginia shore and in the center of the river upstream from Cockpit Point. Additionally, neither vessel could have taken shelter at the mouth of Powell’s Creek on the Virginia side or Mattawoman Creek on the Maryland side of the river due to the shallow depths in those areas. As a result there are no points on the river where the ships could fire from behind the batteries or from a hidden location, forcing the vessels to attack from positions in full view of the batteries. Nevertheless, Union accounts of the battle suggest
the ships were able find a safe position, with the Yankee apparently only sustaining fire from the batteries as they changed position to withdraw from the engagement.

5.1.5 Avenues of Approach
(Potomac River)

Avenues of Approach consist of routes used by opposing forces to and from a battle. While there are no Confederate records related to the Battle of Cockpit Point, it is assumed the batteries were already manned when Anacostia dropped its first shells into the earthworks. There are no records of troop movements in support of the batteries on that day, suggesting that on the Confederate side, travel would have been limited to the area immediately surrounding the batteries, including the camp directly west of the batteries. The Potomac River would have been the only possible route of travel for the Union ships, which would have traveled by water to advance toward, and retreat from, the battle. No records indicate where the ships were positioned prior to advancing toward the battle; however, the home port of the Potomac Flotilla was the Washington Navy Yard, so it is assumed that the ships traveled from some point upstream of Cockpit Point to the battlefield and left the field of battle in the same fashion.

5.2 Defining Features

Defining features that played a part in the battle include cultural elements such as the guns used on both the Union and Confederate sides and the Confederate earthworks surrounding the batteries (see Table 5-2). Natural features affecting the battle include the bluff containing the Confederate batteries and the Potomac River, both its shallows and channels. While there is a lack of explicit information concerning the number and type of guns located both at the Confederate batteries and on the Union ships, enough information exists to make a reasonable determination of the firing capabilities of the combatants. The range of fire aids in determining the potential locations of Anacostia and Yankee during the battle and played a role in the motive for the initiation of the battle by the Union Navy. The earthworks also played a major role in the battle, primarily by offering protection for the Confederate troops, none of whom were reported to be injured in the battle. The earthworks also provided concealment of the guns, creating uncertainty on the Union ships about the potential capabilities of the batteries. While there is no description of troop movement during the battle from the Confederates, it is likely troops moved from the camp directly west of the batteries to man the guns.

### Table 5-2. Defining Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>KOCOA Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Artillery</td>
<td>Key Terrain; Fields of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anacostia and Guns</td>
<td>Key Terrain; Fields of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yankee and Guns</td>
<td>Key Terrain; Fields of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bluff</td>
<td>Key Terrain; Observation; Cover and Concealment; Obstacle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potomac River</td>
<td>Key Terrain; Observation; Obstacle; Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthworks</td>
<td>Cover and Concealment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a battle that took place both on the land and on the water, natural features played a primary role in the events that took place. The Cockpit Point batteries are situated on a bluff that rises approximately 70 feet above the river with a sharp drop down to the river. At the time of the
battle the bluff would have been insurmountable to forces attacking from the river. The landform projects farther into the river than most points within a few miles north or south of Cockpit Point, giving it a uniquely unobstructed view of the river. Contemporary sketches show the bluff clear of vegetation in the areas immediately surrounding the batteries and wooded, or mostly wooded, behind the batteries. This bluff provided an advantage to the Confederates as a high point where the troops could observe the movements of enemy, conceal their own movements, and block terrestrial attacks. The bluff also provided an advantage to the Union troops, who were aware of the stationary location of their enemy.

Perhaps the most critical feature of the battle was the Potomac River. In a larger picture, control of the river was the objective for both the Confederates and the Union. The Battle of Cockpit Point was but a single conflict in the campaign for that control. The Union ships approached the Confederate batteries from the river, but their movements were also restricted by the river. In the mid-nineteenth century, narrow shallows bordered the landform containing the batteries and the water depth reached over 30 feet toward the river’s center. Anacostia and Yankee had drafts of 10–15 feet and therefore needed to maintain positions within those depths. In the vicinity of the Cockpit Point batteries, this prevented access to areas near the river’s confluence with Powells and Neabsco creeks on the Virginia side and Mattawoman Creek on the Maryland side.

5.3 Study Areas

In 2009, in coordination with the Civil War Battlefield Protection Act of 2002, the ABPP updated the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission Report on the Nation’s Civil War Battlefields, which was originally published in 1993 (USDI NPS ABPP 2009). The update recorded changes in the condition of battlefields first identified by the CWSAC in 1993, identified preservation activities carried out at those battlefields during the intervening years, and documented other relevant developments occurring at the battlefields during that time. The CWSAC has identified 122 battlefields in Virginia, including the battlefield containing the January 3, 1862 Battle of Cockpit Point (ABPP Site Number VA 100). The CWSAC report placed the Cockpit Point battlefield into the third tier of the their preservation priorities, meaning the battlefield already has “substantial historic land under protection and face(s) limited threats,” but is still in need of some protection (USDI NPS ABPP 2009).

During the CWSAC survey, individual battles were researched, documented, assessed for potential threats, and mapped with GPS. Results were compiled into ABPP files and maps were imported into GIS. The survey also included a delineation of study areas and core areas for each battlefield. The boundaries of these areas were based on the results of historic research, terrain analysis, and the identification of key features (USDI NPS ABPP 2009). One goal of this project was to refine the boundaries of the Study and Core Areas as defined in the CWSAC report.

The Study Area incorporates all resources known to contribute to the battle, including the location of the forces during the battle, as well as their location leading up to and following the battle (USDI NPS ABPP 2009). The Core Area is located within the study area, but is limited to the specific location where the action took place. The Study Area for the Cockpit Point Battlefield as defined in the CWSAC report includes most of the Possum Nose and Cockpit Point landforms and the Potomac River channel, starting just south of the Possum Nose landform and
following the channel approximately 5.5 miles north (Figure 5-3). The CWSAC Study Area accurately includes the locations of the batteries and the camp of the troops that likely manned the batteries during the battle, which is located directly west of the batteries.

In the Potomac River, the study area is limited to a section of the river channel that consists of the likely paths of Anacostia and Yankee on the day of the battle. Since no information exists regarding the exact location of the ships before the battle, the location of the northern extent of the area is reasonable. It is likely the ships travelled within the river to and from points north; however, it is not known exactly how far they travelled on January 3, 1862. The coverage on Possum Nose seems practical, not only given the Confederate camps and batteries located on the landform, but also the probable range of Union guns at the time of the battle. One change enacted to the Study Area as a result of this project is to extend the portion of the study area in the Potomac slightly east to more completely include the historic river channel and slightly farther south for better coverage of the potential locations of the Union ships (Figure 5-4). One account of the battle suggests Yankee may have passed in front of the batteries and travelled slightly downriver, before returning to the north.

The Core Area as defined in the CWSAC report includes the location of the batteries on the Possum Nose landform and a portion of the river channel approximately 1.7 miles north of the batteries. Only minor changes were made to the Core Area as a result of the current analysis of ranges for the guns potentially used during the battle (Figure 5-4). The Core Area was slightly widened to account for all possible locations of the ships during the battle. The Core Area includes the probable locations of the ships, the location of the Confederate batteries, and the location of the hut features associated with the camp west of the batteries.

Potential NRHP Boundary

The Cockpit Point Battlefield and associated features are currently listed as contributing resources to the Virginia Landmarks Register (VLR) and NRHP Places Multiple Property Listing Campaigns for Control of Navigation on Potomac (076-5313). The features are also included as contributing resources to the VLR-listed and NRHP-nominated Civil War Properties in Prince William County (076-5161). In 1989, the Cockpit Point earthworks were determined eligible for listing in the NRHP and VLR, however the owners of the property at the time filed a notarized objection to the listing (Mitchell 1988). At that time, the proposed NRHP boundary encompassed the batteries and the associated Civil War camp area.

As a result of the current study, the Potential NRHP Boundary is recommended as a roughly rectangular-shaped polygon encompassing the Cockpit Point batteries and other Civil War features and sites on the landform, as well as the landform itself, the interpolated positions of the Anacostia and Yankee on the Potomac River, and the portions of the fields of fire from the batteries and the ships that are directly applicable to the battle (Figure 5-4). The batteries, associated Civil War features, and the landform are included within the boundary as they are defining features of the battlefield and appear to retain good integrity. Additionally, they contribute not only to the significance of the Cockpit Point Battlefield but to the Cockpit Point battery as a contributing element of the NRHP Places Multiple Property Listing Campaigns for Control of Navigation on Potomac. Only those portions of the fields of fire directly between the
batteries and the ship locations are included in the boundary as the full available fields of fire for all combatants would not have been utilized during the battle; fire was directed only between the combatants.

This boundary includes the viewshed from Cockpit Point towards the interpolated positions of the *Yankee* and *Anacostia*, but not from those locations towards Cockpit Point, due to encroachment of the viewshed of the battlefield by surrounding development including the above-ground storage tanks on the Nustar industrial facility to the north of Cockpit Point and the Dominion Virginia Power electrical generating station and the high tension electrical transmission lines crossing the Potomac River to the south of Cockpit Point. The Potential NRHP Boundary is constrained by reduced integrity of the viewshed due to these encroachments. However, the above-ground pipe extending from the Nustar facility out into the Potomac River is located within the Potential NRHP Boundary as a non-contributing element as it is of a scale that is not sufficient to diminish the viewshed and a visitor’s understanding of the battle.
6.0 FIELD INVESTIGATIONS

Field investigations were completed at the 16.2-acre parcel located at 17998 Cockpit Point Road in Dumfries, Virginia, containing the remains of the Cockpit Point batteries and portions of an associated camp. Field investigations at the parcel included an assessment of the current conditions of known Civil War-related features on the property and a walkover of the property to identify new features. Potential modern and historic impacts to the site and to the historic viewshed were also assessed. In order to assess impacts to the historic viewshed, photographs were taken from the batteries at Cockpit Point, as well as selected locations in Maryland and Virginia.

6.1 Historic Impacts

Several changes to the historic landscape surrounding the Cockpit Point batteries are known to have occurred in the last century and a half. In the late nineteenth century, a segment of the RF&P Railroad was constructed adjacent to the river, along the edge of the landform, containing the batteries. The path of the railroad can be seen on the 1903 Nautical Chart of the Potomac River (Figure 6-1). Although exact dates for the initial construction of the railway segment are not known, it was likely constructed after the Civil War and moved to its current inland location west of the batteries in the early twentieth century. While no specific description of the railroad from that time could be found, it is likely the construction of the tracks adjacent to the bluff face caused some disturbance to the historic landscape surrounding the batteries.

More recent disturbances to the landscape are related to industrial activities north of the current project area. Mary Alice Wills writes in her book The Confederate Blockade of Washington, D.C. that the remains of a field battery were present on a rise of land adjacent to the marshy point north of Possum Nose, now known as Cockpit Point (Wills 1975:164). During the time of the writing of her book in 1975, the remains were destroyed by the construction of the District of Columbia Sanitary Landfill project. She also notes the asphalt plant (Nustar industrial property), which is still active today, was constructed on the site of a Confederate camp.

6.2 Current Site Conditions

In November 2013, a site visit was made to examine the condition of the remaining earthworks. The earthworks are well-protected from the elements by a dense forest cover, which also provides habitat for a number of animal species. An examination of historic aerial photos indicates the area has been continuously wooded since at least the early 1930s. The batteries are high enough above the river to be immune to the effects of flooding. The wind coming off the river can be very strong; however, the face of the bluff is generally well-protected from the elements by trees growing up from the shoreline (Figures 6-2). A review of historic aerials compared with the modern aerials indicated slight accretion of the shoreline rather than erosion (Figure 6-3). This may be due to the low projection into the river now noted as Cockpit Point on current USGS mapping, which directs the flow of the river away from the bluffs and creates a slack water area that would allow for the deposition of sediment.
Figure 6-2: Bluff Face Between Batteries A and B - Facing North
Generally, the condition of the earthworks observed during the site visit seemed to be good. It was noted, however, that they did not hold up well to foot traffic. The earthen embankments crumbled when stepped on and were easily crushed by falling trees (Figures 6-4 and 6-5). While the remote location and difficult accessibility has limited unauthorized access of the property, signs of looting of the historic features were apparent around the earthworks and at the hut sites (Figure 6-6). Signs of camping and ATV use were also noted on the parcel directly south of the current project area.

The National Park Service has developed guidelines for the sustainability of military earthworks, which includes an assessment of current conditions and methods for promoting their preservation and maintenance (NPS 1998). According to the guidelines, the condition of earthworks contained in forest cover can be evaluated on the basis of the type and size of trees surrounding the earthworks, the density of the duff layer overlying the earthworks, and the extent of animal and human disturbance present in the area. An ideal environment for the preservation of earthworks would include a mix of native species of trees and plants, a thick layer of duff on top of the earthworks, minimal human and animal activity, and tree sizes less than 12 inches in diameter at breast height on and around the earthworks. The extent to which these criteria are met places the condition of the earthworks into three general categories consisting of good, fair, or poor.

Using these criteria, the conditions of earthworks at the Cockpit Point Battlefield could be described as fair to good. A mix of native species is present in the surrounding forest and a thick layer of duff covers most of the surviving earthworks, although some bare spots were noted, especially on areas of steep slope. Damage from both animals and humans was noted on and around the earthworks in the form of rodent burrows and looter holes, although the severity of the damage is relatively low. Trees growing on the earthworks are generally small; however, trees exceeding 12 inches in diameter were observed on the features.

6.3 Viewshed Analysis

As a part of the current project, photos were taken from several locations on the Maryland and Virginia shores as well as from the Potomac River in order to assess the integrity of historic views to and from the Cockpit Point batteries. Photos were taken using a high-resolution digital camera in color and black and white formats. In order to obtain a complete view of the landscape, photos were taken using 360 degree panoramic shots. Photo points in Virginia included two locations in the vicinity of Freestone Point, which were chosen in order to assess the integrity of the historic viewshed from a contemporary battery. Freestone Point is located approximately 2.6 miles north of the Cockpit Point batteries and was active during the Potomac Blockade. Photos were also taken from one point on the Maryland shore across from the Cockpit Point batteries. While the historic location of the Union batteries at Stump Neck and Budd’s Ferry could not be accessed during the survey, photos were taken from a point between the two locations, approximately 0.6 miles north of the general location of the historic batteries at Budd’s Ferry. Photos were also taken from various points on the Potomac River to assess changes in the historic viewshed from the point of view of the Union ships during the battle.
Figure 6-4: Detail of Typical Erosion Seen on Earthworks - Facing North

Figure 6-5: Example of Treefall Damage to Trench - Facing Southeast
Figure 6-6: Probable Looter Hole at Battery A - Facing East
A review of photos from points in Maryland, Virginia, and the Potomac River revealed the integrity of historic viewsheds toward the Cockpit Point batteries as relatively poor (Figures 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, and 6-10). The location of the batteries can readily be identified as the point directly south of the two or three imposing white tanks on the Nustar industrial property, which is adjacent to the parcel containing the batteries. A pipeline also extends approximately 900 feet into the river from the Nustar property. While the white tanks and pipeline dominate the view of the shoreline north of the batteries, farther south the shoreline is dominated by structures associated with the Dominion Virginia Power electrical generating station. Towers, tanks, wires, and buildings can be seen from points on the river and on the Maryland shore. High tension electrical transmission lines that cross the Potomac from the station can be seen from Virginia, Maryland, and most points on the river. Other notable differences in the historic landscape when looking toward the batteries include the damming of Timber Creek and the addition of the railroad tracks, which run directly west of the Cockpit Point parcel.

The Possum Nose landform itself looks much as would have during the mid-nineteenth century. Sketches of the batteries from the time of the Potomac Blockade suggest the bluff and area immediately surrounding the batteries had been cleared of vegetation. Today those areas are wooded, but the topography remains much the same.

The viewshed from the batteries retains better integrity than the viewshed from the river toward the Virginia shore, as development along the Maryland shore is largely comprised of small-scale residential construction (Figure 6-11). One exception would be construction on the Indian Head military facility, where Union batteries were located during the Potomac Blockade, though the facility is distant enough as to not diminish the view. The pipeline from the Nustar property is visible in the river from points around the Cockpit Point batteries, but it is of a scale that does not diminish the view. The overhead power lines to the south can also be seen from portions of the batteries. One advantage of views from the batteries is that the density of trees prevents one from obtaining a full view of the river and Maryland shore.
Figure 6-9: View of Cockpit Point Batteries from the Potomac River - Facing West

Figure 6-10: View of Cockpit Point Batteries from the Potomac River - Facing South
7.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In collaboration with PWC, URS completed a study of the Confederate batteries at Cockpit Point, located in Dumfries, Virginia, in support of a grant received by PWC from the ABPP in 2012 (Grant No. GA-2255-12-017). As part of this study, URS completed contextual research and baseline documentation, including a military terrain analysis, an assessment of the current condition of the batteries, documentation of the battlefield’s viewsheds, delineation of core areas of the battle, and determination of potential NRHP boundaries of the Cockpit Point Battlefield (ABPP Site Number VA 100). URS also assessed the short and long-term threats to the battlefield and prepared a Battlefield Management Plan (URS 2014), which is a separate document from this report.

7.1 Context of the Battle

The Battle of Cockpit Point on January 3, 1862 occurred approximately half way through the Potomac Blockade at a time when politicians, citizens, and soldiers were distraught with the inactivity of the Union Army. Lincoln had been urging McClellan to make an offensive move into Virginia, but McClellan infamously overestimated the size of the Confederate forces stationed there and refused to act. Union losses at Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff weighed heavily on the minds of the north and the humiliation of the Confederate blockade of the Federal capital was a source of great stress. One northern congressman wrote to his wife in early January “times are exceeding dark and gloomy... The credit of the Country is ruined – its arms impotent, its Cabinet incompetent” (Chase Papers as quoted in Burlingame 2008:2625). President Lincoln was under attack for the ineffectiveness of the army, and General McClellan was perpetually unresponsive. The day before the attack on Cockpit Point, Lincoln confided in Jonathon Dahlgren, Commandant of the Navy Yard, that he was unsure of the potential outcome of the war (Burlingame 2008:2628). The ships of the Potomac Flotilla attacked Cockpit Point during a time when the fate of the Union and the effectiveness of its leadership were being questioned across the north.

On the morning of January 3, 1862, Lt. Wyman ordered two ships to test the strength and capabilities of the batteries at Cockpit Point. Although there was no decisive victor in the conflict, the Union must have been convinced there were weaknesses in the Confederate defenses that could be exploited. Three days after the Battle of Cockpit Point, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of War met with Lincoln and recommended McClellan’s removal from command of the Army of the Potomac and the appointment General Irvin McDowell to his position (Wills 1975:119). McClellan was able to stall insisting he had a plan of attack; however, on January 27 Lincoln issued General War Order No. 1 detailing, among other things, a plan to move the Army of the Potomac to Manassas Junction to seize that portion of the railroad in late February (Wills 1975:122). It was Lincoln’s hope that the batteries could be taken, or would be abandoned, during the assault.

In late February, General Hooker made preparations for an attack on the batteries based on reliable reconnaissance from several balloon expeditions; however, at the last minute McClellan cancelled the plans for attack. The preparations were enough to make the Confederates nervous and the cancellation infuriated Lincoln. McClellan declared he would attack the batteries in
early March, and after a meeting with the General, Lincoln issued General War Order No. 3, which explicitly called for the removal of the Confederate batteries on the Potomac. The order was not necessary, for the Confederates had already moved south into a defensive position close to Richmond.

In the following weeks, McClellan would take his army south to the York River where he had his sights set on Richmond and would begin his Peninsula Campaign. While the Union would win a number of conflicts during the campaign, they would again fail to make the most of their advantages and would not reach the Confederate capital (Civil War Trust 2013). Richmond would not fall for another three years. The city’s eventual capture in April 1865 would bring an end to the war.

### 7.2 Archeological Potential

As a result of the findings of the current study and previous archeological studies on the property it is likely that additional archeological investigations could uncover additional information significant to the Battle of Cockpit Point and the Potomac Blockade. Investigations at other batteries of the Potomac Blockade have not yielded significant information concerning battery construction, layout, and use or details of battle. Freestone Point was metal detected by the Prince William County Historical Society in 1979 and subjected to a pedestrian survey by the Archeological Society of Virginia in 2009; however, no subsurface excavations have been completed surrounding the earthworks. The batteries at Shipping Point were investigated by geophysical survey and subsurface excavation. While features were identified through geophysical survey, it was determined that soil layers had been disturbed as a result of twentieth century activities and artifacts there were not recovered from intact contexts. At Aquia Creek, extensive investigations involving geophysical survey, terrestrial excavations, and underwater investigation identified a number of features; however, significant features relevant to the battle were found to be destroyed and/or submerged by the erosion of the shoreline. Those features include the Confederate earthworks, railroad terminus, warehouse buildings, and the transfer-point to the wharf.

The earthworks at Cockpit Point are largely intact, although some features were reportedly destroyed by Union troops after their abandonment by the Confederates. While the area surrounding the batteries was tested during the 1990 Phase I archeological survey (Stevens et al. 1990), the earthworks have not been systematically investigated. It is possible that archeological investigations could yield information relevant to the Battle of Cockpit Point, including details regarding the construction of the batteries, the location of guns within the batteries, and the type of guns located within the batteries. Recovery of exploded shells could also provide evidence of the type of guns used by Union forces during the battle. Due to the brief nature of the engagement, it is unlikely that underwater resources relating to the battle could be identified.

### 7.3 Threats

A number of potential threats to the Cockpit Point Battlefield have been identified that can be classified under internal versus external threats. Internal threats include erosion, looting, neglect, reforestation, recreational use, and the associated “attractive nuisance” category. External threats
include public access, water/boat access, incompatible development, adjacent industry, and the VRE and CSX rail lines. A summary of these threats further delineated by the level and duration of the threats can be found in Table 4. A more in depth discussion of these threats can be found in the Cockpit Point Battlefield Protection Plan (URS 2014). Despite the high level of cooperation and interest in preservation by the county government and the developer of the adjacent Potomac Shores, there are issues that should be considered in developing a future use and management strategy for the site.

Table 7-1. Cockpit Point Battlefield Threats Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Level of Threat*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Threats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforestation</td>
<td>Regrowth of low-level non-indigenous plants and fast growing weed trees</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erosion</td>
<td>Loss of soil or rock on bluff or earthworks</td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looting</td>
<td>Unauthorized digging and recovery of historic or prehistoric artifacts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational Use</td>
<td>ATV, BMX or other sports that changes landscape</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive Nuisance</td>
<td>Secluded site used for illegal or unauthorized partying.</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect</td>
<td>Lack of site monitoring or protection of cultural resources</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Threats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Access</td>
<td>Ability of interested public to access and appreciate history of site</td>
<td>Short to Long-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water/ Boat Access</td>
<td>Inappropriate scaled docks and landing facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRE and CSX RR</td>
<td>Limiting land access to site and being a potential hazard to visitors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompatible Development</td>
<td>New construction that diminishes integrity of viewshed</td>
<td>Short to Long-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjacent Industry</td>
<td>Expansion or operational change that create inappropriate atmospheric effect, noise and vibration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Threat Levels: Minimum - Corrective action could mitigate adverse effect to historic integrity; Moderate - Minimal to moderate loss of historic integrity, corrective action could mitigate; Severe - Loss of historic integrity mitigation results in reconstruction

*Duration of Threat: Immediate - Within one year; Short-Term - Within five years; Long-Term - Within five to 20 years

In general, as part of the Potomac Shores Proffer and Development Plan, Cockpit Point appears to be under little threat of destruction. Acquisition by the Prince William Board of County
Supervisors is perhaps the best possible outcome for this historic and archeologically significant site as PWC is dedicated towards preparing a plan for the maintenance and management of the site.

From an archeological perspective as it relates to the preservation of the earthwork features, the presence of mature trees that are greater than 12 inches in diameter at breast height (dbh) is an immediate threat to the integrity of the site. If one of the mature trees on the earthworks falls over, it would compromise the integrity the historic resource and further open it up to erosion. Per the National Park Service (NPS 1998), erosion is typically the most pressing threat against all military earthwork features.

Shoreline erosion of the bluff appears to be of a much lower concern than the potential for erosion of the earthworks. As the analysis of aerial photography shows, there has been no appreciable shoreline erosion over the past 70 years, and it appears more likely that there has been minor sedimentation along the shoreline.

While looting has occurred at Cockpit Point, it appears that the intensity of the looting has been low. This may be due in part to the level of occupation at the battery complex during the Civil War. While the batteries were occupied for many months, they do not appear to have been occupied by a large force. Additionally, it appears likely from historical records that material left by Confederate forces after their withdrawal from Cockpit Point was taken by Union forces and likely also by local residents. As such, there may not be a dense and interesting enough array of Civil War artifacts to interest looters.

A current concern is simply maintenance and security. Although the property is isolated, it can be an attractive nuisance, attracting unregulated recreational use. It has been noted that camping and the use of all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) occurs on land parcels adjacent to Cockpit Point. The use of ATVs specifically would be a severe threat to the integrity of the earthworks and other features were this to occur on Cockpit Point. As such, there should be some regular monitoring of the site to discourage trespassing and unregulated use, such as the monthly site monitoring that is currently done with PWC’s historic sites managed by the Department of Public Works, Historic Preservation Division.

These threats are all linked with the threat of neglect. A well-designed program of vegetation management and maintenance will mitigate against the threats of reforestation and erosion. Additionally, increased scrutiny of the site by PWC Historic Preservation Division staff and/or law enforcement officers will reduce the attractiveness of the property to looters and trespassers, thereby reducing such threats to the site.

External threats to the site are related to public access issues and future development. PWC plans on studying many different scenarios for opening the site to public access and interpretation in the future. The ability of the county to open the site is directly tied to the secluded nature of the site and constraints on access. It is currently bordered by a CSX/VRE rail line and the Nustar industrial facility to the north and the Potomac River on the east and south.
Future development in the vicinity of the site is another threat, specifically related to viewsheds and visitor experience. Land around Cockpit Point is currently used for industrial facilities or is zoned for the development of industrial facilities. Additionally, the area continues to attract residential and commercial development due to the proximity to the Washington, D.C. metro area and the Potomac River.

### 7.4 Recommendations

#### 7.4.1 Potential NRHP Boundary and NRHP Nomination Form

The earthworks at Cockpit Point were identified as eligible for the NRHP in 1989 and were included in an NRHP nomination form (Townsend 1989). As part of this study, a potential NRHP boundary for the Cockpit Point Battlefield has been delineated, which expands the area of significance from the earthworks and other known Civil War features on the property to include the locations of the *Anacostia* and *Yankee* in the Potomac and the portions of the fields of fire of the batteries and both ships that are directly applicable to the battle and viewsheds from Cockpit Point. It is recommended that the NRHP nomination form be revised to address this and other investigations and studies conducted since 1989 specific to Cockpit Point as well as the larger Potomac Blockade campaign, including the contributing nature of the property to larger NRHP listings.

#### 7.4.2 Archeological Investigations

As discussed above, the landform including the Cockpit Point batteries and associated features has not been subjected to a holistic archeological investigation. It is recommended that additional archeological survey and evaluation be conducted, building on the previous investigations by PWC and the 1990 JMA survey (Stevens et al. 1990; Townsend 1989). The 1989 Cockpit Point NRHP nomination form contains a range of recommendations for additional archeological investigations. The goals of any future investigation should include the identification of additional Civil War-era features and an assessment of the whole range of archeological features present to determine the potential of the archeological deposits to contribute to the NRHP significance of the Cockpit Point Battlefield.

#### 7.4.3 Site Preservation

According to the NPS guidelines for the sustainability of military earthworks, the current environment of the earthworks at Cockpit Point is considered fair to good (NPS 1998). If the property is not subjected to a well-designed program of vegetation management and maintenance, the continued growth of trees and the inevitable tree-fall and associated erosion will lead to the degradation of the earthworks over time and a loss of integrity to the site. In order to assure the long-term preservation of the earthworks, proper management of the forest cover would be necessary and human traffic would need to be restricted to prevent accelerated erosion of the earthworks. NPS guidelines recommend the skilled removal of hazardous trees, including those in poor health and/or greater than 12 inches dbh in order to minimize damage to the ground surface. The removal of invasive species, mulching of bare spots, and continuous management of the forest understory aids in erosion control. After the initial work to the forest, the guidelines suggest biennial inspections of the forest cover. A more detailed description of
the NPS’s guidelines for sustainable military earthworks management can be found in the Battlefield Management Plan (URS 2014).

7.4.4 Public Access and Interpretation

Access to the property is the most pressing concern for the realization of the site’s potential for public enjoyment and education. The PWC Historic Preservation Division is currently considering various options that include various forms of land and water access, which can be achieved through the construction of infrastructure such as paths, roads, bridges, tunnels, and/or docks. Additional studies are recommended to determine the most appropriate and practicable alternatives. A variety of options exist for public education and interpretation such as wayside interpretive panels, brochures, a trail system, the opening of vistas through vegetative clearing, reconstruction of earthworks and other cultural features, and guided tours, which could further consist of the training of PWC staff and/or volunteers.

Opening historic sites to the public poses some inherent risks to preservation. If the batteries are opened to the public, fencing around the earthworks could be necessary to prevent erosion of the batteries from foot traffic. Opening historic sites to the public also opens the potential for looting and other forms of vandalism. The batteries should be monitored by PWC Park and Recreation staff and/or local law enforcement in order to minimize vandalism to the site. A more detailed description of public access and interpretation recommendations can be found in the Battlefield Management Plan (URS 2014).
8.0 REFERENCES CITED

Balicki, Joseph
1990a  Possum-1 44PW555 Site Inventory Form. Document on file at the Virginia Department of Historic Resources. Richmond, Virginia.


1990c  Possum-3 44PW557 Site Inventory Form. Document on file at the Virginia Department of Historic Resources. Richmond, Virginia.

1990d  Possum-4 44PW558 Site Inventory Form. Document on file at the Virginia Department of Historic Resources. Richmond, Virginia.

Balicki, Joseph, Katherine L. Farnham, Bryan Corle, and Stuart J. Fiedel

Balicki, Joseph, Bryan Corle, and Sarah Goode

Balicki, Joseph, Bryan Corle, Sarah Traum, and Lynn Jones

Balicki, Joseph, William Chadwick, Peter Leach, Sarah Traum, Charles Goode
2009  Phase II Archaeological Evaluation of Shipping Point Battery 1 (44PW1836) and Battery 2 (44PW1830) Marine Corps Base Quantico, Prince William County, VA. Report prepared for EFA-Chesapeake by John Milner Associates, Inc, Alexandria, VA.

Balicki, Joseph, Troy Nowak, Sarah Traum, Peter Leach, and William Chadwick

Born, David
2013  Talk given on a boat tour of the Potomac Blockade.
Brown, William H.

Burlingame, Michael

Civil War Trust
2013 *The Peninsula Campaign: From Hampton Roads to Seven Pines*. www.civilwar.org

Crouch, H. R.

Crowl, Heather, and Susan Travis

Crowl, Heather, Varna Boyd, and Kathleen Furgerson
2003 *Cultural Resources Assessment of the Cockpit Point Property, Prince William County, VA*. Report prepared for Peninsula Environmental, LLC by URS Corporation Bethesda, MD.

Cudworth, Warren H.
1866 *History of the First Regiment (Massachusetts Infantry)*. Walker, Fuller, and Company, Boston, MA. Viewed online at https://openlibrary.org/.

Davis, William C. and Julie Hoffman (eds)

Donald, David Herbert ed.

Fiedel, Stuart and John Bedell

Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper
Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper (cont.)

Fulton, William Frierson

Gray, Michael

Hanson, Joseph M.

Harper’s Weekly
1861a  *The batteries on the Potomac – Evansport - Sketched by an Officer in the Potomac Flotilla.* November 23, 1861.


Haynes, James P.

Haynes, John H.

Herbert, Walter

Hewett, Janet B. (editor)
1994-  *Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.*
2001  *Broadfoot Publishing Company,* Wilmington, NC.
Hoffman, J. Paul
1864    *A map of Fairfax County, and parts of Loudoun and Prince William Counties, VA., and the District of Columbia.* From Library of Congress www.loc.gov. Digital ID g3851s cwh00030

1996 *An Archaeological Assessment and Survey of Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Fauquier, Prince William, and Stafford Counties, Virginia.* Vols. 1 and 2. Report to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Norfolk District, Norfolk, VA, from William and Mary Center for Archaeological Research, Williamsburg, VA.London Illustrated News


Lowe, David W.

Lumley, Arthur
1861-1864    *Flotilla of the Potomac River; Freestone Point; Aquia Creek.* Viewed online at the NYPL Digital Library. Image ID 1708763.

1861    *Flag boat Yankee of the Potomac Flotilla – scouting off Evansport.* August 1861. Viewed online at the NYPL Digital Library. Image ID 1708758.

McMasters, Kristen
2011    Using KOCOA for a Better Understanding of the Battlefield Landscape. Presentation from the American Battlefield Protection Program.

Mills, Charles A.
1984    *Guns Along the Potomac.* Document reprinted with permission from North South Trader (November-December 1984).

Moore, Frank

National Park Service (NPS)

2013    *Battlefield Rehabilitation at Gettysburg.* Available online at www.nps.gov.
Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC)  
2013 *Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships.* Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, Washington, D.C. 

New York Times  


Nineteenth Century Living History Association, Inc.  

Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (OR)  

Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies (ORN)  

Polley, Joseph Benjamin  
n.d. *A Soldier’s Letters to Charming Nellie.* Viewed online at books.google.com

Sands, Louis  
1861 *Perilous position of the U.S. Steam Sloop Seminole, while under a terrific fire from three batteries at Evansport shipping point, Potomac river, Oct. 15, 1861-10 oclock A.M.* From the Library of Congress www.loc.gov.  
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/pnp/ppmsca/22800/22828v.jpg

Scharf, J. Thomas  
1877 History of the Confederate States Navy from its Organization to the Surrender of its Last Vessel. The Fairfax Press. NY, NY.

Shanks, Henry  

Soley, J Russel, U.S.N.  
Small, William F.

Sneden, Robert Knox
1861 Blockade of the Potomac - by Rebels, winter of 1861. Library of Congress Digital ID: gvhs01 vhs00205.


Stevens, J. Sanderson, Donna Seifert, and Joseph Balicki

Stocker, J.D. editor

Townsend, Jan


Tucker, Spencer

Unknown Artist

1861b The Civil War in America: federal picket on the Potomac, in front of the Confederate batteries. Viewed online at the NYPL Digital Library. Image ID: 813064.
United States Adjutant-General’s Office
http://www.artilleryreserve.org/Instruction_for_Field_Artillery.pdf.

United States Coastal Survey (Coastal Survey)
1862  *Potomac River (in four sheets)*. Library of Congress Digital ID: glva01 lva00044
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.ndlpcoop/glva01.lva00044.

United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service, American Battlefield Protection Program (USDI, NPS, ABPP)
2009  *Update to the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission Report on the Nation's Civil War Battlefields: Commonwealth of Virginia*. Washington, D.C.

United States Geological Survey (USGS)
1983  *Quantico, VA – MD*. 7.5 minute quadrangle map, USGS, Washington, D.C.


United States Navy Department Bureau of Ordnance

URS Corporation (URS)
2014  *Cockpit Point Battlefield Battlefield Management Plan*. URS Corporation, Germantown, Maryland.

Virginia Department of Historic Resources (VDHR)

Waud, Alfred R.
1862a  *Union Battery at Budds Ferry*. Library of Congress
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004660301/.

http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004661069/

Williams, Thomas Harry

Williamson, R.S.
1862  *Surveys & reconnaissances in the vicinity of Budd’s Ferry, Charles Co., Md*. Library of Congress. http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g3843c.cw0255000>
Wills, Mary A.

Winter, Len, Brad Botwick, and Debra A. McClane
1998  Phase II Historical and Archaeological Investigations of Eight sites Aboard the Marine Corps Base Quantico Prince William and Stafford Counties, Virginia, Gray & Pape, Inc. Richmond, Virginia
Appendix A:
Qualifications of Investigators
(Page Intentionally Left Blank)
Scott Seibel, MSc, RPA has over 16 years of professional experience in archeological excavations, research and compliance studies and exceeds the Secretary of the Interior’s Professional Qualification Standards (36CFR Part 61). He is the Archeology Program Manager for the URS Germantown’s Cultural Resource Management Group. Mr. Seibel has extensive cultural resource management experience, having served as Principal Investigator or Field Director for over 10,000 acres of Phase I archeological survey, dozens of Phase II evaluations and 11 Phase III data recovery excavations within the Southeast, Mid-Atlantic and Texas. His experience with battlefields includes the ABPP grant-funded Revolutionary War-era Battle of Black Mingo in Georgetown and Williamsburg counties in South Carolina and the Civil War-era Battle of Brandy Station and Mine Run Campaign in Culpepper County, Virginia. He received his Bachelor’s Degree in Archeological Studies at the University of Texas at Austin and his Master’s Degree in Archeomaterials at the University of Sheffield in England.

Kelly Arford-Horne, MA has 15 years of experience in the field of cultural resource management archaeology. She has served as a field director for the URS Germantown Office for a period of eight years. This follows seven years of working as an archaeological technician, crew chief, or field director for various companies throughout the Mid-Atlantic region. During her career, she has worked on a variety of historic and prehistoric sites at all phases of investigation throughout the Mid-Atlantic, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. Her volunteer activities include excavations at a Roman Villa site in Cumae, Italy and the direction and completion of a Phase I archaeological survey and report for a Habitat for Humanity project in Loudoun County, Virginia. She obtained her Master’s Degree in Archaeology and Heritage from the University of Leicester in 2011.

Bradley Krueger, MA, RPA has eight years of experience as a historical and underwater archeologist on archaeological projects throughout the United States. He is responsible for conducting all phases of archaeological investigation, and preparing preliminary and final reports. He also serves as archaeological artifact conservation specialist in the URS Archaeology Laboratory. Mr Krueger has over six years of diving experience, with the majority of that being scientifically based projects. He has participated in several archaeological excavations, and pedestrian and underwater surveys, and has extensive experience with record keeping, plan and section drawings, photography, and map creation. He is trained in the use of GPS units, Total Stations, and remote sensing technologies such as side scan sonar and magnetometry. He is strong in underwater excavation, wooden ship timber recording/analysis, site plan creation, early American steamboat architecture, historical artifact analysis, collection’s management, and archival and electronic research.

Jeff Winstel, MS, AICP has 26 years of experience working as a Historic Preservation Planner. Having served 15 years as Historian, Planner, and Project Manager for the National Park Service and as National Register Manager for the Ohio Historic Preservation Office, he has extensive experience in cultural resource documentation and project management. Mr. Winstel has developed and overseen several historic properties surveys and is responsible for 52 listings in the National Register of Historic Places, including several large Multiple Property Documents. Project work includes developing and administering Section 106 Programmatic Agreements and Memorandum of Agreements, Cultural Landscape Reports, Historic Structure Reports, and National and State Heritage Area and Scenic Byway management plans. Historic interpretation projects include content design and production oversight of wayside exhibits, walking tour...
brochures and museum exhibits. He has served as project manager for numerous NPS resource planning documents, and provided technical assistance for several municipal plans and zoning amendments. His experience with battlefields includes the Revolutionary War-era Bladensburg Battlefield in Baltimore County, Maryland.
Appendix B: 
Gun Ranges
(Page Intentionally Left Blank)
# RANGE OF A 12-POUNDER GUN (2.5LB CHARGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (degrees)</th>
<th>Range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0°</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1°</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2°</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3°</td>
<td>1,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4°</td>
<td>1,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>1,660</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


# RANGE OF A 32-POUNDER HOWITZER (2.5LB CHARGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (degrees)</th>
<th>Range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0°</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1°</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2°</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3°</td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4°</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### RANGE OF A 32-POUNDER OF 27-CWT. (4LB CHARGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (degrees)</th>
<th>Range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0° (level)</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1°</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2°</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3°</td>
<td>1,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4°</td>
<td>1,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>1,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6°</td>
<td>1,637</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### RANGE OF A 30-POUNDER PARROTT GUN (3.25LB CHARGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (degrees)</th>
<th>Range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0°</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1°</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2°</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3°</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4°</td>
<td>1,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10°</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15°</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20°</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25°</td>
<td>6,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## RANGE OF A 80-POUNDER WHITWORTH RIFLE (ALSO REFERRED TO AS A 70-POUNDER) (10LB CHARGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (degrees)</th>
<th>Range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>2,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7°</td>
<td>3,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10°</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## RANGE OF A 9” GUN (10LB CHARGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (degrees)</th>
<th>Range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0°</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1°</td>
<td>718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2°</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3°</td>
<td>1,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4°</td>
<td>1,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>1,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6°</td>
<td>1,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7°</td>
<td>2,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8°</td>
<td>2,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9°</td>
<td>2,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10°</td>
<td>2,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11°</td>
<td>2,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12°</td>
<td>2,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13°</td>
<td>3,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14°</td>
<td>3,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15°</td>
<td>3,357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (degrees)</th>
<th>Range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0°</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1°</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2°</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3°</td>
<td>1,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4°</td>
<td>1,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6°</td>
<td>1,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7°</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8°</td>
<td>2,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9°</td>
<td>2,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10°</td>
<td>2,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11°</td>
<td>2,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12°</td>
<td>3,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13°</td>
<td>3,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14°</td>
<td>3,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15°</td>
<td>3,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### RANGE OF A 32-POUNDER OF 27-CWT.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (degrees)</th>
<th>Range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0° (level)</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1°</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2°</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3°</td>
<td>1,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4°</td>
<td>1,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>1,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6°</td>
<td>1,637</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### RANGE OF A 24-POUNDER HOWITZER*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (degrees)</th>
<th>Range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0° (level)</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1°</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2°</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3°</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4°</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>1,270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### RANGE OF A 12-POUNDER HOWITZER (HEAVY)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (degrees)</th>
<th>Range (yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0° (level)</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1°</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2°</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3°</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4°</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5°</td>
<td>1,085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Page Intentionally Left Blank)